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ABSTRACT 
 
In the aftermath of the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, there are signs that in 
Malaysia, corporate governance practices are gradually converging towards the 
Anglo-American model. Drawing on three key theoretical lenses, namely agency 
theory, institutional theory and resource dependence theory, this study investigates an 
unexplored phenomenon in corporate governance reformation, at least in the context 
of Malaysia. The study examines the relationship between corporate governance 
elements and the level of foreign equity ownership (FEO) in Malaysian public listed 
companies (PLCs). More specifically, the aim of this study is to answer the following 
research question - Does corporate governance influence the level of FEO in 
Malaysian companies? 
 
In the context of this study, corporate governance is taken to be the aggregate of 
board of directors’ characteristics, directors’ attributes and ownership structure. On 
the other side of the equation is FEO, which is taken to be the proportion of equity 
owned by foreigners. The majority of foreign investors who are making investments 
in Malaysia originate from Western countries, and are accustomed to the Anglo-
American corporate governance system.  
 
Thus, this study examines the influence of governance mechanisms in attracting 
foreign investors in a unique governance context following a major economic event 
i.e. the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998.  Accompanied by institutional theory and 
resource dependence theory, agency theory is used as the key lens to explain the 
hypothesised relationships. The study's hypotheses are tested using the panel data 
derived from 1,836 observations over a 12 year period, from 2000 through 2011. By 
considering the existence of heteroscedasticity and the serial correlation problems, the 
generalised least square (GLS) method was employed to estimate the model. To 
enrich the findings, logistic regression analysis was further applied and the potential 
endogeneity issue was resolved with a GMM test.  
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The findings indicate that the level of FEO in Malaysian PLCs is significantly related 
to foreign directorships, the Western educational background of directors, 
professional directors, and multiple-directorships. However, the results defy the 
significant relationships of board size and outside directors, as generally proposed in 
the extant literature. In addition, the role of ownership structure is important in 
foreign investors’ behaviour, since it is found that foreign investors avoid investing in 
family-controlled companies and in companies with high institutional ownership. 
Therefore, from the overall results of this study, it can be concluded that there is 
evidence that corporate governance mechanisms do influence foreign investors’ 
decision making, at least in Malaysian PLCs. 
 
The implications of this study are discussed in terms of the relevant literature, theory, 
methodology and practice. In brief, this study has great potential impact in many 
respects including its relevance for policymakers in setting up new policies, designing 
new rules and strengthening existing regulations, both at country and firm levels.  
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, foreign ownership, foreign investment, Malaysian 
companies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces and lays down the foundation for the work that follows in the 
thesis. In essence, this thesis focuses on elements of corporate governance in relation 
to foreign equity ownership (FEO) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs). The 
study of corporate governance in Malaysian companies is not considered to be 
something new. However, this study offers insights from different theoretical 
perspectives, examining the drivers of FEO, instead of the measurements most 
commonly used in corporate governance study – i.e. performance variables (ROA, 
ROE etc.).  
 
In examining the behaviour of foreign investors when making investments in 
Malaysian PLCs in relation to corporate governance determinants, a different 
approach is needed. The majority of foreign investors, originating from Western 
countries, are accustomed to the established set of corporate governance codes of 
conduct that have become prevalent in their countries. In addition, foreign investors 
from developed capital market share similar values with each other, which dictate the 
direction of their decisions.  These particular features trigger the focal point in this 
study, which is to scrutinise the behaviour of foreign investors when making 
investment decisions in countries with a different corporate governance institutional 
background. This study focuses specifically on the Malaysian context.    
 
The scope of the research is essential in the context of the so-called 
“Americanization” (Djelic 2001) of corporate governance. Americanization is the 
term used to portray the process of convergence towards the American market based 
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system, which is transparent in its distinctive characteristics such as its diffuse1 
shareholders, strong protection law for minority shareholders, liquid stock market, 
emphasis on the importance of an efficient board of directors, including outside 
directors, etc. (Dore 2000).  
 
Corporate governance in Malaysia is claimed to be undergoing a transformation, 
especially in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis 1997/1998 (AFC), moving 
towards the Anglo-American corporate governance practice. This convergence 
process, however, is seen as difficult, especially in terms of the ownership structure of 
firms. The resistance to or divergence from Americanization is alleged to be due to a 
variation in values, cultures, traditions and practices across countries.  
 
In this study, a multi-theoretical approach is used. Agency theory is not the only 
theory that is applied to explain the variation of foreign investors’ behaviour when 
making investment decisions in different corporate governance institutional settings. It 
is accompanied by institutional theory and resource dependence theory (RDT), later 
abbreviated as the multi-theoretical approach (MTA). The use of multiple theories in 
explaining foreign investors’ behaviour seems practical and sensible, as a clash of two 
institutional backgrounds is witnessed in this study. Thus, by utilising the MTA, this 
study seeks to explain the impact of corporate governance mechanisms (board of 
directors and ownership structure) on the level of FEO in Malaysian PLCs. 
 
In summary, while Section 1.1 offers some snapshots of the underlying study, Section 
1.2 provides the research background and puts forward some related issues in the 
corporate governance field which then leads to the engagement of this study. The 
scope of the study is highlighted in Section 1.3. These discussions establish the 
impetus for  the research objectives set in Section 1.4, which then relates to the 
research questions in Section 1.5. Next, Section 1.6 outlines the research methodology 
in brief and finally, Section 1.7 provides an overview of the thesis. 
                                                 
1There are many small shareholders, but none of them have a significant level of 
control (Peng 2006). 
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1.2 Research Background and the Motivation of the Study 
This section offers a discussion of the research background. By gaining a thorough 
understanding of  the research context, the rationale for conducting this study can be 
better  understood. Many factors have combined to form the motivation behind this 
study, particularly in the Malaysian setting. Therefore, this section is organised in 
such a way that each of the essential factors is given, accompanied by its individual 
motivation for conducting the study.  
 
First, one of the main motivations for conducting this study is the uniqueness of 
Malaysia as a setting to examine the association between corporate governance 
determinants and foreign investors’ behaviour. Malaysia can be classified as a country 
whose governance system represents neither the shareholder system of the US and UK 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997) nor the stakeholder system of Japan and Germany (Hall 
and Soskice 2001). The uniqueness of this Asian country lies in its weak legal 
environment and its poor governance system (Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman 
2000), besides its high level of concentrated ownership, with controlling owners (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 2000) cross holding and pyramiding 
(Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 1999; Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; Liew 2007; Lim 
1981).  
 
In addition to these special features, the institutional context of Malaysia, at the height 
of corporate governance reform following the AFC 1997/1998, provides a rich setting 
to be explored. By utilising an institutional perspective, the adoption of new corporate 
governance legislations and codes can be regarded as a reaction to radical changes 
from the external environment (AFC 1997/98). These characteristics are shared with 
other adversely affected countries simultaneously, thus contributing to the 
generalisation of the research findings. Clearly, this study will also benefit other 
emerging countries. At the same time, a comparison can be made with the developed 
countries and justifications can be derived to explain the differences. 
 
Apart from the above motivations, there is another intriguing factor that can 
substantiate the decision to choose Malaysia as an ideal setting to examine the issue. It 
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is generally known that Malaysia’s corporate environment has always been influenced 
by government intervention, policies and regulations (Suto 2003). The political 
pressure in Malaysia’s economy to business players is not something new, albeit they 
are closely intertwined with each other (Gomez 1994). There are companies in 
Malaysia, known as government link companies (GLCs) that are very close to 
government policies. In 2009, for instance, GLCs dominated nearly 40% of the total 
market capitalisation in Bursa Malaysia. The relationship between the Malaysian 
government and the GLCs is reciprocal, such that both parties benefit from the 
connection. Therefore, when the Malaysian government decided to initiate a 
reformation of the corporate governance system, the GLCs were directly involved. 
They represent the giants and the PLCs in the Malaysian market. In this study, their 
reactions are gauged by the choice of corporate governance determinants.   
 
Secondly, in relation to the AFC 1997/1998, many arguments arise which attempt to 
explain the impetus of the crisis (see Section 2.3.1 The Asian Financial Crisis 
1997/1998). Principally, all the arguments lead to one identical premise – the loss of 
confidence of local and foreign investors in the emerging markets (Johnson et al. 
2000). Nevertheless, it is intriguing to understand why the loss of confidence had a 
huge impact on the exchange rate and the stock market of certain emerging markets 
but not on others.  One of the more persuasive explanations for this is provided by 
Johnson et al. (2000), who claim that the weakness of the legal institution and 
corporate governance were the decisive factors that contributed to the stock markets 
declining at the pinnacle of the AFC 1997/1998. Further, Mitton (2002) argues that 
although initially the weakness of corporate governance was not the cause of the AFC 
1997/1998, once the crisis began, the dysfunctional corporate governance system 
could have exacerbated the crisis. Without efficient corporate governance practice the 
countries affected became more vulnerable to financial crisis.  
 
The estimated loss can be depicted by the reversal flows of investors’ funds in Table 
2.2, and well documented cases illustrative of expropriation by managers in the 
countries affected by the Asian crisis can be found in Table 2.3. It is alleged that in 
most expropriation cases, the controlling shareholders did not violate any local law to 
CHAPTER 1  5 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
accomplish their unethical ends. Moreover, in most emerging countries, the 
management is also the controlling shareholder (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; Mat Nor 
and Sulong 2007), misconduct and expropriation of minority shareholders are easier 
to achieve (Johnson et al. 2000; Khatri, Leruth and Piesse 2002).  
 
Ho and Wong (2001) assert that following the AFC 1997/1998, most Asian countries 
endeavoured to strengthen their corporate governance system, enhance the 
transparency of their reports and increase the level of disclosure. Likewise, Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006) claim that a Code of Corporate Governance was established in 
most of the affected countries in order to increase the level of investors’ confidence 
and ensure the continuous flow of funds to the respective capital markets. A 
consideration of the significant amount of flow reversal and many well documented 
cases of expropriation (Johnson et al. 2000; Mitton 2002; Radelet and Sachs 2002) 
strengthens the need for a study that examines the relationship between corporate 
governance and investors in emerging countries. Indeed, there is dearth of such 
studies in the extant governance literature.  
 
Third, as stated beforehand, the implications of AFC 1997/1998 in the affected 
countries are numerous. In fact, crisis had an impact not merely on the economy itself, 
but on other aspects as well, such as the corporate governance system. Prior to the 
crisis, Liew (2007) claims that corporate governance practices in Malaysia were not a 
matter of concern. According to the report from the World Bank (1993), it was 
asserted that East Asian countries (including Malaysia) had their basic rights and 
freedom to determine the direction of their economic management, governance system 
and public institution. However, this view changed dramatically after the AFC 
1997/1998, when corporate governance came to be seen as an expedient way of 
managing the financial crisis (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006: Liew 2008). 
 
Malaysia, as one of the badly affected countries, is claimed to be suffering the 
consequences brought about by the country’s inefficient corporate governance and the 
lack of transparency in its financial system, which has led to the erosion of investors’ 
confidence (Noordin 1999). In brief, before Malaysia was struck by the financial 
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turmoil of 1997, during the period 1987-1996, Malaysia’s economy was undergoing 
remarkable growth. The interest shown by foreign investors in the Malaysian capital 
market meant that this was fuelled by their capital inflow. Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) helped to push the average annual growth of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), and the increase was recorded at 8 per cent. On the other hand, foreign 
portfolio investment had buoyed the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE)2 
composite index up to about 1,300 points, and the market capitalisation reached 
RM900 billion. However, in the aftermath of the AFC 1997/98, the Malaysian capital 
market was shunned by foreign investors. Consequently, foreign portfolio investment 
plummeted by 74 percent, from RM144.9 billion in 1996 to RM37.6 billion in 2001.  
Further details can be found in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1 The Asian Financial Crisis 
1997/1998.  
 
In addition, the collapse of a few giant companies in Malaysia during the crisis such 
as Perwaja Steel, Transmile and Technology Resources Industries (TRI), amongst 
others, is also  seen to have emanated from the weakness of the corporate governance 
system (Khas 2002; Khatri et al. 2002; Kim 1998; Samad and Wilson 2002). Besides 
this, Mohamad (2002) adds that poor corporate governance, a low level of 
transparency in disclosing company information, weak investor relations, the 
ineffectiveness of regulatory agencies in enforcing legislation to punish offenders and 
protect minority shareholders have to some extent contributed to the collapse of the 
giant companies. Realising this fact, the Malaysian government has taken prompt 
action and developed a salvage package to improve the structures of corporate 
governance in the country (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). 
 
Therefore, the years following the AFC 1997/1998 are known as the years of 
corporate governance reformation. It is claimed that there are signs that corporate 
governance in Malaysia is gradually converging towards the Anglo-American model, 
especially in the aftermath of the 1997-1998 AFC (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). The 
Malaysian government has played its role diligently to regain investors’ confidence. 
                                                 
2Recently known as Bursa Malaysia 
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An earnest effort exhibited by the Malaysian government to improve the corporate 
governance system in the country can be seen in the establishment of a few formal 
institutions to take charge of the affairs of corporate governance – e.g., the Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG), the Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (MICG), and the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG). New 
legislations and Codes have also been formulated. These have portrayed the intense 
effort taken by the Malaysian government to imitate the best practice of the corporate 
governance systems of the developed economies such as the Anglo-American model.  
 
From the institutional perspective, this convergence process is known as the 
“Americanization” of corporate governance (Djelic 2001). Hansmann and Kraakman 
(2001), for example, claim that the capital market around the world is converging 
towards the Anglo-American model as it is claimed that this model is a good model 
and is slightly different to other governance practices in other countries (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). In fact, the new environment of institutions, with the tightening of 
legislation that pervades corporate governance practice from the end of AFC 
1997/1998, has not been sufficiently explored in the recent literature. Thus, this 
research will try to explain this unique situation in depth with the help of relevant 
theory. 
 
Fourth, in relation to this study, it has long being noted by many scholars, (e.g. 
Dunning 1993; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane and Shleifer 1999) that corporate 
governance is one of the most important tools for attracting foreign investors. 
Therefore, studies to comprehend this association are of great importance. As such 
there is a need to understand how corporate governance impacts on the behaviour of 
foreign investors when making investment decisions in countries with a different 
institutional background. Such an appeal suggests a focus on several corporate 
governance mechanisms, including ownership structure and board characteristics 
(Chung and Zhang 2011). Thus, the desire of this study is to close this loophole by 
allowing more dimensions of the corporate governance determinants to be examined 
in one comprehensive model.  
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Fifth, in this study corporate governance mechanisms are associated with a distinctive 
dependent variable, i.e. FEO. Given the growing significance of foreign financing and 
the fact that access to foreign capital may be unequal across firms and countries, it is 
important to understand more fully the factors that make investors shy away from 
providing capital to foreign firms (Leuz, Lins and Warnock 2010). It is argued that 
domestic sources of outside funding are limited in many countries around the world 
(Giannetti and Koskinen 2010). In response, many capital markets have been 
liberalised, and foreign capital has become an increasingly important source of 
finance (Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine 2002).   
 
Foreign investment is not only important to the companies, but also, this kind of flow 
helps to finance investments and stimulate economic growth in a country (Suhejla 
2010). It is also widely held that foreign investment is a mechanism for improving 
corporate governance, firm performance and profitability (Bokpin and Isshaq 2009). 
Leuz et al. (2010), however, argue that only selective companies are able to attract 
foreigners to invest and inject capital into their companies. A number of articles (e.g. 
Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki 2005; Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001; Kang and 
Stulz 1997; etc.) have noted that there are certain attributes and criteria that contribute 
to this event.  
 
Besides this, the empirical evidence concerning the main causes of international 
capital flows is in general mixed (Hoti 2004). Various factors influence the decisions 
of foreign investors, whether at a country level or a firm level. Thus, this research 
extends the previous findings and contributes to knowledge at a firm level by 
exploring new variables in relation to corporate governance and foreign investors in 
the unique setting of Malaysian firms. 
 
Sixth, even though there is voluminous research on this particular issue, this study 
finds that the loopholes are worthy of investigation. Past studies on corporate 
governance and FEO tend to focus on developed markets (i.e. Kang and Stulz (1997) 
on the Japanese market, Aggarwal et al. (2005) on the U.S market, Dahlquist and 
Robertson (2001) on the Swedish market, etc.).  Nevertheless, some of the latest 
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studies on the issue of the corporate governance impact on FEO are those conducted 
by Bokpin and Isshaq (2009) on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE), and by Douma, 
George and Kabir (2006) on Indian listed corporations. Both are considered as 
emerging markets. However, there is still a dearth of related literature from other 
emerging markets, with the exception of the Korean setting, as this country is well 
covered in a number of research studies, given its unique setting with Chaebol
3
 firms 
(e.g. Baek, Kang and Suh Park 2004; Kim et al. 2010; Chizema and Kim 2010).  
 
However, the remaining countries that were badly affected by the AFC 1997/1998, 
especially those from Southeast Asia, have been given less attention in this area, 
including Malaysia. It is worth pointing out that even though a few studies of foreign 
ownership have been carried out in certain emerging countries, for instance on the 
Taiwan stock market by Lin and Shiu (2003) and on the Indonesian capital market by 
Rhee and Wang (2009) etc., their studies examine the relationship of foreign 
ownership with other dependent variables, such as a company’s financial 
characteristics (liquidity, ROE, book to market ratio, etc.).  
 
At this point, there is less empirical evidence that attests to the idea that the 
international capital inflow is associated with corporate governance practices in the 
emerging markets. Mangena and Tauringana (2007) discovered that much of the 
empirical literature on the corporate governance impact on foreign investment has 
focused on developed capital markets, and most of the research has studied the impact 
of corporate governance alone. Hence, there are many outstanding issues related to the 
unfinished business of examining this relationship more fully. Thus, this study focuses 
on the developing market, based on the unique characteristics of Malaysia.  
 
                                                 
3The chaebol are the large, conglomerate family-controlled firms of South Korea 
characterized by strong ties with government agencies. The name, which means 
business association, is properly pronounced jay BOL but the spelling 
pronunciation chay bol is considered acceptable by Korean speakers. 
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Empirical evidence claims that foreign investors avoid investing in developing 
countries because of the weak corporate governance structure and disclosure (Gibson 
2003; Johnson et al. 2000; Mangena and Taurigana 2007; McKinsey and Company 
2002). This is echoed by the findings of Aggarwal et al. (2005), who suggest that 
firms with better accounting quality and corporate governance attract more foreign 
capital. It is widely believed that corporate governance generates investor goodwill 
and confidence (Bokpin and Isshaq 2009). A considerable numbers of previous 
studies (e.g. La Porta et al. 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1997) have associated weak 
corporate governance with developing countries. Recent studies (Leuz et al. 2010; 
Kim, Eppler-Kim, Kim and Byun 2010) consistently claim that poor corporate 
governance is one of the factors that draws considerable attention from outside 
investors and regulators. In addition, Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Willianson 
(2003) also suggest that there is a close relationship between corporate governance 
and the portfolio composition held by foreign investors. Kim et al. (2010) have argued 
that the valuation effects of corporate governance may differ between foreign 
investors and local investors, as the former group assigns higher monitoring costs in 
comparison to the latter group, and therefore may discount corporate governance more 
severely than domestic investors. Much of the empirical literature on the impact of 
corporate governance has focused on the developed capital markets (Mangena and 
Tauringana 2007). This presupposes that there is a dearth of literature from the 
emerging markets, e.g. from Malaysia.  
 
Next, it is alleged in many studies (e.g. Chizema and Kim 2010) that most of the 
studies on corporate governance have utilised agency theory as the theoretical lens. 
Others have used resource dependence theory (Douma et al. 2006). However, it is 
argued that the insights from these theories are unlikely to provide sturdy 
justifications (Eisenhardt 1989; Oliver 1997) when there is clash of institutional 
background (developed market versus developing market), as revealed in this study. 
Foreign investors, who generally originate from Western (developed) countries, find it 
difficult to make investments in developing capital markets, as they have certain 
embedded values which dictate their decisions. Thus, the inclusion of institutional 
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theory is claimed to be the ideal to explain the behaviour of foreign investors when 
making decisions about investing in the Malaysian capital market.  
 
This study, however, advocates that multiple theories should be employed (agency 
theory, institutional theory and resource dependence theory). The combination of 
these three theories may provide strong justifications to explain the reactions of 
foreign investors. Besides this, to my knowledge, there is no research study that offers 
this kind of approach to explain the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms and foreign investors’ investment behaviour. This approach is 
concomitant with the recent trend of adopting a multi-theoretical approach, which has 
received heightened interest in debating the issue of corporate governance (e.g. 
Lynall, Golden, and Hillman 2003; Douma et al. 2006; Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, 
Greve and Hu 2006).  
 
Apart from the above highlighted motivations, it is also important to emphasise that 
the study of corporate governance is not new. However, recently and over the years, it 
has been receiving heightened interest (Aggarwal, Schloetzer, Williamson 2014; 
Bokpin and Isshaq 2009; Letza, Sun and Kirkbride 2004). The issues related to 
corporate governance have not only been discussed by scholars, but also by many 
other parties such as shareholders, stakeholders, related institutions, the state, etc. 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Caruzza 2004).  
 
There are two significant events that have kindled massive attention to this subject, 
namely the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998 that hit the South East Asian capital 
markets, and the shocking scandals which engulfed the US giant company, Enron, 
three years later. Besides this, many other cases of unethical behaviour, misconduct, 
malpractice and negligence have been discovered in firms all round the world - e.g. 
WorldCom and Tyco in 2002 and HealthSouth in 2003, etc. These corporate scandals 
had a severe impact on public confidence concerning the reliability of the protection 
systems that are in place to safeguard their interests in firms.  
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As a consequence, in the aftermath of these financial catastrophes, the need for an 
efficient corporate governance system has been manifested. The potential 
consequences that might emerge from the weakness of the corporate governance 
system have been raised by the key players in the economic system (Claessens 2006). 
More of the issues concerning the deficiencies in corporate governance are 
highlighted and more arguments are brought forward. Thus, it is argued that this area 
of study has never been free from criticism, and changes often occur in its setting, 
legislation, codes etc., particularly when a new issue arises. Although numerous 
research studies have been carried out in this area, corporate governance is not a stale 
issue, since these studies have shed light on unexplored areas of corporate governance 
which have become the impetus for fresh research. Thus, this research attempts to add 
to the previous literature, offering a new perspective on corporate governance and 
foreign equity ownership in emerging countries.  
 
Finally, as discussed above, special features exist in the context of a few of the 
external events that have impacted on Malaysia and its unique institutional 
environment, making Malaysia an ideal setting for examining this issue.   Apart from 
this, other factors motivating the study to be carried out in Malaysia is the condition of 
Malaysia in the aftermath of the AFC 1997/1998. Malaysia is one of the countries 
severely affected by this crisis. As a developing country, the weakness of corporate 
governance is considered to be one of the significant factors that contributed to the 
crisis (Kim 1998; Khas 2002; Samad and Wilson 2002). An understanding of the 
background of Malaysia, the consequences of the crisis, and the reaction of the 
government to solve these problems may provide a better analysis of the role of the 
corporate governance system in this country, thus attracting international capital 
inflow to the country.  
 
As a developing country, Malaysia has a vision to be achieved. The main aspiration of 
the country is to transform its economy through industrialisation in order to become a 
fully developed country by the year 2020 (Vision 2020). Therefore, Malaysia must 
provide the crucial resources required to be as efficient as possible. Foreign 
investment has an important role to play in achieving this long term vision. The 
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findings of this study can assist the Malaysian government to understand more about 
foreign investors’ behaviour when making investment decisions in relation to 
corporate governance determinants and the institutional background. Therefore, 
strategies and policies can be generated based on the findings. The findings may offer 
constraints and limitations as well. However,  it is necessary to focus on the 
constraints that can influence the economy through time. An understanding of the 
constraints and opportunities may serve as a guide for policymakers in formulating 
better policy options for the future. More discussion about the Malaysian Vision 2020 
can be found in Chapter, Section 2.4.1 Malaysia before the 1997/1998 Financial 
Crisis. 
 
In summary, based on the discussion provided in this section, the rationale to 
undertake this study has been provided. Each point of motivation that has emerged 
from the research background substantiates the need for the study to be undertaken. 
The successful execution of this study is meaningful in ensuring that the association of 
corporate governance mechanisms and foreign investors’ behaviour in the Malaysian 
setting is clearly deciphered. Thus, this may benefit the many parties involved.  
 
1.3 The Scope of the Study 
This study focuses on examining the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms (board characteristics, directors’ attributes and ownership structures) and 
FEO in Malaysian PLCs. The sample for the study was 153 companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia from the year 2000 until 2011. Eventually, this meant that there were 1836 
observations for 12 consecutive years. The study used secondary data that was 
available in the companies’ annual reports, the Bursa Malaysia database, the Thomson 
One Banker database, individual companies’ web sites, data purchased from Bursa 
Malaysia (FEO) and various other reliable sources. In terms of corporate governance 
determinants, the variables tested in this study were board size, board independence, 
foreign directorship, multiple-directorships, women directorships, Western 
educational background directors, financial expertise directors, family-controlled 
company, managerial ownership and institutional ownership. These variables were 
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subsumed into three categories based on the established research questions. The key 
dependent variable is foreign equity ownership (FEO), represented by the percentage 
of foreign equity in the firm.    
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The main research objective for this study is: To examine whether the level of FEO in 
Malaysian firms is determined by the firm’s corporate governance structure. In 
essence, the main research objective is achieved only if the following specific sub-
research objectives are adequately attained. The following are the specific research 
objectives of this study: 
i. To examine whether the level of FEO in Malaysian firms is determined by the 
characteristics of the board of directors. 
ii. To examine whether the level of FEO in Malaysian firms is determined by the 
directors’ attributes. 
iii. To examine whether the level of FEO in Malaysian firms is determined by the 
firm’s ownership structure. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
Referring to the previous discussion, it is argued that in attracting foreign investors, 
corporate governance mechanisms are central either at the company level or the 
country level. However, corporate governance alone is widely defined, and consists of 
many elements. At the firm level, corporate governance practice can be segregated 
into several internal mechanisms; these include the board of directors, the ownership 
structure, the overseeing function of the management, the internal auditor, the 
directors' remuneration package, etc.   
 
Nevertheless, in relation to comprehending foreign investors’ behaviour, this study 
focuses on a few parts of it – the board of directors’ characteristics, the directors’ 
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attributes and the ownership structure. Thus, this study seeks to answer the following 
research questions: 
Do the characteristics of the board of directors influence the level of FEO?  
Do the directors’ attributes influence the level of FEO? 
Do the ownership structures influence the level of FEO? 
 
Seeking answers to the three subsidiary questions above leads to an understanding of 
the association between the corporate governance variables from each category and 
the level of FEO in a company. Thus, the main research question in this study - Does 
corporate governance influence the level of FEO in Malaysian companies? - can be 
answered more generally.  
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
One of the greatest obstacles encountered in studies of emerging markets is the quality 
of data and indeed its collection. In the context of this study, data for corporate 
governance in Malaysian firms has to be collected manually. There is no database that 
can be accessed to obtain the data. However, the detailed information in companies’ 
annual reports is reliable, as it is audited by the external auditors, and the presentation 
of the information in the annual reports is also uniform and according to the required 
accounting standard. Thus, even though the data collection process was lengthy due to 
the meticulous and tedious procedures that needed to be followed, there is very little 
doubt about the reliability of the data.  The same applies to the data concerning 
foreign equity ownership. This data is not made publicly available; thus, it has to be 
purchased from Bursa Malaysia. Since there are no specific requirements imposed on 
Malaysian firms concerning the ownership by foreign investors. The  only data 
provided by the firms is the percentage of foreign ownership, with the absence of 
other information, such as the investors’ countries of origin, the categories of 
investors etc.  
 
The focus of this study is on examining the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms in Malaysian firms and foreign equity ownership. The data was collected 
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for 12 years in a row from the same companies. Thus, the panel data concept was 
applied. Therefore, the appropriate panel data analyses were considered for utilisation. 
There are many options which can be chosen. However, empirically, the generalised 
least square (GLS) regression method is found to be ideal for the main analysis. In 
addition, to strengthen the findings from the main analysis, logit regression and 
generalised method of moments (GMM) are engaged to estimate the models.  
 
1.7 The Organisation of the Study 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Each of the chapters begins with an 
introductory section to assist in the understanding of the main consideration of the 
chapter. The organisation of the sections in the chapter is also briefly presented, thus 
giving an initial picture of the chapter’s direction. At the end of every chapter, a 
summary section is utilised to briefly highlight the concluding remarks and to provide 
links to the following chapters. A brief overview of each chapter is given below, 
starting with Chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the background to comprehending the study of corporate 
governance and foreign equity ownership in Malaysia. This chapter starts by 
providing a basic understanding of corporate governance in general, such as the 
definition of corporate governance and the importance of corporate governance which 
is essentially understood and applied in developed markets. Next, the scope of 
corporate governance is narrowed down to the Asian case, by focusing on Malaysia in 
particular. The pattern of corporate governance in this region is discussed by 
contrasting the model with the shareholder-model versions. In addition, the discussion 
of the corporate governance issue in Asia is based on the extant literature and the 
changes that affected the corporate governance institutions in the aftermath of the 
AFC 1997/1998. The system and agencies responsible for setting the corporate 
governance framework in Malaysia are also included. This chapter then discusses the 
foreign investments in Malaysia, which can be linked with the corporate governance 
practice, as a basis for the central concern in this study.  
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Chapter 3 is concerned with the development of theories. Three theories (agency 
theory, institutional theory and resource dependence theory) are posited for use as the 
underpinning lenses in elucidating the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and FEO. When these three theories are mentioned together, they will be 
referred to as the ‘multi-theoretical approach’.  This chapter calls for the importance 
of agency theory (principal-principal model) and institutional theory in examining the 
institutional background of the current study setting, Malaysia. It is argued that 
agency theory is relevant to be applied based on the ownership structure of Malaysian 
capital market while institutional theory can offer a persuasive influence from a 
different perspective to explain foreign investors’ behaviour when making investment 
decisions regarding developing markets. Therefore, a single theoretic approach may 
not provide a comprehensive overview of this subject, as some governance practices 
in Malaysia may be moving towards the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model. Hence, a possible explanation can be given when the lenses of institutional or 
resource dependence theory are applied.  In this light, a unitary perspective is 
inadequate.  Thus, this study embraces a multi-theoretical approach which espouses 
agency theory, institutional theory and resource dependence theory.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on hypotheses development. This chapter considers the discussions 
from the previous chapters (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) in constructing the hypotheses. 
Before the commencement of the main arguments, the theoretical frameworks 
presented in Chapter 3 are recapitulated briefly to allow them to be customised to the 
current study setting. The research question is then restated to provide the main debate 
of the hypotheses to be proposed. There are 10 hypotheses which are subsumed into 
three categories in order to answer the three specific research questions.  
 
Chapter 5 covers data and the research methodology. The philosophical approach to 
acquiring the data and conducting the study is provided. After confirming the 
appropriate philosophical approach, the process of identifying the sources, 
determining the sample and designing the research are illustrated. The research is 
conducted in a spirit of positivism. The definition of each variable is also provided. 
The chosen statistical software packages and methods of analysis are discussed. This 
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chapter proposes several analyses that can be utilised. However, the main analysis is 
determined based on the characteristics of the data, which will be decided after the 
diagnostic tests are run in Chapter 7.  
 
Chapter 6 presents the results from the descriptive analyses.  The method of 
explanation is twofold – univariate and bivariate. This chapter aims to explore the 
main features of the data collected by describing its characteristics quantitatively. 
Moreover, the results of the descriptive analyses presented in this chapter can indicate 
certain clues to the findings that may be apparent in the main analysis performed in 
Chapter 7.   
 
Chapter 7 discusses the findings from the multivariate analyses. Standard analyses, 
such as the correlation matrix and variation inflation factors (VIF), are used to test for 
multicollinearity in the models constructed. Then, the main analysis used, GLS 
regression analysis, is singled out based on the diagnostic tests performed beforehand. 
Additional analyses, such as logistic regression and the GMM are also run to add 
robustness to the findings derived from the main analysis, which is GLS regression.    
 
Chapter 8 is the last chapter in the thesis. This chapter concludes the findings and 
links them with the research questions and the research objectives of the study. The 
impact of this study is discussed, alongside the theoretical and practical implications 
that it might have for policymakers and regulators in order to improve the practice of 
corporate governance and appease foreign investors. Further, the limitations 
encountered in this study are described and potential future works are suggested.  
 
The organisation of the study is presented in Figure 1.1 below, whilst Figure 1.2: 
Conceptual Framework illustrates the overall picture of this study. 
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Figure 1.1: The Organisation of the Study 
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Figure 1.2: Conceptual framework for corporate governance and FEO in Malaysia 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND:               
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 introduced this thesis and explained in brief the whole structure of this 
research work. The purpose of this current chapter is to provide a background to 
corporate governance in general, narrowing it down to the Asian case by focusing on 
Malaysia, in particular. The issue of corporate governance will then be linked to 
foreign portfolio investment, as a basis for the work that follows in the remaining 
chapters. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 starts by defining corporate 
governance, as this determines the scope of the issues to be addressed. It also 
discusses the importance of corporate governance and will provide a view of 
corporate governance practices around the world. Section 2.3 moves from corporate 
governance in general to highlight corporate governance in Asia, and offers some 
insight based on extant literatures and the similarities that exist in Asian countries by 
focusing on the Asian financial crisis (AFC) of 1997/1998. The pattern of corporate 
governance in this region will be discussed by contrasting the model with the US and 
UK versions. In Section 2.4, the Malaysian scenario in corporate governance practice 
is discussed. This section also deals with the system and agencies responsible for 
setting the corporate governance framework in Malaysia. Section 2.5 moves from 
corporate governance to foreign investment in general. Next, Section 2.6 reviews 
foreign investments in Malaysia with special emphasis on foreign equity investment. 
In the same section, a discussion of foreign investments is tackled in alignment with 
the corporate governance impact. Section 2.7 limits the previous discussion of 
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corporate governance and foreign investment to the Malaysian setting. Finally, 
Section 2.8 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance has, in recent years, garnered considerable attention as a 
discussion topic in management, economics, business ethics, company law and other 
disciplines (Aggarwal et al. 2014; Bokpin and Isshaq 2009; Letza et al. 2004). It has 
also become a mainstream concern among scholars, shareholders, stakeholders, the 
state, other related parties, and regulatory bodies as well as practitioners, worldwide 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004; Cheung and Chan 2004). Two significant events 
have resulted in considerable attention being focused on this area, namely the 
financial crisis of 1997/1998 that hit South East Asian capital markets, and the 
corporate governance scandals in the US and Europe three years later that swept away 
the public belief in the corporate sector. In the aftermath of this, most of the key 
players in the economic system have begun to comprehend the potential consequences 
on world economies which stem from the weaknesses in corporate governance 
mechanisms (Claessens 2006). 
 
Before explaining further why more attention is being paid to corporate governance, 
definitions of this phrase should be reviewed. In general, the definition of corporate 
governance widely used is “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” (Cadbury Committee 1992:1). On the other hand, the definition of 
corporate governance varies widely, as it can be defined from many angles. However, 
following Claessens (2006), there are two categories to be considered in explaining 
corporate governance. The first set of definitions is concerned with a company’s 
behavioural patterns, measurements of performance, growth, efficiency, financial 
structure, and the treatment of its shareholders and other stakeholders. The second set 
of considerations emphasises the normative framework that is concerned with the 
rules which are applied for firms to operate, the legal sources of the rules, the judicial 
systems, the financial markets and the labour markets. This second definition is close 
to the one given in Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997: 737) seminal paper; “Corporate 
CHAPTER 2  23 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment”.  
 
The importance of effective corporate governance has been proposed by many 
researchers. Franks and Mayer (1997) posit that corporate governance is one of the 
ideal ways of bringing together the interests of owners and managers translated into 
mutual objectives, which is for the ultimate benefit of the investors. It is also believed 
that good corporate governance helps to generate investor goodwill and confidence 
(Ponnu 2008). Gregory and Simms (1999) claim that corporate governance promotes 
the efficient use of resources both within the firm and in the larger economy, as well 
as assisting firms and economies to attract lower-cost investment capital. This is 
concurrent with the view that better governed firms might have more efficient 
operations, which results in higher expected returns (Jensen and Meckling 1976).This 
can happen through the improved confidence of investors and creditors, both 
domestically and internationally. In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) also 
suggest that corporate governance helps in increasing the responsiveness of firms to 
societal needs and expectations and in improving the long-term performance of firms. 
Daily and Dalton (1994), on the other hand, demonstrate that bankruptcy is highly 
likely to occur in companies with poor governance systems. Briefly explained, 
corporate performance is expected to reflect the way that the firm is managed, as well 
as the effectiveness of the firm’s governance structure. 
 
In developed countries, the interest in corporate governance of policy makers has 
grown significantly starting in the early 1990s (Cheung and Chan 2004). Two 
processes, which occurred in parallel - globalisation (such as the liberalisation and 
internationalisation of economies, developments in telecommunications, and the 
integration of capital markets) and transformations in the ownership structure of firm 
(due to the growth of institutional investors, privatisation, and rising shareholder 
activism) - have encouraged the perceived need for a more effective mechanism of 
systems of corporate governance in monitoring investors’ investments (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Caruzza 2004). 
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The first code of corporate governance came into being in the USA in the late 1970s, 
and a decade later, in 1989, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange issued its first ‘Code of 
Best Practice: Listing Rules’. This was then followed by the Irish Association of 
Investment Managers’ draft of the ‘Statement of Best Practice on the Role and 
Responsibility of Directors of Publicly Listed Companies’ in 1991. Despite the non-
linear pattern shown, new codes appeared steadily throughout the early 1990s, and 
particularly since the issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992 (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Caruzza 2004). Codes of good governance are a set of ‘best practice’ 
recommendations on how to manage firms through many aspects, in order to assure 
that the owners’ interests are preserved. The main purpose of the Codes is to address 
any insufficiency in the corporate governance system by recommending “a 
comprehensive set of norms on the role and composition of the board of directors, 
relationships with shareholders and top management, auditing and information 
disclosure, and the selection, remuneration, and dismissal of directors and top 
managers” (Aguilera and Cuervo-Caruzza 2004).  
 
The publication of the Cadbury Committee Report: Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance in 1992 is the first of the large-scale official efforts that were 
implemented by OECD
4
 countries in the UK and Northern Ireland. The weakness of 
internal corporate control was given greater attention after a series of high-profile 
corporate failures, as well as the 1990 British recession. Subsequently, the issue of 
corporate accountability became a major concern (Monks and Minow 1995). The 
objective of this first report was to investigate how corporate governance guidelines 
can be effectively adopted by large public companies. The focus was on the role of the 
accounting profession and the procedures for producing financial reports (Cheung and 
Chan 2004). The Cadbury Report also emphasised the need for independent directors, 
the role of the board directors, shareholder involvement, the standards for financial 
reporting, directors’ pay, auditors’ accountability and the establishment of board 
committees (Charkham and Simpson 1999; Cheung and Chan 2004). In order to be 
                                                 
4OECD is abbreviation of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
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listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), companies need to comply with the 
Codes, otherwise they are required to justify any areas of noncompliance. 
 
This effort then continued three years later with the release of the Greenbury Report 
1995. The remuneration of executive and non-executive board members was detailed, 
and the report also provided recommendation for each public company to set up a 
remuneration committee to determine the compensation packages for the board 
members. Besides this, suggestions were made about disclosing the remuneration 
amount, setting up a remuneration policy, the service contract and compensation. 
Consequently, the issues outlined in the Cadbury Report and the Greenbury Report 
have resulted in the Hampel Report 1998 being published in the UK. This report 
combined the efforts of the previous reports and highlighted four major issues, whilst 
also offering practical guidelines. The issues raised were: (i) the role of the directors; 
(ii) directors’ compensation; (iii) the role of the shareholders; and (iv) accountability 
and audit. In the following years, in the UK, several influential proposals were 
produced in an attempt to settle the practical issues, such as those from the Turnbull 
Committee 1999 and Higgs 2003.  
 
Even though the compliance with corporate governance codes is voluntary, the 
response by public listed companies is quite impressive (Gregory 2002). In several 
countries, as an alternative to noncompliance, the companies need to justify the area 
of noncompliance and disclose it in their annual reports. According to Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Caruzza (2004) this ‘comply or explain’ style encourages more firms to 
comply. Furthermore, a great deal of research has revealed that adopting some good 
practices as recommended by the codes of good corporate governance is directly 
related to higher firm performance (Weir and Laing 2000), increased CEO turnover in 
the UK due to the need for the separation of chairman and CEO, and sensitivity issues 
related to poor performance (Dahya, McConnell and Travlos 2002). Others have 
demonstrated significant changes such as changes in the board structure, the 
appointment of independent non-executive directors, etc. (Stiles and Taylor 2001). In 
summary, codes of good governance are becoming increasingly receptive to the 
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advanced capital markets especially where it has increased firms’ transparency and 
accountability (Aguilera and Cuervo-Caruzza 2004).  
 
It is alleged that the foundation of corporate governance around the world lies in the 
listed firms’ ownership structure and the institutional setting of their capital markets 
(Bokpin and Isshaq 2009; Cheung and Chan 2004; Samad and Wilson 2002). Public 
listed companies in developed markets are characterised by significant ownership by 
institutional investors. The active involvement of institutional investors will provide 
an avenue for fund managers to demand information matrices through which they can 
make informed decisions and assure themselves that they are investing in properly 
monitored public listed companies (Cheung and Chan 2004). Another characteristic 
that is shared by the OECD countries is dispersed ownership. However, this does not 
truly reflect the other parts of the world capital market which can be explained 
through different patterns of ownership and their institutional setting.  
 
There are a few models which explain the nature of corporate governance systems 
around the world. The models are the result of the institutional setting and the culture 
within which the corporation is operating. Some current perspectives on corporate 
governance have been categorised into two contrasting paradigms. The best known 
model is the Anglo-American model, which  is prevalent in the US and UK, and the 
other is the stakeholder model, which applies to Germany, Japan and some other 
continental European countries (see for example, Friedman and Miles 2002; 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2001). These divisions hinge upon the ultimate objective 
of the corporation and its related structure of corporate governance, as understood and 
justified in theory (Letza et al. 2004).  
 
The Anglo-American model is characterised by dispersed shareholders and the firm’s 
primary objective which is to maximise shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Thus, governance mechanisms that operate in this 
model, including the separation of ownership and control, are there to ensure that 
board members and executives work towards the firm’s financial goals and at the 
same time outside investors try to ensure that they are not exploited by the 
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management (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). This approach is further shared by Stenberg 
(1998), who sees corporate governance as a means of ensuring that corporate actions, 
assets, and agents are directed at achieving the objectives established by the 
corporations. These governance mechanisms operate interdependently, whereby if one 
fails, automatically the remaining mechanisms or a combination of them may 
substitute for it and play their own role (Rediker and Seth 1995). 
 
Alternatively, the stakeholder model, which emerged in the late 20
th
 century, is 
characterised by a significant holding by a parent company, while outside 
shareholders represent only the smaller portions of the equity. Shareholders are 
viewed as partners and as one form of stakeholder,  together with employees, 
creditors, suppliers, customers and local communities (Freeman 2010), which is in 
opposition to the Anglo-American model that considers shareholders as the “risk 
takers” of the company (Cheung and Chan 2004). From the point of view of this 
model, the corporation is a locus to serve the interests of wider external stakeholders’ 
rather than merely focusing on maximising shareholders’ wealth (Letza et al. 2004). 
In addition, the supporters of this model argue that the current corporate governance 
system which operates under the shareholder model fails to encourage the 
involvement of other stakeholders (Letza et al. 2004). The figure below shows the 
results of a survey conducted in five countries to ascertain how a large company is 
managed. There were two options given: i) shareholder interest should be given the 
first priority or ii) a firm exists in the interests of all its stakeholders. 
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Figure 2.1: Whose Company Is it? 
Number of firms surveyed: Japan, 68; United States, 82; United Kingdom, 78; Germany, 100; 
France, 50. Source: Yoshimori (1995). 
 
This survey provides evidence to suggest that in terms of their corporate governance 
system, these countries may be divided into two groups, namely supporters of the 
shareholder model and the stakeholder model. The legal protection of investors is 
relied on substantially in the US and UK, as large investors are less prevalent, whilst 
in much of Continental Europe as well as Japan, there is more reliance on large 
investors and banks. However, even these two models claim their superiority; in 
reality Letza et al. (2004) argue that dynamic shifts have occurred and that both 
models are increasingly becoming attractive all over the world, particularly in the last 
two decades. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) reinforce the idea that governance systems in 
developed countries like the US, UK, Japan and Germany are among the good and 
only have slight differences compared to the governance systems of other countries. 
 
Evidence shows that Germany and Japan, which are traditionally categorised under 
the stakeholder model, are converging more on shareholder-value or the Anglo-Saxon 
model due to the pressure of globalisation and international competition (Schilling 
2001; Stoney and Winstanley 2001). These trends, however, do not reflect the 
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corporate governance models in Asian countries, where ownership is typically heavily 
concentrated in families. The next section will discuss, in detail, the corporate 
governance environment in Asia. 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance in Asia 
In many respects, Asian capital markets are very different from developed equity 
markets in Western countries. Unlike in the USA and UK, the typical characteristics 
of companies in Asian countries are the smaller size of the capital raised, smaller 
capitalisation, relatively infrequent turnover and high ownership concentration 
(Cheung and Chan 2004). Zhuang, Edwards, Webb and Capulong (2000) suggest that 
concentrated corporate ownership in most of the East Asian companies has provided 
family-owners/controlling shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000) with unwarranted power 
and has also lessened the effectiveness of essential shareholder protection 
mechanisms, for instance shareholder participation through voting, information 
disclosure and transparency. These characteristics not only affect how corporate 
governance standards can be set up, but also restrict the impact of reforms in the 
overall link between investors and economic development (Cheung and Chan 2004).  
 
The underlying problem for corporate governance under concentrated ownership is 
the protection of minority shareholders from expropriation by controlling 
shareholders. Even though, to a certain degree, this type of ownership helps  
controlling shareholders to play a crucial role in monitoring management, Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) found an inverted “U-shaped” relationship nexus between 
the level of ownership concentration and profitability whereby the costs may exceed 
the benefits when it reaches a certain degree. After this focal point, the profitability 
may start to drop and the controlling shareholding may react in their own interests at 
the expense of the minority shareholders. In most of the Asian capital market, the 
conflicts between the minority and controlling shareholders in a firm arise from 
principal-principal goal incongruence. Relatively speaking, this different from 
traditional agency problems in developed markets where problems arise from 
principal-agent goal conflicts (Douma et al. 2006). Young, Peng, Ahlstrom and 
CHAPTER 2  30 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
Bruton (2008) address these problems in the so-called principal-principal model. More 
discussion on the principal-principal model can be found in Section 3.3.2 
Concentrated Ownership in Malaysian Companies and afterwards. Besides this, other 
factors - such as excessive government interferences, less-developed capital markets, 
and fragile legal and regulatory frameworks for investor protection - contribute to the 
deficiencies in corporate governance practices in selected East Asian countries 
(Zhuang et. al 2000).  
 
In discussing corporate governance in East Asia, their historical backdrops and their 
institutional frameworks need to be fully taken into account (Suto 2003). In Asian 
countries, the inquisitiveness concerning corporate governance has been sporadic, but 
escalated in the late 1990s subsequent to the 1997/1998 financial crisis. The East 
Asian countries that were hit most by this crisis were Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. The geographic location of these countries is shown in 
Figure 2.2 below. However, Singapore was less affected and Thailand is claimed to be 
the origin of the crisis.  
 
Figure 2.2: Countries that were hit hardest by the AFC 1997/1998 
 
This crisis is believed to have started in Thailand in July 1997 (Mitton 2002) with the 
precipitous collapse of the Thai baht (currency used in Thailand for transactions), 
which occurred after the Thai government floated the baht against the U.S. dollar. 
According to Zulkafli, Abdul Samad and Ismail (2005), foreign investors lost their 
confidence and began to withdraw their capital due to currency devaluation. Then, this 
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problem disseminated to other neighbouring countries. Studies that have been carried 
out on the above countries show that they were more fragile on average than the 
others before the economic meltdown (Zhuang and Dowling 2002). In addition, these 
countries shared several identical characteristics in varying degrees. 
 
In contrast, Singapore was seen to have a much higher current account surplus 
throughout the 1990s, which was on average around 10% of GDP in 1990 – 1993, and 
which rose to about 16% of GDP in 1994 – 1996. Comparisons of current accounts 
can be made with other East Asian countries as shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Current Accounts, NIA Definition (% of GDP) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Korea -1.24 -3.16 -1.70 -0.16 -1.45 -1.91 -4.82 -1.90 
Indonesia -4.40 -4.40 -2.46 -0.82 -1.54 -4.27 -3.30 -3.62 
Malaysia -2.27 -14.01 -3.39 -10.11 -6.60 -8.85 -3.73 -3.50 
Philippines -6.30 -2.46 -3.17 -6.69 -3.74 -5.06 -4.67 -6.07 
Singapore 9.45 12.36 12.38 8.48 18.12 17.93 16.26 13.90 
Thailand -8.74 -8.01 -6.23 -5.68 -6.38 -8.35 -8.51 -2.35 
Note: Source: Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999). NIA = National Income Account.  
 
The possible role of current account deficits in creating  troublesome tensions in the 
financial markets has been reiterated in the literature (Corsetti et al. 1999). As written 
by Lawrence Summers, the US Deputy Treasury Secretary, in The Economist5 “close 
attention should be paid to any current account deficit in excess of 5% of GDP, 
particularly if it is financed in a way that could lead to rapid reversal”. By this 
standard, all East Asian countries excluding Singapore provided reasons for concern 
(Corsetti et al. 1999).  
 
Data on the current account positions yields some preliminary evidence that the 
currency crises may have been tinged with an external competitiveness problem. In 
                                                 
5 The Economist 23 December, 1995–5 January 1996, pp. 46–48.  
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fact, as a group, the countries that were hit the hardest in the 1997 turmoil appeared to 
link with the countries with a large current account deficit throughout the 1990s. Thus, 
Singapore was affected, mainly because of the regional contagion crisis (Zhuang and 
Dowling 2002). This was proven by the fact that Thailand lost 65% of its stock market 
value in dollar terms, Indonesia lost 71%, Malaysia lost 57%, the Philippines lost 
58%, South Korea lost 72% while Singapore lost only 24% of its value. In addition, 
both currencies and the local stock market plunged in most countries whereby 
Thailand lost about 33%, Indonesia lost 34%, Malaysia lost 42%, the Philippines lost 
32%, South Korea lost 44% and Singapore only lost 10% (Chakrabarti and Roll 
2002).  
 
2.3.1 The Asian Financial Crisis 1997/1998 
The AFC 1997/1998 affected many Asian countries and raised fears among investors 
worldwide of financial contagion. Subsequent to the crisis, as a result of investor 
apprehensions, the foreign investors’ capital inflow suddenly dried up and the local 
market faced a serious liquidity problem (Cheung and Chan 2004). The root of the 
crisis has been discussed in depth, leading to the emergence of two main arguments. 
The first of these is that the crisis began when there was a decreasing level of 
investors’ confidence and a swift shift in market expectations, followed by regional 
contagion which caused financial turmoil and propagation over time in some Asian 
countries (Chang and Velasco 1999; Marshall 1998; Radelet and Sachs 2000). This 
macroeconomic imbalance then led to panic among investors, both local and 
international (Zhuang and Dowling 2002), who subsequently decided to withdraw 
their investments. 
 
The second argument is that the crisis emerged primarily due to structural and policy 
distortions (Corsetti et al. 1999; Dooley 1999). This fundamental imbalance triggered 
the financial and currency crisis in 1997, and once the crisis started, market 
overreaction caused the plunge of exchange rates, and the plummet of assets’ prices. 
This view has been supported by Zhuang and Dowling (2002), who discriminate 
between the two arguments, and their findings suggest that weaknesses in the 
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economic and financial fundamentals in these countries played an important role in 
triggering the crisis. 
 
Instead of providing two different arguments, Johnson et al. (2000) posit, however, 
that the above explanations agree that, for some reason, there was a loss of confidence 
by domestic and foreign investors in all emerging markets. According to Zulkafli et al. 
(2005), investors had experienced an unanticipated change in their expectations, and 
their irrational behaviour, compounded by the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
inappropriate responses to the crises, apparently added to the panic among investors. 
This led to a fall in capital inflows and an increase in capital outflows that triggered, 
in some cases, a very large nominal depreciation and a stock market crash. Table 2.2, 
reproduced from a figure presented in a report by Radelet and Sachs (2000), gives a 
rough estimate of the breakdown of the adverse reversal flows for the five East Asian 
countries that were badly affected by the crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand). 
Table 2.2: Five East Asian Economies: External Financing, 1994 – 98 (billion 
dollars) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997
a
 1998
b
 
Current account balance -24.6 -41.3 -54.9 -26.0 17.6 
External financing, net 47.4 80.9 92.8 15.2 15.2 
Private flows, net 40.5 77.4 93.0 -12.1 -9.4 
   Equity investment 12.2 15.5 19.1 -4.5 7.9 
     Direct Equity 4.7 4.9 7.0 7.2 9.8 
     Portfolio equity 7.6 10.6 12.1 -11.6 -1.9 
   Private creditors 28.2 61.8 74.0 -7.6 -17.3 
     Commercial banks 24.0 49.5 55.5 -21.3 -14.1 
     Nonbank private creditors 4.2 12.4 18.4 13.7 -3.2 
Official flows, net 7.0 3.6 -0.2 27.2 24.6 
   International financial institutions -0.4 -0.6 -1.0 23.0 18.5 
   Bilateral creditors 7.4 4.2 0.7 4.3 6.1 
Source: Radelet and Sachs (2000) 
Note: The five East Asian economies are South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines. 
a
Estimate 
b
Institute of International Finance (IIF) forecast 
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The above Table 2.2 shows that net private capital flows into the most affected Asian 
economies jumped from $40.5 billion in 1994 to $93 billion in 1996. But in the last 
half of 1997, these inflows suddenly reversed themselves, with net capital flows 
turning into an outflow of $12.1 billion. This represents a turnaround of $105 billion, 
in just six months, from an inflow of $93 billion to an outflow of $12.1 billion, where 
$77 billion came from commercial bank lending, $5 billion came from a decline in 
non-bank lending, while direct investment was sustained at around $7 billion. The 
significant decline came from a $24 billion fall in portfolio equity. The reversal of 
foreign capital had several marked interlocking macroeconomic and microeconomic 
adverse effects. Most dramatically, exchange rates depreciated, and this was followed 
by a soaring of the domestic interest rate, which led to a tightening of the domestic 
credit situation (Radelet and Sachs 2000). In Malaysia, for example, after the AFC 
1997/1998, foreign capital shunned the Malaysian market so that foreign portfolio 
investment fell by 74 percent from RM144.9 billion in 1996 to RM37.6 billion in 
2001. Figure 2.3 below depicts the plummet of foreign investment in the Malaysian 
capital market. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Foreign Portfolio Investment in Malaysia 1996 -2001 (RM) 
 
However, the above clarifications do not address precisely why the loss of confidence 
had such a significant impact on the exchange rate and the capital market in some 
emerging markets but not others. The “Asian Crisis” of 1997/1998 affected all the 
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“emerging markets” open to external capital flows. Johnson et al. (2000) present 
evidence that the ineffectiveness of the legal institutions for corporate governance had 
a crucial impact on the extent of the devaluation and the slump of the stock market in 
the Asian crisis. Therefore, in the case of the Asian turmoil, they posit that corporate 
governance provides a persuasive explanation for the cause of the tragedy. Many other 
researchers (Suto 2003) have reached the same conclusion (see for example Khatri et 
al. 2002; Sam 2007). 
 
This argument is further echoed by Mitton (2002), who goes on to claim that even 
though weak corporate governance may not have caused the East Asian crisis, once it 
began, the countries with poor governance practices would have been more vulnerable 
to financial crisis; these poor practices could have exacerbated the crisis severely, or 
at least accelerated the deterioration (Suto 2003) compared to the countries with 
strong shareholder protection practices. It has been alleged by Kim and Wei (2002) 
that foreign investors may have been positive feedback traders, who were eager to 
copy each other’s behaviour and ignored fundamental information. This was proved 
during the AFC 1997/1998, since they were rushing to buy when the market was 
booming and then instantly sold their shares when the price was declining. 
 
This AFC 1997/ 1998, then, has highlighted the importance of high quality financial 
disclosure (Aggarwal et al. 2005) which resulted in most of the Asian countries 
seeking ways to strengthen their corporate governance, transparency and disclosure 
levels (Ho and Wong 2001). In the aftermath of the crisis, it is claimed that policy 
reforms emerged in a number of emerging markets (Aggarwal et al. 2005). Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006) also assert that most of the countries in the region established a 
Code of Corporate Governance to ensure the continuous flow of funds and to boost 
the confidence of investors in their capital market.  
 
The theoretical explanation given by Johnson et al. (2000) is straightforward. If 
stealing by managers increases when the predicted rate of investment return falls, then 
an unpleasant shock to investor confidence will lead to more theft and a decrease of 
capital inflow, which simultaneously causes greater attempts at capital outflow for a 
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country. These, in turn, will result in lower stock prices and diminishing values of the 
exchange rate. There were many well documented cases illustrating expropriation by 
managers in countries affected by the Asian crisis. Table 2.3 summarises the details of 
selected allegations of expropriation in a few countries affected by the Asian crisis.  
 
Table 2.3: Alleged Incidents of Stealing in the AFC 1997/1998 
Company Country Date Alleged Incident 
Bangkok Bank of 
Commerce 
Thailand 1996-97 Bank managers moved money to 
offshore companies under their control 
United Engineers 
(Malaysia) Bhd. 
Malaysia 1997-98 United Engineers bailed out its 
financially troubled parent, Renong 
Bhd., by acquiring a 33% stake at an 
artificially high price. 
Malaysia Air 
System Bhd. 
Malaysia 1998 The chairman used company funds to 
retire personal debts. 
PT Bank Bali Indonesia 1997-98 Managers diverted funds in order to 
finance a political party. 
Sinar Mas Group Indonesia 1997-98 Group managers transferred foreign 
exchange losses from a manufacturing to 
a group-controlled bank, effectively 
expropriating the bank’s creditor and 
minority. 
Samsung 
Electronics Co. 
Korea 1997-98 Managers used cash from Samsung 
Electronics to support other members of 
the Samsung group (notably Samsung 
Motors) that were losing money. 
Hyundai Korea 1998-99 Managers of a Hyundai-controlled 
investment fund channelled money from 
retail investors to loss-making firms in 
the Hyundai group. 
Sources: Johnson et al. (2000:144) 
 
There is evidence to suggest that the expropriation of minority shareholders was 
prevalent and severe during the East Asian crisis (Mitton 2002). One example comes 
from Malaysia, whereby United Engineers Malaysia (UEM) bought 32.6% of the 
shares of Renong, its financially troubled parent, in November 1997. This action has 
been interpreted by UEM’s minority shareholders as a financial bailout of Renong at 
an inflated price, with the result that UEM’s stock price fell by 38% on the day that 
the transaction was announced (Arjuna 2000). In another case from Korea, the 
minority shareholders of Samsung Electronics protested against the actions taken by 
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the firm, since it had been providing debt guarantees to a few less-successful Samsung 
group companies, and these guarantees were often not disclosed (Acemoglu and 
Johnson 2003). Other cases of expropriation by management or controlling 
shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders are described briefly, and can be 
seen from the table. In summary, generally, most debt defaults triggered by the Asian 
Crisis of 1997/1998 have resulted in investors receiving none of the liquidation value 
(Johnson et. al 2000). It may be noted  that in many of these cases, controlling 
shareholders did not violate any local laws in order to expropriate minority 
shareholders. Accompanied by the fact that the management in most of the emerging 
countries is also the controlling shareholder, this makes these transfers effortless to 
achieve (Johnson et al. 2000; Khatri et al. 2002). 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) assert that the governance 
mechanisms applied in order to protect the rights of creditors and minority 
shareholders determine how the firms are funded, which varies between countries. 
Based on the observations made in 49 countries, their findings suggest that weak 
shareholder rights and poor company performance leads to underdeveloped capital 
markets. Johnson et al. (2000) share a similar view, adding that weak enforcement of 
shareholder rights tremendously impacts the stock market and the extent of exchange 
rate depreciation.  
 
According to Rajan and Zingales (1998), protecting investors’ rights is not important 
while growth lasts, because during the euphoric inflow period of capital from 
investors, managers do not want to steal. It may even be possible to attract a great deal 
of outside capital during the period when the economy is expanding. The investors 
may at first have ignored the weaknesses of East Asian firms before the crisis begin. 
However, when the growth prospect declines, the lack of good corporate governance 
becomes important. In the case of the AFC 1997/1998, investors quickly pulled out 
their investment because they believed that the region lacked adequate institutional 
protection for their investment (Rajan and Zingales 1998), where managers are led to 
expropriate more as the expected return on the investment falls (Mitton 2002).  
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Without an effective shareholder protection mechanism, a mild shock can entail a 
huge increase in stealing, which in turn results in a large depreciation. Thus, Johnson 
et al. (2000) posit that managerial agency problems can cause countries with poor 
legal systems to become vulnerable to the effects of an abrupt loss of investor 
confidence. The crisis could become a force factor for investors causing them to 
recognise and take account of the corporate governance weaknesses in corporations 
that have existed all along (Mitton 2002). As Asian countries share similarities in 
terms of controlling shareholders and weakly enforceable minority shareholders 
rights, then they are particularly vulnerable and could have lost relatively more value 
during the crisis. 
 
On the other hand, the AFC 1997/1998 can be considered as remarkable in several 
ways. The crisis struck the most rapidly growing economies during that time and 
sparked off the largest financial bailouts in history (Radelet and Sachs 2000). It was 
the least anticipated financial crisis in years (Li 2003). The collapse of the involved 
countries was not mainly because of the lack of resources to support their economies, 
but also because of the “euphoria inflow” of capital that could not be retained; this can 
be understood as a “crisis of success”, which was caused by a significant upsurge of 
international inflow, followed by an abrupt withdrawal of funds (Radelet and Sachs 
2000). Zainuddin6 (1998) allege this financial turmoil as a “crisis of confidence”, 
where a loss in confidence by investors (especially foreign investors) on the capital 
market had been triggered by a lack of transparency and efficiency in corporate 
governance.  
 
According to the report by the World Bank (1993), during the second half of the 
twentieth century, East Asia witnessed the world’s highest economic growth. For 
more than two to three decades, many countries in this region experienced double-
digit annual growth. Since this favourable growth was not anticipated, it was known 
                                                 
6 Daim Zainuddin was held responsible to 'manage' financial crisis in Malaysia by his 
appointment as the executive director of the National Economic Action Council 
(NEAC). This body has played a crucial part in promoting strategies to combat 
the crisis (Liew 2008). 
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as the “East Asian Miracle” which was widely acclaimed by the World Bank and 
international financial institutions like the IMF. The consistent and high interest rates 
became one of the main attractions for foreign investors to choose this region as their 
locus of investment. In addition, there are a few other explanations provided by Calvo, 
Leiderman and Reinhart (1996) for the causes of the capital inflows to Asia in the 
1990s, which in brief can be referred to in the footnote number 7 below
7
.  
 
However, there are drawbacks noted by Calvo et al. (1996), who claim that the large 
capital inflows received by the developing countries on the other hand tend to cause 
rapid monetary expansion, real exchange rate appreciation, inflationary pressure, and 
widening current account deficits. These undesirable macroeconomic effects have 
rendered the economy more vulnerable to foreign shocks. Kim (2000) explains that 
when the inflow of foreign capital is distracted, the economy experiences inverse 
adjustments in the current account and exchange rate. These shocks obstruct the 
functioning of the economy and afterwards the growth momentum (Thanoon, 
Baharumshah and Rahman 2006). The adjustment process due to these unfavourable 
shocks in capital movement can be severe, as proven in a few episodes of debt crisis 
(Kim 2000).  
 
Malaysia is one of those countries that were badly hit by this financial crisis. As a 
developing country, weakness of corporate governance is considered to be one of the 
significant factors that contributed to the crisis. The following subsections provide the 
chronological facts concerning corporate governance in Malaysia before, during, and 
after the crisis. An understanding of the background of Malaysia, the consequences of 
the crisis and the reaction by the government to solve this problem will provide a 
                                                 
7 In brief, the capital inflows to developing countries in the 1990s are explained by 
Calvo et al. (1996) as being triggered by a few factors. Among them are i) the 
recession that hit the United States, Japan and many European countries, made 
Asian countries more attractive for investment, ii) there was an escalating trend 
where life insurance companies entered into emerging markets to explore more 
profitable investments and iii) the changes in regulation in the US and European 
countries, has facilitated the investors to invest in foreign firms. A more detailed 
explanation can be found in Calvo et al. (1996).   
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better analysis of the role of corporate governance in Malaysia and how corporate 
governance could potentially help to attract international capital inflow to the country. 
 
2.4 Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
According to Liew (2007), up until the 1997/1998 AFC, corporate governance 
practices in Malaysia were not a matter of concern. This was according to the view of 
many international bodies, in particular the report from the World Bank (1993) which 
concluded that East Asian countries (including Malaysia) had managed their 
economies efficiently and had effective public institutions and governance. This view, 
however, changed precipitately following the 1997/1998 Asian turmoil when the poor 
practice of corporate governance was blamed as one of the main factors that had 
exacerbated the crisis.  
 
As mentioned previously, the scandals in the USA, as well as the 1997/1998 AFC, 
have been viewed as a strong case for healthier corporate governance and 
transparency among Malaysian corporations. The Malaysian corporate landscape itself 
has been disgraced by a couple of cases such as Renong, UEM, Perwaja Steel, 
Transmile, Malaysia Airlines System (MAS) and a few others, due partly to a 
deficiency in corporate governance mechanisms (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). It was 
suggested that the eroding of investor confidence in Malaysia was caused by the 
country’s defective corporate governance standards and the transparency problems in 
the financial system (Noordin 1999; Sam 2007; Suto 2003; Zainuddin 1998). 
 
Therefore, reforms in corporate governance came to be viewed as a way of managing 
the crisis. This reformation was advocated by a few international bodies, including the 
World Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank and the Malaysian government 
itself. Thus, Zulkafli et al. (2005) posit that the discussion of the historical background 
of corporate governance in Malaysia, as well as other East Asian countries, should be 
commenced from the time of the East Asian economic meltdown in the second half of 
1997. This is further supported by Suto (2003), who considers that the institutional 
framework of the country should be sufficiently taken into account. Therefore, the 
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following discussion will attempt to provide a possible explanation for the historical 
and institutional development of corporate governance in Malaysia. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the initiatives taken by the Malaysian government to 
reform corporate governance, with the intention of creating a better image for the 
country in order to attract more foreign investors.  
 
2.4.1 Malaysia before the 1997/1998 Financial Crisis 
Malaysia just prior to the financial crisis could be described as a fast developing 
country. Its corporate sector in the 1990s experienced rapid growth compared to other 
East Asian countries. An average annual growth rate of 10.9 per cent was recorded for 
listed companies throughout the 1990s in Malaysia, compared to 10 per cent, 7 per 
cent and 1 per cent in Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea respectively (Khatri 
2001). In addition, according to Liew (2007), the total market capitalisation for 
companies listed on the main and second boards of the Malaysian stock exchange 
increased at an annual average of 40 per cent which was largely driven by increasing 
shares and a high level of new equity issues and privatisations. It is believed that the 
development of the Malaysian corporate sector was closely linked to the government’s 
policies in developing the private sector to promote industrialisation while 
restructuring society in terms of participation and ownership. 
 
During the period preceding the crisis, Asian countries had several years of strong 
economic growth. Malaysia, in particular, achieved a real gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth of 8.5 per cent between 1991 and 1997, with per capita income 
increasing twofold in terms of U.S. dollars by 1997, and the incidence of poverty 
falling from 16.5 to 6.1 per cent (Ministry of Finance 2002). It was expected that the 
sustainable growth rate would continue, propelling Malaysia to achieve its developed 
status by 2020, generally known as Wawasan 2020
8
 (Vision 2020), one of the 
                                                 
8Wawasan 2020 or vision 2020 was articulated by Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, 4th 
Prime Minister of Malaysia.  It is where the nation must be fully developed along 
all the dimensions: economically, politically, socially, spiritually, psychologically 
and culturally. They also need to be fully developed in terms of national unity and 
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government’s long term visions. However, instead, the Malaysian economy drastically 
moved to a lower plateau in the aftermath of the AFC 1997/1998 (Thanoon et al. 
2006). The precipitous fall of equity prices was reflected in this financial turmoil, 
which witnessed the plummet of the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index by 72% during 
the period end-June 1997 to end-August 1998 (Zulkafli et al. 2005). 
 
Weakness in corporate governance was considered to be one of the significant reasons 
for the collapse of a few giant companies in Malaysia during the financial crisis of 
1997/1998 (Kim 1998; Khas 2002; Samad and Wilson 2002), or it at least accelerated 
the deterioration (Suto 2003). Poor corporate governance, weak investor relations, a 
low level of transparency in disclosing information by companies listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia and the ineffectiveness of regulatory agencies in enforcing legislation in 
punishing offenders and protecting minority shareholders are all partly blamed as 
reasons for the collapse of several Malaysian companies (Mohamad 2002; Zainuddin 
1998). This led the government to take prompt action, and to produce a rescue 
package for the country (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006) consisting of a series of reforms 
that had significant impact on the corporate governance structure.  
 
Despite the harsh criticism of the weakness of corporate governance practice, in 
reality, corporate governance in Malaysia is not considered to be something new. 
Starting as early as 1993, efforts had been taken to improve the governance practices 
of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia when Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) listing requirements made audit committees mandatory (Haniffa and Cooke 
2002). Good corporate governance practices were further emphasised by the 
Malaysian Securities Commission following the move from a merit-based to a 
disclosure based regulatory regime in 1995. Although a series of corporate 
governance mechanisms were introduced, the implementations were very naïve. 
Othman (1999) claims that the mechanisms for ensuring compliance and enforcement 
                                                                                                                                            
social cohesion, in terms of economy, in terms of social justice, political stability, 
system of government, quality of life, social and spiritual values, national pride 
and confidence. 
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were inefficient, whilst the penalties imposed for breach were an inadequate deterrent, 
especially during times of economic tension.  
 
The main features of the corporate sector in Malaysia, like its East Asian 
neighbouring countries, are the high level of ownership concentration, cross-holdings 
and the significant participation of owners in management – an insider system of 
corporate governance (Khatri 2001). According to Khatri et al. (2002), these features 
have resulted in some innate vulnerabilities in the countries concerned. The cross-
holding structures can create incentives for double gearing, thus creating a multiplier 
effect in the sensitivity of corporate wealth changes in the equity market (Kochhar 
1999). In addition, concentration shareholding can lead to poor governance, as a small 
group can exercise control over a firm and pursue their objectives at the cost of the 
outsiders or minority shareholders (Claessens et al. 1999). 
 
Lim (1981), in his study of the 100 largest companies in Malaysia, found a high 
degree of concentration at various structure levels. A major proportion of the financial 
assets and the productive capacity of the corporate economy were concentrated in a 
few large companies at the first structure and in the next structure. The concentration 
was at the level of share ownership, where shares were not widely distributed and 
were concentrated in the hands of a few institutional and corporate investors. Finally, 
the concentration was of control over the large companies. A complex system of 
interlocking and pyramiding share ownership had developed which enabled a few 
individuals and entities to control an amount of capital which was many times more 
than what they actually owned (Khatri et al. 2002).  
 
The problem with ownership concentration in Malaysia is not so much the general 
separation of management and control commonly experienced by most industrialised 
nations, but the domination in most companies by large shareholders who exercise 
control rights, putting minority shareholders at high risk (Claessens et al. 1999). 
Claessens et al. (1999), in their study of 2,980 publicly traded companies, in nine East 
Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), found that 67.2 per cent of the sample 
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of Malaysian firms was family-controlled and 28.3 per cent of market capitalisation 
was controlled by 15 families. From further investigation, they also discovered that 
39.3 per cent of Malaysian companies used pyramid structures as a means to enhance 
control, and 14.9 per cent of Malaysian companies had some cross ownership. Other 
notable percentages are as follows: 37.4 per cent of the sampled Malaysian firms were 
controlled by mainly a single large shareholder, 85 per cent of the same samples had 
managers (CEOs and or chairpersons) who were a member of the controlling family 
or a nominee (Claessens et al. 1999). 
 
In addition, based on the analysis by the World Bank (2001) of the Malaysian capital 
market, almost half of the public listed companies belonged to the five largest 
shareholders. These shareholders generally owned 60 per cent of the outstanding 
shares and more than 50 per cent of the voting shares. La Porta et al. (1999), in their 
earlier study, also found a high degree of ownership concentration in Malaysia, where 
the average share of common equity owned by the three largest shareholders in the ten 
largest companies was 54 per cent compared to 19 per cent and 20 per cent in the UK 
and US respectively.  
 
The study conducted by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) verified the findings of La Porta 
et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (1999), namely that there is a high concentration of 
ownership in Malaysia (as elsewhere in Asia). They found that the mean 
shareholdings of the single and largest shareholder and the five largest shareholders of 
the companies in their study were 31% and 62% respectively, which implies that the 
protection of minority shareholders may be problematic. In summary, as concluded by 
Liew (2007), companies in Malaysia are typically controlled by a small group of 
related parties and managed by owner-managers. Claessens et al. (1999) claim that the 
concentration of shareholding can lead to poor governance, as a small group can 
exercise control over a firm and pursue the objectives of the insiders at the cost of the 
outsiders, or minority shareholders. 
 
These inheritance problems (high level of ownership concentration, cross-holdings 
and significant participation of owners in management) have drawn attention to the 
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requirement for maintaining corporate governance standards, increased transparency 
and improved investor relations, while the market regulatory agencies such as the 
Securities Commission (SC), Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) and Bursa Malaysia 
should enforce more effective legislations. However, Zulkafli et al. (2005) claim that 
the mechanisms that have been used in Malaysia were comprehensive enough, and 
appropriately covered all areas of corporate governance both internally and externally. 
The following sections discuss the development of corporate governance in Malaysia 
and the regulatory bodies or institutions that are responsible for improving corporate 
governance in Malaysia.  
 
2.4.2 Development of Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
The reform agenda for corporate governance in Malaysia has taken place since the 
AFC 1997/1998. Three main institutions - the Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance (FCCG), the SC and the BNM - were responsible for the evolution of 
corporate governance straight after the crisis by introducing the Codes and guidelines 
as seen below. The direction, principles, best practices and future prospects of 
corporate governance in Malaysia are discussed in the three following sections. 
 
2.4.2.1 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
The release of the Code marked the importance of the corporate governance system in 
Malaysia. Corporate governance in Malaysia is set up based on the Anglo-Saxon 
approach, as in the US and UK (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Based on the High Level 
FCCG Report (1999), corporate governance has been defined as: 
 
“Process and structure used to direct and manage the business 
prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of 
realizing long term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the 
interests of other stakeholders” 
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This definition is retained in the latest version of Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) 2012. The first Code of corporate governance was issued in 
March 2000. It is the main cornerstone of the corporate governance reforms agenda in 
Malaysia (Ponnu 2008) as it provides guidelines on the principles and best practices in 
corporate governance and the direction for the implementation. It also charts the future 
prospects of corporate governance in Malaysia.  
 
In addition, the Code consists of the optimal corporate governance structures and 
internal processes. The principles underlying the report focus on four areas including: 
the board of directors, director’s remuneration, shareholders and accountability and 
audit. The Code became effective through the revamped Listing Requirements of the 
KLSE in January 2001. Compliance with the Code is not mandatory but listed 
companies are required - under the listing requirements of Bursa Malaysia - to include 
in their annual report a narrative account as to how they have applied the principles 
and best practices set out in the Code. Since the release of the Code, the Malaysian 
corporate scene has made significant strides forward in its corporate governance 
standards.  
 
The Code was then reviewed and revised in 2007 to further strengthen corporate 
governance practice in line with the developments in the domestic and international 
capital markets. The fifth Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi, had announced in the Budget 2008 speech that: 
 
“the Code is being reviewed to improve the quality of the board of 
public listed companies (PLCs) by putting in place the criteria for 
qualification of directors and strengthening the audit committee, as well 
as the internal audit function of the PLCs” 
 
Key amendments to the Code are aimed at strengthening the board of directors and 
audit committees, and ensuring that the board of directors and audit committees 
discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively. The Code has been revised by 
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considering the feedbacks and comments made by the related bodies which represent 
the continued collaborative efforts between the Government and industry. 
 
Then, in July 2011, The SC Malaysia released the Corporate Governance Blueprint 
2011, which sets out the desired corporate governance landscape going forward. The 
crux of the Blueprint is to achieve excellence in corporate governance through 
strengthening self and market discipline, promoting good compliance and corporate 
governance culture. From this Blueprint, The Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance 2012 (Code 2012) was recently issued. Code 2012 focuses on 
strengthening the board structure and composition, recognising the role of the directors 
as active and responsible beneficiaries. It has emphasised the duty of directors to be 
effective stewards and guardians of the company, not just in strategic direction and 
overseeing the conduct of business, but also in ensuring that the company conducts 
itself in compliance with laws and ethical values.  
 
2.4.2.2 Capital Market Master Plan (CMP) 
The introduction of the CMP by the SC is considered important in that it charts the 
direction of the Malaysian capital market for the next ten years. It was initially 
announced by the Second Finance Minister and the Chairman of the SC on August 6, 
1999. In December 2000, the Minister of Finance approved and subsequently 
launched it in February 2001. The vision of CMP is to provide a platform for the 
efficient mobilisation and allocation of funds, as well as to give a high degree of 
confidence to market participants. A key strategic point in CMP is the good corporate 
governance of public listed companies, enabling investors to do business in a better 
and more conducive corporate environment in Malaysia.  
 
2.4.2.3 Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) 
Bank Negara Malaysia also plays an important role in charting the future direction of 
the financial sector after the AFC 1997/98 by launching the FSMP. The FSMP’s 
objective is to develop more resilient, competitive and dynamic financial systems 
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which contribute to economic growth and technology-driven development. Corporate 
governance elements have been nurtured in this plan by promoting shareholders’ and 
consumers’ activisms, regulatory control and priority sector financing.  
 
2.4.3 Corporate Governance Regulatory Bodies in Malaysia 
Complementing the development of corporate governance in Malaysia, institutional 
development has moved forward. A few institutional bodies have been established, 
including the High Level FCCG, the MICG and the MSWG, in order to strengthen the 
changes that have taken place in corporate governance mechanisms and practices. 
Their functions, objectives and related issues are discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
 
2.4.3.1 High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) 
On 24 March 1998, the minister of finance announced the establishment of the high 
level FCCG. The committee, which is comprised of senior representatives of the 
government, regulatory agencies, industry bodies and professional associations, was 
given a mandate to review the practice of corporate governance in Malaysia and to 
recommend legal reforms that potentially strengthen the effectiveness of corporate 
governance (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; Nor Azizah and Halimah 2007). A number of 
deficiencies in corporate governance practices have been recognised in the country, 
which are mainly attributable to ownership concentration, the efficacy of boards of 
directors, shareholder passivity, enforcement mechanisms, and the lack of 
responsibility awareness by directors (Othman 1999). Besides, weaknesses were also 
identified in a few areas, – e.g. the transparency and disclosure requirement and the 
right of minority shareholders. 
 
In March 2000, the FCCG issued the MCCG based on the earlier report that they had 
produced. The MCCG is largely derived from the recommendations of the Cadbury 
Report (1992) and the Hampel Report (1998) in the UK (Code 2000; Haniffa and 
Hudaib 2006). The report consists of 70 recommendations relating to three matters: (i) 
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the proposed Code; (ii) the reform of laws and regulations on the duties of directors 
and officers, improving disclosures, enhancing the rights of shareholders and 
improving the effectiveness of company meetings; and (iii) the training and education 
of directors. The aim is to set the practices for the industry, as part of a series of 
government measures to boost confidence in the Malaysian economy. 
 
2.4.3.2 Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) 
The MICG was established under the Companies Act 1965 in March 1998 by the 
High Level FCCG. Many objectives have been outlined to be achieved by MICG, 
among them to provide consistent education and to raise awareness of the practice of 
good corporate governance among corporate participants, the investing public and 
corporations. The importance of good governance is emphasised in enhancing long-
term shareholder value, company financial viability, and to provide advisory, 
technical and support services to assure the successful implementation of corporate 
governance best practice.   MICG working  closely with the relevant authorities and 
regulatory agencies to make this feasible.  
 
2.4.3.3 Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
In order to protect the interests of minority shareholders, the government of Malaysia 
has taken the initiative of establishing the MSWG in the year 2000. Over time, 
MSWG has evolved to become an independent research organisation to investigate 
corporate governance matters in Malaysia’s corporate environment. MSWG provides 
a platform for the collective voices of minority shareholders to encourage good 
governance practice amongst Malaysian PLCs with the aim of increasing the 
shareholders’ value over time. Among the main functions of MSWG is the provision 
of advice to minority shareholders during the voting process in the Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) and the Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) of public listed 
companies. The establishment of MSWG is believed to be the first step taken by the 
government to encourage shareholder activism without recourse to courts.  
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There are number of ways to achieve the aim of MSWG, and among them are 
monitoring any breach and non-compliance in corporate governance practice by 
PLCs, developing and disseminating the educational aspects of corporate governance, 
becoming a resource center for minority interests and corporate governance matters in 
Malaysia and a few others as listed in the MSWG objectives as set out in a Charter 
under its Memorandum and Articles of Association. For more information about the 
MSWG, please refer to this link: http://www.mswg.org.my/web/page. 
 
The structure of the evolution of corporate governance in Malaysia may be 
summarised in the following figure: 
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Figure 2.4: Background of the corporate governance structure in Malaysia 1996 - 
2012 
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2.4.4 The Institutions: Performance, Challenges and What Lies Ahead? 
Malaysia is one step ahead in promoting and developing a comprehensive corporate 
governance system compared to her neighbouring countries. This claim is based on 
the survey conducted by KLSE-PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2002, where the results 
indicate that 93% of the investors agreed that Malaysia’s standard of corporate 
governance has improved since the introduction of the Code.  
 
Although positive feedback has been received from investors, Malaysian corporations 
are yet to achieve a satisfactory level of corporate governance practices and 
compliance. The joint study conducted by the emerging market investment bank 
CLSA and Asian Corporate Governance 2003, ranked Malaysia as number one (9 out 
of 10) in terms of rules and regulations but only managed to obtain an average score 
of 5.5 out of 10 for overall corporate governance practice (Zulkafli et al. 2005).  
 
Considerable numbers of studies have been conducted to measure the impact of the 
Code. One such study has compared Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, and it was 
found that Singapore offers the best corporate governance environment in Asia, while 
Malaysia has shown significant improvement since 2001. However, Thailand lags 
behind (CLSA 2001; 2003). A later study by Allen (2005) indicates the same result 
for Singapore, but that Malaysia and Thailand have improved. Chuanrommanee and 
Swierczek (2007) have otherwise argued that the practice of corporate governance 
only applies in the documents of companies and does not have an impact on company 
performance. The implication of this claim is that corporate governance in Asian 
countries is more an illusion than a fact. 
 
Tam and Tan (2007) claim that the Code as introduced is not convincing enough to 
address the significant issue of the expropriation of minority interests by controlling 
shareholders, as the rapid growth of Malaysia’s economy has not diluted the 
concentrated ownership structure in Malaysian firms. The inception of MSWG 
provides an avenue to protect the interest of minority shareholders. Unfortunately, the 
effectiveness and independence of the group still invites scepticism as the board of 
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directors and the management of MSWG are dominated by the key players from the 
trust funds, which are also the large institutional shareholders in the corporate sector.  
 
Hence, Tam and Tan (2007) suggest the increasing of independence and transparency 
among policymakers and officers as a key to more effective corporate governance 
standards and practices in Malaysia. They further suggest that corporate governance in 
Malaysia needs to be better at being able to scrutinise and perhaps restrain the power 
of larger shareholders in order to protect the interests of minority shareholders. The 
views of many parties - for example shareholders, stakeholders, Bursa Malaysia, 
MICG, MSWG, etc. - are sought to understand the practicalities, challenges and 
expectations of inculcating high standards of corporate governance in listed 
companies and to ensure that the necessary principles and recommendations of best 
practices, to meet those standards, are available.  
 
Malaysia, as a developing country requires a huge amount of capital in order to 
sustain its economic growth. Foreign investors are the main capital contributors, and 
play a crucial part in realising the country’s Vision 2020. However, they view 
investment more cautiously by relying heavily on corporate governance practices, 
which stress investor protection to ensure that their investments are safe and not 
expropriated by the substantial shareholders. Thus, the following sections and sub-
sections of this chapter will discuss foreign investment and corporate governance in 
Malaysia’s setting in greater detail.  
 
2.5 Foreign Investment 
Domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world 
(Giannetti and Koskinen 2010). In response to this, many capital markets have been 
liberalised (Li 2003). Das (2014) addresses this as a privilege to foreign investors to 
make cross-border diversification, whilst on the other hand, Bekaert et al. (2002) 
imply that this is an opportunity for the developing capital market to access sources of 
finance from outside investors which apparently becomes increasingly important. 
Therefore, the study of foreign investment is not considered to be something new, as 
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many researchers believe that the benefits which could be derived from this activity 
are indisputable (Chihuang and Cheng-Yi 2001; French and Poterba 1993; Leuz et al. 
2010; Tesar and Werner 1995)  
 
Flows of international capital to developing countries have had a significant impact on 
the growth of their economies. According to Hoti (2004), these outside sources for 
developing countries have fluctuated significantly over the last three decades. They 
help to finance investments, and simultaneously stimulate economic growth, thereby 
smoothing out consumption and subsequently increasing the standard of living in the 
countries (Calvo et al. 1996). In addition, Aggarwal et al. (2005) assert that the 
demand for emerging firms’ shares can lower their capital cost (Das 2014) and enable 
them to compete more efficiently in the global market. On the other hand, developed 
countries, through their portfolio investment in developing markets, can gain a better 
international diversification, which provides support for pension funds and their future 
retirement accounts (Calvo et al. 1996; Hoti 2004). During the period 1970 - 1990, 
international capital flows to emerging countries were mainly in the form of direct 
lending from banks to governments and/or to the private sector. However, in the 
1990s, capital flows took the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio 
investment, hereafter in this study referred to as foreign equity ownership (FEO).  
 
This study will focus on FEO, which has played a crucial role, since the investment 
mostly incurs a large amount of money, which can stimulate the growth of a company 
as well as the country. Given the growing significance of foreign financing and the 
fact that access to foreign capital may well be uneven across firms and countries, it is 
important to have a deeper understanding of the factors that make investors shy away 
from providing capital to foreign firms (Leuz et al. 2010). It is understood that only 
selective companies are able to attract foreigners to invest and inject capital into their 
companies. A number of articles (for example, Aggarwal et al. 2005; Dahlquist and 
Robertsson 2001; Das 2014; Kang and Stulz 1997; Leuz et al. 2010; Lin and Shiu 
2003 etc.) have determined that there are certain attributes and criteria that contribute 
to this event. 
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Lin and Shiu (2003) posit that global investors are believed to make their investment 
selection by considering specific factors that can benefit them. Empirical evidence 
concerning the main causes of international capital inflows, in general, are mixed. 
Hoti (2004) believes that there are various factors which have influenced the decisions 
of foreign investors regarding driving capital inflows into emerging markets whether 
at country level or firm level. Based on the results exhibited by Aggarwal et al. 
(2005), steps can be taken at both levels to attract foreign capital and create an 
environment conducive to foreign investors.  
 
2.5.1 Foreign Investment at Country Level 
At the country level, Boubakri, Cosset, Guedhami and Omran (2007) have examined 
the determinants of foreign investors’ involvement in the privatization process of 
developing countries. Results show that such investors prefer to invest in an investor-
friendly institutional environment which is strong in shareholder rights and interest 
protection (Leuz et al. 2010), in larger firms in high growth economies, and in socially 
stable countries. Delois and Beamish (1999) studied Japanese behavior in nine 
countries in the South East Asia region, and reported that international experience is 
an advantage, and a strong institutional environment can also lead to an increase in the 
equity acquisition of the foreign investor. Aggarwal et al. (2005) find that US funds 
invest more in open emerging markets with better accounting standards, shareholder 
rights, and legal frameworks. High quality accounting information allows foreign 
investors to monitor, protect their investment and efficiently allocate investment.  
 
La Porta et al. (1997) postulate that investor protection at the country level has a 
positive impact on market development. For example, even though foreign investors 
disfavour  a company with a high level of insider ownership, which is likely to be 
associated with opportunistic behavior such as expropriation, they still have the faith 
to invest if the countries have strong laws and enforcement agencies to monitor their 
local companies (Leuz et al. 2010). A strong institutional environment, which 
emphasises investor protection, may make it difficult and costly for insiders to 
manipulate a firm’s wealth and activities. Hence, a strong institutional environment 
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can be associated with fewer governance problems. However, this finding contradicts 
the results of Das (2014), who argues that a firm’s level of corporate governance plays 
an important role in attracting foreign investors. It is not a substitute for country level 
governance as suggested by Leuz et al (2010), but rather they act as a complement to 
each other.  
 
2.5.2 Foreign Investment at Firm Level 
At the firm level, the study conducted on Swedish firms shows that foreign investors 
favour larger firms, firms paying low dividends, and firms with a large proportion of 
cash position (Dahlquist and Robertson 2003). They also found that market liquidity 
and presence in the international market, measured through export sales or listing on 
other exchanges, seems to attract more foreign holdings. Similarly, Aggarwal et al. 
(2005) noted the preference of U.S institutional investors for allocating their 
investments to emerging equity markets. In addition, the qualities of the auditor (Das 
2014), the preparing of a consolidated financial statement, and the use of a reliable, 
internationally-recognised accounting standard are also dominant determinants for 
foreign investors to allocate their investments.  
 
Associated studies, for example, Kang and Stulz’s (1997) study of the Japanese 
market, have reported that foreign investors favour large firms and firms that have a 
considerable proportion of export sales in international markets. This is consistent 
with the findings of Lin and Shiu (2003) concerning the Taiwan stock market. In 
addition, Kang and Stulz (1999) discovered that foreign investors in Japan tend to 
underweight smaller and highly leveraged firms. Covrig, Lau and Ng (2006) have 
investigated foreign funds’ manager behaviour in investment allocation decisions and 
they arrived at similar conclusions. Falkenstein (1996) investigated a cross-section of 
U.S. open-ended mutual fund equity holdings for the years 1991 and 1992, and 
revealed that mutual funds have a significant preference for firms with high visibility 
and low transaction costs.  
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The analysis by Dahlquist and Robertson (2003) revealed that foreign and institutional 
ownership can be characterised by similar attributes. Their finding supports the results 
of Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (1999). Falkenstein (1996) 
documented that U.S mutual funds tend to diversify their portfolio towards large 
firms, whilst Gompers and Metrick (1999) found that American institutions invest in 
firms that are larger, more liquid, and have had relatively low returns during the 
previous year. These findings mirror the study by Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) 
regarding foreigner investing in Sweden.  
 
However, Leuz et al. (2010) and Das (2014) contend that information problems are 
likely to play a major role in investment decisions. Therefore, foreign investors avoid 
investing in poorly governed firms, as they are at an informational disadvantage 
compared to the local investors. These information asymmetries are particularly 
pronounced when it comes to evaluating a firm’s governance and ownership structure. 
Many firms around the world are family-controlled or family businesses. The control 
structures that arise from this type of management structure are often complicated, and 
can provide minimal protection to the outside investor’s rights (La Porta et al. 1997, 
2000). As a consequence, firms with potentially problematic governance structures are 
particularly avoided by foreign investors as they will add to their information and 
monitoring cost (agency cost) (Leuz et al. 2010). 
 
2.5.3 Home Bias 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999), on the other hand, find evidence of a preference among 
U.S. investors for geographically close investments. This is consistent with the model 
proposed by Merton (1987), which indicates that investors rationally invest in firms 
which are better informed and well protected; as has been phrased by Huberman 
(2001), “familiarity breeds investment”. Another popular term in foreign investment 
literature is that of “home bias”. This refers to the explanation about why investors 
show a preference for investing in their home countries (Dahlquist and Robertsson 
2001). Their explanation is that international investors face barriers, either implicit 
and/or explicit, in selecting and investing in a firm’s shares.  
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Explicit barriers include foreign exchange control, withholding taxes and other 
directly observable obstacles. However, many believe (Cooper and Kaplanis 1994; 
French and Poterba 1993; Tesar and Werner 1995) that explicit barriers no longer 
exist in developed markets. Implicit barriers, on the other hand, include political risk 
and informational asymmetries. Investors prefer not to make investment in countries 
with political uncertainty, as they are afraid of facing trouble in retrieving their 
income and capital (Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001). Foreign investors also try not to 
get involved in a country or firm where they find less information available to them, 
as suggested by Merton (1987), Huberman (2001) and Kim et al. (2010), who  argue 
that investors prefer firms with which they are familiar. This is also suggested by Leuz 
et al. (2010); information problems faced by foreign investors are more prevalent in 
countries with low disclosure requirements and poor and weakly enforced governance 
rules and investor protection. More detail on information asymmetry will be given in 
the following section.  
 
2.5.4 Information Asymmetries 
It is well explained in many studies that foreign investors are in an adverse position in 
terms of obtaining information in relation to local investors (Choe, Kho and Stulz 
2005; Das 2014). In obtaining the information, foreign investors have to incur extra 
costs, which make the investment more expensive to them. With incomplete 
information due to cross-border investment, foreign investors are prone to 
underweight the stock, and prefer to find the stock with which they are familiar 
(Merton 1987). This predicted behavior is explained by Leuz et al. (2010) when they 
claim that foreign investors find it difficult to estimate the real value and risks 
associated with the firms, and are therefore unable to predict how far expropriation 
can be pervasive. The claim made by Merton (1987) has received special attention, 
and evidence is offered to support his view (for example, Covrig et al. 2006; Kang and 
Stulz 1997). The results reinforce the view that foreign investors decline to invest in 
stock with an information asymmetry problem.  
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Nevertheless, the information asymmetry problem can be overcome by foreign 
investors if they invest in firms with better corporate governance practices (Das 2014). 
It is well accepted that corporate governance is one of the tools which can be used to 
reduce the information asymmetry problem and it can lower the monitory cost 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Furthermore, there are more benefits to be gained from 
good practice corporate governance, for example in terms of firm performance (Weir 
and Laing 2000), increased CEO turnover related to poor performance and the CEO 
duality issue (Dahya et al. 2002), changes in board structure, and the proportion of 
independent directors (Stiles and Taylor 2001), etc. Therefore, foreign investors and 
the link with corporate governance is given special attention by researchers, especially 
after the AFC 1997/1998 (Bokpin and Isshaq 2009).  
 
2.6 Foreign Investment and Corporate Governance 
As mentioned above, growing interest in the issue of foreign investment and corporate 
governance was given a boost especially after the AFC 1997/1998.  Other benefits can 
be generated from the good practice of corporate governance in firms. It is widely 
accepted that corporate governance generates investor goodwill and confidence 
(Bokpin and Isshaq 2009) and enhances the flow of information in firms (Ferreira and 
Laux 2007). Furthermore, there is evidence that countries with effective corporate 
governance systems attract investors beyond their boundaries (La Porta et al. 1999), 
and simultaneously, this helps local companies to prosper (World Bank 2000). At the 
same time, the countries involved will become the investor’s choice (Dunning 1993) 
for making investments, and concomitantly, this will contribute to economic growth 
(Levine 1999).  
 
Empirical evidence also suggests that foreign investors avoid investing in developing 
countries because of their weak corporate governance structures and disclosure 
(Coombes and Watson 2001; Gibson 2003; Johnson et al. 2000; Mangena and 
Tauringana 2007). This is also echoed in the findings of Aggarwal et al. (2005) who 
claim that firms with a better accounting quality and corporate governance attract 
more foreign capital. Considerable numbers of previous studies (for example see La 
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Porta et al. 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1997) have associated weak corporate 
governance with developing countries. Apparently, recent studies (Das 2014; Kim et 
al. 2010; Leuz et al. 2010) consistently claim poor corporate governance as one of the 
factors that draws considerable attention from outside investors and regulators. They 
assert that outside investors discount the price they are willing to pay for shares in a 
firm with potential governance problems. All the associated studies indicate strong 
evidence to show that a poor corporate governance system in developing markets may 
affect the inflow of foreign investment. 
 
In addition, Dahlquist et al. (2003) suggest that there is a close relationship between 
corporate governance and the portfolio composition held by foreign investors. 
According to Cheung and Chan (2004), corporate governance has been receiving 
attention from regulatories bodies and practitioners worldwide since the early 1990s,  
with the intention of improving investor protection and providing more transparent 
information. This will result in enhancing the development of local capital markets 
and promote foreign investment to provide funds for long term economic 
development.  
 
Kim et al. (2010) further argue that the assessment of corporate governance practice 
may result in the different decisions between foreign and local investors. The former 
group needs to assign higher monitoring costs in comparison to the latter group, and 
therefore may discount corporate governance more severely than domestic investors. 
Notably, Leuz et al. (2010) found evidence that US investors hold significantly lower 
shares in firms which have managerial control and significant family ownership, when 
these firms reside in countries with a poor disclosure requirement, securities 
regulation and investors’ rights. In contrast, firms with significant managerial and 
family control do not experience lower foreign investment when they are domiciled in 
countries with a strong disclosure requirement and extensive investor protection. They 
also found that U.S investors, which represent about half of all foreign investment 
worldwide, do in fact hold fewer shares in foreign firms with a higher level of 
managerial and family control, as this kind of ownership structure makes it more 
conducive for expropriating minority shareholders. 
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2.7 Malaysia, Foreign Investment and Corporate Governance 
The development of the equity market in Malaysia was significantly influenced by the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) enacted in 1971 and the Industrial Coordination Act 
(ICA) 1975 (Gomez and Jomo 1997). The ICA 1975 liberalised the NEP to be more 
“accommodative” towards non-Bumiputera and foreign investors (Heng 1997). In 
addition, starting in the early 1990s, foreign funds began to increase as a result of the 
liberalisation of capital flows, which led to a remarkable increase in portfolio 
investment (Suto 2003). Political stability played an important role in ensuring a 
business-friendly environment and vigorous growth in foreign investment, which is 
documented in the increase from M$287.6 million in 1970 to M$15 billion in 1996 
(Thanoon et al. 2006). Nevertheless, not long after this, the inflow of capital once 
again tensed as a result of the AFC of 1997 (Tam and Tan 2007).  
 
The Securities Industry Act (1973 and 1983) became a framework for investor 
protection in Malaysia (Jomo 1995). However, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that the 
enforcement was not effective, and thus has resulted in an adverse effect on the 
development of financial markets in Malaysia. In a further investigation, La Porta et 
al. (2000) claim that foreign investors tend to shy away from making investments in 
firms if the available legal framework does not guarantee their interests, and their 
rights cannot be protected.  
 
According to the survey conducted by Thanoon et al. (2006), in the aftermath of the 
AFC of 1997, the growth of real GNP in nominal terms declined by 4.8 percent in 
1998. Per capita income contracted by 1.8 percent to M$11,835 in 1998, compared 
with M$12,051 in the year before. FDI shrank from a high of M$15.3 billion in 1997 
to M$7.1 billion by the end of 1998, mainly due to the riskiness in turbulent exchange 
rates following the currency crisis. Both external and internal demand fell steeply, 
which led to excess capacity and a tensed liquidity position. The overall financial 
position of the country documented a deficit in 1998 - most certainly due to the 
shortage of tax revenue collection, which dropped by 13.6 percent to M$55 million in 
1998 (1997: M$70.2 million). The deficit recorded in the service account was largely 
caused by the higher net outflow of investment.  
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Foreign investors played an important role in supporting the growth sustainability of 
the Malaysian economy before the AFC 1997/1998 (Suto 2003). Indeed, several 
studies have documented the importance of foreign capital to the economic progress 
of Malaysia for the past two decades, for example a study by Thanoon and 
Baharumshah (2003) finds a positive relationship between foreign investment and 
economic growth in Malaysia. According to Thanoon et al. (2006), Malaysia has 
actively sought international funding from the United States and Japan. It is to be 
noted that US institutions, including mutual funds, constitute the largest sources of 
equity capital in the world, where collectively they hold more or less one-third of the 
world’s foreign investment. Salina and Jarita (2009) reinforce this claim by 
demonstrating that on average, in 1991-2007, of the total foreign ownership in 
Malaysian companies, 80% came from four countries – the US, the UK, Singapore 
and Hong Kong:  for example in 2007, the US (20%), the UK (22%), Singapore 
(23.2%) and Hong Kong (17.4%). More specifically, in 1991, the average value of 
foreign ownership from these four countries was around 94.4%.  Therefore, consistent 
with the claim made by Leuz et al. (2010) and Thanoon et al. (2006), the major 
foreign investors investing in Malaysia are the US, the UK, Singapore and Hong 
Kong. 
 
A considerable number of articles (for example, Dahlquist and Robertson 2001; Kang 
and Stulz 1997; Merton 1987; etc.) argue that foreign investors have a preference for 
firms having attributes with which they are familiar and about which they are well-
informed. Thus, it is likely that they would place more emphasis on the firm’s 
management, which, subsequently, disciplines them, whilst reducing the information 
asymmetry problem between managers and shareholders. However, Suto (2003) 
argues that if foreign investors were ‘myopic’, or not well-informed, they would not 
be capable of contributing to mitigating agency cost and would possibly disrupt the 
disciplinary function of the shareholders.  
 
The above argument, however, was not held to be true when Suto (2003) found a 
negative relationship between FEO and the debt ratio in most cases. This suggests that 
increasing foreign ownership contributes to the disciplining of corporate management, 
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and this can be considered as a positive sign indicating the high profitability or high 
growth of firms. Interestingly, Suto (2003) also discovered a negative relationship 
before and after the crisis 1997. Therefore, it is believed that foreign investors, as 
shareholders, played a certain role in disciplining corporate management in Malaysian 
firms.  
 
The following Table 2.4 provides a brief comparison of the corporate governance 
systems in Malaysian companies with the countries providing FEO. Based on the facts 
presented in the previous discussion, four major investors’ countries are the US, the 
UK, Singapore and Hong Kong.  
 
Table 2.4: The Comparison of Corporate Governance System in Malaysian 
Companies and Major Investor Countries. 
 
Corporate Governance Practice 
Countries 
Malaysia US UK Singapore Hong 
Kong 
 
A. Stakeholder Interest 
Shareholders’ interest is considered 
as the top priority to the companies. 
The main objective of the companies 
is to maximise shareholders’ values. 
Managers’ performance are also 
evaluated on the basis of how well 
they have contributed to improving 
shareholders’ values.  
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
/ 
 
B. CEO Duality 
 
The roles of chairman and chief 
executive should be separated and 
not to be exercised by the same 
individual.  The roles and 
responsibilities for each designation 
should be clearly established, set out 
in writing and agreed by the board.  
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
Having dual 
role is the 
norm 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
/ 
 
C. Board Size 
 
There is no fixed number for board 
size to be applied. It is not prescribed 
in any of their rules and regulations. 
 
 
/ 
Notes:  
Board 
 
 
/ 
 
 
/ 
 
 
/ 
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However, the size must be sufficient 
that the balance of skills and 
experiences is appropriate.  
 
composition 
should be 
assessed 
periodically 
to ensure the 
efficient 
board 
membership 
mix. 
 
D. Board Member Selection 
 
Nomination committees should be 
responsible to oversee the selection 
of members to be appointed to the 
company’s board of director.  
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
E. Independent Non-Executive 
Board Director 
 
Board composition should be 
composed of significant proportion 
of independent non-executive 
directors (INED) in order for the 
board to be effective.  
 
Notes:  
In Malaysia, it is recommended that 
INED making up at least 1/3 of the 
board. 
 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
/ 
 
Notes:  
INED 
making up 
at least 1/3 
of the 
board 
 
 
 
/ 
Sources: Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism, the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, the Hong Kong Code on 
Corporate Governance Practice and Singapore Code on Corporate Governance. 
 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter has presented the narrative story of the background to corporate 
governance around the world. It started with a general discussion of corporate 
governance, and then proceeded to encompass the corporate governance practices in 
major developed economies, such as the US and the UK. Next, the discussion steered 
towards Asian countries, and finally, focused on Malaysia’s institutional environment 
in the aftermath of AFC 1997/1998. The discussion of corporate governance was 
linked to foreign investment, as a basis for the analyses of the nexus between them in 
later chapters.  
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In brief, the chapter contrasted the practices of corporate governance in the developed 
capital markets (of which there are two major models - the Anglo-American model 
and the stakeholder model) with the emerging equity markets, which it achieved by 
outlining their differences regarding characteristics, mechanisms and practices. Next, 
the chapter proceeded by discussing the typical characteristics found in the Asian 
markets, which were hit the hardest by the financial turmoil in 1997/1998. 
Subsequently the chapter focused on Malaysia to obtain a deeper understanding of its 
unique characteristics, thus enabling the arguments to justify the hypotheses.  
 
In addition, based on the theoretical and empirical literature, the current chapter also 
assessed the recent developments and reformation of corporate governance in 
Malaysia. Consequently, the following chapters  use this chapter as a fundamental 
work in justifying the reasons behind the selection of the theories applied for the 
arguments (see Chapter 3) and in strengthening the hypotheses (see Chapter 4). The 
final chapter, Chapter 8, concludes the findings by referring to the supply of 
information from the current chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MULTI-THEORETICAL APPROACH:                  
AGENCY THEORY, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY, AND 
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 discussed the evolution of corporate governance in Malaysia, mainly 
stemming from the disastrous Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. The pressures for 
the reformation of corporate governance in this country resulted from the exigencies 
of institutional forces, both inside and outside the country (please revisit Chapter 2). 
As discussed, there were many reasons for the extreme changes in corporate 
governance; one of them was to regain investors’ confidence, both foreign and local. 
Therefore, highly credible theoretical explanations are required to justify the 
relationship between foreign investments and corporate governance practices in 
Malaysia, with the institutional forces and governance reformation in mind. 
 
Therefore, this chapter posits three theories to be employed as the underpinning lenses 
in explaining the relationship between corporate governance variables and foreign 
investments in Malaysia. The theories are agency theory, institutional theory and 
resource dependence theory. Hereafter, when the three theories are taken together, 
they will be referred to collectively as the ‘multi-theoretical approach’. Even though 
there are many other theories which are prevalent in corporate governance studies 
(e.g. stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, etc.), they are less relevant to the current 
study as the scope of the study is confined to examining foreign investors’ investment 
behaviour. More specifically their reaction towards the corporate governance system 
in Malaysian companies in relation to the institutional background in Malaysia’s 
unique corporate environment. 
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This chapter is organised into six sections, and three of them discuss each of the 
theories individually. After the introduction section, the chapter starts with a 
discussion of the multi-theoretical approach in Section 3.2, followed by more detailed 
arguments of each theory: agency theory in Section 3.3, institutional theory in Section 
3.4, and resource dependence theory in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 provides a 
summary of the chapter and a conclusion.   
 
3.2 The Multi-theoretical Approach (MTA) 
Most of the extant literature examines corporate governance variables in relation to 
foreign ownership using agency theory (Chizema and Kim 2010) and resource 
dependence theory as their theoretical lenses (Douma et al. 2006). However, the 
insights from these two theories are inept with respect to the firms in emerging 
economies with their different institutional backgrounds (Fama and Jensen 1983), 
which is in contrast to developed economies. Therefore, institutional theory is claimed 
to be the ideal theory to explain the institutional changes of corporate governance in 
Malaysia in the aftermath of the Asian financial Crisis (AFC) 1997/1998. Corporate 
governance in Malaysia is claimed to be undergoing transformation, especially after 
the AFC 1997/1998, which involves moving towards the Anglo-American corporate 
governance practice. In fact, the institutional framework is an element that is rarely 
disputed in the study of organisations (Peng 2002). The reformation of corporate 
governance is claimed to be influenced by the institutional forces which firms have to 
abide by in order to stay legitimate. These influences are generally considered as 
institutional frameworks (Scott 1995). Therefore, institutional theory is also proposed 
to be utilised in this thesis as an explanatory device for corporate governance changes.  
 
In addition, Eisenhardt (1989) and Oliver (1997) also assert that agency theory is 
insufficient to explain the event exclusively as the scope of the theory is only part of 
the world view. This is the main reason why agency theory is incapable of explaining 
the relationship between foreign ownership and corporate governance in Malaysian 
firms exclusively. Agency theory is too narrow to stand on its own in explaining this 
relationship, whilst at the same time the social elements embedded in the organisation 
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are prone to being ignored. Nonetheless, this theory still receives substantial attention 
because of its ability to allow researchers to be more circumspect in giving firmer 
conclusions concerning the investigated relationships.  Therefore, it is suggested that 
resource dependence theory and institutional theory be used to complement the 
agency theory in order to yield the rich perspectives for explaining certain events or 
pre-supposed relationships especially in emerging countries.   
 
In this light, a unitary perspective is inadequate. Thus, this study embraces a multi-
theoretical approach which espouses agency theory, institutional theory and resource 
dependence theory. Recently, the use of the multi-theoretical approach has received 
heightened interest to debate the issue of corporate governance (e.g. Douma et al. 
2006; Lynall et al. 2003; Ruigrok et al. 2006). The combination of these three theories 
assists in articulating the influences of the variables which affect the investment 
decisions made by foreign investors in emerging markets, by offering a more holistic 
perspective. Douma et al. (2006) assert that each theory plays its own role in 
explaining the characteristics of each variable. Sometimes these theories counteract 
each other, and at times they are in congruence in justifying the featured issues. The 
effects of each variable are further accentuated with the incremental value infused by 
the multi-theoretical approach (MTA). Figure 3.1 below depicts the MTA in 
examining the key variables for this study. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The Multi-theoretical approach in examining the relationship of 
governance variables-foreign ownership in an emerging market. 
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The figure above presents the relationship between corporate governance variables 
and FEO. These three dominant theories are utilised to provide reasonable 
justifications concerning what kind of relationship exists between corporate 
governance variables and FEO. The following section begins by discussing agency 
theory, and the subsequent sections discuss the remaining two theories.  
 
3.3 Agency Theory 
3.3.1 Overview 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory is explained by the 
principal-agent relationship, or its alternate name is principal-agent problem. The 
principal is the owner of the company, while the agent is the person or manager who 
is hired to perform some of the services on their behalf. These two parties have an 
interest in the same asset but in a different way, which may trigger a conflict of 
interest between them. This relationship involves the delegation of a certain amount of 
power to the agent by the company’s equity owners in order to make the company’s 
important decisions. On the other hand, the agent, by virtue of the economic contract 
has certain obligations to the principals (Culpan and Trussel 2005). In fact, agency 
theory uses the ‘contract’ to study the nexus between these two actors.   
 
The concept of the “modern corporation”, as introduced by Berle and Means in 1932, 
has led to agency theory becoming  one of the more popular explanations for the 
separation between ownership and control in the company. In the era of the “modern 
corporation”, it is difficult for a corporation to be controlled by the sole owner. The 
ownership of the modern corporation is widely diffused, whereby the shares in large 
corporations can be owned by the public at large, due to their huge capital 
requirements. The extended ownership in a company creates what Berle and Means 
(1932) call a “quasi-public” company. This refers to its characteristics, which are its 
tremendous size and its reliance on the public market for capital. Therefore, multiple 
owners are normally prevalent in tandem with the abrupt growth of modern 
corporations. 
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In order to represent the multiple owners of the company, there is a separation of 
ownership and control, claimed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) to be the main trigger 
of the agency problem. The actual operations of the firm are carried out by managers, 
and they are accorded certain powers to control the company to maximise shareholder 
wealth. Generally, the principals are not the major shareholders of a firm. This is 
typically associated with hired management working under dispersed ownership, 
where it is contended that the agency problem is very likely to occur (Turnbull 1977). 
Moreover, in order to supervise management, additional time and costs are incurred 
whereby the supervision initiated by a few principals would encourage the ‘free rider’ 
issue regarding other principals. However, Berle and Means (1932) assert that this 
separation has totally eliminated the control powers that have been previously 
exercised by the owners over the management. The unfettered power given to the 
management should be exercised wisely by managers and the owner's utmost welfare 
should always be their top priority.  
 
Unfortunately, a new dilemma has arisen whereby this responsibility turns into a dark 
opportunity for managers to reap benefits for themselves and level out the 
shareholders’ interests. John and Senbet (1998) propose two possible propensities for 
managers acting in this situation: (i) to expand their power of control in the 
organisation at the expense of the company’s shareholders and (ii) to finance only 
conservative and inferior investments to secure their position in the company or for 
other monetary compensation. As posited by Dimitris and Maria (2010), this theory is 
premised on the idea that the interests of the agent and the company’s owner are not 
perfectly aligned, or it is difficult or expensive to verify whether the actions taken by 
managers are for the interest of a principal or not.  The difference in attitudes towards 
risk possessed by the two parties leads to two different courses of action which may 
not be preferred by the principal.  
 
Eisenhardt (1989) has previously posited that agency theory is the best theory to 
provide an explanation concerning the divergent goals of the principal and agent in the 
company, as well as the problem of information asymmetry (Akerlof 1970). Agency 
theory assumes that both players in the agency relationship (principal vs agent) are 
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individualistic (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 1997) and utility maximisers 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). In this context, the agency conflicts that emerge are due 
to the agent that who is assumed to take actions that is not in the best interests of the 
company’s owners (principals). The actions which maximise the managers’ expected 
utilities are not necessarily perceived by the owners as the actions that can maximise 
their expected utilities (Watts 1977).  
 
In addition, the related problem of information asymmetry is claimed to arise when 
managers have superior access to the company’s information compared to the 
principals (Arnold and de Lange 2004). This exacerbates the agency conflict when the 
principals are not capable of controlling the agent’s activity, owing to the fact that 
there is a separation of ownership and control (Morris 1987). There are two agency 
problems that may result from the asymmetry of information: (i) the adverse selection 
problem – where the principals face difficulties in assessing the real skills and abilities 
possessed by the agent in performing their work and (ii) the moral hazard problem – 
where principals are not able to tell whether the agent is performing their job 
commensurate with their ability, or whether there is any shirking or consumption of 
perks (Arnold and de Lange 2004). This kind of action is very likely to happen when 
the activities that benefit the principals are costly to the agent. However, for principals 
to verify what the agent is actually doing is also expensive. Indeed, the principals may 
choose not to enter into transactions at all due to the fact that they might be exploited 
by the agents, despite the fact that both parties may gain benefits from the 
transactions.  
 
In much of the literature, agency theory has been used to shed some light and enhance 
some understanding of the problems that arise when the interests of the principal and 
the agent conflict with each other (Jensen and Meckling 1976), or when it is difficult 
(or expensive) for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing (Eisenhardt 
1989). A ‘conflict of interests’ arises from the varying goals that are sought by both 
parties (Eisenhardt 1989). The agent with their divergent interests will be motivated to 
pursue their own goals (Sundramurthy and Lewis 2003), rather than the value of the 
firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976). If this is not controlled, there is a likelihood that the 
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goal of the principals will be jeopardised for the sake of the agents’ whims and desires 
(Douma et. al 2006). 
 
In fact, there are three cost components that are identified as being associated with the 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976): i) monitoring costs – the costs that are 
incurred by the principal to ensure that the agent’s actions are aligned with the best 
interests of the principal, ii) bonding costs – these costs are borne by the agent in order 
to assure the principal that they will act in the best interests of the principal; 
otherwise, they will bear the compensation costs, and iii) residual loss - a reduction in 
the security, well-being and protection faced by the principal, by utilising all the 
monitoring and binding costs. The agency cost is then referred to as the sum of all 
these three costs.  
 
Thus, to ensure that the actions taken by the managers are aligned with the owners’ 
interests, they should be monitored. It is claimed that agency theory tries to deal with 
the goal alignment issue between the principal and the agent as well as reconcile the 
different risk tolerance between them. However, as emphasised by Eisenhardt (1989), 
agency costs are associated with these monitoring activities, and the costs of 
monitoring the agent’s actions and decisions are not cheap (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Moreover, a standard contract between the agent and the principal seems to be 
unavailable, especially for a large firm in developed countries. As an alternative, 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest few mechanisms to reduce the agency cost, for 
instance through formal contracts, board monitoring, executive compensation, 
information intermediaries, fear of firing, etc.  
 
Prior studies also suggest that the level of information disclosure in the company’s 
annual report may lessen the monitoring cost (Cooke 1993) as well as the bonding 
cost, as this provides a signal to the principals that the agents are following their 
agreement (Hossain, Tan and Adams 1994). This is consistent with the suggestions of 
Fama and Jensen (1983) that effective control procedures are needed to minimise 
agency costs. In Asian companies, the monitoring mechanisms applied include 
employing recognised external auditors and being listed in foreign listings (Claessens 
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and Fan 2002). Without efficient tools, the information asymmetry that emerges from 
the divergence of information and motivation between the agent and the principal may 
become more serious.  
 
As stated earlier, agency theory has garnered considerable attention from researchers 
as the conceptual basis for their studies on factors influencing company performance 
(Douma et al. 2006), nature, volume and type of information disclosure. In brief, 
agency theory can be summarised in the following Figure 3.2, whereby actors, issues 
and elements are inserted into the model to show their interaction with each other.  
The figure depicts the overall discussion of agency theory, whereby the agency 
relationship begins with the establishment of a contract between the principal and the 
agent. In brief, the contract sketches out the obligations that should be shouldered by 
both parties, but a few issues arise as the agent and the principal are in different 
positions and have different goals to achieve. Therefore, the issues of monitoring, 
information asymmetry, risk preference and conflict of interest arise, and hence 
require further clarification from the perspective of agency theory. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Agency theory, its issues and its elements 
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However, agency theory is frequently applied to countries with dispersed ownership, 
where there is a separation between ownership and control as in the US and the UK 
(Short and Keasey 1999). This is the main trigger that causes agency problems, as 
claimed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). On the other hand, the Malaysian capital 
market is widely known to be concentrated in ownership. Therefore, the utilisation of 
agency theory in this work emphasises the principal-principal problems, instead of the 
principal-agent problem that is prevalent in traditional agency theory.  The Malaysian 
concentrated ownership and the principal-principal problem are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
3.3.2 Concentrated Ownership in Malaysian Companies 
Malaysia is a unique country, whose governance system neither represents the 
shareholder system of the US and UK (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) nor the stakeholder 
system of Japan and Germany (Hall and Soskice 2001). In addition, as an Asian 
country, Malaysia shares the region’s common characteristics, such as its weak legal 
environment and a poor corporate governance system (Johnson et al. 2000). 
Moreover, the context is highly characterised by high levels of concentrated 
ownership, with controlling owners (La Porta et al. 2000) cross holding and pyramid 
corporate structures (Claessens et al. 1999; Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; Khatri 2001; 
Liew 2007; Lim 1981).  
 
In addition, for an emerging market like Malaysia, there are imperfections in the 
capital market which should be corrected. The system does not work independently, 
due to the absence of specialised intermediaries which are prevalent in the developed 
markets, synonymous with the ‘institutional void’9 (Khanna and Palepu 2000).  This 
flaw in the emerging markets, coupled with ineffective corporate governance practice, 
further increases the likelihood of expropriation by large shareholders with regards to 
                                                 
9   Institutional void is defined as “the lack of institutional facilities, norms, and 
regulations needed for a well-functioning economy” (North 1990). 
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minority shareholders. To remedy this corporate governance shortcoming, the Anglo-
American approach is established in Malaysia (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; Liew 2007).  
 
A different approach should be applied to solve the issue of corporate governance 
under concentrated ownership. Protection of the minority shareholders from 
expropriation by the controlling shareholders should become the paramount concern 
for emerging countries. In relation to the expropriation by managers, powerful 
shareholders have privileges, such that the agent may easily be ousted by them, or 
through hostile takeover (Douma et al. 2006). Therefore, controlling shareholders may 
also be considered as powerful agents for monitoring management action. 
 
Meanwhile, Morck et al. (1988) find an inverted “U-shaped” relationship between a 
company’s profitability and the degree of ownership concentration. The “U-shape” 
implies that, at a certain point in the relationship, the costs may outweigh the benefits. 
Beyond this point, a company’s profit may start to drop and the controlling 
shareholders may act to fulfil their own interests at the cost of the minority 
shareholders. On the other hand, the minority shareholders have to face large barriers 
and incur huge costs in voicing their views. The figure below is reproduced from the 
work of Douma et al. (2006) who envisage the ownership-performance relationship. 
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Source: Douma et al. (2006) 
 
Figure 3.3: The agency theory view: Ownership-performance relationship in 
emerging economies’ firms. 
 
As proposed by Douma et al. (2006), the above figure presents the view from agency 
theory using two dimensions: ownership identity and ownership magnitude. The 
impact of each relationship is projected in four quadrants. Quadrant three narrates the 
relationship between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders, 
whereby the performance of the firm is postulated as moderate. In this light, even 
though the controlling shareholders are inside and concentrated, which is a platform to 
manage the firm’s affairs competently, this also provides an opportunity for the 
expropriation of the minority shareholders
10
 (Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis 2000; 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000).  
 
Given the above, the structure of Malaysian firms can be characterised as unique from 
the agent-principal point of view, with agency problem appearing  to emerge due to 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed explanation on quadrant I, quadrant II and quadrant IV, please 
see Dharwadkar, George and Brandes (2000) and Douma et al. (2006). 
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the exploitation of the minority shareholders, not by the managers, but by the 
controlling shareholders (Baek et al. 2004; Young et al. 2008). This is consistent with 
the argument by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who state that the controlling 
shareholders are in a strong position to maximise their own goals at the expense of 
other shareholders.  
 
Considering this, a new perspective on corporate governance has been developed in 
emerging countries which focuses on the conflicts between the minority and 
controlling shareholders in a firm – the so called principal-principal model (Young et. 
al. 2008). This perspective arises from principal-principal goal incongruence, in 
opposition to the traditional agency problems which are based upon principal-agent 
goal incongruence in Anglo-American economies (Douma et al. 2006). This is 
believed to stem from the weakness of corporate governance practices in emerging 
economies (Claessens et al. 2000). Therefore, applying traditional perspective of 
agency theory as a theoretical lens is inadequate, and thus, emphasis on principal-
principal problem should be seriously considered.  
 
3.3.3 Principal-Principal Conflicts 
As explained beforehand, concentrated ownership has become a norm in many Asian 
countries, including Malaysia. This type of ownership has triggered a new conflict, in 
addition to principal-agent conflicts. The primary conflicts that occur in this type of 
ownership are between two classes of shareholders: controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders – both are principals. These conflicts are largely known as 
principal-principal problem. It can be illustrated in the following Figure 3.4: 
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Source: Peng (2006) 
 
Figure 3.4: The Illustration of Principal-Agent Conflicts vs. Principal-Principal 
Conflicts 
 
The main difference between principal-agent conflict and principal-principal conflicts 
can be seen from the illustration in Figure 3.4. In the countries with ownership 
concentration, where controlled by families is a norm, the  practice of appointing 
family members to the board of director is widespread. According to Peng (2006), 
approximately 57 per cent of the corporations in East Asia have board chairpersons 
and CEOs appointed from the members of controlling families. These families are 
capable of dominating the board because they are controlling shareholders.  
 
In this kind of scenario it is argued that family managers may override their traditional 
professional roles to increase the firm value, where they need to act as both principal 
Professional 
managers 
Minority 
shareholders 
Principal-agent conflicts 
Family 
managers 
Minority 
shareholders 
Principal-principal conflicts 
Controlling 
shareholders 
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and agent (managers) at the same time when making important decision for the 
company. As a result, family managers (who represent controlling shareholders) may 
be involved in the expropriation of minority shareholders in order to safeguard the 
interest of controlling shareholders (their family members), while the value of 
minority shareholders is  jeopardised. There are many ways that expropriation can be 
engaged in by family managers, for example – “tunnelling”, where managers can 
divert company’s resources for their family’s personal use (Peng 2006). Even though 
tunnelling is illegal, family manager may do this by partaking in related transactions 
that may conceal the expropriation activity, such as selling a company’s asset at lower 
market price to the related family’s company, purposely incorporated to make this 
kind of activity look like a normal transaction between two authorised parties (Peng 
2006).  
 
Normally, the formal institutional protection of minority shareholders in these 
countries is often insufficient, and biased in favour of controlling shareholders (Peng 
2006). The discussions, implications and effects of concentrated ownership, principal-
principal conflicts and minority shareholders’ treatment are further elaborated in the 
hypotheses development in Chapter 4, and the discussions of the results in Chapter 8. 
 
It is argued that in the Malaysian equity market, foreign investors are a group of 
investors that can be categorised under the class of minority shareholders. Consistent 
with the proofs of figures and facts provided by Leuz et al. (2010), Salina and Jarita 
(2009) and Thanoon et al. (2006) claim that the major foreign investors in Malaysia 
originate from Anglo-American countries such US and UK. Therefore, they are 
accustomed to the established set of corporate governance practices in developed 
countries and share similar values among them. In Malaysian capital market, which is 
synonymous with the concentrated ownership, family companies with controlling 
shareholders, the weakness of corporate governance and insufficient shareholders’ 
protection; the group of foreign investors sceptical and more wary of  executing 
further investment actions. The fear of being expropriated by controlling shareholders 
is pervasive. Thus, the inclusion of a principal-principal conflicts discussion is 
worthwhile in gaining a better understanding of this relationship. 
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Therefore, this study investigates the relationship between foreign ownership and 
corporate governance in Malaysian firms, by taking into account the insights gained 
from agency theory, emphasises on principal-principal problems as well as 
institutional theory and resource dependence theory (RDT) in order to improve the 
theoretical strength of the presupposed hypotheses. The next theory, which of 
institutional theory, is elucidated in the following section.  
3.4 Institutional Theory  
3.4.1 Overview 
Institutional theory is entrenched in the concepts of institution and institutionalisation 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). Thus far, there are no definitive definitions of institution 
and institutionalisation given by the institutional scholars, and there is little consensus 
among them. ‘Institutions’ and ‘institutionalisation’ are viewed from different 
perspectives by scholars, varying in the various disciplines and approaches (Scott 
1987). It is claimed that the institutional theory of organisations allows comprehensive 
views of organisations (Zucker 1987), and thus, this has become a dominant theory for 
studying organisations (Suddaby 2010). However, Zucker (1987) claims that 
institutional theory is difficult to explicate and through his work he tries to offer an 
explanation of this theory in a lucid way.  
 
According to North (1990), institutions can be prescribed as humanly devised 
constraints that can determine the form of interaction between people. In a similar 
way, Scott (1995: 33) defines institutions as “cognitive, normative, and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour.” These 
definitions are consistent with the definition of ‘institutional framework’ advanced by 
Davis and North (1971: 6) as “the set of fundamental political, social, and legal 
ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange, and distribution.” It is 
claimed that the existence of institutions can reduce the uncertainties found in 
everyday life, whereby a set of guidelines are prevailed upon to steer their actions 
(North 1990). Peng (2002) adds that uncertainties are lessened when institutional 
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frameworks communicate with organisations by providing clues about which possible 
courses of action are tolerable and able to be executed.  
 
In a wider context, it is important to note that the concept of institutions is not 
restricted to legal and regulatory institutions, such that ‘formal and informal aspects’ 
such as companies’ policies, cultural and societal norms (Aguilera and Jackson 2003) 
are also included. Institutional frameworks are composed of formal and informal 
constraints (North 1990). Formal constraints take into account all the political rules, 
the judicial verdicts and the economic covenant, whilst informal constraints may 
include embedded societal norms, behaviour and values as their culture and ideology 
(Scott 1995).  These two groups of constraints operate interdependently, whereby if 
formal constraints fail, informal constraints may automatically substitute the former in 
the role, in order to reduce the uncertainties and provide constancy to organisations 
(North 1990).  
 
Scott (2004) argues that institutional theory offers thorough and strong arguments in 
studying the aspect of social structure embedded in an organisation. He contends that 
the institution begins with the move to establish rules, norms and routines, which 
become the recognised guidelines for social behaviour. Thus, the chronology of when 
and how these elements are adopted, diffused, or created is examined, and how they 
become disused and subverted is deciphered. This concern echoes the study by 
Selznick (1996), who asserts that ‘value’ is the locus of institutional theory. Indeed, 
Selznick (1957) emphasises that “institutionalisation” is a process for instilling 
‘value’, which subsequently promotes stability in the structure of the institution, 
which are claimed to vary with each other. However, the concept of 
institutionalisation as proposed by Selznick (1957) is argued by Scott (1987) to 
remain definitional rather than explanatory, which is vague in its occurrence. Selznick 
(1957) contends that values are instilled, but the process of how these values are being 
instilled is not described. It is important to understand the values that matter, how to 
instil them into the organisations’ culture and social structure, and how they can be 
weakened or subverted. 
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Institutional theorists are interested in examining organisational structures, and they 
attempt to understand the process of institutionalisation over time (Meyer and Rowan 
1977). Selznick is among the earlier prominent institutional theorists. Selznick (1957), 
in his view, distinguishes between organisation and institution. He claims that the 
former is merely a technical instrument with a definite goal, while the latter may be 
partly engineered with the existence of a “natural” dimension. Nevertheless, later 
work by Berger and Luckmann (1967) shares the same view as Selznick (1957), 
whereby they emphasise an historical approach. They argue that every institution has 
its own history, and it is difficult to grasp the institution sufficiently without knowing 
its roots. One of their dominant views is the concept of social order, which then leads 
to their main argument that institutionalisation is a process of creating reality. They 
describe this process through three steps; externalisation, objectivity and 
internalisation. These steps are explained in the following order: the human actions 
(externalisation) are interpreted (objectivity) and the interpretations are shared with 
others (internalisation).  
 
The “routine” actions accepted by others with a similar meaning are defined as 
institutionalisation by Berger and Luckmann (1967). A social definition of ‘routine’ is 
elucidated by Zucker (1987) as the repetitive tasks performed by individual workers 
within an organisation. Thus, when managers, for example, claim that “this is how it 
should be done”, “everybody does it this way” or “only in this way things are done”, 
these justifications are referring to institutionalised activities (Oliver 1997).  
Therefore, in relation to institutions, institutionalisation is seen as a “process” of 
building the social values to be accepted and shared among the individuals concerning 
the way things are, what is perceived as important and how to do things (Scott 1987). 
 
The concept of institutionalisation held by Berger and Luckmann (1967) then 
becomes fundamental to the subsequent works by Zucker (1977) and Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) to analyse the forms of the organisation. Zucker (1977) studies the 
theory of the organisation, whilst Meyer and Rowan (1977) study the organisation as 
myth and ceremony. They are in agreement that institutionalisation is the social 
process, and the actors in the system accept the same meaning believed by others 
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concerning how things should be done. Nonetheless, there is no universal agreement 
as to its definition in the institutional school of thought. However, from the sea of 
definitions, it is interesting to note the definition by Scott (1995:33) which seems 
comprehensive but is not yet agreed as conclusive: 
 
“Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of 
resilience. They are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and 
regulative elements that, together with associated activities and 
resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. Institutions 
are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic 
systems, relational systems, routines, and artefacts. Institutions 
operate at different levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to 
localized interpersonal relationships. Institutions by definition 
connote stability but are subject to change processes, both 
incremental and discontinuous”. 
 
From this study’s vantage point, the above stated definition includes all the elements 
which are considered necessary to determine the emergence of an institution.   
However, the connotation that institutional theory refers to stability in the social order 
is not fully acceptable, as in the passage of time it cannot escape being plagued by the 
conflict and changes in social life (Scott 2004). Notwithstanding, choosing a precise 
definition of institution and institutionalisation remains arbitrary, as institutional 
theory can be reflected using several  different approaches (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991) which hinge upon many factors, and are subject to changes. Among the factors 
that lead to organisational changes are political, regulatory and technological 
complexities (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). The changing phases have to be 
confronted by organisations in order to survive and remain competitive (D’Aveni 
1994).    
 
The following Figure 3.5 depicts the above discussion on the institution and 
institutionalisation from the insights of many institutional scholars. The institution is 
claimed to be composed of formal and informal aspects (Aguilera and Jackson 2003) 
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and institutionalisation is defined from many perspectives, such as the process of 
instilling values (Selznick 1957), creating reality (Berger and Luckmann 1967), 
promoting stability and providing meaning (Scott 1995). 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Institution and Institutionalisation – Elements and Process. 
 
3.4.2 “Old” and “New” Institutionalism 
In order to review the state of institutional theory, there is a discrimination to be made 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutionalism, as proposed by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991). The former was focused on certain issues such as influence, coalitions, 
competing values, power and informational structures (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; 
Selznick 1957), whilst the latter accentuated legitimacy. According to Mizruci and 
Lisa (1999), prior to the 1970s, most of the organisational studies emphasised the ties 
between organisations and their environment. However, in the late 1970s, after a 
series of works in this area, the focus shifted and the new basis of organisational 
studies was formed. The new approach that emerged from the cumulative effect of 
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these organisational studies is now called the new institutional theory, or neo-
institutional theory (Mizruci and Lisa 1999).  
 
Neo-institutional theory, to a large extent, stems from three seminal works by 
institutional scholars, Zucker (1977), Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983). These three leading organisational studies of the neo-institutional 
theory have engendered fresh discernment of institutions, and have switched the focus 
of the institutional perspective (Selznick 1996). DiMaggio and Powell (1991:8), in 
their view, see new institutional theory as:  
 
“a rejection of rational actor models, an interest in institutions as 
independent variables, a turn toward cognitive and cultural explanations, 
and an interest in properties of supraindividual units of analysis that 
cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals’ 
attributes or motives”    
 
From the above view, Selznick (1996) argues that there are no significant differences 
concerning the definition of institution and institutionalisation. However, several new 
directions emerge. From the perspective of the classical model of institutions, 
economic choices are constrained by the technological, informational and income 
ceiling. However, this is disputed by the neo-institutional perspective, whereby 
economic choices are claimed to be constrained not only by the factors mentioned 
above, but also by socially constructed limits such as norms, habits and customs 
(Oliver 1997).  
 
New institutionalism focuses on expanding a sociological view of institutions by 
examining their interactions and how they can affect society. Through the view of 
neo-institutionalism, there is an awareness that institutions operate in an environment 
that is constituted of other institutions, which is referred to as the institutional 
environment. It is understood that each of the involved institutions can be influenced 
by its institutional environment. Each of them has a main goal, which is to assure that 
they can survive. In order to achieve that, they not only need to strive beyond 
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economic success, but also establish legitimacy within the institutional environment as 
well (Oliver 1997).  More specifically, the focus of this new strand of theory is to seek 
legitimation by organisations in order to sustain themselves in business.  Legitimacy is 
seen by Selznick (1996: 273) as the “organisational imperative that is both a source of 
inertia and a summons to justify particular forms and practices”.  
 
In order to achieve legitimacy, Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest that organisations 
should formulate stories about the actions they have taken that are compatible with 
society’s expectations. These stories play a symbolic role in placating the prospective 
influence of the public. This work is further developed by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) using the same theme, where they explicitly link it with the organisation and 
sociological theory. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) noticed the tremendous 
resemblance of organisations in a particular field, which then intrigued their interest to 
find possible explanations. Consistent with Meyer and Rowan (1977), it is argued that 
the similarity becomes highly visible as a result of institutional pressures which force 
organisations to take further actions to attain legitimacy within their wider 
environments (Mizruci and Lisa 1999). As suggested by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), 
organisations depend on resources from their environments to sustain themselves. 
This process is known as homogenisation, and to describe this process, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) adopted the ecological concept of isomorphism (Mizruci and Lisa 
1999).   
 
Two types of isomorphism have been identified, competitive and institutional 
isomorphism. Competitive isomorphism refers to the pressures that are derived from 
market competition, which can be from the local as well as the global organisational 
field (Hessels and Tersejen 2010). On the other hand, institutional isomorphism 
pertains to organisational competition for political and institutional legitimacy. 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983:150), institutional isomorphism is a useful 
tool for understanding the politics and ceremony that pervade much modern 
organisational life. One justification offered by Meyer and Rowan (1977) for 
isomorphism, is when organisations become similar to their environment either 
technically or by exchange of interdependencies, or both. It is argued that for this 
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study, this thread of organisational theory may be used as a premise to offer 
reasonable justifications of foreign investors’ investment behaviour in Malaysian 
companies.  A lengthy discussion of institutional isomorphism can be found in Section 
3.4.4 Institutional Isomorphism.  
 
Nevertheless, the use of institutional theory is pertinent to find sensible answers to the 
questions that are raised in this study. These are questions such as: What are the 
properties of the different views held by foreign investors when making investment 
decisions in the Malaysian capital market compared to other capital markets? How 
can the differences be explained? How can the presumed relationships be justified? 
and most importantly, which strand of institutional theory can offer the best 
explanation of the process of investment decision making by foreign investors in 
Malaysian PLCs?  
 
Therefore, as proposed by Powell (1996:297), to make further theoretical progress, the 
issues at hand must be tackled wisely and be examined from many angles such as 
“how they matter, under what circumstance, to what extent, and in what ways”. 
Therefore, institutional theory, under the new institutionalism which is focused on the 
strand of sociology specifically known as New Institutional Sociology (NIS), is found 
to be the most relevant organisation theory for responding to the research questions 
that were raised in Chapter 1. 
 
3.4.3 New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
There are two recognised models of organisational actor that have been employed in 
most of the social analyses - the rational actor model and the institutional model 
(Pfeffer 1981). Under the first model, the individual is assumed to act rationally when 
making decisions by considering all possible alternatives and continually checking the 
associated costs and benefits. Hence, this individual is perceived to seek the optimal 
solution when making decisions. On the other hand, the institutional model assumes 
that the decision made by an individual is mainly based on the existing social norms, 
and is not influenced by their personal interest. These two opposing views are claimed 
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to be being two ends of a continuum in the decision making process – thus the most 
fitting theory to justify these behaviours should be addressed (Tolbert and Zucker 
1999).  
 
One of the explanations put forward by NIS is that the behaviour of organisations is 
influenced by the forces that exist in the wider ‘society’. Society is defined by Clark 
(1962) as being comprised of institutions that interlock comfortably for the sake of 
efficiency, or as asserted by Parsons (2013) become the dominant value system. 
Modern organisations studies use this ‘society’ definition as the basis for their work. 
By adhering to the norms and rules that are valued by society at large, or at a smaller 
scope by certain institutions in society, legitimacy can be achieved. Institutional 
isomorphism is one domain in NIS that represents the manner in which organisations 
adopt similar procedures practiced by other organisations that are surrounded by the 
same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
 
3.4.4 Institutional Isomorphism 
The discussion presented in this section is a continuation of the discussion of 
institutional isomorphism that was made in Section 3.4.2. In the current section, the 
explication of institutional isomorphism goes deeper in order to substantiate the 
rationale for selecting this strand of organisational theory to provide a justification for 
foreign investor behaviour in the Malaysian market. As previously stated, the 
isomorphism concept is captured in one of the strands of institutional theory, which is 
the New Institutional Sociology (NIS). NIS primarily focuses on seeking explanations 
pertaining to the process of institutionalisation, which stems from societal forces 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983), and where the focus is particularly on answering 
questions concerning how and why organisations conform to institutionalised 
credence in society. 
 
It is argued that, to find legitimacy, the rule is to adhere to the values and norms that 
are accepted by society. Meyer and Rowan (1977) have previously contended that the 
influences of political power seem to escalate institutional legitimacy. This is 
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consistent with the later work by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who deny the claim 
that organisations are only concerned with competing for resources and customers. 
Oliver (1997) asserts that organisations strive beyond economic optimisation, 
whereby they are contended to strive for political power, social well-being, economic 
fitness and institutional legitimacy as well. Legitimacy is essential to organisations in 
order to be recognised by society, and in accessing external resources for 
sustainability and to compete in the market.    
 
In the early work of isomorphism, the institutional environment is portrayed as fixed. 
However,  Hannan and Freeman (1977) broaden this view by emphasising the process 
of competition that occurs between organisations, which then leads them to adopt the 
best structure for organisational layout in order to sustain them in the industry. The 
effect of institutional isomorphism is homogenisation, hence this will result in a 
decrease of variation and diversification among organisations. It is claimed that the 
level of homogeneity among organisations is increasing over time. The inexorable 
push towards homogenisation (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) forces the changes within 
the organisation to take place. The changes, however, are largely dependent on the 
environment in which the organisations operate.  Thus, the organisations change to 
become isomorphic with their environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Slack and 
Hinings 1994).  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 149) describe isomorphism as the “concept that best 
captures the process of homogenization” and can be explained as a tendency for 
countries and organisations to adopt similar institutions (e.g. corporate governance 
structures). Institutional isomorphism is claimed to emerge due to the desire of 
organisations to model themselves after other organisations that are perceived to be 
more successful (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). In this light, it is argued that 
institutional isomorphism is a domain of NIS that represents the efforts made by 
organisations to resemble other organisations and reduce the gap of disparity that 
exists between them. In fact institutional isomorphism is not a means to justify the 
difference between organisations, but the similarity that pervades organisations in 
their environment (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). This understanding of the 
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isomorphism concept is consistent with the description given by Hawley (1968) when 
he contends that isomorphism is a constraining process that pushes the actor in an 
institutional environment to resemble other actors as they are facing the same set of 
environmental conditions.  
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) assert that there are three important consequences for 
organisations derived from isomorphism with environmental institutions: i) the 
elements that have been recognised by society increase the degree of legitimation, 
rather than increase the organisation’s efficiency concomitant with the increasing 
level of commitment by internal and external participation in the institutional 
environment,  ii) the value of the organisation’s structural elements is defined by 
employing external assessment criteria, thus recognising the organisation as one of the 
subunits rather than a loose element in the institutional environment, and iii) the 
stability of the organisation increases while the potential upheaval decreases when 
organisations depend on the external institutional environment to decide on changes. 
Hence, for brevity, institutional isomorphism contributes to the success and 
sustainability of an organisation, which becomes the insulation for an organisation to 
fend off failure. 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three mechanisms through which institutional 
isomorphic change occurs, namely coercive, mimetic and normative. A discussion of 
each mechanism is given in the following sections. 
 
3.4.4.1 Coercive Isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism emanates from political force and seeks for legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). It is a result of both the formal and informal forces 
exerted on organisations by other coercive organisations. The organisations under 
pressure are the organisations dependent on other coercive organisation, and they need 
to abide by their insistence in order to survive and for their viability (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). Common examples of these actors (i.e. dependent organisation vs 
coercive organisation) are public companies vs government institutions. It can also 
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occur outside the governmental arena, such as parent company vs subsidiary 
company, etc. For example, the rules that have been enshrined in the Codes have to be 
followed by related organisations (for the first example), and the standard operating 
procedures and accounting reporting mechanisms applied in the parent company must 
be followed by the subsidiary companies (for the latter example).  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose that the greater the dependencies on the other 
organisation, the higher are the forces to become isomorphic with that organisation. 
This is coupled with the fact that the dependence on the organisation may be caused 
by them being the single source for vital resource, and further strengthens the 
pressure. In contrast, it can be understood that an organisation may opt not to obey the 
demands of an organisation that they are not dependent upon (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). However, it is asserted that disobedience to the rules, laws, structures etc. 
imposed by the greater institutions that they depend on, may be to the detriment of the 
organisations in terms of restrictions to the resources, and obstructions to involvement 
in any corporate transaction, etc.  
 
Even though the changes made are ceremonial, this does not mean that the changes 
are inconsequential (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
contend that when organisations are confronted with an uncontrollable situation, they 
seek for a higher power (e.g. the government) to fix the difficulties or provide for their 
needs (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Other than this, coercive power or authority 
power can ensue from more subtle and less explicit sources than those suggested 
above. Coercive isomorphism may also stem from the societal expectations or 
preferences in which the organisation operates. It can be in the form of force, 
persuasion or as an invitation to join in with the collusion. The adherence to societal 
expectation is essential in assisting with organisational sustainability, securing 
economic resources and their power  (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Oliver 1997). 
 
CHAPTER 3  92 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
3.4.4.2 Mimetic Isomorphism 
The second mechanism is mimetic isomorphism, which results from the uncertainty 
that pervades organisations. Mimetic action or modelling is the standard response to 
uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Organisations are claimed to be very 
sensitive to the cultural environment that surrounds them (Selznick 1996), and thus, 
uncertainty becomes the powerful push factor (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) to initiate 
the action of imitation of another peer that is perceived as a successful model.  
Mimetic action is considered as “a response of uncertainty” rooted in anxiety; it is 
compulsive rather than rationally taken as a solution to solve the organisation’s 
problem (Selznick 1996:273). New entrants into a highly uncertainty industry, in 
particular, will seek an established model in the field in order to imitate their practices 
to achieve viability and to be recognised by society.  
 
Apart from ‘uncertainty’, other issues that can encourage the imitation process, with 
respect to a superior model are ambiguous objectives, unclear solutions, less 
technological acumen, etc. within the company. The lack of well-defined technologies 
in organisations may permit them to bring in institutionalised rules and practices from 
well-established organisations that can increase organisational stability. Likewise, the 
ambiguous goals set by organisations may steer them to find a perceived successful 
model in order to imitate the design and learn the way they run their business. Even 
though there is an argument that copying another organisation may lessen the 
competitive advantage of an organisation, Maggio and Powell (1983) contend that this 
imitation may enhance organisational legitimacy and sustainability. The closest 
example for Malaysian companies is the imitation of the innovative management 
system, known as the 5S concept
11
, which was imitated by Malaysia from Japan. 
Malaysia adopted this practice in the mid-1980s.  
 
                                                 
11 The 5S concept is a systematic guideline, introduced by Japan in the early 1980s to 
assure the cleanliness, neatness and overall safety of the workplace 
environment.The application of this method by institutions will help to improve 
service quality, reduce cost and simplify work.  
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However, it is claimed that the modelled organisations may not be aware of the 
modelling process, as the process may be performed unintentionally, either indirectly 
through employee transfer or explicitly by consulting firms (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). The imitation process aims to enhance the organisation’s legitimacy; this effort 
has been taken to demonstrate that the organisation at least endeavours to improve the 
uncertainty that faces it. It is contended that the larger the organisation and the wider 
the customers served, then the pressure for the betterment of the organisation is more 
intense. Therefore, the organisation should be more serious in considering mimetic 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Organisations are prone to model 
themselves after identical organisations in their field which they perceive as more 
successful and legitimate. It may be  argued that having fewer exemplary models for 
imitation, results in a faster rate of isomorphism and more homogeneous 
organisational structures emerging in that field.  
 
3.4.4.3 Normative Isomorphism 
The last mechanism in institutional isomorphism is that of normative isomorphism. 
Institutional theorists such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
and Zucker (1987) suggest that organisations are shaped by the normative pressures 
which embrace them. Normative pressure may arise from external and internal 
sources. An example of an external source is the state, while an internal source is 
within the organisation itself (Zucker 1987). Within the organisation, normative 
isomorphism is argued to stem primarily from professionalism. Two aspects of 
professionalisation are the formal education received in a university and the growth 
and elaboration of professional networks, which enable new practices to be diffused 
easily across organisations.  
 
It is asserted that universities and professional training institutions play a vital role as 
a centre for encouraging and nourishing organisational norms and values among 
professional managers and management staff (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The 
formal education received in an established organisation, such as a university, can 
influence the development of professional norms and inculcate specific values in 
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people within the same setting. The values that are instilled during their upbringing 
and adolescence produce lasting effects within the individual. Thus, when they enter 
employment, they will hold these values within them, which enable them to be 
diffused easily into and across organisations.   
 
Similarly, professional associations for accountants, engineers, lawyers and financial 
analysts, amongst others, have escalated this recently. These professionals are bonded 
strongly with their respective professional bodies, which have embedded certain 
values to be applied by the members in the circle. As asserted by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983), those who have the same background, share common attributes and 
tend to view problems in parallel with each other, due to this significant influence on 
them and the values that have been instilled in them.  The strong ties with the 
professional bodies dictate the criteria for comparable professional behaviour 
(Greenwood and Hinings 2002).  
 
Focusing on the normative isomorphism that can dictate management behaviour, it is 
argued that managers operate within a standard working environment. They have a 
common set of rules, and interact with a regular group of people inside and outside the 
organisation. Their management action is influenced by normative constraints and 
embedded values, which will determine their ‘accepted’ and ‘proper’ professional 
behaviour (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Despite the location and the range of 
organisations in which managers work, normative pressure acts as a strong 
mechanism to create a pool of identical managers possessing a similar orientation, 
which may override the variation that exists due to the organisation’s tradition 
(Perrow 1974). These conditions lead the organisation to adopt legitimate elements, 
which expedite isomorphism with the institutional environment, hence securing the 
position of the organisation within the industry (Zucker 1987).  
 
It is argued that the institutional isomorphism process does not necessarily increase 
organisational efficiency. In fact, an organisation may take more requisite actions to 
become similar to the modelled organisation in order to gain more benefits from the 
parity. By being similar to the prestigious and reputed organisation, the organisation 
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finds it easier to deal with other organisations, to be recognised as legitimate, and to 
attract more professional staff etc. (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). It is claimed that in 
the organisation’s field (e.g. hospitals) where most of the professional staff are highly 
desired, the organisations advance the need for prestige and reputation to attract a 
professional and highly skilled workforce, because these people are considered as 
actual consumers that in return can attract more ‘real customers’ (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). Therefore, pressures for institution isomorphism are highly intense in 
certain areas of industry or certain fields in order to seek legitimacy and similarity to 
the modelled organisation in the environment where the organisation is operating. 
 
The following Figure 3.6 presents the mechanisms of the isomorphic changes which 
drive institutional change from the view of NIS. However, in this study, the discussion 
of isomorphism is merely focused on institutional isomorphism, which is coercive, 
mimetic and normative, as depicted in the figure. In fact, institutional isomorphism 
does not necessarily occur simultaneously for all mechanisms, it can occur through 
one or a combination of these three mechanisms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The 
end effect would be the changes in the organisational sphere, in terms of 
organisational structures, systems and activities. Further arguments and justifications 
based on these mechanisms will be presented in Chapter 4. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3  96 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
 
Figure 3.6: Towards the Homogeneity of Organisations 
 
3.4.5 Level of Analysis in Institutionalisation Process 
In fact, the basic premise of institutional theory is that firms are trying to conform to 
societal expectations, whether from their internal or external environments. This will 
lead to homogeneity among firms that is exhibited through their structures and 
activities. According to Oliver (1997:700), “the successful firms are those that gain 
support and legitimacy by conforming to societal pressures”. 
 
In order to be acclaimed as a successful firm and achieve sustainability, there is an 
awareness that each firm should undergo the institutionalisation process (Oliver 
1997). In the institutional theory view, institutionalised activities are the result of an 
interrelated process at three levels of analysis - individual, organisational and inter-
organisational (Oliver 1997). The following Figure 3.7 depicts the process.  
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Figure 3.7: Level of Analysis in Achieving Sustainable Advantage 
 
At the individual level, institutionalised activities are influenced by the managers’ 
norms, habits and their unconscious conformity with the organisation’s tradition 
(Berger and Luckmann 1967), whilst at the firm level, corporate culture, shared belief 
systems within the organisation and political process shape the institutionalised 
structures. Finally, at the inter-organisational level, pressures emerge from the 
government, other organisations in an institutional environment, industry alliances and 
societal expectations (rule, norms, standards, environment etc.). These pressures are 
consistently experienced by all the organisations in the same institutional background, 
thus initiating the move to imitate similar structures and activities or become 
homogenised with each other (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
 
Overall, discussion of institutional theory heretofore has been based on the general 
view of institutional theory at large, without specifying the institutional context.  
Therefore, the following Section 3.4.6 is drafted specifically to discuss the 
justifications as to why institutional theory is suitable to be applied to the Malaysian 
capital market and “isomorphic change” in the context of Malaysia. 
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3.4.6 Corporate Governance and “Isomorphic Changes” in Malaysia 
Based on the overview of institutional definitions and concepts, it is instructive for 
this study to embrace institutional theory as the theoretical lens. In the context of 
Malaysia, in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 1997/1998, the 
corporate governance structure has totally changed. Most of the key players in the 
economic system have begun to realise the potential consequences on economies of 
deficiencies in corporate governance. Initiatives have been taken by the responsible 
parties to reform their corporate governance with the intention of creating a better 
image of the country, subsequently attracting more foreign investors. This reformation 
has been proposed by many institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), in order to regain the confidence of investors. The Malaysian government, for 
instance, has played a diligent role in ensuring that this goal could be achieved. 
 
The crucial factor that enables the institutional perspective to be more strongly linked 
to Malaysia’s governance reformation is that large Malaysian firms were substantially 
dependent on government resources (Gomez 1994; Suto 2003). On the other hand, the 
government of Malaysia itself, aware of the role played by large firms in the country 
in stimulating the economy, sought to reform the corporate governance structure, 
consistent with the recommendations of the IMF for regaining the confidence of 
investors. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) assert that the institutional forces arising from 
organisations, in an effort to maximise shareholder value, place extreme pressure on 
firms in search of legitimacy to imitate or adopt the governance structures of Anglo-
American capitalism. This can become an indicator that a process of isomorphic 
change has occurred in the Malaysian institutional environment. 
 
Consequently, a few formal bodies have been established in order to review the 
corporate governance system and to provide recommendations for better practice. As 
a result, the Code on corporate governance was released in March 2000, and the 
adoption of this code can be seen as evidence of corporate governance reform. This 
marked the significant importance of corporate governance in Malaysia (Ponnu 2008). 
The reformation of corporate governance is viewed as a global phenomenon (Klapper 
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and Love 2004). Scott (1987) sees this as a pushing factor from the perspective of 
institutional theory; it has to be translated as a lawful need coming from society. 
 
Nevertheless, Chizema and Kim (2010) note that most of the literature on corporate 
governance reformation still employs agency theory as its theoretical premise. 
Moreover, this approach is claimed by Fama and Jensen (1983) to be suffering from a 
serious flaw if the capital markets that are examined are not liquid, and shareholder 
protection is not their precedence. This argument is supported by Dacin, Goodstein 
and Scott (2002) who suggest that different tools should be applied in different 
institutional contexts. Notably, institutional theory has been proposed by Aguilera and 
Jackson (2003) as well as by Buck and Shahrim (2005). They claim that institutional 
theory is an ideal framework to obtain insights into the analysis of corporate 
governance reform, and agency theory is under-utilised with respect to the social 
aspect of firms (Aguilera and Jackson 2003). 
 
Likewise, Douma et al. (2006) assert that by waiving institutional theory, the social 
facet embedded in the firm’s activity is likely to be overlooked, which may make it 
less easy to explain how the relationship of concern might occur. In order to regain 
investor confidence, Malaysia has geared up to reinforce its corporate governance 
practice and has undergone a process of institutional change following the AFC 
1997/1998; these actions can be translated as corporate governance reform. Thus, in 
this light, institutional theory is persuasive to be applied as one of the important theory 
for this study. Nevertheless, exclusive discussions of institutional isomorphism in 
terms of coercive, mimetic or normative in Malaysian institutional capital market are 
made explicit in the hypotheses development section in Chapter 4.  
 
3.4.7 Criticism of NIS 
Even though this thesis attempts to offer justifications concerning why NIS has been 
selected to explicate foreign investors’ investment behaviour in Malaysian corporate 
institutions, this strand of institutional theory is not free from criticism. It is worth 
emphasising the concerns surrounding this strand as claimed by a few scholars. It is 
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claimed that this theory is full of contradictions, depicting an organisation as a 
submissive institution and a passive recipient (Suddaby 2010) of its operating 
environment, which is claimed to be unduly constraining. However, this view has 
been corrected by DiMaggio (1988), who insists researchers to be more creative in 
understanding organisational behaviour that reflects and interacts with its institutional 
environments (Suddaby 2010). Moreover, it is argued that this theory fails to 
acknowledge the importance of the conflicts that pervade an organisation with undue 
concern given to myth and ceremony, thus overlooking the other aspects of the 
organisation which are power and control (Carruthers 1995). 
 
In addition, Greenwood and Hinings (1996) argue that the theory is less capable of 
examining and elaborating on the aspect of the internal dynamics of organisational 
changes, but gravitates towards exploring the similarity (isomorphism) of the 
organisation to its particular field of organisations. Thus, it is futile to study the 
process of organisational change as the theory itself does not offer much 
enlightenment on the change process (Ledford, Mohrman and Lawler 1989). Recently, 
Suddaby (2010) asserted that current work on institutional theory is still unable to 
provide an understanding as to why and how organisations serve their institutional 
environment.    
 
Furthermore, the focus of this theory is merely at the macro level – i.e. the changes in 
the institutional environment where the organisations operate, thus disregarding the 
micro level such as the changes in the organisational sphere (Scott 1991). The limited 
insights offered by this theory are argued to be inefficient, and thus comprehensive 
views and explanations of organisations cannot be achieved. Therefore, in order to 
provide an exhaustive understanding of foreign investors’ behaviour when making 
investment decisions concerning Malaysian companies, agency theory and resource 
dependence theory are brought forward to facilitate the understanding of organisations 
at the micro level, while institutional theory concentrates on explanations at the macro 
level, organisational setting and its framework. The following sections discuss the 
other one supporting theory, resource dependence theory. 
 
CHAPTER 3  101 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
3.5 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) is closely linked to institutional theory in defining 
the organisation. The organisation in both theories is seen as a structure that is 
vulnerable to uncertain environmental pressures, and has limited organisational 
choices as it is constrained by these pressures. Hence the organisation requires 
constant reinterpretation and negotiation to enable its sustainability, and the 
acceptance of its legitimacy (Hessels and Terjesen 2010). In fact, both theories are 
concerned with the existence of external actors in the organisation’s environment, 
how organisations confront the competitive pressures, and what kind of relationship 
results between them. Thus, both theories attempt to explain the relationship from 
their individual perspectives, which are quite distinct from each other.  
 
RDT argues that dependence on other actors pertains to the need for resources, whilst 
institutional theory claims that organisations tend to imitate the behaviour of other 
organisations which are perceived as successful models in order to obtain legitimation 
(Hessels and Terjesen 2010). However, in certain areas of explanation, RDT is 
difficult to distinguish from institutional theory, especially when the degree to which 
institutionalisation can be measured hinges upon the degree of control by the 
government, regulation, resource flow, etc. (Zucker 1987). This can be explained by 
the level of dependence that organisations have on other organisations, which results 
in resource disruption if noncompliance occurs.  
 
RDT has long been applied in worldwide studies to explain how organisations can 
minimise environmental interdependence and uncertainty (Hillman, Withers and 
Collins 2009). It is considered to be one of the most influential theories in 
organisational theory besides institutional theory. In this light, RDT is seen as one of 
the auxiliary theories to support the primary theories in this study, namely agency 
theory and institutional theory. It is argued that when these theories are applied 
together, they can offer greater predictive power to explain the presupposed 
relationship between variables (Sherer and Lee 2002). The role of RDT in this study is 
to put forward arguments to substantiate the existence of an asserted relationship.  
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This theory has had a far reaching effect on organisation studies over the last 30 years 
since the publication of a paper by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), “The External Control 
of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective”. With its slight difference in 
its focus when compared with institutional theory, RDT tilts towards discussing 
organisational success and power. As an organisation’s success and power depend on 
its resources, RDT is claimed to focus on how to access these resources from the other 
actors in their corporate environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In defining 
resource, the work by Hessels and Terjesen (2010: 207) is preferred. According to 
their work, the term resources can be defined as the “tangible and intangible assets 
firms use to conceive of and implement their strategies”.  However, there are 
limitations to the availability of resources, resulting in multiple organisations striving 
for the same set of scarce resources (Hessels and Terjesen 2010). Therefore 
organisations are forced to seek new innovations that can substitute the resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Sherer and Lee 2002).  
 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), in order to achieve an understanding of an 
organisation’s behaviour, the context of the behaviour should be clearly deciphered. 
They assert that an organisation’s ecology consists of external influences, and 
likewise internal influences (with less emphasis) (Dill 1981), which revolve around 
‘power’. The success of an organisation is gauged by how it maximises its  power 
(Pfeffer 1981). Similarly, the links that exist among organisations are claimed to 
emerge due to the need to exchange resources.  
 
The following Figure 3.8 presents the interaction between organisations and their 
environments, which leads to coalition, pooling resources and strategy implementation 
throughout time, in order to ensure the viability of the company.  
 
CHAPTER 3  103 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
 
Figure 3.8: The interactions between an organisation’s ecology in RDT 
 
RDT views the interaction between the elements in an organisation’s ecology as a 
cyclical process, encompassing three major factors. In relation to power in the context 
of RDT, organisations seek power by gaining control over resources which can reduce 
their dependence on other organisations, and at the same time, obtain control over 
resources that can increase the dependence of other organisations on them. This 
interdependence leads to uncertainty. In order to overcome this uncertainty, 
organisations form a coalition, pool resources and change their strategy. The 
interactions between the elements in the organisations’ ecology affect how 
organisations work, as they are competing for scarce and valued resources which are 
considered vital for them to survive. However, over time, when balances in the market 
shift, more uncertainties surge in the environment, stability turns unstable again, 
thereby triggering the cycle all over again.  
 
In brief, RDT rests on certain assumptions. First, organisations are presumed to 
consist of internal and external coalitions that emerge due to resource exchange, 
which then influences the organisation and controls its behaviour. Second, the vital 
resources needed for the organisation to survive are assumed to be limited, thus 
leading to the uncertainty in an organisation’s resource acquisition. Finally, 
organisations are surmised to work toward achieving two main objectives: i) acquiring 
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control over resources, then minimising the dependence on other organisations, ii) 
similarly, acquiring control over resources helps to maximise the dependence of other 
organisations on them.  
 
The element of uncertainty in acquiring resources is one of the problems that have to 
be confronted by the leaders in the organisations. It becomes their responsibility to 
assess this kind of unpredictability and to find solutions which solve the dependencies 
in the best way in order to survive. It is broadly defined in RDT that successful 
organisations are those which can gain control over resources by escalating their 
power over other organisations. Therefore, to obtain protection against the vicissitudes 
of their environments, in order to minimise their dependencies, there are five options
12
 
proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), one of these being through the board of 
directors.  
 
The board of directors is widely known as the most vital mechanism in corporate 
governance practice. This area of research has received considerable attention by 
researchers, across disciplines and countries. However, most of them implement 
agency theory as their primary theoretical lens (Hillman et al. 2009). Based on the 
RDT point of view, the board of directors is the pivotal feature of the resources in 
organisations, which can minimise their dependence on other organisations. However, 
RDT is not a prevalent choice as a key theoretical lens.  In spite of this, and reinforced 
by the empirical evidence, RDT is attested as being a persuasive lens for 
understanding the board of directors’ characteristics.  
 
RDT recognises the organisation as an open system which is integrated 
interdependently with external entities for survival (Pfeffer 1972). Therefore, it is 
postulated by resource dependence scholars that directors should reflect organisational 
dependencies (Daily, Dalton and Cannella 2003). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) contend 
                                                 
12 The options proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) to minimize environmental 
dependencies are: (a) merger/ vertical integration, (b) joint ventures, (c) board of 
directors, (d) political action and (e) executive succession. 
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that the resources which are acquired from other connected organisations are made via 
the directors on the board in order to benefit the organisation. Therefore, the board of 
directors is considered to be the main linkage mechanism which connects a firm to 
external resources (Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella 2007). 
 
It is argued that by selecting directors with strong influence, valuable skills and good 
connections with external resources, the firm’s outside dependency can be reduced.  
Pfeffer and Slancik (1978) proposed three main benefits that can be derived from 
board linkages: advice and counsel, legitimacy, and a channel to disseminate 
information. Thus, by first identifying the firms’ characteristics, then applying RDT in 
sketching the framework, Hillman et al. (2009) contend that the best types of directors 
for benefitting a firm are able to be identified. 
 
Referring to the second of the benefits proposed by Pfeffer and Slancik (1978) above, 
i.e. the legitimacy which is derived from the directors on the board, this echoes what 
is emphasised in institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1995). The 
explanation provided is that societal expectation determines an organisation’s 
legitimacy, whereby it is expected that the appointed directors are observed and 
recognised by society at large. This recognition leads prestigious members of society, 
such as institutional investors, to invest in the company, which reflects their 
acceptance and recognition of the organisation’s legitimacy. Nienhuser (2008) also 
supports this view and claims that RDT has similar independent and dependent 
variables to institutional theory.   
 
Therefore, although RDT is claimed to be a persuasive theory to explain the board of 
directors’ characteristics, unfortunately it has its own limitations. There are a few 
organisational factors which are not considered under this theory (e.g. human resource 
practice, organisational cultures, values, beliefs and social factors), which also 
important for predicting board characteristics. Thus, RDT should be accompanied by 
other theoretical lenses, i.e. institutional theory, after considering the above 
arguments, as well as agency theory for its delicate insights in predicting 
relationships.  
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the multi-theoretical approach, which 
espouses agency theory, institutional theory and resource dependence theory. Each of 
the theories is explained in different sections to reinforce the justification for them 
being applied in this study. The theoretical frameworks presented in this chapter are 
recapitulated in Chapter 4 to allow them to be customised to the current study setting. 
It is anticipated that applying this multi-theoretical approach will assist in articulating 
each of the hypothesised relationships in detail and persuasively. 
 
Agency theory is the salient theory among them, and thus the key lens for our analysis 
in this study. It is for this reason that  this theory has received the large share of 
discussion, followed by institutional theory in this chapter. The selection of this theory 
was instigated by the unique ownership structure and changes in Malaysia’s 
institutional environment pertaining to corporate governance reform, which resulted 
from the macro crisis, i.e. the Asian financial crisis 1997/1998. The other theory 
(RDT) is underpinning theory to support the theoretical foundation for this study. The 
applications of these theories in the extant literature are well established, with many 
arguments pertaining to their far reaching effects in many facets. Thus, this study, 
which examines the dynamic changes in Malaysia’s corporate governance, provides a 
bridge between agency theory, institutional theory and resource dependence theory in 
explaining the relationship of governance to foreign ownership.  
 
The development of hypotheses in Chapter 4 will be achieved by interweaving many 
arguments from the three theories and extant literature. Therefore, the multi-
theoretical approach is adopted as an overarching theory to justify the predicted 
relationships between FEO and corporate governance variables in the Malaysian 
corporate environment.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, LITERATURE 
REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature of corporate governance in general around the world, 
comparing Western literature with other parts of the world like Asian countries, and 
finally focusing specifically on Malaysia. Special emphasis was given to the issue of 
foreign equity ownership in alignment with the corporate governance impact, as this is 
the main issue of this study. Next, before testing the relationship in the hypotheses 
development chapter, Chapter 3 related the theories that can be applied suitably to 
articulate the unique features of developing countries, particularly Malaysia.  
 
In order to further enhance the understanding of this study, the current chapter draws 
together the work from the two previous chapters, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. It does 
this by discussing the theoretical framework and generating hypotheses using agency 
theory as an underpinning theory, with insights gained from institutional theory and 
resource dependence theory.  The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows. 
Section 4.2 presents the conceptual framework as the spine for the whole research 
work, and briefly recapitulates the idea of base constructs and developing hypotheses 
on the theoretical underpinning. Section 4.3 restates the research question, while 
Section 4.4 reviews the related literatures, issues and theories to establish the 
framework for the hypotheses development. Lastly, Section 4.5 summarises the 
chapter. 
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
This section covers the corporate governance mechanisms (board and ownership 
structure) in relation to FEO, as suggested in this study. The overall process and the 
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relationships between the components in this study are depicted in the conceptual 
framework presented below. 
 
Restated Figure 1.2: Conceptual framework for corporate governance and FEO in 
Malaysia 
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Before the discussion of hypotheses development proceeds, it is necessary to base 
construct (ownership structure, board characteristics and composition) on the 
theoretical underpinning of the study.   The construction of conceptual framework, as 
can be seen from the Figure 1.2 in this current section, should be able to clearly depict 
the relationships that exist between the components in the constructs. Moreover, the 
theoretical concept should be well-embedded, thus providing a better picture of how 
the constructs are developed and related to the theoretical frameworks.  
 
Firstly, it is important to revisit Chapter 3, which was devoted exclusively to 
discussing  in detail the three theories (agency theory, institutional theory and 
resources dependence theory) that were selected to become the underpinning theories 
for this study. Secondly, it should be noted that 10 variables (please refer to the 
conceptual framework) were used as constructs for this study, these being subsumed 
under three categories, namely: board characteristics, directors’ attributes and 
ownership structure (can be referred from the conceptual framework as well). These 
variables were chosen for a variety of reasons, such as lack of study, the potential 
variables of foreign investors’ preference, the unresolved issue in existing literatures, 
the changes in corporate governance setting in Malaysia, etc. that making them 
essential for inclusion  in this study. The detailed discussion for each variable and the 
reasons for them to be examined can be found in the current chapter, Section 4.4 
Hypotheses Development.  
 
Next, the theoretical base to be applied on each variable is justified. Agency theory is 
applied to all variables in the constructs as this is the main theoretical lens for this 
study.  Agency theory has received substantial attention from researchers to study 
corporate governance in Malaysian setting. The advantage of this theory is in its 
ability to lead researcher to comprehend the investigated relationship by providing 
more precaution in any justifications offered. However, given the empirical evidence 
provided in a number of studies for example by Claessens et al. (1999), Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006), Khatri (2001), Lew (2007), Lim (1981), La Porta et al. (1999), etc.,  
there are argument that Malaysian corporate ownership structure is concentrated, with  
controlling shareholders being pervasive  and minority shareholders’ expropriation 
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being prevalent. Thus, the theoretical argument of agency theory should not be limited 
only to principal-agent conflicts, but should go beyond this by including the argument 
from the perspective of principal-principal goal incongruence as strongly 
recommended by Peng (2006) and Young et al. (2008).  
 
In this study, agency theory is compatible with all variables in examining their 
relationship with foreign equity ownership in Malaysia. The ownership structure issue 
especially requires strong theoretical arguments in determining the direction of the 
relationships coincide with the unique characteristic of Malaysian capital market’s 
ownership structure. Board characteristics and directors’ attributes also extensively 
apply the arguments from agency theory, as the theory offers a justification for 
determining the positive and negative sides of certain variables to be connected with 
foreign ownership. For example, based on agency theory’s theoretical arguments, 
foreign investors favour the presence of foreign directors on a board because it is 
considered to be one of the efficient corporate governance mechanisms to curb 
monitoring cost. It is believed that the existence of foreign directors (generally from 
the developed capital market) on the board may secure their interests in the firms as 
they share similar values and perspectives, which is to maximise shareholder wealth 
thereby reducing agency conflict. 
 
On the other hand, institutional theory is a practical theory that is applied based on the 
situation of Malaysian market that has undergone a process of institutional change -
moving towards the Anglo-American corporate governance practice following the 
Asian financial crisis 1997/1998. The process of institutional change can be translated 
as corporate governance reform. This is compatible with the home countries of foreign 
investors, the majority of which are Western countries that are accustomed to  an 
established set of corporate governance practice in their countries. Thus, in this light, 
institutional theory is persuasive in terms of its application as one of the primary 
theories, in addition to agency theory, in explaining the relationship between 
variables. In analysing corporate governance reform, agency theory is argued as 
under-utilised with respect to the social aspect that is embedded in firms (Aguilera and 
Jackson 2003) which may detract from the whole picture (Douma et al. 2006) 
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concerning the relationship that might occur between corporate governance variables 
and the level of foreign equity ownership in Malaysian companies. 
 
Generally, from the perspective of institutional theory, the arguments used to justify 
the relationship between two variables of study are based on the claim made by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that the institutional forces arising from organisations 
are an effort to maximise shareholder value. Therefore, to understand corporate 
governance practice (proxied by the corporate governance variables) in Malaysian 
companies, the pressure exerted on them in the search for legitimacy has been 
translated through their action whether they imitate or adopt the governance structures 
of Anglo-American capitalism. Each of the components in variable constructs is 
refined in detail, in accordance with their institutional pressure and institutional 
background, and in order to justify their relationship with foreign equity ownership.  
 
Therefore, the use of institutional theory to be applied on all variables in this study is 
considered significant to scrutinise the behaviour of foreign investors when making 
investment decisions in countries with a different (institutional) corporate governance 
setting, such as Malaysia. For example based on institutional theory, it is argued that 
foreign investors prefer companies with Western educational directors, as it is 
suggested that organisations are shaped by the normative pressures that pervade them 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987). Thus, in this 
scenario, the source of normative pressure is derived from the directors’ educational 
background, which may result in changes in organisational structure in an isomorphic 
way, in accordance with institutionally prescribed expectation (Slack and Hinings 
1994). It is argued that these directors may preserve foreign investors’ interests in the 
company as they share similar values, which is to maximise shareholder wealth. 
 
Lastly, resource dependence theory (RDT) has been used to strengthen the 
justifications made to hypothesise the relationship, in addition to the existing two 
theories, agency theory and institutional theory. RDT is used to complement 
institutional theory, as this theory is closely linked to institutional theory in describing 
organisation. RDT is used to support the primary theory and it is claimed that, with 
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the combination of these three theories together, greater predictive power can be 
offered to explain the presumed relationship (Sherer and Lee 2002). In this study, 
RDT focuses more on explaining the board director’s characteristics and directors’ 
attributes, as RDT sees the board of directors to be the pivotal feature of resources in 
organisations, which can minimise their dependence on other organisations. For 
example, from the perspective of RDT, it is argued that foreign investors favour the 
presence of foreign directors on corporate board as they are considered to be a crucial 
asset to the company in bringing in prospective resources such as global experiences, 
foreign networks (Masulis et al. 2012), managerial expertise (Kim et al. 2010), or 
technical skills that cannot be offered by domestic directors.  
4.3 The Research Questions Restated 
The contention that changes in Malaysian corporate governance have been taking 
place has been made in the earlier discussion. Public listed companies (PLCs) in 
Malaysia seriously started to adopt corporate governance reformation at the pinnacle 
of the AFC 1997/1998. Some scholars claim that these changes demonstrate a 
convergence on the Anglo-American governance system (e.g. Kim et al. 2010), while 
others discern that convergence should be concerned with establishing congruence 
with the Malaysian corporate culture (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Nevertheless, the 
changes are not uniformly applied to all of the elements in the corporate governance 
system. There are certain elements of the structure that show some resistance to 
institutional pressures (Slack and Hinings 1994), such as family ownership. 
 
The present study therefore aims at improving our understanding of the process of 
investment decision making by foreign investors, particularly those from Anglo-
American countries, driven by a few elements of corporate governance practices in 
developing countries like Malaysia. More specifically, the study seeks to answer the 
following research question: 
Does corporate governance influence the level of FEO in Malaysian companies?  
 
However, answering the main research question is contingent on the answers to the 
following subsidiary research questions: i) Do board of director characteristics 
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influence the level of FEO? ii) Do directors’ attributes influence the level of FEO? 
and iii) Do ownership structures influence the level of FEO? 
 
These answers are sought by relying on the argument derived from the multi-
theoretical approach and previous literature. Hypotheses are generated accordingly in 
the next section. 
 
4.4 Hypotheses Development 
The hypotheses in this study are based on firm specific factors. These are subsumed 
into three groups, in order to answer three subsidiary research questions, as shown in 
the above figure and explained in Section 4.3 The Research Questions Restated. For 
hypothesis development and variable arrangement, equal weight of concern is given to 
each variable of corporate governance. The selection of board characteristics to be 
dealt first does not indicate that a higher level of priority has been  given to the board 
characteristics variables and less to ownership structure variables. The following 
discussion of hypotheses development begins with the category of board attributes, 
while the remaining categories are treated equally. 
 
4.4.1 Board Attributes 
The board of directors is a crucial element in a firm’s corporate governance system 
and has received special attention from many parties (Jiraporn, Davidson, DaDalt and 
Ning 2009; Masulis, Wang and Xie 2012). It has long been recognised, notably by 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) that  the board could become an important 
mechanism to prevent minority shareholders from expropriation by controlling 
shareholders, whilst Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggest that the board’s main functions 
relate to organisational performance. Generally, the board of directors plays two 
crucial roles, which are monitoring roles (Fama 1980; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998) 
and advisory roles (Fama and Jensen 1983). The effectiveness of the board directors is 
measured through their performance in making corporate decisions and in creating 
shareholder value (Masulis et al. 2012). The following sub-sections discuss the role of 
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the directors on the board and associate this role with the level of foreign equity 
ownership (FEO) in the firm. Scholarly arguments, related codes and pertinent 
theories have been taken into consideration in developing the hypotheses. 
 
This section aims to answer the first research question, which is - Do board of 
director characteristics influence the level of FEO? The discussions follow in each of 
the subsections. 
 
4.4.1.1 Board Size 
As specified in the Best Practice in Corporate Governance, board size can impact on 
its effectiveness. Therefore, it should be carefully examined (Code 2000). The 
question which arises is what is the ideal size of the board of directors in a company? 
This is an ongoing issue and has long been debated by both practitioners and 
researchers. Nevertheless, a conclusive consensus on board size has yet to be 
achieved. 
 
Monks and Minow (1995) emphasise that board size should be given particular 
consideration, as it has a bearing on a company’s monitoring, controlling and decision 
making capabilities. From an agency theory perspective, those who advocate a larger 
board size argue that the monitoring capacity may increase with the addition of 
director(s) to the board. A larger board size makes it more difficult for CEOs to 
dominate the board (Zahra and Pearce 1989). However, the claimed benefits may be 
outweighed by the ‘incremental cost’ due to communication problems and the poor 
decision making processes associated with a larger board size (John and Senbet 1998). 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) also assert that when the size of the board becomes 
too large, the board becomes more of a symbol within the company rather than being 
truly involved in the management process. This view is consistent with the previous 
claim by Jensen (1993), namely that a small board size can increase a company’s 
performance. Therefore, reducing the board size is suggested as a method of 
improving efficiency. 
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In contrast, drawing on RDT, it is argued that a larger board of directors produces 
greater diversity, which  can assist a company to secure critical resources (Haniffa and 
Hudaib 2006) and lessen the uncertainties in the corporate environment (Dalton, 
Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand 1999; Pfeffer 1987). Correspondingly, Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) have stressed the importance of having a larger board of directors in 
order to give access to greater and more effective external linkage. Diversity also 
encourages constructive decision making, as members of the board may have different 
opinions on certain issues, which require a healthy debate, thus enabling the 
productive sharing of information. In addition, Pearce and Zahra (1992) contend that a 
large board is effective in providing advice and charting the strategic direction of the 
firm. However, the ‘free rider’ problem is also associated with a larger board size. 
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recommend that the ideal board size is between eight and 
nine members, whilst Jensen (1993) suggests that the ideal number to be between 
seven or eight. They have mutual agreement with John and Senbet (1998) that any 
additional numbers of director(s) will lead to inefficiencies in the decision making 
process and in monitoring activities. In a different study, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
found a significant, negative relationship between board size and market performance 
in Malaysian companies, which indicates that markets perceive a large board size to 
be ineffective. This result is consistent with previous empirical studies by Yermack 
(1996) on large US corporations, using Tobin’s Q as a market performance indicator. 
A similar pattern was found by Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) in their study 
of small and mid-size Finnish firms. However, by using a different accounting 
measurement, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found a significant relationship with board 
size, but in a different direction. This implies that although the market in Malaysia 
perceives a larger board size as being only symbolic, rather than seriously managing 
the business, the company actually obtains benefits from the diversity that a larger 
board can offer. This pool of expertise and experience can become a critical resource 
in enabling companies to survive in an uncertain corporate environment, as proposed 
by RDT. 
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In developed markets like the US, UK and New Zealand, no definite number for the 
board size has been determined for adoption. Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007) 
in their study found that the board size increases in relation to the firm size. This 
finding is consistent with other studies, which arrive at the conclusion that board size 
can increase or decrease in relation to other factors, such as growth opportunities 
(Mak and Roush 2000), asset characteristics and governance practice in firms (Boone 
et al. 2007; Linck, Netter and Yang 2008). As alleged by Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2008), adopting a “one-size-fits-all” approach is misguided. Therefore, there is no 
robust cut off to be followed, as the Anglo-Saxon market, which represents the 
developed market, does not pronounce any ideal number for the board size that can fit 
every corporation. However, practitioners believe that the enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 reflects an attempt to improve corporate governance 
practice and restrict the corporate board structure in the U.S (Raheja 2005).  
 
Likewise, there is no recommendation in the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) concerning the ideal number for the board size for PLCs in 
Malaysia. This is consistent with the practice in developed markets, where the board 
size is not prescribed in any of their rules and regulations. As a developing market, 
which expects outside investors to flood the market, the steps taken by the developed 
markets seem a sensible model to be imitated. Therefore, no fixed number for the 
board size is proposed for PLCs in Malaysia.  
 
In this context, in regards to the Malaysian case, it is argued that mimetic 
isomorphism has been applied. The action of the Malaysian government, in imitating 
the existing structure and practices of countries that are perceived to be more 
successful, is claimed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) to be an exercise that has been 
induced by the uncertainties that have pervaded the corporate environment in 
Malaysia, especially after AFC 1997/98. After the financial turmoil, there was a high 
degree of uncertainty in the Malaysian corporate environment due to institutional 
transition in the country. The MCCG was drawn up by referring to the Cadbury 
Report (1992) and the Hampel Report (1998) in the UK (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). 
However, no specific number for the directors on the board was proposed in either of 
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the reports. Therefore, the practices undertaken by most of the successful 
organisations in the developed markets have been imitated.   This means that the 
individual company is free to determine its board size, provided that board 
effectiveness is not compromised. 
 
Code (2000) does place emphasis on board effectiveness, whereby it is recommended 
that the board should consist of a balance of executive and non-executive directors 
(including independent non-executive directors). This is to ensure that “no individual 
or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision making” (Code 
2000:7). In ensuring its effectiveness, the size of the board must not be too large or 
too small.  
 
The results of the survey conducted by KLSE and PricewaterhouseCoopers in 1999 
found that on average, the board size in Malaysian companies consisted of eight 
directors and the composition of each board generally constituted of independent non-
executive directors, equalling about one third of the board. The committee of Finance 
Committee of Corporate Governance (FCCG) has only formulated the board 
composition structure, rather than recommending the ideal size of the board. This 
approach is preferred, as there are many characteristics which should be considered 
before prescribing a figure for the board size, such as the size of the listed companies, 
etc. Therefore, their board size must be varied significantly. 
 
Although the size of the board of directors is not prescribed by the Codes, the impact 
of choosing the ideal number of directors on the board is significant, as evidenced in 
many studies. Companies should determine the ideal size of their board in order to 
ensure that the board of directors can perform its duties effectively for the sake of 
shareholder value. Foreign investors are believed to monitor the size of the board of 
directors in a company before making their investment decision. Drawing on agency 
theory and RDT, both theories favour a larger board. Therefore, it is argued that 
foreign investors prefer companies with a larger size for the board of directors. 
Nevertheless, the standpoint of these theories has received much criticism from the 
scholars that advocate a smaller board (e.g. John and Senbet 1998; Hermalin and 
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Weisbach 2003). In addition, institutional theory plays its role in strengthening the 
reasons behind the action taken by the Malaysian government for not having a 
compulsory board size. Even though foreign investors are highly likely to favour the 
practice that has been imitated from their home countries, there is a recognition of the 
significant role that having the right size for the board of directors plays for foreign 
investors, and it is therefore hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A larger size for the board of directors in Malaysian PLCs is positively 
associated with the level of foreign equity ownership.  
 
4.4.1.2 Outside Director Compliance 
Outside directors are broadly defined by Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996:417) as 
“all non-management members on the board”. In the Malaysian context, the terms for 
outside directors are interchangeable with independent directors. However, the 
concept of ‘independent’ is unique to each country (Code 2000; Rediker and Seth 
2005). For Malaysian companies, the term independent refers to two crucial aspects: i) 
independence from management and ii) independence from a significant shareholder
13
 
(Code 2000:25).  
 
The composition of outside directors is an ongoing issue. The effectiveness of having 
higher proportions of independent outside directors has been widely discussed (e.g. 
Jiraporn et al. 2009; Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt 1993; Pearce and Zahra 1992; Peng 
2004; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt 2003), since the effectiveness of a board 
to oversee the management is highly related to that composition (Code 2000:23). In 
2000, as an attempt to improve corporate governance, the Malaysian government set 
out the benchmark for best practice in corporate governance, thereby putting pressure 
on all PLCs to appoint a certain ratio of independent directors to their board. It is very 
                                                 
13Significant shareholder is defined as “a shareholder with the ability to exercise a 
majority of votes for the election of directors” (Code 2000:10). 
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important to have a ‘board balance’14 to ensure that the members of the board play fair 
and active roles, thus making them an effective board. It is contended that PLCs need 
to be headed by an effective board to ensure that the companies can be managed and 
controlled efficiently. 
 
Even though executive directors are undoubtedly important to companies, as they 
have the skills and knowledge to run the business, the appointment of outside/non-
executive directors with a wealth of experience helps to bring a broader view to the 
company’s affairs as they are capable of exercising independent judgement (Code 
2000:23). As alleged by Perry and Shivdasani (2005), outside directors are better at 
taking the initiative to form a disciplined restructuring programme after any 
substantial performance decline has occurred in the company. 
 
The appointment of independent directors to the board is one example of good 
governance practices (Cho and Kim 2007; Payne, Benson and Finegold 2009). 
Although this practice has long been applied in the Anglo-American governance 
system, Peng (2004) considers this kind of practice in emerging markets as a type of 
management innovation. The adoption of corporate governance codes from more 
developed markets is evidence of corporate governance reformation (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra 2009), which has been taking place in Malaysia in the immediate 
aftermath of the AFC 1997/1998. 
 
The Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance
15
 - Code (2000) - stated that 
board composition should be composed of at least one third (1/3) of independent non-
                                                 
14Board balance is defined by Code (2000:9) “Non-executive directors should be 
persons of calibre, credibility and have the necessary skill and experience to bring 
an independent judgement to bear on the issues of strategy, performance and 
resources including key appointments and standards of conduct. To be effective, 
independent non-executive directors need to make up at least one third of the 
membership of the board”. 
15Best Practice in corporate governance is set out in Part 2 of Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance. It identifies a set of guidelines / practices intended to 
assist companies designing their corporate governance mechanism system. The 
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executive directors in order for the board to be effective. This is exactly what was 
enshrined in the Hampel Report 1998, published in the UK. In the earlier discussion, 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2 Corporate Governance, a brief history of this report has been 
given. 
 
This reaction taken by the government of Malaysia to escalate the composition of 
independent directors on the board, or at least abide to their minimum requirement, 
was a reaction to the radical changes in the macro environment, specifically the AFC 
1997/1998. Furthermore, there was also intense institutional external pressure from 
the actors (for instance, the IMF) in the economic environment. Scott (1987) argued 
that these external pressures are to be fulfilled by the institutions in order to obtain 
their legitimacy and to access external resources. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
suggest that outside directors could be adopted in an isomorphic fashion in many 
countries. The nature of the institutional environment in Malaysia coincides with the 
recommendation made by a few scholars (see Aguilera and Jackson 2003 and Buck 
and Shahrim 2005), to utilise institutional theory as the main theoretical lens in order 
to analyse the process and antecedents of appointing independent directors on a 
Malaysian board.  
 
Malaysia’s corporate environment has always been influenced by government 
intervention, policies and regulations. The political pressure in Malaysia’s economy 
towards business players is not something new, albeit they are very intertwined with 
each other (Gomez 1994). Since 1970, the Malaysian government has encouraged and 
facilitated many business activities by a group of large firms, designated as 
government link companies (GLCs
16
), to support economic development in Malaysia. 
                                                                                                                                            
compliance towards the best practice is voluntary; however they need to disclose 
in their annual reports, the extent of compliance and noncompliance(s), if any, 
needs to be justified. 
16Government link company (GLC) is defined as company in which the Malaysian 
government has direct controlling interest of more than 20% through 
Government-Linked Investment Companies (GLICs) (The Treasurer Circular, 
Ministry of Finance 1993). However, the extent of government intervention is not 
just depends on percentage ownership, it refers to the ability of government to 
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In 2009 for instance, GLCs dominated nearly 40% of the total market capitalisation in 
Bursa Malaysia. Among the well-known GLCs are the Malaysia Airline System 
(MAS), PETRONAS, PERWAJA etc., and they are very close to government policies.  
The significant contributions made by these GLCs and other PLCs to the Malaysian 
economy cannot be denied as their relationships are reciprocal. These companies play 
a crucial economic role, and the Malaysian government has never failed to support 
and reward them. Therefore, in the aftermath of the AFC 1997/98, the Malaysian 
government decided to initiate a corporate governance reformation programme, in 
order to regain the confidence of investors, after they shied away from the Malaysian 
capital market. 
 
The government intervention in the governance matters of PLCs, by exerting pressure 
to maximise the compliance of the independent director composition on the board, is 
seen as an action that has to be accomplished by organisations with limited options. 
This kind of situation is identified as ‘forced selection’ by Abrahamson (1991), 
whereby a powerful institution such as the Malaysian government can use its power to 
exert political pressure on an organisation in order to ensure that it adopts innovations 
to help  it maximise shareholder value, or reject them if it is otherwise. This 
institutional pressure, as asserted by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), is known as 
coercive isomorphism. The later study by Oliver (1997) claims that institutional 
pressure can also be exerted in two ways; legal coercion and voluntary diffusion.  
 
In the Malaysian case, the pressure can be in both forms. The ultimate results of 
fulfilling the pressure exerted by a more powerful institution were predicted to benefit 
the organisations as a whole. Therefore, the PLCs in Malaysia seem to be voluntarily 
receptive to this idea. Apart from enhancing the organisation’s legitimacy (Scott 
1987), it is also consistent with the RDT perspectives, as argued by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) that strong interdependence between the superior and its subordinate 
                                                                                                                                            
make major decisions for companies such as selection of BOD’s members, 
restructuring, policies, acquisitions etc. 
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(in this case, the Malaysian government and the PLC), and the obedience shown by 
the latter, enables the dependent organisation to access more resources from the 
former, concomitantly enhancing the firm’s value (Chizema and Kim 2010). Outside 
directors are seen as having large networking capabilities, thus acting as a corridor to 
access external resources or potential markets which can benefit a company in many 
ways, e.g. strategic decision making (Carpenter and Westphal 2001). 
 
From the perspective of agency theory, the role of independent directors in an 
emerging country like Malaysia is believed to reduce agency problems (Fama and 
Jensen 1983) as outside directors can assist to monitor owner-managers (Cho and Kim 
2007). This claim is consistent with the new corporate governance perspective for 
emerging markets, which is focused on the conflicts between the minority and 
controlling shareholders, and is alluded to by Young et al. (2008) as the principal-
principal model
17
. It is also asserted by Jiraporn, Singh and Lee (2009)
b
 that a large 
composition of independent directors on the board may lead to the strongest 
monitoring of management. By having a large number of independent directors on the 
board, it is highly likely that the majority of compensation, audit, and governance 
committees members, are comprised of them - as recommended by governance 
experts (Code 2000:13; Jiraporn et al. 2009
b
). Meanwhile, studies by Bonn (2004) and 
Dahya and McConnell (2007) imply that the benefits of having a high proportion of 
outside directors on the board can be seen in a significant improvement in companies’ 
operating performance. In Malaysia, the results are echoed in a few studies (Abidin, 
Kamal and Jusoff 2009; Ameer, Ramli and Zakaria 2010).  
 
In summary, the multi-theoretical approach (MTA) applied in this study advocates a 
positive effect on compliance of adhering to the minimum requirement composition of 
independent directors on the board. Thus, based on the lengthy arguments above, it is 
                                                 
17Principal-principal model is emerged from emerging markets where the concentrated 
ownership is prevalence.  Concentrated ownership, combined with the weakness 
of corporate governance mechanisms, results in more conflicts arise between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and has come to be known as 
principal-principal (PP) model. 
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argued that governance practice is enhanced by the high composition of independent 
directors on the board. The role of the Malaysian government in applying pressure 
regarding this issue can also be seen as an impetus to encourage more companies to 
adopt this practice. In addition, relatively speaking, good governance practice leads to 
a company’s high performance. Besides this, the practice of having a relatively high 
proportion of outside directors on the board has long been practised by the developed 
market. Therefore, it is in line with the practice recognised by most of the foreign 
investors in their home countries, which assumes that foreign investors prefer 
companies which comply with, or work beyond, this compliance. Thus, through the 
institutional pressure or coercive isomorphism exerted by other powerful institutions, 
the adoption of this practice is seen by foreign investors as an indicator of good 
governance practice in a company, which simultaneously mitigates agency costs and 
accommodates more vital resources for the sustainability of the company. Therefore, 
it is hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between the presence of outside directors 
on the board and foreign equity ownership in the firm. 
 
4.4.2 Directors’ Attributes 
Different attributes among directors lead to board diversity. Board diversity is a term 
to describe the existence of female, multiracial and cultural elements in the 
composition of the board of directors. The extant literature (e.g. Erhardt, Werbel and 
Shrader 2003) typically follows two general distinctions for diversity classifications, 
(i) observable (demographic) and (ii) non-observable (cognitive). Generally, 
observable diversities are gender, race, age and ethnicity, whilst unobservable 
diversities are education, values, knowledge, perception etc. The existence of these 
multi-elements in the board members is believed to affect a firms’ long term and short 
term financial performance (Carter, Simkins and Simpson 2003). A few selected 
directors’ attributes are discussed in the following subsections. Do these directors’ 
attributes (foreign directorship, multiple-directorship, women directorship, 
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professional directorship and Western educational directorship) have a bearing on the 
level of foreign equity ownership (FEO)? 
 
More specifically, this sub-section aims to answer the second research question, which 
is: Do directors’ attributes influence the level of FEO? The discussion follows in each 
subsection. 
 
4.4.2.1 Foreign Directorship 
The inclusion of foreign director(s) on the board of directors may bring different 
cultural dimensions, and therefore affect the overall monitoring system of board 
performance (Kim et al. 2010). This is consistent with the perspective of RDT, and 
with the idea that heterogeneity in the resource capabilities of the different directors 
on the board will lead to a positive impact on firm performance (Douma et al. 2006). 
The foreign director may bring global experience (Masulis et al. 2012), managerial 
expertise (Kim et al. 2010) or technical skills to the firm which may not be accessible 
by the domestic director. Foreign directors also help to improve the board’s advisory 
role by transferring the first-hand experience and knowledge that they have gained 
from their home countries, thereby enabling the company to expand its foreign 
networks (Masulis et al. 2012) and operations internationally (Adams, Hermalin, and 
Weisbach 2010).  
 
Drawing on the agency theory perspective, foreign directors may act more 
independently in monitoring the management of the company as their personal 
attachment to it is weaker than that of the local director. Kim et al. (2010) found a 
positive relationship between foreign ownership and the presence of a foreign outside 
director, suggesting that foreign portfolio investors prefer firms with a foreign outside 
director. As asserted by Erhardt et al. (2003), the inclusion of foreign directors on the 
board, from the corporate governance perspective, relates to the degree to which a 
CEO may have influence on the board. As proposed by Schleifer and Vishny (1997), 
CEOs may need independent overseeing; therefore, the inclusion of a foreign director 
on the board is likely to have a positive impact on the monitoring function and could 
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be one of the corporate governance mechanisms which minimises potential agency 
issues. The appointment of a foreign director may be perceived by foreign investors as 
a sign of improved governance. Subsequently, they may translate this into a positive 
signal and this may act as a catalyst for them to invest in the firm (Kim et al. 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, there is evidence offered in a few studies which provides a different 
view on this issue. Masulis et al. (2012), for instance, find that foreign directors are 
more likely to engage in international misreporting and this is also associated with 
significantly higher CEO compensation. They also find that a board meeting 
attendance problem is associated with foreign independent directors. Poor board 
meeting attendance is due to the geographic distance
18
, making them less effective in 
overseeing management compared to the domestic directors. Therefore, the overall 
impact of board directors on monitoring and controlling activities is undermined. 
Attending board meetings is crucial, as emphasized by Adams and Ferreira (2009), 
Jiraporn et al. (2009) and Masulis et al. (2012), who note that the board meeting is an 
important avenue for the interactions of directors and management. 
 
Besides this, the geographic distance also triggers another problem. Foreign directors 
are cut off from local networks, making them less informed pertaining to the current 
information about a company (Coval and Moskowitz 1999), for instance its 
performance and operations. Consequently, this can result in detriment to the firms if 
decision making is based on inadequate information. Apart from being less responsive 
to current local information, foreign directors are likely to be less familiar with the 
local accounting rules, laws and regulations, corporate governance standards, and 
niche management styles; this complicates their decision making process as 
familiarity plays a crucial roles in comprehending local issues. Considering these 
                                                 
18Board meetings are usually held in corporate headquarters. If foreign directors are 
not domiciled in the local country in which they are appointed, then geographical 
distance is the main constraint for them to perform efficiently. This happens when 
attending the meeting becomes more difficult and time consuming, especially 
with different time horizons, which requires more time and energy to be 
consumed. 
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constraints, foreign directorship is claimed by a few scholars to be one of the factors 
that can weaken a board’s monitoring effectiveness, which leads to exacerbating the 
agency problems between shareholders and managers, resulting in poorer company 
performance (Masulis et al. 2012). 
 
Further evidence of the deficiencies in appointing foreign directors can be seen in the 
Enron scandal case in 2001. During the fraudulent years, from 1997-2001, its audit 
committee consisted of two foreign independent directors
19
, and later their roles and 
effectiveness in monitoring the firm’s operation and overseeing its financial reporting 
were questioned.  
 
Institutional theory comes with a perquisite perspective. It is argued that foreign 
directors on the board, particularly those from the USA and the UK, bring with them 
the norms and values that emphasise maximising shareholder wealth. These 
characteristics are favoured by foreign investors as they also share similar attributes 
when making investment decisions (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005). Usually, in 
developed markets, there are two means by which foreign investors can promote their 
interests. They can either use the threat of exit – leaving the company by selling their 
shares if they are not satisfied with the management, or they can use the voice 
mechanism through shareholder activism. According to Nooteboom (1999), these two 
options could be achieved through coercive isomorphism. However, it is argued that, 
for a developing country like Malaysia, these mechanisms do not fit well with its 
institutional environment, where shareholder activism is weak and the process of 
promoting shareholder value is still in the undertaking period (especially after the 
AFC 1997/1998). 
 
                                                 
19The two foreign directors included in the Enron audit committee were Chairman of 
the Hang Lung Group from Hong Kong and a senior executive of Group Bozano 
from Brazil. 
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Therefore, different mechanisms are sought by foreign investors in selecting 
companies for investment. Alternatively, I argue that foreign directorship could be one 
of the favourite criteria of foreign investors when making their investment allocation. 
Foreign directors are claimed to bring auxiliary styles to the traditional board of 
directors by ensuring an ideational shift of boundary in making company decisions 
and advocating new management practices with the shareholder value maximisation 
objective in mind. In institutional theory parlance, this is referred to as normative 
isomorphism. 
 
Given the concomitant benefits and drawbacks of having foreign directors on the 
board, the net effect on the overall board effectiveness regarding corporate 
governance, company performance and foreign investor decisions is refined. It is 
argued by Masulis et al. (2012) that unless the company has major operations in the 
home regions of foreign directors, the expected advisory benefits derived from the 
appointment of foreign independent directors onto the board are not great enough to 
offset the adverse effects due to the value destroying nature of their poor monitoring 
and disciplinary roles. From the corporate governance perspective, the geographical 
factor plays a crucial role in ensuring that foreign directors can effectively perform 
their duties, as it can impede their performance in monitoring management and in 
comprehending the company’s local laws and regulations. However, drawing on 
institutional theory, foreign directors on the board can be said to represent foreign 
investors in their decision making processes. Since they share the same norms and 
values, which place emphasis on maximising shareholder wealth, the approaches that 
are applied in the decision making processes and management actions proposed by 
foreign directors are believed to benefit foreign investors. 
 
Therefore, it is argued that, in the Malaysian setting, foreign investors strongly prefer 
the existence of foreign director(s) on the company’s board of directors in order to 
represent and secure their interest in the company. The appointment of foreign board 
members is likely to send a positive signal to foreign investors as a sign of good 
governance practice. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
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Hypothesis 3: Foreign directorship is positively associated with foreign equity 
ownership. 
 
4.4.2.2 Multiple directorships 
‘Director’s busyness’ or multiple-directorships, the preferable term used in the present 
study, has garnered a great deal of interest among researchers (Ferris, Jagannathan and 
Pritchard, 2003; Jiraporn et al. 2009). Scholars who advocate multiple-directorships 
point out the many benefits to be derived from this extra commitment assumed by 
directors. They regard multiple-directorships as a corporate recognition of directors 
and, as alleged by RDT, through additional directorships in other companies, directors 
can bring in more vital resources and help the sustainability of the corporation in an 
uncertain corporate environment. 
 
Drawing upon RDT, directors with multiple-directorships are gaining precious 
executive experiences, learning more managerial styles (Carpenter and Westphal 
2001), establishing corporate networks (Loderer and Peyer 2002) and this also signals 
positive recognition of their expertise. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) are 
inclined to agree with this point, and contend that outside directors, for instance, 
should aim for multiple-directorships to build their reputation as monitoring experts. It 
is also considered to be an excellent opportunity to ‘advertise’ corporate receptiveness 
to their credibility. These positive views are consistent with the argument that these 
directors (proxied by multiple board seats) are highly honoured and that their services 
are highly sought-after. 
 
However, there are also different opinions with regards to this contentious issue. Core, 
Holtausen and Larcker (1999) do not agree with Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983), questioning the impact on a director’s fiduciary duty, which they claim can be 
jeopardised. For instance, Ferris et al. (2003) assert that directors who sit on multiple 
boards may be unable to perform their duties effectively due to their stretching 
schedules. They face time and energy limitations in performing their duties in specific 
firms (Fich and Shivdasani 2006). It is more likely that there will attendance problems 
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with respect to directors with multiple-directorships, because of their highly attached 
commitment. This view is evident in a later study by Jiraporn et al. (2009) who also 
found a significant relationship between multiple-directorships and the attendance 
problem of board directors at meetings. They associate multiple-directorships with 
‘director’s busyness’. 
 
Generally, the above views indicate that ‘director’s busyness’ may lead to corporate 
governance problems in the company (Fich and Shivdasani 2006). Time limitations 
may hinder a director from attending board meetings as per the schedule (Masulis et 
al. 2012), which from the point of view of corporate governance is one of the crucial 
methods of disseminating important information about the company, and for directors 
to understand and exercise their duties (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Jiraporn et al. 2009; 
Masulis et al. 2012). Even though failure to attend board meetings does not directly 
imply that directors are not fulfilling their roles, it is still a visible way to measure 
how the directors’ responsibilities have been abused. Consistent with the report 
produced by Core et al. (1999), Jiraporn et al. (2009) claim that the failure to attend 
board meetings indirectly affects the firm’s value. This statement refers to the results 
of the study by Vafeas (1999), which provide evidence that the performance of the 
company improves following the years when the board meetings occur more 
frequently than usual. Likewise, from the vantage point of agency theory, the 
‘busyness’ lessens the management monitoring activity20 performed by the outside 
directors, and this may therefore increase agency costs which can lead to a 
deterioration in the firm’s value (Core et al. 1999; Ferris et al. 2003). 
 
The negative consequences of multiple-directorships are further highlighted by 
Jiraporn et al. (2009)
b
. They offer evidence concerning how directors with overloaded 
commitments have their capacity undermined through their inability to serve on 
internal board committees. Drawing on the agency theory perspective, internal board 
                                                 
20 In this view, the quality of the monitoring activity reduces when there is the 
‘attendance problem’of directors due to their high commitment in other firms. 
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committees, (for instance audit committees and compensation committees) could 
reduce agency problems. These committees are important in monitoring a company’s 
vital activities, for instance, financial reporting. Small board committees are more 
sensitive to a certain issue, for instance the issue of CEO remuneration, rather than if 
this is discussed in a large board of directors (Laux and Laux 2009). Unfortunately, 
directors who seek a higher reputation by serving on the board of more firms have less 
time to serve on internal committees.  As a result, the cost of monitoring has been 
transferred at the expense of the shareholders. Apart from this, the company itself may 
be reluctant to appoint busy directors to important tasks that they might not be able to 
perform in normal conditions, which in the end may create frustration. Therefore, 
Jiraporn et al. (2009)
b
 postulate that directors with multiple-directorships should serve 
on fewer internal board committees. 
 
Nevertheless, from the attributes of a firm’s size and total sales, the inverse results are 
derived, as attested by Jiraporn et al. (2009)
b
. The results show that busy directors are 
associated with larger firms and higher total sales, which is not surprising, albeit a 
little bit disconcerting. It is to be noted that the expertise and reputation of directors, 
as sought-after by the larger firms, are built upon many board appointments. In 
summary, directors with multiple-directorships serve on fewer internal board 
committees, but there is a turning point when the outside directorships reach a certain 
value. Beyond this value, serving board committees increases concomitantly with the 
number of outside directorships. 
 
In addition, the monitoring role, which is assumed to be one of a director’s main roles, 
may be superseded by the existence of efficient regulations (Booth, Cornett and 
Tehranian 2002). In the developed market, for instance, the SOX Act
21
 was enacted in 
late 2002. Given the responsibilities outlined in the SOX, directors are burdened with 
extra risks if they do not perform their roles properly. Thus, it is expected that the 
existence of additional regulations, like SOX, could help to  monitor the performance 
                                                 
21The goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was to strengthen the corporate governance 
mechanism in public corporations.  
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of directors and this places a greater burden on them if they fail to fulfil their 
obligations, for example attending board meetings. Jiraporn et al. (2009)
b
 claim that 
recent studies have found a significant positive relationship between corporate 
governance variables and the effects of SOX. 
 
In Malaysia, there is no maximum number of directorships designated by the Code. It 
is recommended that the responsibility for assessing the most suitable number of 
directorships is held by a nomination committee. The assessment should be made by 
considering the individual’s other commitments, the allocation of their time which is 
available for the company, and the resources that are attached to them which may 
benefit the company. 
 
Even though there is an absence of a specific number for directorships in the Code, 
the government of Malaysia, aware of the potentially hazardous effects for 
shareholders of directors sitting on too many PLCs boards, has taken an initiative to 
restrict the number of directorships held by a director at any one time. Drawing upon 
the institutional theory perspective, the Malaysian government has used its substantial 
power to put pressure on the PLCs in Malaysia to deal with this issue. It is feasible to 
achieve this by implementing the rules through the Listing Requirements of the Bursa 
Malaysia (Code 2000). The Bursa Malaysia listing requirements of 2002 require a 
director to hold no more than 10 directorships in public listed companies, while the 
number of directorships should be 15 or less for non-listed companies. Recently, this 
restriction has been tightened by limiting the number of directorships in listed 
companies from 10 to only 5. As claimed by Yoshimori (1995), whenever huge 
corporate mismanagement has occurred, there is always increased pressure to reduce 
the maximum number of directorships, often the recommended number is 5. The 
rationale behind this restriction is to ensure that directors can perform their duties 
effectively. 
 
Therefore, in order to be listed in the Bursa Malaysia, the PLCs in Malaysia, with few 
other options, have to follow the prescribed requirements. DiMaggio and Powel 
(1983) assert that the institutional forces exerted by higher organisations, in an effort 
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to maximise shareholder value, place extreme pressure on firms in search of 
legitimacy to adopt the governance structures of Anglo-American capitalism. This 
kind of pressure, in the form of force, is translated as coercive isomorphism under 
institutional theory parlance, which has to be abided by in order to stay legitimate and 
to be perceived by societal members. Foreign investors should be more confident 
about placing their investments in PLCs that comply with this rule, as they can be 
assured that the directors on the board can give a reasonable commitment to 
maximising shareholder wealth, simultaneously mitigating the agency problem. 
 
Therefore, the empirical studies concerning this issue have given equivocal evidence, 
which at this point needs to be deciphered cautiously. Referring to the arguments, the 
extant literature, and pertinent theories, it is argued that in Malaysia, multiple-
directorships simply a negative signal to foreign investment. In this regard, it is 
hypothesised that directors with multiple board-sitting status are more likely to dilute 
their quality time in a company due to their stretching schedule, which apparently 
affects their fiduciary duty and monitoring activity in the company. This implies a 
negative effect on corporate governance practice in the company which is not 
preferred by foreign investors. This hypothesis thus predicts a negative relation 
between the FEO and the number of multiple-directorships: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The level of foreign equity ownership is negatively associated with 
multiple-directorships. 
 
4.4.2.3 Female Directorships 
In this section, board diversity term solely refers to the female director(s) on the board 
of directors or women directors. Carter et al. (2003) assert that gender proportion is 
among the most significant governance issues facing the management, directors and 
shareholders in the modern corporation. The heightened interest in female directorship 
coincides with the escalating proportion of women on boards of directors (Daily, 
Certo and Dalton 1999). 
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The interest shown in this issue comes from many parties, not only investors but 
researchers and policy makers as well (Farrell and Hersch 2005). Apart from the fact 
that, worldwide, women on boards are increasing in number, their proportion on the 
board is far from uniform across firms (Hillman et al. 2007). Apparently, this trend 
persists even though there are increasing pressures from many parties, for instance, 
institutional investors (Singh 2005). Many institutional investors hold the view that 
investment should be made only in companies with gender diversity on the board, 
which is then moulded into their policies (Coffey and Fryxell 1991). 
 
Worldwide, gender diversity is amongst the main focal points (Carter et al. 2003) for 
governance reformation (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Accompanied by the fact that 
Malaysia has undergone a reformation process in firm corporate governance, gender 
diversity is an element which needs to be applied to the Malaysian company’s board 
of directors. Many developed countries (for instance, UK, Norway, Spain and 
Sweden) have stressed the importance of having female directorships (25% - 40% 
representation on the board) which they claim could enhance board effectiveness in 
many ways including governance practice (Adams and Ferreira 2009). From the view 
of institutional theory, this practice of the developed countries becomes a benchmark 
for companies in Malaysia when considering the proportion of women on the board. 
 
To find legitimacy, as sought by the societal members - for example, institutional 
shareholding (Singh 2005) - the mechanism that can be used by companies in 
Malaysia is mimetic isomorphism, one of the isomorphism mechanisms which were 
identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Based on the explanation of institutional 
theory, there is a powerful pressure that pushes the organisations that are confronting 
uncertainty to initiate the action of imitation. This pressure comes from other 
successful organisations, particularly from the developed capital market. 
 
Institutional theory and RDT are in mutual agreement that the appointment of female 
directors onto a board is based on the argument that they assist an organisation to seek 
organisational legitimacy, and that it can be conferred by societal members (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977; Scott 1995). The pressure coming from influential societal 
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members, for instance institutional shareholders (Coffey and Fryxell 1991; Singh 
2005), to include female director(s) can be a strong factor for an organisation to make 
such an appointment.  A corporation attempts to adhere to the political pressures and 
thus give more minorities a position on the board as well as on board committees 
(Jiraporn et al. 2009
b
). This pressure is more pronounced in larger organisations 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977) because they are more visible 
to the public (Salancik 1979) and are bonded to strict regulations. By abiding to 
gender diversity insistence, the reputation and credibility of organisations may 
improve and subsequently be recognised by society (Hambrick and D’Aveni 1992), 
including foreign investors. Thus, it is postulated by Milliken and Martins (1996) that 
gender diversity on the board helps to increase legitimacy to an organisation. 
 
On the other hand, drawing on RDT, in relation to auxiliary benefits, Kang, Ding and 
Charoenwong (2010) are of the same view as Fondas (2000), whereby they link the 
appointment of female director(s) with the positive improvement in the board’s 
control and strategic function. Fondas (2000) argues that women, based on their 
experiences, have a special ability to comprehend the market. They can go to great 
lengths to understand consumer need, which in no way can be substituted by men. 
This claim is attested by the purchasing powers shown by women in relation to men. 
Thus, the inclusion of female directors on the board simultaneously contributes to a 
range of experiences and values (Selby 2000). Burke (2000) favours this view, and 
further adds that women directors create an important symbolic value in the company, 
which helps in linking the firm with other organisations, compared to men (Hillman et 
al. 2007). They can promote effective global relationships (Siciliano 1996), which 
assists the company to access its external constituencies (Burke 2000
b
). 
 
The above perspectives, gleaned from two main theories, are taken and fused with the 
view of agency theory. Drawing on agency theory, it is argued that female directors 
could assist in reducing the agency cost and protect shareholder wealth (Kang et al. 
2010) as they are claimed to be more sensitive than male directors, and thus give extra 
‘concern’ to the issues raised in the company by asking sensible questions (avoiding 
stereotyped questions) of the board of directors concerning the issues (Selby 2000). 
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Konrad, Kramer and Erkut (2008) assert that when making company decisions, 
women directors provide different perspectives on the issues, ask difficult questions, 
expand the content of the issues, raise any issues that pertain to multiple stakeholders, 
and use their interpersonal skills to influence the board process. 
 
In addition, in making the financial decision for company, it is argued that by 
appointing women directors, it is likely that immoderate risk taking is reduced, as the 
study by Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) in the US setting found. Here, it was noted 
that women avoid excessive risk when compared to men – and they are more likely to 
be risk-averse. Besides this, Ferreira (2010) also associate female directorship with 
CEO turnover in relation to the stock return performance, which is one of the methods 
used to gauge the effectiveness of board monitoring roles. In this controversial area, 
Konrad et al. (2008) are consistent with what is postulated by principal-agent theory, 
whereby higher risk should be compensated with higher pay, and women directors 
have been found to play pivotal roles by raising tough questions and demanding 
straight answers pertaining to CEO performance. Thus, a CEO should give up their 
position due to a failure to increase the stock value, which is proved to have a 
significant relationship with female directorship. 
 
The monitoring role played by women directors is also crucial. Lessons were learned 
from the unprecedented history of the Enron scandal in 2001, where a lack of 
independent overseeing and control of the company’s financial report, eventually led 
to the bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation. Erhardt et al. (2003) reviewed the 
Enron’s 1998 annual report, which revealed that of 17 board members, there was only 
one female director . This shows that Enron’s board of directors was not diverse at 
that time and the board failed in its overseeing function. 
 
According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), people in an organisation make 
organisational decisions based on their cognitive mould. Males and females are 
known for their difference in cognitive skills, abilities and processes; these differences 
derive from different attitudes, norms, perspectives, and beliefs (Pelled, Eisenhardtand 
Xin 1999). However, to what extent does the gender of the director affect the 
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corporate governance in a company? In the light of corporate governance, this gender 
attitude issue can be reviewed from the perspectives of two theories, RDT and agency 
theory. Adams and Ferreira (2009) offer empirical evidence that female directors are 
more committed to attending board meetings, compared to male directors. 
Consequently, a higher proportion of female directors on the board could become a 
positive, contagious factor, which could reduce the likelihood of male directors having 
an attendance problem. 
 
Attending board meetings is not to be seen as a petty issue; furthermore from the view 
of corporate governance, this is the primary medium for the company to disseminate 
important information and for directors to execute their duties (ibid, p. 295; Jiraporn 
et al. 2009). In relation to this, Adams and Ferreira (2009) also conclude that female 
directors are detailed and meticulous in their monitoring activities, such that they are 
always appointed to sit on monitoring committees e.g. corporate governance, audit 
and nominating committees. There are various scopes of commitment enshrined in 
these committees, which are to be executed by their members, and it is assumed that 
those who have been placed on these monitoring committees are able to influence the 
setting of objectives and the company’s monitoring activities quite intensively. By 
adhering to societal pressure, as suggested by institutional theory, more women may 
be placed on these committees. 
 
Concomitant with the benefits put forward by agency theory, RDT, in addition, 
postulates that gender diversity on the board of directors promotes a better 
understanding of the marketplace (Carter et al. 2003), whereby it also can be implied 
as a good signal for workforce diversity (Rose 2007). By dealing effectively with 
diversity in the labour and product market, Mattis (2000) asserts that women directors 
can help to foster competitive advantage. In order to attract investors and penetrate 
markets, companies should match the diversity in the marketplace with the 
composition of the board of directors. Investors, on the other hand, when making their 
investment decisions, respond to the signals provided by the firms to understand the 
local market and workforce diversity. Erhardt et al. (2003) claim that gender diversity 
represents the practice of companies, and signals their efforts to overcome the 
CHAPTER 4  137 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
discrimination problem, one of the preferences attribute to foreign investors and 
inspiring other women employees to work harder (Mattis 1993). In summary, female 
directorship epitomises the equal opportunity provided in the workplace, and it is 
favoured by foreign investors, as it is considered to be  a source of competitive 
advantage for firms (Kang et al. 2010). 
 
Many studies have tried to address the relationship between female board diversity 
and a firm’s value (e.g. Carter et al 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003; etc.), which generally 
offers mixed results. A critical factor in good corporate governance appears to be the 
relationship between board diversity and shareholder value creation (Carter et al. 
2003), which postulates that good firm value and higher performance is positively 
associated with good governance (Bokpin and Isshaq 2009); subsequently this attracts 
foreign investors so that these facets are very intertwined with each other. 
 
Apart from the benefits of having female representatives on the board as already 
discussed, Adams and Ferreira (2009) highlight that, even though gender diversity 
seems favourable to the company as a whole, the issue of ‘over monitoring’ has 
always been associated with women’s leadership. They lend their opinion that 
excessive monitoring apparently decreases shareholder value (Almazan and Suarez 
2003). 
 
As stated beforehand, the increasing pattern of women directorship is proven in many 
research studies. For instance, Daily et al. (1999) offer evidence of the increasing 
trend for women assuming a seat on the board of the Fortune 500 firms, albeit not the 
CEO position. Even though Bilimoria (2000) agrees with this fact, he defies that any 
substantial effect has emerged from the rising rate. He shares the view with Mattis 
(2000), asserting that the escalating number of women directorships is not significant, 
as there are still gender discrimination, stereotyping and tokenism elements in 
existence on the boards with female director representation. 
 
The ‘number’ of women on the board is a crucial factor in order to get their voice 
heard. Being a lone woman, or being in only a small minority on the board, is very 
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challenging and it is difficult to gain the attention of the other members;  women in 
this situation are likely to be ignored and their presence among the male directors 
(defined by Kanter 1977 as the ‘majority’) is not welcomed. The only reason for the 
appointment of women directors onto boards is the pressure from related parties, such 
as the shareholders. Therefore, one or only a small minority of women are appointed 
to the board. This is called ‘tokenism’. Frequently, they are viewed as symbols rather 
than individuals, the symbols of “how-women-can-do, stand-ins for all women” 
(Kanter 1977). 
 
However, with three or more women in the boardroom, the level of acceptance by 
other members on board for the women directorship seems to improve and changes to 
a higher stage. It is claimed that with this number they reach a ‘critical mass’ (Erkut et 
al. 2008; Konrad et al. 2008), which can influence board decisions significantly 
without barriers to their communication (Torchia, Calabro and Huse 2011). The 
collaboration of three or more female directors becomes a dynamic ally, which helps 
to break the ‘stereotypes’ that are always associated with a solo woman on the board, 
or the ‘conspiracy’ accusation for coupled ladies on the board. 
 
On the other hand, there are studies which suggest that diversity can worsen a firm’s 
performance. For example, Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996) claim that diverse groups 
were slower in their actions and responses compared to uniform teams. Their 
explanation for the claim is that they are likely to dispute and create more conflicts, 
consequently lessening the effectiveness of team consensus. This statement is further 
reinforced by Knight et al. (1999) in their argument that greater time and effort is 
allocated to achieve consensus results in decision making. Therefore, due to greater 
interference, a firm’s performance is negatively affected.  
 
Maznevski (1994) offers a suggestion to overcome this problem by enhancing the 
integration and communication in a diverse group, which was then argued by Treicher 
(1995) as being impractical as high expenditures are incurred to accommodate the 
needs of different types of people, which may cause substantial cost to the company 
(Cox and Blake 1991). Treicher (1995) further adds that diversity is likely to increase 
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work group conflicts and break important communication processes. However, 
Murray (1989) refines this finding, and asserts that diversity and a company’s 
performance are related by the type of market in which the company operates. When 
the type of market is intense, a homogenous group works more effectively than a 
heterogeneous group, whilst during rapid and dynamic changes in the market, an 
adverse relationship is found. 
 
In summary, there are many empirical studies which have provided evidence to 
associate the benefits gained by companies with the gender diversity of the boards, for 
instance, in relation to a company’s improved performance (e.g. Burke 2000a; Carter 
et al. 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003; Shrader, Blackburn and Iles 1997). Hillman et al. 
(2007) anticipate that the appointment of female directors to the board of directors is 
purposely plagued by the potential benefits attached to them. In the light of this 
literature, and the link between the board of directors and the benefits outlined from 
an MTA, the appointment of female director(s) onto the board is believed to have a 
positive effect on the company’s overall performance (Kang et al. 2010), which is 
claimed by Zahra and Pearce (1989) to be one of the board’s crucial functions. 
 
Nevertheless, it could be a good idea to position Malaysia in the Asian context and 
consider the role of women in order to make a more accurate comparison of the 
impact of having women on a board to attract foreign investors. However, there is a 
lack of studies on gender issue in relation to board of directors that specifically focus 
on the Asian setting as a whole. Therefore, studies from a few specific Asian countries 
have been scrutinised, such as Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, China, Sri Lanka, etc. 
in order to find the gender issues on boards in relation to investor preference and 
company performance. Generally, most of these studies highlighted the under-
representation of women directors on the board. According to the survey conducted in 
China and India, for example, female representation on a corporate board lags behind 
their male counterparts, amounting to  only around 5 per cent of board seats 
(Wellalage and Locke 2013). Therefore, the appointment of women to the corporate 
board is seen as a means of enhancing  the ability of the board to utilise the board’s 
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control and strategic roles, which indirectly enhances the firm’s value (Kang et al. 
2010).  
 
However, there are no clear results for each country. In the study conducted by Kang 
et al. (2010) on Singapore listed firms, they found a positive response by investors to 
the appointment of women directors on the company’s board. However, a study by 
Wellalage and Locke (2013) in the Sri Lanka setting shows the significant inverse 
relationship between the proportion of women on boards and firm value, concomitant 
with an increase in company’s agency cost. Whilst in Malaysia Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy (2009) and Shukeri, Shin and Shaari (2012) found no significant 
relationship to be recognised. Therefore, it is argued that even though the issues of 
women on boards have escalated worldwide, in Asian countries, investors’ responses 
towards the inclusion of women directors on corporate board are different depending 
in which country they invest in. The diverse reactions shown by investors can be 
explained by the variation of culture embedded in corporate culture of each country.  
 
Thus, given the current arguments and the institutional setting in Malaysia, it puts 
forward equivocal evidence about the effects of the gender diversity of the board of 
directors on the level of FEO. It is interesting to note the statistic from the World 
Population Review
22
; the latest data for the population of Malaysia for the year 2013 
in total is 29,791,949 people. Of this number, 50.7% (15,106,780) is the male 
population and the remaining 49.3% (14,685,169) is the female population. This is in 
tandem with the 40% proportion of women in workforce labour, as revealed in the 
Grant Thornton International Business Report (IBR) 2013. The previous data from the 
World Bank showed the rate increasing relatively from 35.81% reported in the year 
2010. As females continue to become a larger proportion of the workforce in 
comparison to males, it is assumed that corporations will experience significant 
changes in potential candidates wishing  to sit on the hot ‘chairs’ as members of the 
board of directors. 
 
                                                 
22http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/malaysia-population/ 
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Unfortunately, this is not the case. According to the IBR report, Malaysia has the 
highest number of women in the workforce compared with other Asian countries, yet 
it has the lowest proportion of senior roles occupied by women, at only 26%. 
Therefore, it cannot be compared with the developed countries or even other Asian 
countries. Nevertheless, female directorship or gender diversity on the board of 
director represents a visible effort to imitate the good practice of corporate governance 
in a firm. However, in terms of its practicality in corporate work, especially for firms 
in an emerging market (as discussed above), it is difficult to predict the relation 
between female directorship and FEO. Even though it is not possible to make this 
supposition, based on the facts, arguments and prior studies, it is contestably presented 
that in Malaysia women directorship implies a positive signal to attract more foreign 
investment. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The level of foreign equity ownership in a company is positively 
associated with women directorship. 
 
4.4.2.4 Directors’ Educational Background 
(i) Directors with Financial Expertise 
Following the wave of accounting scandals around the world, for example at Enron - 
2001, WorldCom - 2002, Tyco - 2002, HealthSouth - 2003, etc., the call for more 
financial experts on boards is highly emphasised. It is argued that “an understanding 
of generally accepted accounting principles and financial statements” assists in a 
board’s overseeing functions, hence protecting the interests of the shareholders (Burak 
Guner, Malmendier and Tate 2008:323). From the parlance of agency theory, the 
appointment of financial experts to the board leads to reduced monitoring costs. 
 
There is a special section enacted in the SOX 2002 that highlights the requirement of 
having at least one member that is considered to be a financial expert on the audit 
committee. This practice, it is claimed by Burak Guner et al. (2008), has also been 
applied by the major stock exchanges around the world. However, it is argued that 
directors with financial expertise may spend most of their time providing financial 
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advice rather than monitoring the company’s activities (Adams and Ferreira 2007). 
This advisory role can be really taxing if directors are affiliated with certain financial 
institutions, which may create personal conflict about whether to pursue their own 
interests or to maximise shareholder value (Burak Guner et al. 2008).   
 
Even though the crucial role of financial expertise is specified in the 2002 SOX, 
however, the definition of financial expertise is too broad, so that commercial bankers 
are becoming common on corporate boards (see the definition in Section 407 of 2002 
SOX). Moreover, Olson (1999) justifies that managerial experience is sufficient to 
assure the effectiveness of the audit committee. But, the empirical results shown by 
Burak Guner et al. (2008) find an adverse effect on shareholder value whenever 
directors without a critical accounting qualification, for example commercial bankers, 
join the corporate board as the financial expertise. It is argued that when bankers act 
as the financial expertise, they make decisions to acquire loans for a company at an 
unnecessary time, or not in the interest of the shareholders, but for their perquisite 
from the affiliated institution (in this case, a banking institution). This can be 
explained through the actions of managers that may use the fund acquired from a loan 
to symbolise their power or use the money and invest it in unprofitable projects, etc., 
which consequently lead to empire-building and overconfident managers (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).  
 
On the other hand, in invoking RDT, there are studies that offer evidence that 
companies may benefit from the presence of financial expertise directors, with 
specific accounting background, on the board; for example, Agrawal and Chandha 
(2005) find that directors on audit committees with a CPA, CFA professional 
qualification or similar degrees reflect fewer of earning restatements, whereas Defond, 
Hann and Hu (2005) register a positive stock market reaction when directors with an 
accounting background are appointed to the audit committee board. Hillman, Cannella 
and Paetzold (2000) add that the skills and expertise possessed by directors assist 
management in making important decisions, which can thus affect a firm’s value. 
These findings add more credence to the conjecture that directors with accounting or 
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financial qualifications, or a similar background, can greatly assist in overseeing a 
firm’s financial reporting, thus reducing monitoring costs and mitigating agency costs. 
 
In the context of this study, the objective is to measure the reaction of foreign 
investors when making their investment decisions, to determine whether they favour 
the existence of financial expertise (qualified accounting or financial background) on 
the corporate board, or otherwise. The presence of directors on the board with this 
kind of financial expertise is expected to be valued, as they can be relied upon for 
their expertise in understanding the accepted principles of accounting (Burak Gurner 
et al. 2008). A firm’s financial forecasting and financial expertise are also associated 
with a better quality of financial reporting through the practice of accounting 
conservatism (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). Therefore, the criteria used to define 
the variable that represents ‘director with a professional qualification’ in this study is 
derived from this understanding (see 5.6.2 Independent Variables). In addition, the 
primary assertion concerning having qualified directors on the board is due to the 
escalation of high-profile cases in accounting scandals (Krishnan and Visvanathan 
2008).   
 
In Malaysia, the revised Code (2007) has pronounced the criteria that should be 
considered when appointing potential directors to the board. Among the suggested 
criteria are: skills, knowledge, expertise and experience, professionalism and integrity 
(Code 2007). These criteria are emphasised to ensure that the newly appointed 
directors can discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively. In addition, their 
professional development should be continually assessed. The amendments made to 
the existing Code (2000) are aimed at strengthening the corporate governance practice 
of the PLCs in Malaysia. This can be achieved through the selection process for 
company directors, by putting in place the right and sensible criteria before the final 
appointment is made, thus improving the quality of the board of PLCs in Malaysia 
(Budget 2008).    
 
It is believed that the specific clause pertaining to the directors’ terms of appointment, 
as drafted in the revised Code (2007) that came into existence in Malaysia, is 
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consistent with the practice in developed capital markets. In order to achieve a better 
level of corporate governance practice, generally, the quality of the board of directors 
is given special attention. The rise in high-profile accounting scandals and the collapse 
of giant companies around the world has swept away public confidence in the 
corporate sector. This catastrophe in the business world has been considered to be a 
wake-up call, not only for the countries involved, but also for their counterparts as 
well. The new clause pertaining to improve the directors’ monitoring role and their 
capability to comprehend a company’s financial reporting should become the main 
priority in combating the weakness of the existing corporate governance code. This 
aims to restore public confidence in the governance practice in the corporate sector.   
 
Therefore, in Anglo-American corporate governance, the 2002 SOX Act was 
introduced, which mandates the requirement to disclose whether the audit committee 
includes a financial expert (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). Similarly, the 
requirement for directors with financial literacy has been followed by all major stock 
exchanges (Burak Guner et al. 2008), without exception, including Malaysia. It is 
argued that Malaysia has taken serious steps to improve governance practice by 
imitating the related section from the world’s best benchmarking for application in the 
revised Code (2007).  
 
Drawing on  the perspective of institutional theory, the remedial action taken by the 
Malaysian government to imitate the institution (the tendency to adopt a similar 
institution, for example corporate governance code revision) of the developed markets 
in order to regain public confidence can be considered as an effort to seek legitimacy 
that can only be conferred by society at large. Heeding the previous lesson of the 
Asian turmoil 1997/1998, swift action was taken to remedy the severe condition of the 
corporate market after it had been tarnished by a series of corporate scandals. 
Therefore, the codes and the governance elements of firms, which are mostly from 
Anglo-American countries (Witt 2004), are adopted in an isomorphic way (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983), since these countries are claimed as having an optimal practice of 
good corporate governance (Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson 2010).  
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In emerging economies, where the system of corporate governance does not operate 
effectively, foreign investors are relying on proper mechanisms which can protect 
their investment. In this case, a firm’s compliance with the requirement of having a 
director with financial expertise can be accomplished through a few levels of 
isomorphism. Mainly, it can be realised through mimetic isomorphism, as the Code 
imitates the requirement imposed on firms in Anglo-American countries, so that it is 
consequently embodied in the revised Code (2007). This has resulted in coercive 
isomorphism, as the government of Malaysia can use its superior power to pressurise 
the PLCs in Malaysia to abide by this best practice in the revised Code (2007). 
Besides this, the emphasising of ‘financial expertise’ directors insists on the area of 
critical qualifications and professional association, such as accounting and financial, 
being aligned with the recognised professional titles awarded by professional 
institutions such as CPA, CFP, ACCA, CIMA, etc. (again, see 5.6.2 Independent 
Variables). This kind of enforcement can be seen as normative isomorphism, which 
primarily stems from professionalism.  
 
Therefore, this facet of professionalisation is derived from the growth and elaboration 
of the professional network. The established networks that encompass accountants and 
financial experts cause them to be bonded by similar values and attributes. Thus, their 
shared values can be diffused easily across the organisation. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) assert that by possessing the same background and values, people tend to view 
problems in a similar manner. Therefore, it is claimed that foreign investors favour the 
existence of directors with financial expertise as they share similar values, which can 
lead to similar perspectives in making decisions thus reducing monitoring costs. In 
addition, the revised Code (2007) also replicates the governance practice of developed 
markets, which is implied by foreign investors as being good governance practice. 
Overall, it seems that RDT, agency theory and institutional theory are in mutual 
agreement with each other that director with accounting and financial qualifications 
are highly sought by foreign investors. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Directors with financial expertise are positively associated with foreign 
equity investment in a firm. 
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(ii) Directors with a Western Educational Background 
In addition to the above notion of normative isomorphism, there is another aspect that 
can be considered as appearing under this mechanism, namely formal education 
received in a university. The formal education received in an established organisation, 
inculcates specific values in people within the same setting. The values that are 
instilled during their upbringing produce lasting effects within the individual. Thus, 
when they enter employment, they will hold these values within them, which enable 
them to be diffused easily into and across organisations.   
 
Institutional theorists such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
and Zucker (1987) suggest that organisations are shaped by the normative pressures 
which embrace them. The sources of these pressures originate from other regulatory 
bodies or the state. Adhering to these pressures changes the organisation’s structure in 
an isomorphic way with institutionally prescribed expectations (Slack and Hinings 
1994). In this case, directors are the crucial actors that can influence an organisation’s 
structure. The sources of their influence emanate from the system, i.e. the type of 
education and the corresponding values that they received in their tertiary school. The 
educational background of the directors is also claimed to be able to assist 
management in strategy evaluation (Ruigrok et al. 2006). Therefore, it is argued that 
directors with a Western educational background are favoured by foreign investors 
when making their investment decisions as they share the same values and 
perspectives (Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005).  
 
Drawing on the perspective of agency theory, foreign investors may regard directors 
with a Western educational background as a sign of improved governance, as they 
have been exposed to a similar institutional background, and share similar values 
which emphasise the maximisation of shareholder wealth; thereby they are assumed to 
act in a way that is preferred by foreign investors. Thus, foreign investors can at least 
hinge upon the expected integrity that these directors uphold while carrying out their 
fiduciary duties within the company, which results in a decrease in monitoring costs.  
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Besides this, and consistent with the argument from RDT, the existence of directors 
with a Western educational background promotes heterogeneity, which therefore 
helps to break the deadlock in the traditional board of directors. Heterogeneity on a 
board leads to a positive impact on firm performance (Douma et al. 2006). Directors 
with a Western educational background are argued to share similar attributes with 
foreign directors, where they can advise on global experiences (Masulis et al. 2012) 
and technical skills that are beyond the outreach of directors with a local educational 
background. They also steer the meeting to run in a different paradigms, which 
removes the boundary of close proximity thinking in making company decisions; this 
therefore advocates a new management practice to be adopted, which is centred on the 
Anglo-American governance practice.  
 
It is widely known that Malaysian companies share the typical characteristics of Asian 
companies. Unlike in the US and UK, ownership in East Asian companies is relatively 
high and concentrated (Cheung and Chan 2004), and this can lead to family-owners or 
controlling shareholders getting more power to rule the companies (Zhuang et al. 
2000). La Porta et al. (2000) contend that this type of ownership has weakened the 
effectiveness of shareholder protection mechanisms. Cheung and Chang (2004) also 
argued that these characteristics affect investors’ view and the way they assess the 
companies. Thus, it is argued that having the director(s) with Western educational 
background on corporate board helps to reduce their apprehension of being 
manipulated by controlling shareholders.  
 
Therefore, it is argued that for emerging countries like Malaysia as part of Asian 
countries, foreign investors favour the existence of directors with a Western 
educational background on the corporate board, in order to preserve their interests and 
uphold their rights since they share similar values, e.g. maximising shareholder 
wealth. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Directors with a Western educational background are positively 
associated with foreign equity investment in a firm. 
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4.4.3 Ownership Structure 
There are many types of equity ownership that can be found in a company. Among 
them are shareholding by corporations, banks, mutual funds, governments, and 
individuals. Douma et al. (2006) presuppose that the ownership structure in each firm 
triggers the differences which exist among them. The differences in the owners’ 
identity, their concentration and their resources determine the company’s relative 
power, incentives and how they monitor managers. In addition, the ultimate goal held 
by the firm’s owner - for instance, their preference to choose either short or long term 
returns on investment - may also subsequently influence the performance of the firms. 
The subsections below discuss the three types of ownership to be tested in the 
hypotheses. This is done in the context of answering the third research question: Do 
ownership structures influence the level of FEO? 
 
4.4.3.1 Family-Controlled Companies (FCCs) 
Large and single-family conglomerates are ubiquitous, and have dominated in many 
emerging countries (Claessens et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2000). Chang (2003) and Joh 
(2003) assert that this type of company plays a particularly important role in Asian 
countries. Most of the studies in developed markets, such as the US and Europe, have 
discovered that family companies have shown better performance compared to non-
family companies (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Daily and Dollinger 1992; Margaritis 
and Psillaki 2010; Maury 2006; Villalonga and Amit 2006). In contrast, there are a 
few studies which reach a different conclusion; these suggest that non-family 
companies are better in terms of performance (Lauterbach and Vanisky 1999; Morck 
et al. 1988; Nowland 2008; Perez-Gonzalez 2006). Others find no relationship (e.g. 
Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Demstez and Villalongan 2001). Thus, mixed results are 
obtained.  
 
In this study, to be identified as a family-controlled company (FCC), one of the 
conditions is to acquire the minimum of family ownership (direct and indirect) for at 
least 20% of the company’s equity (see Section 5.6.2 Independent Variables). This 
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controlling power and higher concentration on large shareholders is expected to 
mitigate agency conflict between managers and outside shareholders by solving the 
free-rider problems of small shareholders (Suto 2003). Based on the agency theory 
perspective, the claim made by Suto (2003) has long been noted by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). This is consistent with the previous 
argument made by Berle and Means (1932) that US corporations with dispersed 
ownership among small shareholders tend to underperform in terms of company 
performance. Therefore, they contend that, through the advantage gained by the 
controlling power that the large shareholders have, this enables them to discipline 
management (Suto 2003).  
 
The above claim is supported by Grossman and Hart (1988); this kind of concentrated 
ownership is effective in solving managerial agency problems and is efficient in 
undertaking costly monitoring or control which benefits other shareholders as well 
(Gillan and Starks 2000). Put simply by Peng and Jiang (2010:255), “one does not 
steal his own money”. The increased return from efficient monitoring may outweigh 
the monitoring costs involved with the large shareholders (Gillan and Starks 2000). 
Therefore, it is argued that the concentrated owner, such as the family owner, has 
substantial economic incentives to diminish agency conflicts and maximise the firm’s 
value.  
 
A family-owned or controlled business has its unique characteristics. It has a 
reputation to be preserved and the survival of the business is the main concern. 
Therefore, this helps to mitigate the agency cost of outside equity and outside debt 
(Anderson, Mansi and Reeb 2003; Demsetz and Lehn 1985). The uniqueness of 
family firms is also underpinned by the family ties that bind them together (Litz 
1995), where the family spirit is inculcated from childhood, thus becoming the 
internal monitoring mechanism which controls the family business (Fama and Jensen 
1983). Therefore, FCCs are much governed by family traits (Mishra, Randoy and 
Jenssen 2001), and provide competitive advantage to the firm (Burkart, Panunzi and 
Shleifer 2003). In fact, Maury (2006) claims that FCCs in Western Europe seem to 
benefit minority shareholders rather than harm them. Likewise, less developed 
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countries, which are associated with weak investor protection, also claim to obtain 
benefits from equity concentration in relation to the company’s performance; whereby 
these shareholders may act as a substitute for the weak legal protection in that country 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 2002; Peng and Jiang 2010; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1986; Suto 2003).      
 
However, this claim is disputed by Bebchuk et al. (2000) and Claessens et al. (2000), 
who argue that concentrated ownership creates new agency problems. The agency 
problem in FCCs may occur between the minority shareholders and the family owners 
(principal-principal conflicts) (Villalonga and Amit 2006), instead of principal and 
agent conflicts. According to Claessens et al. (2000), the controlling shareholders may 
ignore the minority shareholders’ interests due to the difference in their ultimate 
objectives, and may mislead managers into making non-value-maximising investment 
decisions (Ferris et al. 2003; Kim et al. 2007) and into misallocating corporate 
resources in unproductive business units (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 2000).  
 
Whilst there are two sides of agency theory to be grasped, according to RDT, in 
relation to FCCs, there are benefits to having controlling shareholders participate in a 
firm’s decision making. The controlling shareholders may become the critical 
resources for the survival of the firm especially during a financial crisis – whereby 
their decisions and wealth effects are unified to provide benefits for the whole 
company (Holderness 2003). Minority shareholders, who also benefit from the role 
that large shareholders play in managing a crisis and preserving a firm’s value during 
difficult times, are aware of the important critical resources that large shareholders can 
provide to the company (Peng and Jiang 2010). 
 
Referring back to the work by Berle and Means (1932), they advanced the proposition 
that as firms grow larger, inevitably, family concentrated ownership will be replaced 
by dispersed ownership which separates between ownership and control. This 
suggests that family control may not encourage creation of value to large firms. As 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue, if firms fail to comply with this time adjustment 
pressure, their competitive advantage will be jeopardised (Morck, Wolfenzon and 
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Yeung 2005). However, Peng and Jiang (2010) assert that the impact of family control 
on a firm’s value differs across countries; this hinges upon the level of investor 
protection enshrined in the legal and regulatory institutions of a particular country.  
 
The modern corporations of the US and the UK started with concentrated family 
ownership (Chandler 1990) and their ownership become dispersed over time (Berle 
and Means 1932). However, the evolution of ownership is not uniform in other parts 
of the world, since certain elements of their structure do not change swiftly or as much 
as others, thus showing resistance to institutional pressures (Slack and Hinings 1994). 
The main explanation for this is the existence of the country’s institutional regulations 
concerning investor protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008; Peng 
and Jiang 2010; Young et al. 2008). In the US and the UK particularly, the interests of 
shareholders and the rights of minority shareholders are highly important, which 
encourages family companies to dilute their ownership and delegate their power to the 
professional managers in order to attract minority shareholders, and over time they 
become part of the minority shareholders as well (Peng and Jeng 2010).  
 
The above notion might be true for countries that have strong institutional governance 
regulation. The founding families may submit their responsibilities for managing the 
corporation to trusted managers, as they are comfortable with the existing regulations 
that rule the corporate environment. However, with respect to their counterparts 
elsewhere, especially in Asian countries where investor protection is weak, family 
firms have no choice and must run their business directly (Peng and Jiang 2010). 
Appointing outside managers summons scepticism as they may invite “abuse and 
theft” or “rampant agency problems” in the company (ibid p.256) Consequently, 
prospective minority shareholders such as foreign investors may be less enthusiastic 
about investing as they are afraid of the fragile investor protection and the 
expropriation by controlling shareholders, which is apparently associated with 
countries that are weak in governance institutions and regulations. These situations are 
making concentrated ownership more visible and prevalent in these countries (La 
Porta et al. 2000; Young et al. 2008). 
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Empirical evidence was put forward by Tsamenyi et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2010), 
to suggest that foreign investors disfavoured firms with concentrated ownership, 
especially during the period of financial crisis. This is underpinned by the evidence 
offered by Mitton (2002) and Baek et al. (2004), who claimed that during the crisis, 
Asian firms with significant controlling ownership experienced a sharper drop in their 
share price.  Johnson et al. (2000) claimed that, during the Asian crisis, many family 
companies suffered huge losses, thus expropriations of minority shareholders were 
severe in order to ‘make up’ their losses. Peng and Jiang (2010) contend that the 
greater the control of family companies, the greater the opportunities are for them to 
expropriate minority shareholders, hence reducing a firm’s value.  
 
Hence, based on these theoretical arguments, even though there is evidence that FCCs 
perform better than non-family-controlled companies, from the institutional theory 
view, the findings may be contingent upon the distinct institutional framework that 
pervades particular countries like the US and the UK. In Asian countries like 
Malaysia, there are many cases which evidence that the expropriation of minority 
shareholders is severe, especially after the AFC 1997/1998. Thus, the findings cannot 
be generalised. In addition, the agency theory perspective is prone to associating FCC 
with high agency cost organisations, even though RDT advocates that controlling 
shareholders are likely to increase a firm’s value. Nonetheless, considering the inverse 
relationship between agency costs and corporate governance, FCC is associated with 
being a weak corporate governance proxy in the model. Since foreign investors assign 
higher monitoring costs compared to domestic investors, they closely monitor 
corporate governance’s internal mechanisms and place more weight on those variables 
(Dahlquist et al. 2003). Therefore, it is argued that foreign investors, when making 
investment decisions concerning FCCs that are domiciled in countries with weak 
institutional and governance regulation, such as Malaysia, perceive them negatively. 
Thus it is hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 8: FEO is negatively associated with a family-controlled company (FCC). 
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4.4.3.2 Managerial Ownership 
In the light of the agency theory perspective, the separation of ownership and control 
leads to agency conflict between the owners and the managers of a firm (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). It is claimed that a manager may 
manipulate his position to pursue his own interests at the expense of the shareholders. 
Hence, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the best mechanism to solve the 
agency problem between these two parties is ownership by corporate managers. 
Managerial-share ownership is thought to lessen the potentially hazardous actions 
taken by managers (such as engaging in inferior projects, seeking other perquisites, 
shirking, etc.) that might expropriate shareholder wealth. Therefore, this helps in 
aligning the principal and managerial interests.   
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that, concomitant with an increase in managerial 
ownership, a firm’s performance increases, since managers with vested interests are 
more responsible for maximising a firm's value, rather than shrinking it. On the other 
hand, zero or low ownership by managers, triggers them to find alternative perquisites 
outside the firm, for instance, multiple-directorships, which can satisfy their ambition 
for establishing their reputation or self-fulfilment (Jiraporn et al. 2009
b
). Then, they 
become too busy to reap their private benefits, and neglect their managerial 
responsibility in the company which is detrimental to the shareholders. Therefore, 
managerial ownership is considered to be the best mechanism for aligning the 
divergence of interests between managers and shareholders. 
 
Furthermore, managerial ownership appears to become an inducement for the 
managers to work more diligently in order to increase the value of the company, and 
this yields high returns to shareholders, as well as themselves (Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen 2006). Consistent with the above view, Jiraporn et al. (2009) postulate that the 
larger the equity ownership held by the director, the better their meeting attendance 
and the more likely they are to serve on more board committees (Jiraporn et al. 
2009
b
). This argument favours the finding of Suto (2003) who claims that it can help 
to mitigate conflict between the owners and the manager and can solve the 
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information asymmetry problem as well (Jensen and Meckling 1976). It is argued that 
owner-managers who are involved in the daily operations of the firms are better able 
to comprehend the firm, thus there will be less of an information asymmetry problem 
and fewer managerial conflicts, which in turn reduces the need for monitoring and 
mitigates the agency cost. 
 
In contrast, Fama and Jensen (1983) consider that insider shareholders (managerial-
ownership) may be associated with ‘adverse entrenchment’ effects. The effect of 
raising the insider equity can lead to higher ‘managerial opportunism’, at the expense 
of outside shareholders. External shareholders, then, may face difficulties in 
controlling the manager’s action (Morck et al. 1988). High equity possession by 
managers may become an enticement for them to pursue their own goals, and not the 
interests of outside shareholders, hence reducing the firm’s value (adverse 
entrenchment effect) (Demsetz 1983). Therefore, the linear relationship between a 
firm’s performance and ownership, which is evidenced by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
is denied by later findings from Morck et al. (1988). Morck et al. (1988) find a non-
linear relationship between a firm’s performance and managerial ownership, which 
suggests that, at a certain level of ownership
23
, managers may gravitate towards taking 
actions which benefit them and might reduce the firm’s value. Furthermore, they have 
sufficient control to make them invulnerable to the penalising threats and disciplining 
actions of other shareholders (Short and Keasey 1999). This significant positive-
negative-positive relationship result of Morck et al. (1988), however, is argued by 
Short and Keasey (1999) as only existing for performance which is measured by 
Tobin’s Q and not for accounting profit.  
 
Despite all these arguments, it is debatable as to whether the findings concerning the 
impact of managerial ownership in Western countries can be generalised to other parts 
                                                 
23The results suggest that when the managerial ownership is between 0% to 5% and 
beyond 25%, there is a positive relationship in relation to a firm’s performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) – (convergence of interest effects), however when the 
ownership is in the range of 5% to 25%, a negative relationship is documented -
(entrenchment effect).   
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of the world, especially to countries with different institutional settings and corporate 
governance systems. Indeed, companies in the US and the UK are often depicted as 
having widely dispersed ownership (Short and Keasey 1999). Apparently, in 
Malaysia, their ownership structure is different. As one of the emerging countries, it is 
widely known that its capital markets are concentrated in the ownership structure.  
 
According to Chang (2003), the main agency problem in Asian firms lies in the fact 
that little control is in the hands of majority shareholders, in contrast with the little 
ownership but powerful control by owner-managers. Owner-manager companies are 
prevalent among PLCs in Malaysia (Mat Nor and Sulong 2007), especially in family 
companies (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Family businesses would normally choose 
their family members to manage the company, especially for the top management 
position, and at the same time use their influence to recruit employees and other 
business relationships (Che Ahmad 2002).  
 
There are streams of agency theory that claim the ineffectiveness of this practice, 
which may be detrimental to the firm. Agency theorists argue that when family 
members are appointed as managers, with the ownership they hold, they may gravitate 
towards adopting investment policies that benefit their family members, instead of 
outside shareholders. In addition, if the managers are unqualified and incompetent, 
they may deviate from the objective of maximising shareholder wealth (Peng and 
Jiang 2010).   
 
There is also some literature that draws on RDT, questioning whether family ties are 
an appropriate resource for achieving a competitive edge. This is associated with 
‘altruism’24 , which is commonly found in family firms. The relationships between 
principals (family owners) and agents (family managers) are likely to be based on 
emotion and family sentiments. Thus, any inappropriate actions taken by family 
managers may be concealed and silenced by other family members in order to 
                                                 
24Altruism – selfless or unselfish; concerned more with the well-being of others than 
with one's own. 
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preserve their relationship (Peng and Jiang 2010). This may reduce a firm’s value 
(Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino 2003). Instead, it can also happen in an inverse way 
leading to family squabbles, which are the opposite of altruism. In both ways, it may 
affect a firm’s value. For the latter conflicts, additional costs might be incurred such 
as generation envy, sibling rivalry, irrational strategic decisions and non-merit 
compensation (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez 2001). 
 
As argued beforehand, the structure of Malaysian firms is unique in terms of the 
agency relationship, where the exploitation of the minor shareholders arises from the 
action of the controlling shareholders, and not the managers (Baek et al. 2004; Young 
et al. 2008). The controlling shareholders are argued to have a strong position to 
maximise their own goals at the expense of other shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). Therefore, the conflict is focused between the minority and controlling 
shareholders, the so called principal-principal model (Young et. al. 2008). This is 
believed to stem from the weakness in corporate governance practice in emerging 
economies (Claessens et al. 2000). 
 
Even though there are many studies which claim that managerial ownership reduces 
the conflicts (Fama and Jensen 1983
b
) of principal-agent, lower asymmetry 
information problem, lessens the monitoring cost, and hence mitigates the agency cost 
(see Mustapha and Ahmad 2011). However, in the current study setting, i.e. Malaysia, 
it is argued that foreign investors perceive managerial ownership as a proxy of a weak 
corporate governance mechanism in a firm. Family ownership has a bearing on 
managerial ownership in Malaysia, which is postulated in the previous argument as 
one of the mechanisms that is shunned by foreign investors. Foreign investors 
perceive family-controlled companies in Malaysia negatively due to the weak 
institutional and governance regulations protecting investors. Therefore, it is argued 
that managerial-ownership is also perceived by foreign investors as a proxy of a weak 
corporate governance mechanism. Thus, it is hypothesised that:  
 
Hypothesis 9: The level of foreign equity ownership is negatively associated with 
managerial ownership. 
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4.4.3.3 Institutional Ownership 
The role of institutional investors has become increasingly important in the developed 
capital market. Investment companies, insurance companies, bank trust departments, 
foundation and pension funds are among the institutions that are active in the equity 
market, and their participation in equity ownership has increased dramatically 
concomitant with the growth in pension assets (Gillan and Starks 2000). It is widely 
claimed, with the growth of institutional ownership that their role and capacity as 
shareholders has also evolved.  
 
Studies have put forward evidence of a significant relationship between institutional 
shareholding and the corporate governance structures of companies (see Chung and 
Zhuang 2011). A survey conducted by McKinsey and Company (2002) in 31 
countries regarding more than 200 institutional investors shows that institutional 
investors place greater emphasis on a company’s governance quality when they are 
making investment decisions, at a par with other crucial financial indicators. With the 
passage of time, institutions have become more active in influencing the governance 
structure of the corporations within which they have their shareholdings (Gillan and 
Starks 2000). Among the corporate governance attributes which are preferred by 
institutional investors is a greater level of information disclosure. This is very helpful 
and cost effective to investors as they can reduce their monitoring costs, because less 
outside monitoring is required (Chung and Zhang 2011).  
 
Nevertheless, it is argued that these institutions can simply sell their shares in 
underperforming companies, rather than involve themselves with the companies’ 
problems. However, depending on the proportion of equity they hold, the threat of exit 
is sometimes not a good option as they may suffer greater losses. Institutional 
shareholder activism
25
 is one of the expedient ways to administer their equity 
possession in the company. In the USA, institutional shareholder activism arose 
                                                 
25For the detailed history of the emergence of institutional shareholder activism, see 
Monks and Minow (1995).  
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around the early 1990s by submitting proxy proposals, and the target was a firm that 
was not achieving the expected performance. The proposals usually pertained to the 
corporate governance practice in the firm. With the passage of time, the approach has 
evolved, and the substantial cost incurred to initiate a coalition among the 
shareholders has reduced as they no longer hinge upon proxy proposals, but direct 
communication with the management.   
 
It is contended that the initiative of arousing the institutional shareholder activism was 
due to the goal incongruence between managers and shareholders. Moreover, they 
have strong fiduciary duties towards their individual shareholders (Chung and Zhuang 
2011). Therefore, they should avoid investing in firms with weak governance 
practices as they are likely to be manipulated by large shareholders or management; 
they may even fail to obtain a good return, or, in the worst case, preserve their capital. 
It is asserted that institutional investors have a stronger encouragement to monitor 
management, rather than the individual shareholder, because they own larger stakes in 
those companies. Thus, the impact of any undesirable case occurring in the company 
may be even greater to them. In the UK, for example, despite criticisms that there is a 
lack of public intervention in issues of corporate governance, in reality, the level of 
intervention by UK institutions is higher than that publicly reported (Short and 
Keasey1999).  
 
Even though there are many corporate governance mechanisms able to tackle this 
issue, both internal and external, and in developed capital markets, institutional 
shareholder activism is claimed to be one of the most effective mechanisms (Gillan 
and Starks 2000). However, there are oppositions to this view. It has been argued that 
the role of the fund manager should not deviate from its primary function, which is to 
manage money for beneficiaries. They should not interfere in management decision-
making, as they are claimed to have a lack of expertise for giving advice (ibid p.280).  
 
However, for this case, the main point to be highlighted is that firms which are 
favoured by institutional investors are also of the same interest to foreign investors. 
Thus, the initial conjecture is that firms with high institutional shareholdings will 
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show the same pattern for foreign investors. This is evidenced by the study of 
Dahlquist and Robertson (2003) which claims that foreign and institutional ownership 
can be depicted by similar attributes. This result adds credence to the conjecture that 
there is a positive relation between institutional ownership and foreign ownership in a 
firm, which may be driven by the corporate governance practice of a firm. This 
argument is based on the results of a few studies that analyse the relationship between 
corporate governance practice and institutional investors’ reaction, which mirror 
Dahlquist and Robertson (2003) their study of foreign investment in Sweden. Among 
the attributes are that institutional investors favour firms that are well-governed, 
larger, more liquid, and have had relatively low returns during the previous year 
(Chung and Zhang 2011; Falkenstein 1996; Gompers and Metrick 1999).  
 
On the other hand, in Malaysia, institutional shareholder activism is not something 
common, albeit that the backdrop of institutional participation in the equity market is 
still in its infancy stage and emerged from contrasting roots. In 1996, before the AFC 
1997/1998, institutional shareholdings in the PLCs in Malaysia accounted for 47.8%, 
which was as high as the developed market (Suto 2003). The holding of foreigners 
was 19.2% and the remaining balance, 43%, was the holdings of non-Malay citizens
26
. 
From the perspective of agency theory, when it is applied to developed economies, the 
large shareholders, including institutional investors, might help in solving the free-
rider problems of small shareholders (Pound 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). It is 
contended that large external equity holders help to mitigate the agency problems by 
using their strong influence to monitor and dicipline management (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1986). However, in contrast, Villalongan and Amit (2006) claim that large 
institutional shareholders may not have incentive to monitor management, and they 
may even coerce with management (Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, this kind of statement does not really fit with the capital market 
environment in Malaysia, where most of the major institutional investors, including 
                                                 
26These figures are taken from various issues of Investing in the Stock Market in 
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and published by Suto (2003). 
CHAPTER 4  160 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
government agencies and social securities funds, such as the Employees Provident 
Fund (EPF) and national unit trusts, are state-backed institutions. These institutions 
have been used by the government to hold equity issues arising from the privatisation 
of government enterprises and to support equity financing growth sectors since 1980 
(Suto 2003). Institutional investors in Malaysia are less likely to monitor the firms 
they invest in, and this hinges upon the government intervention to manage funds. 
Therefore, it is suggested by Suto (2003) that the issue of information asymmetry 
problems must be more serious for firms held by institutional investors with the 
emergence of the free-rider problem, and also, it does not help to mitigate the agency 
cost. Despite the fact that a few regulations have arisen to regulate funds in Malaysia 
since the 1990s, these institutional investors are still enmeshed with government 
policies, which makes them difficult to separate out when any issues related to 
institutional investors are highlighted.  
 
Malaysia is a multiracial country. In this country, there are three ethnic structures of 
ownership: the Malays, non-Malays (Chinese, Indian and other citizens) and 
foreigners. The Malays are the indigenous people, known as Bumiputra (sons of the 
soil). According to the Social Contract
27
 made by the country’s founding fathers in 
the Constitution, Malays were granted special rights and privileges, whilst in return, 
the non-Bumiputra was granted citizenship. Since 1971, in its Second Year Five-year 
Plan, the government of Malaysia has been very consistent in its objective of 
eradicating poverty and reducing the income disparity between ethnics, in order to 
establish the basis of savings for economic growth.  
 
Bumiputra are given various preferential treatment schemes to encourage them to 
participate in financial transactions. This is attested by the fact that income 
distribution was still uneven and Bumiputra were found to be in the lower 
                                                 
27The Social Contract in Malaysia is an initiative of the country’s founding fathers in 
the Constitution in an attempt to nourish a spirit of cooperation between 
multiracial people to gain independence. Articles 14-18 and Article 153 of the 
Constitution, pertaining to the granting of citizenship to the non-Bumiputra and 
special rights and privileges to the Malays can be referenced for further details. 
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occupational categories (Tam and Tan 2007). The New Economic Policy (NEP) 1971, 
for example, has stated the aim to achieve 30 per cent of Bumiputra ownership and 
management in the corporate sector by 1990
28
. Securities investment through 
collective investments schemes, such as EPF and national unit trusts, are among the 
platforms to increase the shareholding of Malays
29
.  
 
The explanation behind this is that the policy pertaining to conserve Bumiputra 
privileges in institutional investment schemes is thought not to contribute to reducing 
the agency costs of a company.  The increasing ownership by Malays has had no 
significant effect on the choice of corporate financing; as predicted, Malay 
shareholders have not played a significant role in disciplining the corporate 
management of the firms that they invest in. Therefore, the initial conjecture 
established in the earlier discussion is no longer valid in the context of Malaysia, with 
its different institutional background. In active and liquid capital markets, shareholder 
activism, such as the threat of exit and through voice mechanisms, can be achieved 
through coercive isomorphism (Noteboom 1999), but this has not held true in the 
Malaysian capital market. It is argued that, in Malaysia, shareholder activism is still in 
its infancy phase and promoting shareholder value is an undertaking in progress.  
 
It is suggested that a policy which promotes the social dispersion of ownership 
coupled with an effort to enhance the awareness or consciousness of Malays as 
shareholders should be intensified (Suto 2003). Besides this, fund management 
efficiency should be improved at the institutional level, and then the agency cost can 
be reduced. If not, the predicted relationship between FEO and institutional 
shareholding should be negatively related or neutral. In addition, the empirical results 
of monitoring by institutional investors are mixed. Smith (1996) and Strickland, Wiles 
                                                 
28Bumiputra ownership increased significantly - by 18.8% - in 20 years (from 1.5 per 
cent in 1970 to 20.3 per cent in 1990), however the initial target of 30 per cent 
was not achieved (Tam and Tan 2007). 
29 30 per cent Bumiputra ownership, 20 per cent foreign ownership was set as the 
policy target. 
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and Zinner (1996) offer evidence of positive effects on corporate value, whilst in 
contrast Karpoff (1996), Wahal (1996), and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) question the 
monitoring ability of institutional investors.  
 
Taking into consideration all the points offered and the contrasting institutional 
background in Malaysia, it is thus hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 10: The level of foreign equity ownership is negatively associated with 
institutional shareholding.  
 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, a set of research hypotheses relating to the corporate governance 
attributes associated with foreign investment behaviour are formulated. This process 
commenced with a discussion of the rationale for generating hypotheses from a multi-
theoretical approach.  Understanding the board roles and the ownership pattern in 
Malaysia requires a multi-theoretical approach that espouses agency theory, 
institutional theory and resource dependence theory. The use of a multi-theoretical 
approach has escalated recently in order to comprehend the issue of corporate 
governance (see Douma et al. 2006; Lynall et al. 2003; Ruigrok et al. 2006).  
 
In an attempt to justify the corporate governance determinants that affect foreign 
investors’ investment decisions in Malaysia, a set of testable hypotheses was 
developed. More specifically, for Malaysia, the arguments for hypotheses’ 
development hinge upon the reality of institutional change, the unique ownership 
pattern and the insight from resource dependence theory. Thus, it is hoped that by 
considering all these elements in Malaysia’s corporate environment it will be possible 
to answer the research questions (see Section 1.5 Research Question), which were 
again restated in this chapter. Overall, to answer the main research question, it is 
hypothesised that the level of FEO in Malaysian companies is associated with its 
corporate governance structure. Hence, the following chapter, Chapter 5, presents the 
process of data collection and the statistical methods used to test the hypotheses. The 
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results are presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. Finally, a full length discussion of 
the results follows in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter developed the hypotheses to be tested. In continuance, this 
chapter is structured to illustrate the process of data collection and presents the 
procedures for using the statistical method to test these hypotheses. Data was collected 
from various sources and a number of methods were employed to analyse the data.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides an explanation of the 
philosophical approach in acquiring data and conducting the study. Section 5.3 
elaborates on the types of data, followed by the selection of the sample. The process 
of data collection is outlined in Section 5.4. The instruments used in this study are 
then explained in Section 5.5. The next section provides a description of the 
measurement employed for the dependent, independent and control variables. 
Statistical analysis is discussed in Section 5.7. Finally, Section 5.8 summarises and 
concludes the whole chapter, and indicates some problems and limitations 
encountered during the data collection process.  
 
5.2 The Philosophical Approach to the Study 
The philosophy behind the research work can influence how the researcher sees the 
things they want to see. Epistemology and ontology are the appropriate branches of 
philosophy. Epistemology studies knowledge and justified belief. Researcher may 
justify their belief in the way they see things using their own justification, while it 
might be different from another person’s vantage point; “where you stand can 
influence what you see” (Fischer 1998:128).  As a result, the epistemological stance 
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influences the design and methods used for data collection. Ontology is the 
philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence, or reality, which are 
the very basic categories and relate to the very essence of the issue being investigated 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979).  
 
There are also two dominant views or paradigms concerning the nature of knowledge: 
positivist and interpretivist. This study can be claimed to be a positivist study. In 
epistemological studies, the concern is for the ground of knowledge, where the 
researcher begins to understand ‘reality’ and conveys this understanding to be grasped 
by others as knowledge. The ‘reality’ which is to be investigated is questioned in 
ontological terms as to whether it is external to the researcher or whether it is a 
product of individual consciousness (Burrell and Morgan 1979). For positivists, their 
epistemological assumption is that external reality may only be observed, not in other 
ways, for the knowledge to be considered as significant (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Lowe 2002). Consistent with this, Yin (2003) argues that positivists of the ontological 
paradigm assume that reality is external and should be measured through objective 
methods. Thus, the interpretivist approach is undermined when the objective method 
is preferred, whereas the subjective approach is inclined to inferences based on human 
emotions, sensations, reflections or intuition (Hussey and Hussey 1997). There are a 
few criteria which have been used in this study which reflect ontology and 
epistemology in the positivist paradigm.  
 
Based on ontological positivism, reality and truth exist out there, and are waiting to be 
discovered (Yin 2003). Meaning itself exists in the world and knowledge will reflect 
reality. Thus, accurate knowledge precisely reflects the world as it is. Based on what 
is argued by Yin (2003), this study has tried to find the knowledge that exists in the 
business world, particularly foreign investor behaviour. In the context of this thesis, 
from the view of the ontological approach, the primary source of information is 
mainly based on objective information. This applies when the analysis of foreign 
ownership to Malaysian public listed companies is based on factual data obtained 
from companies’ annual reports and the Datastream database.   
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The differences between positivist and interpretivist work can be seen by way of the 
following comparison. Positivist work seeks to identify research data with 
propositions that can be tested or identified in other cases, while interpretivist work 
seeks to combine these data into a system of belief whose manifestations are specific 
to a case (Lin 1998).  It is stated in this study that the findings will be helpful in 
linking other companies, or generally other developing countries, to understand the 
behaviour of foreign investors by imparting knowledge about them. Generalisations 
can be made to another case in a similar setting. Hence, a key evaluation criterion 
pertains to the reliability of findings, in the sense that different researchers, or the 
same researchers on different occasions, would “discover the same phenomena or 
generate the same constructs in the same or similar setting” (LeCompte and Goetz 
1982). 
 
In addition, Lin (1998) also argues that discovering causal relationships is the 
province of positivist research. Under epistemology based research, positivists claim 
that knowledge can be predicted and explained by observing the regularities of action 
and causal relationships between elements in the population (Burrell and Morgan 
1979). This statement is in agreement with Neuman (1997) who posits that positivist 
research discovers causal laws that can be used to predict general patterns of human 
activity, hence embracing the reductionist approach (Remenyi, Williams and Swartz 
1998). Therefore, the need for the formulation of hypotheses is emphasised in 
conducting empirical testing to search for persuasive explanations for the causal 
relationships (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). Indeed, this is what has been done in this 
study; the findings of this study will explain the role of corporate governance as a 
conduit between foreign investors and their investment in companies based on the 
observation of regularities and causal relationship occurring between them. Then, 
empirical findings can be generalised to the wider population. 
 
Besides, in positivist management research, there is an underlying implicit 
commitment, whereby according to the theory of truth, the distance between the 
researcher and the researched should be preserved. The aim is to ensure that the 
research process and findings are not contaminated by the actions of the researcher 
CHAPTER 5  167 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
(Johnson, Buehring, Cassell and Symon 2006). In contrast with the view of 
interpretivists, Burrell and Morgan (1979) claim that those who are anti-positivists 
contend that knowledge can only be understood by obtaining information directly 
from the individuals who are involved with the particular issues that are being 
investigated. However, from this study’s perspective, it could be argued that 
conducting interviews with the respondents would indirectly eliminate the gaps or the 
distances between the researcher and the respondents. If the researchers interfere in 
natural phenomena, it would lead to unreliable findings as there is potential bias and 
‘contamination’ in the data collection process.  Objective data collection is 
emphasised in management research so as to test hypotheses by having built in 
‘extensive means for protecting against personal biases’ (Behling 1980).  
 
There are long debates and arguments conducted by scholars who advocate their own 
paradigms, whether positivist or interpretivist. Notwithstanding the arguments, in 
reality the points that matter are the impact of the study and the generalisability of the 
findings. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) have argued that even though there is a clear 
distinction between positivist and interpretivist paradigms, when the actual research is 
performed, the incompatibility is blurred. Nevertheless, the arguments made above 
favour the use of the positivist approach in this study. In the initial stage of data 
collection planning, the interview method was proposed to be used as part of the data 
collection. However, this idea was discarded in the panel meeting as there was a 
concern that the data from interviews would be biased (see Section 5.3.1 Secondary 
Data for justifications). Besides, the difficulty of obtaining data through interviews is 
also one of the key factors which eliminate the use of the interpretive approach as an 
option.  
 
Thus, the data collection methods, the variables and the statistical methods that are 
used in a spirit of positivism in this study are discussed in the following subsections. 
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5.3 Data 
The data type, data choice, and the issues associated with the data selection are 
addressed in detail in the subsections below. To coincide with the ultimate objective 
of this study, secondary data has been chosen to strengthen the findings and also for 
the purpose of data robustness. 
 
5.3.1 Secondary Data 
Secondary data is extensively used in this study. The data from secondary sources is 
equally as important as the premier sources as highlighted by Cooper, Schindler and 
Sun (2003); secondary sources are initially derived from the interpretations of primary 
data. The secondary data is derived from observations and the interviews process, and 
then is transformed into text by emphasising the inherent credibility of the 
documentary data. Quantitative and qualitative data can both be utilised in descriptive 
and explanatory research (Kervin 1999). The main approach taken to collect data is 
that of using documentation, consisting of multiple published sources from established 
institutions. Reports from international institutions (World Bank reports, Asian 
Development Bank report, International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports, etc.), national 
institutions reports (such as the Central Bank of Malaysia reports, Malaysian Budget 
reports, Malaysian Institute on Corporate Governance (MICG) reports, etc.) and 
companies’ annual reports were used extensively at the companies’ level. These 
reports were scrutinised in order to provide meaningful explanations for arguments, 
justifications, analysis and to support the findings. 
 
Companies’ annual reports represent meaningful sources to extract the practice of 
corporate governance adopted by companies. The data are considered to be more 
consequential than verbal utterance particularly where it is not easy to approach the 
board of directors in the company. It is argued that administrative records can offer 
more reliable information than interviews, especially on a particular topic such as 
corporate governance practice, directors’ profile, directors’ education, family 
relationship etc. Indeed, significant numbers of previous studies on corporate 
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governance have used data sourced from published sources such as companies’ annual 
reports. 
 
Companies’ annual reports were gathered by downloading them from Bursa 
Malaysia’s website, while the financial data for the companies were accessed from 
Datastream and Thompson Advance Databases.  Companies’ individual websites were 
also explored to obtain more information about the companies, especially their 
backgrounds, including incorporation history. Academic books, and articles in the 
professional magazines and newspapers, were also extensively used in gaining an 
insight into corporate governance and foreign investment around the world, in Asian 
countries and in Malaysia.  
 
There are many advantages in using secondary data for research analysis: it can 
provide savings in money and time (Ghauri and Gronhaugh 2002); it can result in a 
higher quality of data than when collecting one’s own (Stewart and Kamins 1993); 
and it gives results in a permanent form which are available to be checked at any point 
of time by others (Denscombe 2010), either for verification, further research or other 
purposes. These characteristics of secondary data enhance its credibility. As insisted 
by Mason (2002), the credibility of documentary evidence is hard to be denied.  
 
Originally, primary data was also planned to be used to complement secondary data. 
This would have been obtained by conducting a few interviews with key people who 
witnessed the changes in Malaysia’s economic and corporate governance landscape 
following the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 1997/1998. However, this initial plan was 
discarded. The accuracy of the information provided by the potential interviewees 
could be questioned and would be difficult to verify. There are four reasons 
highlighted for this: i) the probability of not having the right ‘key’ person. The key 
person is a subjective matter, and it requires further effort to identify those people who 
are in the right position to justify the changes of corporate governance in relation to 
the AFC 1997/98; ii) if it is possible to find the key person, the judgement they make 
could be biased, as they now might be in a different position. Their ‘past’ and 
‘current’ positions can influence how they portray their views in this issue; iii) the 
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duration of time since the AFC 1997/1998 should also be considered because the 
memories of it may have; the vital part is iv) the use of secondary sources alone is 
consistent and fulfills the ultimate objectives of this study. 
 
In summary, the initial plan to conduct interviews was been discarded as the accuracy 
of the information provided by these interviewees could be questioned. An 
imbalanced view may be created and would not represent the whole story of corporate 
governance in Malaysia before the crisis. The reliability problems associated with the 
primary data should then be avoided. The most important thing is to use the right 
sources and types of data to achieve the objectives outlined in this study. Thus, the 
study only employs secondary data. 
 
5.4 Population and Sample 
5.4.1 Population 
The main research interest is to investigate the reaction of foreign investors to the 
practices of corporate governance in Malaysian companies. Thus, the companies listed 
on Bursa Malaysia were identified as the subject of interest. Public listed companies 
(PLCs) are chosen for a variety of advantages over non-listed companies. For 
example, the annual reports of PLCs are publicly available and they can be assessed 
from the Bursa Malaysia’s website30. 
 
In addition, the stringent requirements imposed by Bursa Malaysia and the Companies 
Act 1965 are to be followed in publishing the annual report, making the reports highly 
reliable. They are also presented in a uniform way. Besides, the data from PLCs is 
also available in Thomson Datastream and Thomson ONE Banker databases. These 
reliable sources complement the annual reports. However, the required data, which 
were not made available in any of the above mentioned sources (such as the list of 
foreign equity ownership in Malaysian companies and the details of listed companies 
                                                 
30http://www.bursamalaysia.com/market/listed-companies/ 
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each year), were purchased from Bursa Malaysia. Notably, the use of information 
from PLCs enables a comparison to be made with studies in Malaysia and overseas as 
the data is reliable and uniformity is almost guaranteed. 
 
As at December 1996, according to the data provided by Bursa Malaysia, a total of 
629 companies were reported as listed on this date. Out of these, 413 companies were 
listed on the Main Board and 216 companies on the Second Board
31
. Advice sought 
from the Bursa Malaysia pointed to the use of data for PLCs from the year 1997 as 
this is when records of PLCs started to be properly kept and made up to date by Bursa 
Malaysia. Thus, the list of companies for the year 1997 was matched with the list of 
companies for the year 1996. This was done to avoid the possibility of leaving out 
eligible companies. Companies appearing on the 1997 list but not in the year 1996 
needed further checking on their listing status from a few other sources such as 
companies’ websites, annual reports etc. This made the population 644 companies 
instead of 629 companies. Out of this number, only 413 companies remain listed on 
Bursa Malaysia by the year 2011. Thus, the total number of public listed companies in 
the sample is 413 companies.  
 
Upon the completion of population identification, the next process is to refine the 
population and finalise the sample of the study. This has been done by sorting out the 
                                                 
31Prior to 3 August 2009, Bursa Malaysia offered three (3) boards for companies to be 
listed, Main Board, Second Board and MESDAQ Market. The listing 
requirements (such as minimum issued and paid up capital, etc.) were different 
for each board and generally Main Board was for the established companies and 
had tougher conditions to be fulfilled compared to the Second Board, while 
MESDAQ was for high growth and technologies companies. However, effective 
on 3 August 2009, Second Board was merged into Main Board and was renamed 
as Main Market. MESDAQ on the other hand was revamped as ACE Market. The 
new framework for listings and equity funds-raisings is in line with international 
practices and aimed at allowing efficient access to capital and investments, as 
well as making Bursa Malaysia a more attractive platform for Malaysian and 
foreign companies. More information please refers to 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/market/regulation/rules/listing-
requirements/main-market/listing-requirements. 
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population group stage by stage according to the written procedure and established 
sample characteristics. An explanation of the procedures and sample characteristics 
follows. 
 
5.4.2 Sample 
The most important procedure is to remove the companies that do not fulfill the 
requirements set for the study. The data set includes all Malaysian firms listed in the 
year 1996 or at any time before the year, but without failing to retain their listing 
status from the year 1996 to the year 2011. This yielded an initial potential sample 
n=413. For each of the selected firms, the shares of total equity held by foreign 
investors were acquired at the end of each year.  
5.4.2.1 Sample Period 
This research applies panel data study which spans for 12 continuous years from 2000 
to 2011. The choice of time period was determined by the unique characteristics 
associated with the time frame which will be explained in Section 5.4.2.2 (i) The 
Listing Year. A static panel is adopted, where data is collected from the same 
companies for 12 years in a row. Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran (2001) favour this 
kind of data study as it can offer a sensitive measurement of the changes which can 
happen between points in time.  
 
Data was collected starting from the year 2000 because it is from this year that the 
annual reports of listed companies in Malaysia are made available and complete from 
Bursa Malaysia’s website. In addition, the year 1999 witnessed the huge impact of 
corporate governance in Malaysia when the Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance (FCCG) report was published by Securities Commission (SC) and is 
known as the Report on Corporate Governance (1999). Reformation of corporate 
governance has taken place since the financial crisis, and the year 1999 is considered 
the ideal year to capture the impact of the AFC 1997/1998 on corporate governance. 
Therefore, the effect can be seen immediately after one year which is the year 2000. 
The year 2011 was chosen as the last year for sample selection since this is the latest 
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of the financial year ends for all companies with a ready and published annual report 
at the time the process of data collection began. As stated in the Bursa Malaysia’s 
listing requirement, PLCs have a few months after the financial year ends to publish 
their annual reports
32
.  
 
While it might be better and more meaningful to cover the data from the year 1996 in 
order to make comparisons and perform analysis with the pre-Asian financial crisis, 
data availability is unfortunately very limited. Moreover, further difficulties include 
the cost of accessing the annual reports and the absence of a standard corporate 
governance disclosure by firms before 1999. Thus, empirical comparisons cannot be 
drawn before that period. Despite the lack of conformity, to make meaningful 
justifications in the discussion of the changes in corporate governance due to the AFC 
1997/1998, World Bank reports, Asian Development Bank reports, IMF reports, etc. 
are important documents that have been used to support the arguments, justifications 
and findings in this study.  
 
5.4.2.2 Sample Characteristics 
The sample items have been chosen based on a few strict rules to ensure that they lead 
to reliable findings in answering the research questions and to achieve the research 
objectives. The lists of sample characteristics are explained below: 
 
(i) The Listing Year 
As explained briefly in the above sections, the samples comprise Malaysian firms 
listed on Bursa Malaysia and which retain their listing status without fail between the 
years 1996 and 2011. This stringent condition is to reveal the pattern of foreign 
                                                 
32Under Paragraph 9.23 (a) of the BM Listing Requirements,” the annual audited 
accounts together with the auditors’ and directors’ reports shall, in any case, be 
given to the Exchange for public release, within a period not exceeding 4 months 
from the close of the financial year of the listed issuer unless the annual report is 
issued within a period of 4 months from the close of the financial year of the 
listed issuer.” 
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ownership in Malaysian firms. The later result or finding can be associated with any 
possible explanations that would be sought from the pattern(s) based on the earlier 
constructed hypotheses and the ground theories.  
 
In the years before the AFC 1997/1998 struck the Asian region, Malaysia was 
considered as a rapidly developing country. This attracted many foreign investors 
which helped to stimulate the country’s economic growth. However, everything 
changed after this financial turmoil and Malaysia was one of the badly affected 
countries. Thus, the reason for including the listing year of 1996 is that this is the pre-
crisis year with the euphoria inflow of foreign funds. Then, of the years after that, 
1997 and 1998 are the crucial years in the middle of the financial crisis.  
 
These events are considered as the significant factors in shaping the pattern of foreign 
investment in Malaysia. The inclusiveness of these listing years as one of the 
conditions for sample selection would add some intrinsic value to the data. By 
considering the year before the crisis, it is well accepted that the selected PLCs have 
undergone the three phases of the AFC 1997/1998 (pre-crisis, the crisis and post-
crisis) and the changes in corporate governance which would lead them to take any 
possible actions in order to attract and retain foreign investment. On the other hand, 
foreign investors who were fully aware of the financial environmental changes 
surrounding them would also take wise actions to protect their investment from the 
expropriation of any parties.  
 
In the aftermath of the crisis, most Asian countries sought ways to strengthen their 
corporate governance, transparency and disclosure levels (Ho and Wong 2001). 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) also claim that most of the countries in the region 
established a Code of Corporate Governance to boost the confidence of investors in 
their capital market. The Government of Malaysia played an active role in creating an 
awareness of corporate governance and advocated the reformation of corporate 
governance. The years after the crisis, more specifically the years 1999 to 2001, 
witnessed major changes in the structure of corporate governance in Malaysia. Thus, 
these years would gauge the reaction from foreign investors towards the efforts taken 
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by the government of Malaysia to regain investors’ confidence and attract them back 
to the Malaysian capital market. 
 
However, the year 2001 also witnessed the collapse of Enron and the same type of 
scandals due to failures driven by corporate governance in the UK and US which had 
a world-wide effect. In the following years, most of the key players in the economic 
system began to realise the potential consequences for economies derived from the 
deficiencies in corporate governance. As a result, more company-based corporate 
governance began to exist. Later, in the year 2007, the global financial crisis started to 
spread and after three years, the year 2010 came to represent the post global financial 
crisis. The year 2011 is also included as this is the latest year with available data at the 
time when the process of data collection began. The pattern of foreign investor 
behaviour can be examined during the period of study. 
 
(ii) Malaysian Companies 
Only Malaysian companies were considered in this study. The scope of this study 
defines a Malaysian company as a public limited liability company, incorporated and 
domiciled in Malaysia, and quoted on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia Securities 
Berhad. The above information was derived from annual reports, corporate 
information, general information and also from the corporate website. Foreign 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia were excluded as they have different 
characteristics to be considered by the foreign investors in making their investment 
decisions. As opposed to the definition of a Malaysian company, a foreign company is 
defined as a company that is incorporated and domiciled in any country other than 
Malaysia. Foreign companies and “foreign-type” companies were excluded. The 
definition of Malaysian companies is to be followed strictly, since the inclusion of 
foreign companies and “foreign-type” companies in the sample would affect the 
potential results predicted in the hypotheses.  
 
“Foreign-type” companies, on the other hand, are defined as companies that are 
generally known as international, established and well-known with a foreign image. 
Even though they are incorporated and domiciled in Malaysia, the influence of their 
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home country’s image has a significant attraction for the foreign investors in 
Malaysia. Among the companies that have been grouped as “foreign-type” companies 
are Ajinomoto, Guiness, Shell, and a few others. These companies have already 
established their international image and have their own goodwill. With those values 
in mind, they would have no difficulty in attracting foreign investors to invest, 
regardless of any country in which they are incorporated and domiciled. From the 
initial observation, the percentage of foreign ownership in these companies is more 
than 50 percent in a row for the 12 years of the study period and a few companies 
have exceeded more than 80 percent of foreign investment from the total company’s 
ownership. This proportion of foreign ownership is very different from the proportion 
of foreign ownership in Malaysian companies in the study sample. Thus, including 
these companies in the sample study would only invite outliers.  
 
In addition to the above justification, the exclusion of “foreign-type” companies was 
made based on the other important reason. This study was conducted to understand 
the behaviour of Malaysian firms. Therefore, only pure Malaysian companies were 
included in the sample. By including foreign companies or “foreign-type” companies, 
the understanding of Malaysian companies’ behavior might not have been fully 
achieved. 
 
(iii) Non-Financial Companies 
Companies which are subsumed under the financial sector, Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) and unit trusts are excluded from the study sample because of the 
difference in their business activities as well as the unique features of their regulatory 
frameworks and compliance (Lin and Shiu 2003). It has become an adopted 
convention for this type of study to exclude companies in the financial, real estates 
and utility sectors from the sample of the study (Douma et al. 2006). The codes and 
regulations posed on them do not apply to the other PLCs. In addition, their financial 
statements are differently structured. Therefore, accounting performance comparisons 
cannot be made in a straightforward way (Ponnu 2008). 
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5.4.2.3 Sample Screening Process 
In order to arrive at the final sample, the following procedures were used. The first 
step of the screening process is explained in detail in Section 5.4.1 Population, where 
the listed companies for the years 1996, 1997 and 2011 were bought from Bursa 
Malaysia. Then, the lists of companies for the years 1996 and 1997 were matched to 
assure that no single company dropped out from the initial observation. Next, the 
current list was matched with the list of companies for the year 2011 based on the 
stock code identification and the companies’ names. This process is important in order 
to access the list of companies listed at the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) in 
the year 1996 and which continued to survive at Bursa Malaysia until the year 2011.  
 
The process was begun by checking the companies with the same stock code and 
identical name. These companies were then extracted from the list to be confirmed as 
the first group of the sample. Next, companies with the same stock code, but with 
different names in the year 2011 were grouped together. Advice was sought from 
Bursa Malaysia on how to categorise these companies.  The suggestion was to read 
carefully all the companies’ announcements one by one. These are available at the 
given web site address: 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/listed_companies/company_announcements 
 
The above step is crucial to determine why these companies’ names have been 
changed. After the checking process was completed, several explanations were found 
to justify the reasons behind the changes.  One of the reasons was the original 
intention of the company itself to enhance its corporate image. Other reasons for name 
changes include: debt restructuring, merger, acquisition, joint venture and the 
admission of an unrelated company to replace the delisted company by using the same 
stock code number which had been used previously.  
 
Apparently, not all this information can be found from the announcements in the 
Bursa Malaysia’s web site. Further checking for absent information was done 
thoroughly using the company’s web site and a few other mechanisms such as the 
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media and other reliable and available information from the internet. After 
summarising all this information, it was decided only to consider the first reason (a 
company changes its name for commercial purposes) in order to be included in the 
sample study. Other reasons have to be declined as the status of the company itself is 
no longer the same or is totally different.  
 
The third category of companies is the group of companies which appear in the listing 
of KLSE for the year 1996, but do not exist in the listing of Bursa Malaysia for the 
year 2011. An initial assumption was made; these companies have been delisted from 
the Exchange. However, each of these companies’ announcements was scrutinised to 
confirm the assumption. As predicted, this group of companies was no longer listed on 
the Exchange for the year 2011, and their delisted years varied and were recorded for 
additional references in the future. Unfortunately, since the main criterion did not 
meet the sample’s requirements, which is to be listed from the year 1996 to the year 
2011, this third group was rejected. In the end, the entirety of the companies from the 
first group was included as a sample, some of the companies from the second group 
were selected and none of the third group was included.  
 
The data screening process was continued by removing the REITs and financial 
companies. The reasons for removing these types of companies were explained under 
Section 5.4.2.2 (iii) Non-Financial Companies. Next, the process of selecting only 
Malaysian companies took place. Detailed explanations for this action can also be 
found under Section 5.4.2.2 (ii) Malaysian Companies. Finally, a few more firms with 
incomplete information were dropped. The observations were also made on any 
suspicion of typographic errors. 
 
The process of the sample selection implemented in this study is illustrated in the 
following Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1: Sample Screening Process 
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5.4.2.4 Sample Selection 
These meticulous processes have been applied in order to arrive at the final sample. 
Starting from the total number of 665 companies listed on KLSE, as at 30 June 1997, 
21 companies have been omitted from the sample that  were found to be listed after 
the year 1996. Then, 231 companies were excluded as they were not qualified to be 
accepted into the group of the sample. These companies were delisted somewhere 
between the years 1996 to 2011, the main condition which has not been fulfilled. 
Thus, the initial sample is n=413.  
 
The initial sample size was further reduced when another 52 companies classified 
under the financial sector, unit trusts and REITs were removed because of their unique 
features in terms of business activities. The remaining non-financial PLCs included 
361 companies which were then reduced by the removal of nine companies which do 
not satisfy the definition of Malaysian companies (see Section 5.4.2.2 (ii) Malaysian 
Companies). 
 
The third screening process left the sample with the Malaysian non-financial PLCs. At 
this point, the latest sample was checked for data completeness. Malaysian companies 
with incomplete financial data, board governance data and ownership data were also 
removed. Bursa Malaysia was contacted for an explanation before the decision was 
taken to remove the companies with insufficient data of foreign ownership, which is 
the dependent variable in this study. Assumptions were made about whether the data 
actually represented 0 (zero) percentage or whether the data really was unavailable. 
Then it was explained that these companies did not provide their foreign data for the 
mentioned years. Thus, Bursa Malaysia was unable to serve the ownership data. 
Therefore, the actions below were taken. 
 
Three companies that were removed due to insufficient data about foreign ownership 
are Malton Bhd (6181), Sapura Motors Bhd (7811) and TCL Bhd (6661). They have 
no data about foreign ownership for two years in a row and the difference between the 
two blank years was too significant. Thus averaging was not reliable for estimation 
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purposes. For example, foreign ownership for the year 1999 in TCL Bhd was 30.87%, 
and after two years of absent data the percentage plummeted to only 5.13%. In this 
case, the company had to be removed as the averaging method could not be used to 
estimate the real value.   However, in the few cases where the gap of absent data was 
only one year and the difference between the percentages was not significant, the 
averaging method was applied. For example, 1.15% was estimated as the percentage 
of foreign ownership in LBS Bina Bhd (5789) for the year 2001 by considering the 
percentage of foreign ownership in the year ‘before and after’ (1.88% and 0.41% 
respectively) the missing data. Companies without a complete set of annual reports, 
which is the main source for data collection, have also been taken out. The number of 
companies reduced to only 339 after the process of sample selection.  
 
Table 5.1: Sample Selection 
 Number of 
companies 
Total PLCs listed on KLSE/ Bursa Malaysia as at 30 June 1997 665 
Exclude:  
Total of PLCs listed on Bursa Malaysia later than the year 1996 
Total of PLCs delisted from the Exchange for 1997 to 2011 
Total of Finance, REITs and Unit Trust PLCs 
 
21 
231 
52 
Total of PLCs listed on Bursa Malaysia for 1996 to 2011 after excluding Finance, 
REITs and Unit Trust PLCs 
 
361 
Exclude: 
Total of PLCs with the status of foreign / “foreign-type” companies  
 
9 
Total of PLCs companies which were defined as Malaysian companies after 
excluding foreign / “foreign-type” companies listed on Bursa Malaysia 
 
352 
Exclude: 
Incomplete company’s annual report from the year 1996-2011 
Incomplete financial data 
Incomplete foreign ownership data 
 
9 
- 
4 
Total PLCs in the initial sample for the years 2000 to 2011 339 
Total PLCs in the research sample for the years 2000 to 2011 153 
Total PLCs for observations for the 12 years  1,836 
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5.4.2.5 Final Sample 
Sampling is the process of selecting a sufficient number of elements of the population, 
so that the study is able to generalise the properties or characteristics of the total 
population. After determining the potential number of subjects which were feasible 
for this study, an initial attempt was made to collect the data. However, the amount of 
time to collect the corporate governance data from the companies’ annual report 
seemed practically impossible. Even if it were possible, it would be prohibitive in 
terms of human resources (Sekaran 2003). 
 
In order to collect corporate governance, board of directors and ownership data, every 
single line of the narrative story and the information in the annual report from the 
related sections had to be scrutinised. This made the process of data collection time-
consuming, especially when the data had to be collected for the 12-year period 
consecutively from the year 2000 until 2011. In addition, as at the date of data 
collection there was no possible source or database for Malaysian corporate 
governance data that was available to be accessed. It was therefore decided to reduce 
the sample size. Eventually, there were 1,836 observations from 153 companies in the 
final sample.   
 
5.4.2.6 Sample Representativeness 
It is believed that adopting an appropriate method for sample selection, rather than 
taking the entire population to be analysed, is likely to produce reliable results.  Given 
the huge number of elements in a population, Sekaran (2003) claims that taking each 
of them into consideration would lead to potential error due to human mistakes. As 
long as the results of the chosen sample are generalisable to the entire population, then 
it is acceptable and considered as an efficient method as fatigue is reduced which 
consequently lessens the production of potential error.  
 
The size of the final sample is also large, 153 companies represent half of the initial 
sample and the total observations for the 12 years is 1,836 (153 x 12) (see Table 5.1: 
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Sample Selection), which is likely to increase the probability of the sample being 
representative of the population (Hussey and Hussey 1997; Remenyi et al. 1998). 
 
(i) Probability Sampling  
The need for choosing the right sample for a study cannot be underestimated. A 
representative sample will be able to generalise the population’s properties. In this 
case, probability random sampling has been used for sample selection, whereby each 
element in the population has a known chance of being chosen as a subject in the 
sample. However, there are identifiable subgroups of elements within the population 
that may be expected to have different parameters on a variable. Knowledge of the 
kinds of difference that exist for the different groups will help to develop useful and 
meaningful interpretations when evaluating the results (Sekaran 2003). Thus, stratified 
random sampling was selected, as data needs to be collected in a manner that helps the 
assessment of needs at each subgroup level. 
 
(ii) Stratified Random Sampling 
This kind of sampling involves a process of stratification, followed by the random 
selection of subjects from each stratum. The companies were divided into mutually 
exclusive groups that are considered relevant, appropriate and meaningful in the 
context of the study. In this case they were chosen based on their sector of operation. 
There are eight sectors or strata and this followed accordingly from the classification 
made by Bursa Malaysia. The sectors are: industrial products, property, consumer 
products, construction, technology, trading/service plantation and others. In this study, 
a stratified sampling design technique helps to answer the question about which 
sectors are likely to attract foreign investors. 
 
The initial sample was 339 companies, which was justified to be reduced to the 
minimum of 150 companies (see Section 5.4.2.5 Final Sample and Section 5.4.2.6 
Sample Representativeness). The companies have been stratified from each stratum or 
sector using simple random sampling. They were proportioned to the number of 
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feasible samples in the respective sector. Please see the following Table 5.2 for 
details.  
 
Table 5.2: Proportionate Stratified Random Sampling Table 
Sector Number of feasible 
segments 
Proportionate Sampling 
Industrial products 105 46 
Property 51 23 
Consumer products 42 19 
Construction 23 12 
Technology 7 3 
Trading/Service 75 33 
Plantation 31 14 
Others 5 3 
Total 339 153 
 
The final sample chosen for this study is 153 PLCs, and the total number of 
observations for the 12 years is 1,836 (153 x 12).  
 
5.5 Instruments 
Almost the entire data was hand-collected from secondary sources; this was mainly 
from company annual reports in addition to the Datastream and Thomson One Banker. 
The process of data collection was performed by checking the items one by one in 
order to assure their accurateness. Besides this, data was cross-referenced to other 
sources of references to double confirm the initial information and the figures in hand. 
For example, the information for each company was rechecked from the company’s 
website and the Datastream, besides the annual report of the company itself. The 
details relating to the board of directors and ownership structure were also cross-
checked from various sources (such as the directors’ profile, shareholding statistics, 
statement of directors’ shareholding, and noted to the accounts). The details are given 
in the following Table 5.3 and Table 5.4. All the data gathered was keyed-in to the 
worksheets that functioned as templates and these would be used one after the other to 
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cross check and also to calculate the type of ownership. Five worksheets were 
prepared to sort the companies’ data, corporate governance and financial data.   
 
Table 5.3: Data Sources 
 Sources Related information 
Companies’ 
general 
information 
Companies’ annual report Companies’ incorporation year and information, 
listed year.  
Bursa Malaysia website Companies’ sector, listed history, and 
announcements. 
Companies’ website  Companies’ history, incorporation year and 
board of directors. 
Board 
governance 
data  
Annual reports Directors’ name, designation, age, nationality, 
background (e.g. academic, industry, profession, 
political, professional qualification), family 
members of directors, significant shareholders 
on the board, other directorship and ownership. 
Datastream Directors’ name and designation. 
Companies’ website Board of directors and companies’ history 
Financial 
data  
Annual report Income statement, balance sheet and cash flow 
information. 
Datastream The book value of total assets, market to book 
ratio, debt ratio, dividend yield and market value 
of ordinary shares 
Thomson One-Banker ROE, book to market ratio (BTM), total assets 
and total debt. 
Ownership 
data 
Annual report Name of shareholders, number of shareholdings 
by each director (direct and indirect), number of 
shareholdings by the family shareholders, 
management shareholders, and institutional 
shareholders.  
Bursa Malaysia data  Foreign equity ownership 
Thomson One-Banker Foreign equity ownership for current year 
Control 
variables 
Annual report Debt and total assets 
Datastream Debt, total assets, listing date, incorporation 
date. 
 
Most of the data was collected from the companies’ annual report. The information 
provided is comprehensive and divided into the relevant sections. These reports are 
prepared according to International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), previously 
known as the International Accounting Standards (IAS), and approved by an 
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independent external auditor and the statutory accounting standard-setting body, 
which is under the surveillance of the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board 
(MASB). Therefore, there is a high degree of confidence in the reliability of the data 
presented in the annual report. The following Table 5.4 presents the precise locations 
from where the data was collected in the companies’ annual reports. The selected 
parts of annual report are attached in the Appendix. 
Table 5.4: Annual Report Sources 
Sections Related Information 
Corporate Information Directors’ name, designation, auditor, listing information. 
Corporate Structure Company’s subsidiaries, business segment. 
Directors’ Profile Directors’ name, designation, age, nationality, background 
(e.g. academic, profession, political, professional 
qualification) other directorship, relationship and ownership. 
Corporate Governance 
Statement 
Board size, independence, board composition, and family 
relationship. 
Director’ Report Principal activity of the company, directors’ rotation date, 
directors’ interests, auditor. 
Independent Auditors’ 
Report 
Auditor’s information.   
Financial Statements Income Statement - revenue, net profit, financial year end 
Balance Sheets – total assets and total debts. 
Statement of Changes in Equity – dividend paid. 
Cash Flow Statement – dividend paid. 
Notes to the Accounts Corporate information – principal activity, incorporation and 
domiciliation status, listing status. 
Investment in Subsidiaries – list of subsidiaries, foreign 
subsidiaries. 
Segment Information – business and geographical segment. 
Statement of 
Shareholding 
Number of shares held, thirty largest shareholders, substantial 
shareholders, directors’ interest, institutional shareholding. 
 
The data were keyed-in to the worksheets accordingly. After all the selected 
companies had been scrutinised, any missing data was identified. Missing data 
treatment will be explained in the related subsection (see Section 5.7.2.2 Missing 
Value Analysis). The following subsections, discussing the dependent and 
independent variables, further explain the relevant sources of data for each variable. 
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5.6 Variable Definitions and Measurement 
5.6.1 Dependent Variable (FEO) 
The research problem focuses on the pattern of foreign ownership in Malaysian 
companies. Information on the percentage of foreign equity ownership was collected 
for each company in the sample from the year 2001 to the year 2012. Even though the 
sample study was taken from the year 2000 to the year 2011, a one year lag was 
allowed for independent variables, to capture the effect on the dependent variable. For 
instance, foreign ownership in the year 2001 would be associated with the 
independent variables from the year 2000. This was performed to ensure that the 
effect of any changes or actions taken by the companies was considered by foreign 
investors before they decided whether to increase their shares, to retain their 
investment or to withdraw their investment from the companies. The nearest time to 
see the effect is a year after that. Panel data facilitates this by allowing the result of 
decision making to be considered after a certain period, as it is expected that the 
impact of it can be seen after some time has passed (Wooldridge 2009).  
 
The percentage of foreign ownership in the company is the source for the key 
dependent variable and the unit analysis is the company. This data was not provided 
by the Bursa Malaysia, nor disclosed in the companies’ annual report, and was not 
made available in any database. This is mainly because there is no requirement 
imposed on the companies to disclose this information. Thus, this data had to be 
purchased from the Bursa Malaysia. Bursa Malaysia is the only legal party who can 
access this data from the disclosure made by the shareholders in their Central 
Depository System (CDS)
33
 accounts. Unfortunately, the data of this percentage of 
FEO in a company is a solid percentage without any further information to be 
comprehended, for instance, what type of foreign investors are they, what are their 
                                                 
33A CDS account acts as a means of representing ownership and movement of 
securities for an individual or a corporate body. In Malaysia, in order to start the 
transactions in Bursa Malaysia, CDS account is a must besides the trading 
account. More information can be viewed via this link: 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/market/securities/education/faqs-on-cds/ 
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countries of origin, are they foreign financial institutions, foreign industrial 
corporations or foreign individual investors? Thus, no investors’ classification can be 
made. Where the percentage of foreign ownership was not stated for certain years or 
appeared vaguely, the Bursa Malaysia was contacted for clarification. The procedures 
taken were explained in Section 5.4.2.4 Sample Selection. 
 
In order to provide meaningful results, the pattern of FEO was scrutinised. Instead of 
using the actual foreign ownership percentage, the value was changed to a blunter 
scale e.g. 0/1. In the initial observation, it was discovered that all the companies in the 
sample study had a proportion of foreign ownership. For the new form of dependent 
variable, logistic regression is utilised (see Section 5.7.5 Logistic Regression Model). 
Where the total of foreign ownership was 20% and more, this was categorised as 1, 
otherwise 0. More detailed explanation can be found in Section 6.2.3 Dependent 
Variable: Distribution and Skewed Data. 
 
5.6.2 Independent Variables 
An independent variable is the predictor variable which is supposed to be the cause of 
change in the dependent variable. In this study, the independent variables are 
subsumed into three sub-groups: i) board of directors’ characteristics ii) directors’ 
attributes iii) ownership structure. Four different models are built (see Section 5.7.4.1 
Research Model and Measurement) in relation to these variables. Information was 
collected for each of the years from 2000 to 2011. 
 
For the first independent variable in this study, testing Hypothesis 1, board size 
(BSIZE) H1, the number of directors on the board was counted with a few conditions. 
The director was only counted if he or she had served on the board for the whole 
financial year. If this condition was not fulfilled, then he or she must sit on the board 
for at least six months and above, or if less than 6 months he or she must sit on the 
board at the end of the company’s financial year end. Alternate directors were not 
counted. This data was collected from the corporate information, the board of 
directors’ profiles and the directors’ reports.  
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Outside director compliance (BCOM) H2 is considered when there is the requirement 
stated in the Code (2000) that one third (1/3) of the board must be independent; this 
takes into account the varying board sizes of these companies. A binary variable was 
set, where firms were coded with 1 if they complied with this best practice and with 0 
otherwise. This data was obtained from the corporate information and the board of 
directors’ profiles.  
 
For H3 - foreign directors on the board (DIRFOR) - the nationality of the directors on 
the board were meticulously checked and the presence of foreign director(s) on the 
board was measured as a percentage of the resulting total number of directors on the 
board. Directors with multiple-directorships (DIRMUL), H4, were recorded by 
referring to the number of additional directorship(s) in other public companies. A 
dichotomous variable was constructed, 1 was recorded for 7 and above additional 
board seats, and 0 was recorded otherwise. The measurement is slightly different in 
Perry and Peyer (2005) and Jiraporn et al. (2009), since they only counted outside 
directorship in other companies. In this study, for an indication of ‘directors’ 
busyness’, it is considered practical to include whatever type of directorships they 
serve outside the firm, since they are time consuming and limit their effective 
presence in the company. The cut-off point may seem arbitrary. However, it is 
selected based on the pattern of DIRMUL data distribution, as checked in the STATA 
software. Nonetheless, all the variables were obtained from the corporate information 
and directors’ profiles.  
 
From the same sections - corporate information and directors’ profile - the data for the 
rest of the variables concerning board characteristics - such as women directorship 
(DIRWOM), directors’ Western education (DIRWEST) and directors’ professional 
qualification (DIRPROF) - were obtained. They are referred to as H5, H6, and H7 
respectively. DIRWOM is a binary variable which is equal to one for the existence of 
female director(s) on the board and zero otherwise.  Western educational directors 
(DIRWEST) were counted from the total number of directors on the board. For the 
directors’ professional qualification’s variable, they were considered only when the 
qualification was in accounting and/or finance. The professional qualifications in 
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these critical purviews are considered crucial in predicting the market and 
understanding the company’s financial stability (Burak Guner et al. 2008). Among the 
qualification titles are CA, CMA, CPA, CCSA, etc. (see abbreviation for details). The 
directors’ profile was carefully checked and the proportion of directors with these 
professional qualifications was calculated based on the total number of directors. 
 
For the second part of the corporate governance variables, the ownership structures 
were categorised into three groups: family-controlled company (FCC), managerial 
ownership, and institutional ownership. In relation to FCC, the data was collected 
from various sections in the companies’ annual reports such as Directors’ Profile, 
Corporate Governance and Shareholder Statistic. Effective from January 2001, the 
Code (2000) mandated that companies should disclose the relationships between its 
directors and managers and among its directors. 
 
Family ownership would be considered if they fulfilled two conditions: (i) Director(s) 
are related by blood or marriage to other director(s) or if not, at least one of the family 
members sits on the board and the other(s) who are related by blood or marriage to a 
director on the board may acquire shares but not sit on the board, (ii) family directors 
have ownership (direct or indirect) in the company. If these two criteria are fulfilled, 
then the total ownership held by them is considered as family ownership. In certain 
cases, a third criteria would be considered which is (iii) if two directors or more are 
not related to each other, but they have a family relationship with the other director(s) 
or shareholder(s), then the total of the directors ownership and their family ownership 
is considered for the variable.  
 
After the process of identification and calculation of family ownership, it would be 
decided whether they are an FCC or not. In this study, an FCC is determined by the 
position of the family member on the board and/or the percentage of family total 
ownership. The minimum of family ownership (direct and indirect) must be at least 
20% of the company’s equity and one of the family members must at least sit on the 
board as an executive director for it to be considered as controlling ownership. If these 
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two requirements have not been fulfilled, then the company would not be considered 
as an FCC.  
 
There are a few explanations for using a minimum 20% for family ownership. Around 
the world, there is no uniform percentage applied. Scholars use different measurement 
and percentage of equity ownership to define family companies, for example – (i) 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) use at least 5% of the firm’s equity as a cut-off point for 
their study of family firm listed on the Fortune 500, (ii) Smith and Amoaka-Adu 
(1999) use the minimum of 10% of total votes to determine family firm on Canadian 
markets, (iii) Yeh, Lee and Woidtke (2001) found that Taiwanese families need only 
15% control, on average, to control a firm effectively and (iv) European Union (2009) 
uses 25% of the decision-making rights mandated by the share capital to define family 
company, etc. 
 
The 20% ownership as a cut-off point has been used extensively by many scholars in 
defining family companies. For example, Faccio and Lang (2002) used 20% equity 
ownership as a threshold point in their examination of the family companies for 13 
Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). 
Meanwhile,  Claessens et al. (2000) also used the cut-off level at 20% in their study of 
family firms on nine East Asian countries (Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia). The reason why 20% of 
ownership was used as a cut-off point is also explained in Section 6.2.3 Dependent 
Variable: Distribution and Skewed Data and also from the footnote number 35, in 
Chapter 6. 
 
A dichotomous variable was constructed to record family-controlled ownership. An 
FCC was coded using a dummy variable (0, 1). An FCC was coded as 1, and 0 
otherwise. No earlier assumptions have been made to predict the relationship among 
the directors. Even though the relationship can sometimes be traced from their family 
names, especially if they are Chinese family, the relationship would only be 
ascertained from valid sources. Alternative sources such as newspapers, Google, 
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encyclopaedias, etc. were used to obtain clarification. Without any information, no 
relationship was recorded.   
 
In computing the total ownership for the group of managerial ownership (MANTOW) 
H9, the percentage of ownership acquired by each director was scrutinised and 
recorded in one worksheet according to the year and company. The directors’ position 
was then identified and the shares held by the directors in a managerial position were 
classified as managerial ownership. A different worksheet was used to compute the 
total ownership. The ownership information was obtained from two sections in the 
company’s annual reports: the directors’ report and shareholding statistics.  
 
The third category of ownership, institutional ownership (INSTOW) H10, was 
gathered from the shareholding statistic section in the company’s annual reports. In 
this case, only the direct shareholding in the company was computed. The institutions 
refer to a similar definition given in general by the companies: Banks/Finance Co; 
Trust/foundation/Charities; Clubs/Associations/Societies; Cooperatives and 
Government Agencies/Institutions. The ownership was taken from the 30 largest 
shareholders disclosed in the shareholding statistic. The following Table 5.5 lists the 
variables, acronym and provides the definition as well. 
 
Table 5.5: Independent Variables 
 Variables Acronym Definition 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ATTRIBUTES 
 
1. Board size BSIZE Number of directors on the board 
Condition:  
The Directors who are counted are the 
directors who served on the board for the 
whole financial year, if not he/she must sit 
on the board for at least 6 months and 
above OR if less than 6 months he/she 
must sit on the board at the end of the 
company’s financial year end.  
Alternate director(s) is/are not counted 
2. Outside Director 
Compliance 
BCOM 1= if more than 1/3 of BOD is 
independent non-exec director, otherwise 
= 0 
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3. Presence of foreign 
director 
DIRFOR The percentage of foreign director(s) on 
the board. Foreign director is defined as 
directors that are domiciled in foreign 
countries.  
4. Multiple-directorships DIRMUL 1 = if number of additional directorship(s) 
in other public companies is 7 or above, 
otherwise = 0 
5. Women directorship DIRWOM 1 = the existence of female director(s) on 
the board, otherwise = 0. 
6. Directors’ with Western 
educational background  
DIRWEST The percentage of directors with the US, 
UK and Australia, etc. Western 
educational background 
7. Directors with professional 
qualification(s) 
DIRPROF The percentage of directors with 
accounting and financial professional 
qualification (CA, CMA, CPA, CCSA, 
CCA or CPE)   
 
OWNERSHIP ATTRIBUTES 
 
8. Family-Controlled 
Company 
FCC 1 = if the companies are controlled by 
family members for at least 20% of the 
company’s equity (direct + indirect) with 
one family member at least sitting on the 
board as an executive director, otherwise 
= 0 or NFCC – Non-Family-Controlled 
Companies.  (Companies that not fulfill 
the definition of FCC) 
9. Managerial total ownership MANTOW Total ownership (direct and indirect) by 
executive directors 
10. Institutional ownership INSTOW Percentage of ownership by institutions 
(direct only) 
 
5.6.3 Control Variables 
There are eight control variables that are appropriate to be characterised as continuous 
variables in this study. These variables are liquidity ratio (current ratio), solvency ratio 
(leverage ratio), profitability ratio (ROE), firm size, firm age, audit firm, foreign sale 
and dividend yield.  
 
Based on the extant literature, these control variables are well-known for their 
important role in influencing foreign investors’ decisions, for example, the study by 
Kang and Stulz (1997) in association to the size of firms. Dahlquist and Robertsson 
(2001), on the other hand, show foreign investors’ preference for firms with high cash 
on hand (liquidity ratio) and low dividends yields. The rationale for controlling firm 
size (FSIZE) and firm age (FAGE) is that the bigger and the older the company, the 
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more experienced they would be and thus in a better position to attract foreign 
investors. The companies’ ages were identified from their annual reports and the 
Emerging Market Information Service (EMIS) at http://www.securities.com, while the 
size of the companies was formulated from the natural log of the book value of the 
total assets from Datastream.  
 
Current ratio (LIQRAT), debt ratio (DEBRAT), Return on Equity (ROE) and dividend 
yield (DIVYI) were obtained from Datastream, supplemented by the Thomson One 
Banker. At the end of the data collection process, the remaining variables with 
missing values were retrieved from the financial statements presented in the 
companies’ annual reports.  
 
Audit firm (AUDF) was also used as a control variable since, based on the previous 
study, foreign investors favour firms which are audited by international and well-
known auditors. AUDF is used as a proxy for higher quality disclosure. Finally, a 
foreign sales (FSALE) was used as a proxy for international recognition. This data 
was collected from the companies’ annual reports. In the following sub-sections, 
control variables are discussed in further detail. 
 
5.6.3.1 Firm Size 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find that foreign investors favour large firms, and 
this is supported by the findings of Lin and Shiu (2003), which also repeat similar 
results demonstrated by Falkenstein (1996), Kang and Stulz (1997) and Gompers and 
Metrick (1999). In addition, Kang and Stulz (1997) offer evidence that foreign 
investors in Japan are less interested in smaller firms. This is based on the assumption 
that the larger firms are more efficient at competing in the international market than 
smaller companies (Bonaccorsi 1992; Calof 1993) and have lower investment barriers 
(Lin and Shiu 2003). Therefore, it makes it easier for them to be recognised by foreign 
investors.  
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In addition, Cavusgil (1984) asserts that larger firms have various advantages. The 
other main argument which has been documented is that, compared to small firms, 
large companies have achieved economy of scale (Short and Keasey 1999), making 
them more competitive in the international market (Aaby and Slater 1989), enabling 
them to acquire more resources such as finance, technology and personnel etc. 
(Cavusgil 1984) and enabling them to create entry barriers (Short and Keasey 1999) 
which restrain other firms from competing in the market.  
 
The finding of Kim et al. (2010) is consistent with this claim, as they find that during 
the unstable and volatile period, foreign investors prefer the large firms because the 
probability of firm survival increases with firm size (Evans 1987). It is also assumed 
by Lin and Shiu (2003) that a large firm is friendlier for disclosing information. Thus, 
to minimise the negative impact of information asymmetry, foreign investors favour 
large firms since informational asymmetry is higher for them compared to local 
investors. This is consistent with the evidence exhibited by Bujaki and McConomy 
(2002) who found that larger companies disclose more, based on the arguments that 
disclosures are costly to small companies, and they are also associated with the 
informational asymmetry problem which is in agreement with Aksu and Kosedag 
(2006) and Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, Onumah (2007). 
 
5.6.3.2 Firm’s Age 
It is discovered that a firms’ age is an important determinant of firm growth (Evans 
1987). Evans (1987) further concludes that the growth and the variability of firm 
growth decrease with firm age. On the other hand, he implies that the probability of 
survival increases with age more rapidly for larger firms. Thus, the size and the age of 
a firm are found to be interrelated with each other.  
 
5.6.3.3 Debt Ratio 
Debt ratio (DEBRAT) is used to control for the possibility that debt holders inflict any 
substantial influence over the operation and behaviour of the firms and its 
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management (Short and Keasey 1999). It is argued that the debt ratio can be implied 
to be one of the mechanisms to resolve conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
The managers are assumed to be responsible for achieving the necessary level of cash 
flow to pay for the obligation, thus lessening their time consuming excessive 
perquisites, concomitantly increasing the value of the firm’s equity (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Chizema and Kim (2010) argue that firms with a high level of debt 
face a lot of uncertainty and difficulty in obtaining alternative finance, especially 
during a crisis (Peng and Jiang 2010). High debt results from lack of managerial 
control as firms mismanage their funds due to their involvement in unprofitable 
segments, hence jeopardising their core competencies. Thus, these firms need to send 
a signal to foreign investors that they will change for the better by adopting a new 
governance template (Greenwood and Hinings 1996).  
 
Dahya and McConell (2007) suggest that, to solve this problem, the presence of 
outside directors on the board should be considered. By having a high debt ratio and 
simultaneously having a high proportion of outside directors on the board, this 
provides a positive signal to foreign investors that the firm is undertaking a change 
process to improve its financial position. The need for governance reform is 
noteworthy for the companies with a high debt issue, as they can derive legitimacy 
from society, including foreign investors, subsequently having access to resources. 
Therefore, it is argued that foreign investors do not favour firms with a high debt ratio 
in the emerging market unless they can be convinced that special vigilance on that 
issue has been exercised - e.g. good corporate governance practice, for instance the 
existence of a high proportion of outside directors on the board.  
 
5.6.3.4 Audit Firm 
Mitton (2002) used ‘auditor quality’ as one of the proxies for higher disclosure. He 
finds that the quality of the auditor had a strong impact on a firm’s performance 
during the East Asian crisis. In a later study, Aggarwal et al. (2005) also used the 
same proxy to represent the higher quality of accounting disclosure. The auditor was 
indicated as 1, which represents ‘high quality’ if the firms used an international Big-5 
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auditor, otherwise 0. The results of the study suggest that firms with better accounting 
quality and corporate governance attract more foreign capital (foreign institutional 
investors). This study suggests that in allocating their investment in emerging market 
equities, U.S. institutional investors give preference to the quality of the auditor and 
itis one of the dominant determinants of foreign investor investment allocation 
decisions. It is argued that, for reputed audit firm to preserve their status, they are 
highly likely to ensure that an acceptable level of transparency is applied in presenting 
the company report (Mitton 2002) as their attachment to the audited firms are weaker 
than the local audit firms, while their burden of liability is greater for making errors 
(Dye 1993). In the Malaysian environment, Che Ahmad (2002) attests that foreign 
companies tend to hire Big 4 auditors.  
 
5.6.3.5 ROE 
In this study, ROE is used as a proxy to measure a firm’s efficiency in generating 
profits from every unit of common stock owners. This ratio can tell us how an 
efficient firm manages its funds to generate earning growth. Based on agency theory, 
managers in companies with a satisfactory level of profits are prone to highlighting 
their performance. Hence, they may be able to convince prospective investors that 
their company is competently managed. It is argued that foreign investors tend to 
invest in the high-profit companies as high profitability emphasises success. Previous 
studies find evidence that foreign investors prefer firms with high ROE (see Dahlquist 
and Robertson 2001; Das 2014), while Bokpin and Isshaq (2009) find no significant 
relationship.  
 
5.6.3.6 Liquidity Ratio 
The liquidity ratio is used to determine the liquidity of the assets in a company and its 
ability to pay its short term obligations. If the ratio value is greater than one, it is a 
good sign as it demonstrates the capability of the company to fully repay its short term 
debts. The evidence offered in many studies indicates that foreign investors favour 
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firms with a healthy cash position (see for example, Bokpin and Isshaq 2009; 
Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001; Mangena and Tauringana 2007). 
 
5.6.3.7 Dividend Yield 
Foreign investors preferred high dividend yield firms during the pre-crisis period, but 
showed no particular preference during the post-crisis period (Evans 1987). Dahlquist 
and Robertsson (2001) also found, in their study that foreigners in the Swedish market 
prefer to invest in firms which pay low dividends. This is similar to Gompers and 
Metrick (1999), who found that American institutions invest in firms that have had 
relatively low returns during the previous year. Thus, the amount of dividend paid is 
not an important deciding factor in foreign investment. Abdullah, Yahya and Elham 
(1999) explain that the variable is not important as the dividend declared by 
Malaysian firms is not substantial.  
 
5.6.3.8 Foreign Sale 
In further analysing the preference for larger firms, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) 
also found that market liquidity and presence in the international market, measured 
through export sales or listings on other exchanges, seems to characterise foreign 
holdings better than firm size alone. Kang and Stulz (1997), who conducted a research 
in Japan, also report a higher percentage of foreigner ownership in firms that have a 
larger portion of export sales. A similar result was found by Covrig et al. (2006). 
While, Delois and Beamish (1999) reported that international experience and a strong 
institutional environment also lead to increases in the equity position of the foreign 
investor. The definitions and acronyms for each of the control variables are presented 
in the following table: 
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Table 5.6: Control Variables 
 Control Variables   
1. Firm size FSIZE Natural log of the book value of total assets 
2. Firm age FAGE Number of years since being incorporated until 1 
January of the annual report year 
3. Current ratio LIQRAT The book value of short term asset divided by short 
term debt 
4. Debt ratio DEBRAT The book value of total debt divided by total assets 
5. Return on Equity ROE Net Income divided by shareholders’ equity 
6. Audit Firm AUDF 1 = Big 6/5/4, Otherwise = 0 
 
The BIG 8: (Prior 1989) 
Earnst & Whinney 
Arthur Young 
Delloitte, Haskins & Sells 
Touche Ross 
Arthur Anderson 
Coopers & Lybrand 
KPMG Peat Marwick 
Price Waterhouse 
 
The BIG 6: (1989) 
Earnst & Young (1+2) 
Delloitte & Touche (3+4)  
Arthur Anderson 
Coopers & Lybrand 
KPMG Peat Marwick 
Price Waterhouse 
 
The BIG 5:(1998) 
Arthur Anderson and The BIG 4 
 
The BIG 4:(2001) 
Earnst & Young  
Delloitte & Touche (3+4)  
KPMG Peat Marwick 
Price Waterhouse Coopers 
7. Foreign sales FSALE Percentage of sales in the foreign countries out of the 
company’s total sales in the financial year. 
8. Dividend yield DIVYI The dividend yield expresses the dividend per share as 
a percentage of the shares price. The underlying 
dividend is calculated according to the same principle 
as datatype DPSC (Dividend per share, current rate) 
that it is based on an anticipated annual dividend and 
excludes special or one-off dividends.  
OR: 
The value of all dividends paid during the year 
divided by the market value of the firm at year-end. 
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5.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
5.7.1 Panel Data 
Collecting data for a series of time, 12 years in a row and for multiple numbers of the 
same companies allows for dimensional consideration between cross sectional and 
time series effects. This structure of data is called a panel or longitudinal data set. The 
general estimated equation for the panel data model may be formulated as below: 
Yit= β0 + β1Xit+ β2Xit + … + βnXit + εit 
That is, i denotes the firms and t denotes time. Meanwhile, Yit and Xit are the 
dependent and independent variables, respectively, of pooling N cross sectional 
observations and T time series observations. β0 is the constant term or intercept across 
sectional observations, and εit  is the error term, where: 
εit = μi + vit 
This model has a composite error, encompassing μi and vit.μi denotes the unobservable 
individual specific effect (heterogeneity) and vit denotes the remainder of the 
disturbance or idiosyncratic error term. 
 
The analysis of panel or longitudinal data provides a rich environment for the 
development of estimation techniques while helping to examine the issues and the 
possible mingled effects that cannot be studied in either cross-sectional or time series 
settings alone (Arellano 2003). The dynamic changes within the period of study can 
be examined with the repeated observations on the same units, which allow the 
researcher to control for certain unobserved time invariant heterogeneity. In this 
analysis, the causal inference is relatively easy to conclude compared to the single 
cross-section study (Wooldridge 2009: Arellano 2003). Therefore, this enhances the 
quality and quantity of data (Greene 2003; Gujarati 2003).  An appropriate statistical 
analysis was designed for this kind of data and the explanations are presented in the 
next subsection. 
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5.7.2 Statistical Analysis 
The data has to be arranged and various econometrics concepts have to be applied to 
explain the data in order to draw inferences (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2009). 
The selection of an inappropriate statistical technique or econometric model may lead 
to an incorrect interpretation and the study objectives may not be achieved. Statistical 
software - SPSS Version 19 and STATA version 12 - were used to run the statistical 
analysis in order to measure the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables. STATA appears to have a particularly rich variety of panel 
analytic procedures. Statistical discussion in this section covers three aspects, namely 
descriptive statistics, missing value analysis and detecting multicollinearity.  
 
5.7.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
A number of descriptive statistics techniques and analysis can be explored to explain 
the data set. In this section, the descriptive statistics discuss the normality test and 
univariate analysis. 
 
(i) Normality Test 
Normality essentially refers to the distribution of error (or residuals) which is 
considered to be in the normal distribution. Data is assumed to have a normal 
distribution in order to test hypotheses, even though it is not needed to perform 
multiple regression analyses (Hair, Tatham, Anderson and Black 2006). The 
assumption must be held true in order to use the parametric test. The distribution of 
each variable can be checked from the histogram. Several other graphs can also be 
used such as the kernel density estimate plot, the standardised normal probability plot 
(P-P normal probability plot) and also the quartile of a normal distribution plot (Q-Q 
normal probability plot). 
 
In this study, the normality test was conducted in two ways. Firstly, the skewness and 
kurtosis value of the variables was computed. According to Field (2012), a skewness 
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of +/-1.96 and a Kurtosis of +/- 3.29 are within the normality limits. Secondly, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk test were performed. In order to be 
considered as normally distributed, Pallant (2001) suggests that the p-value produced 
in these tests must be non-significant (p-value > 0.05); a significant p-value suggests 
that the assumption of normality is violated. However, even though the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables is not linear, there 
should be no problem, as long as the standard deviation of the dependent variable is 
higher than the standard deviations of the residual (Hair et al. 2006). In addition, 
according to the central limit theorem, if sample size n>30 this should not be a 
problem and the parametric test can still be used (Field 2012). 
 
(ii) Univariate and Bivariate Analyses 
Histograms, bar charts, scatter diagrams, box plots etc. are used to understand the 
data’s characteristics. This process is crucial before further tests can be employed. It is 
always prudent to obtain frequency distributions - such as the mean, the median, the 
standard deviation, the range and the variance - for each variable. Examining the 
central tendency and how the data is dispersed or clustered provides a good place to 
start data exploration. This stage is what Sekaran (2003) calls the feel for data. These 
analyses are helpful in identifying whether the data set is skewed, and also allows the 
detection of odd patterns of variables that may suffer from data key-in errors or 
missing values.  
 
In addition, for the categorical variables, the Chi-square test of independence should 
be applied. This test is used to examine the relationship between the categorical 
variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). Depending on the type of data distribution, 
the parametric (t-test analysis) or non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney U Test) will 
also be explored for application to any suitable variables in order to explain their 
relationship.  
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5.7.2.2 Missing Value Analysis 
After all the data has been collected, any missing values will be identified. The 
sources for the missing data were inspected again to determine the reasons for the 
absence of data. Other alternatives were then explored, for instance financial data 
could be manually calculated from a company’s financial statement presented in the 
annual reports, instead of being retrieving from the Datastream or Thomson One 
Banker. By using the best information available, a few justifications have been made 
for the categorical data which has not yet been categorised due to ambiguous 
information. A few estimations like averaging have been applied for any suitable 
missing data as previously explained for foreign equity ownership data (see Section 
5.4.2.4 Sample Selection). 
 
For the corporate governance data, the pattern for certain variables in the related 
companies was seriously scrutinised in order to ensure that the values accorded to the 
missing data were acceptable and reliable. For example, even though there was a lack 
of information about the number of independent directors in the year 2000, the 
percentage of independent directors out of the board size was estimated based on the 
pattern that the companies have shown for that data in the years 2001 onwards. This 
was carried out when the number of the board size is equal or only slightly different. 
This method of treating the missing data is also applied to the other variables of 
corporate governance. In entering the missing value into the statistical software, dot (.) 
is applied. This is well recognised and can be read as ‘missing value’ in the STATA 
software. 
 
5.7.2.3 Multicollinearity Test 
Correlation analysis is part descriptive statistics and is employed to measure the 
degree of association between two variables and this may vary from -1 to +1. This 
analysis is also conducted to prevent highly associated variables being fitted in the 
same model. High multicollinearity causes estimated regression coefficients to 
become unreliable and unstable. The accurate estimation of the coefficient of the true 
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model will be difficult to estimate and the small changes that occur in the model might 
change the result dramatically (Hamilton 2003).  
 
The existence of multicollinearity must be treated by conducting suitable tests. A few 
analyses can be used: Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient test, 
Kendall’s correlation coefficient and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. 
Additional analysis which can be used to examine the effect of multicollinearity is the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). 
 
However, Kendall’s correlation coefficient and Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient behave in almost the same way and can substitute for each other. Pearson’s 
coefficient is a popular analysis for testing the multicollinearity issue between 
variables and it measures the degree to which the relationship conforms to a straight 
line. Unlike Pearson, Kendall’s coefficient measurement is based on whether the 
relationship is always increasing or decreasing. VIF, on the other hand, shows how the 
coefficient’s variance and the standard errors of other variables increase due to the 
inclusion of the variable (Hamilton 2003). 
 
This study is interested in measuring interval scale data and linear relationships. Thus, 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient test is employed. However, 
depending on the normality test result, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient may be 
employed. The other multicollinearity test used in this study is VIF. Gujarati and 
Porter (2009) suggest that a high pairwise correlation coefficient between two 
regressors in excess of 0.8 (Bryman and Cramer 1990), indicates an issue of 
multicollinerity, and a correlation that is above 0.9 indicates a serious problem (Hair 
et al. 2006; Pallant 2001). For VIF, the variable is said to be highly correlated if the 
VIF of the variable exceeds 10 (Gujarati 2003; Hair et al. 2006); it is suggested by a 
few scholars (see Hair et al. 2006; Wooldridge 2003) that one of the collinear 
variables should be dropped in order to solve the problem. 
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5.7.3 Multivariate Analysis 
This section discusses the multivariate analysis for this study. This analysis, which 
involves several variables at a time, is in contrast with the previous analyses, 
univariate and bivariate; a discussion of these can be found in Section 5.7.2.1 (ii). 
According to Sekaran (2003: 407), multivariate analysis, in brief, examines the 
relationships of the dependent variable and several independent variables in one 
regression model. There are four regression models constructed in this study (see 
5.7.4.1 Research Model and Measurement). 
 
However, before each model can be tested, diagnostic tests must be implemented to 
verify whether the assumptions of multiple regressions hold true. Thus, misleading 
results can be avoided. The diagnostic tests start with checking outliers, normality, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and the autocorrelation test. A discussion of 
normality and multicollinearity has been given in previous sections (see Section 
5.7.2.1 (i) and 5.7.2.3). Thus, this section will only discuss the remaining three items.  
 
5.7.3.1 Outliers 
Outliers in statistics are defined as observation points that are distant from the other 
observations (Grubbs 1969). They have unique characteristics which can be 
differentiated from other observations (Hair et al. 2006). The outliers may exist in any 
distribution by chance, or be due to the variability in measurement, or it could be that 
the population itself has a heavy tailed distribution. For each case, different treatments 
are applied.  
 
For the first type of outliers, they may be discarded from the population, or the 
statistical analyses that are robust to outliers are used. Capable estimators which can 
cope with the outliers are said to be robust, such as the median compared to the mean. 
For the latter case, precaution should be taken where the statistical tools assuming a 
normal distribution are selected to be used.  
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In order to obtain a clear picture of the potential outliers, several graphs should be 
used, such as the histogram box plot and the stem and leaf plot. In this study, the 
outliers can be detected by identifying an influential observation that may 
significantly change the estimate of the coefficient when the observation is dropped.  
 
The decision to retain or drop the outlier from the sample depends on its impact on the 
coefficient of multiple regression analysis. Multiple regression analysis is run with 
and without the outliers, and the results are then compared. Without significant 
differences, the outliers should be retained to ensure the generalisation of the entire 
population. By not deleting the outliers, the robust STATA command will be used and 
it will treat the outliers with less weight.  
 
Another alternative is winsorising, which is the transformation of statistics by limiting 
the extreme values in the statistical data to reduce the effect of outliers. Using the 
trimmed technique, the extreme values are discarded, but in the winsorising technique 
the extreme values are replaced by a certain percentile (the trimmed minimum and 
maximum). This command can be executed in the STATA. 
 
5.7.3.2 Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is the opposite of homoscedasticity. In regression analysis, the 
presence of heteroscedasticity is one of the major concerns which need to be 
addressed. For multiple regressions, the homoscedasticity assumption states that the 
variance of the unobservable error, u, conditional on the explanatory variable, is 
constant (Wooldridge 2009: 264). This assumption is violated whenever the variance 
of error is not constant over the sample of observation.  
 
Heteroscedasticity does not cause the ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient 
estimates to be biased. However, OLS no longer has the smallest variance among 
linear unbiased estimators in the presence of heteroscedasticity. If the 
heteroscedasticity problem is not addressed, it may also result in higher t and F values, 
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which may lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis even though otherwise it should 
have happened (Cheng, Hossain and Law 2001).  
 
There are several methods to test the presence of heteroscedasticity: White General 
Heteroscedasticity, Breuch-Pagan Godfrey Test, Part Test or Glejser Test (Gujarati 
2003; Wooldridge 2003; Green 2003). The null hypothesis that the variance of the 
residual is homogeneous will be rejected if the value of p<0.05. 
 
Where the existence of heteroscedasticity is proved, there are four common 
corrections suggested: i) view logged data, ii) use a different specification for the 
model, iii) apply a weighted least square estimation method, and iv) use the 
Heteroscedasticity Consistent - Standard Error (HCSE) technique (Hair et al. 2006; 
Gujarati 2003; Cheng et al. 2001). 
5.7.3.3 Autocorrelation 
In general, it is claimed that what happened in the past is the best predictor of what 
will happen in the future or, put statistically, what happens in time t will predict what 
is likely to happen in time t + 1. However, in order to apply the OLS regression 
model, no serial correlation or autocorrelation is one of its main assumptions. This 
assumption states that the conditional on x is that the errors in two different time 
periods are uncorrelated, Corr(ut,uslx) = 0 or Corr(ut,us) = 0, for all t≠ s. In the case of 
the presence of autocorrelation, it does not bias the coefficient estimates but the 
standard error tends to be underestimated. Thus, the results produced are less efficient 
(Drukker 2003). If this assumption is violated, it is believed that the errors suffer 
serial correlation because they are related across time (Wooldridge 2009).  
 
In this study, the Wooldridge test, derived from Wooldridge (2002), will be applied to 
detect serial correlation in random and fixed effect models. This test is recommended 
because it is easy to implement and works well under general conditions (Drukker 
2003). For the regression model with the autocorrelation problem, it needs to be 
transformed; thus, the error term in the transformed model is serially independent. 
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This process is known as the generalised least square (GLS) and it is suitable for the 
large observation.  
 
5.7.4 Model Estimation: OLS vs GLS 
There are considerations about whether to use the OLS or the GLS for the model 
estimation. After all the assumptions have been scrutinised and the violations of any 
assumptions have been detected, the selection of the best method to generalise the 
model would be decided.  
 
The OLS method minimises the sum of the squared vertical distance, between the 
observed response in the dataset and the responses predicted by the linear 
approximation. Using this technique, all the errors are given equal weight, regardless 
of how much closer they are to the regression function. Thus, if the problem of 
heteroscedasticity prevails, then OLS is not able to remedy the problem. Therefore, 
this method requires few assumptions to hold true: issues of multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, normality and autocorrelation will determine the efficiency of the 
estimator.  
 
GLS on the other hand is considered as the proper estimation method when it 
effectively standardises the observations (Baltagi 2008; Greene 2003). It is applied in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity or in the presence of the serial-correlation problem. 
Gujarati (2003) stated that GLS is capable of producing the estimator - Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimators (BLUE), and in this case OLS is not reliable as the result is not 
efficient or may even give misleading inferences. GLS is also suitable for a dataset 
with a normality problem, and it is claimed as the OLS on the transformed variables 
that satisfy the standard least square assumptions (ibid; p. 396). Between these two 
methods, the most suitable method will be applied to the dataset based on the 
assumptions and dataset characteristics.  
 
CHAPTER 5  209 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
5.7.4.1 Research Model and Measurement 
The full regression model is illustrated by the following basic specification: 
FEO =  f (corporate governance variables, control variables) 
 
Next, four main regression models were constructed - beginning with the basic model, 
followed accordingly by the improved models with the inclusion of the related 
variables, and finally ending with the full model. The regression models are as 
follows: 
 
Model 1: Control Variables  
FEO =  b0 + b1FSIZEit-1+  b2FAGEit-1 +  b3DEBRATit-1 + b4AUDFit-1  + b5ROEit-1  + 
b6LIQRATit-1 + b7DIVYIit-1 + b8FSALEit-1 + αi + λt + μit 
(Equation 5.1) 
 
Model 2: Board Structure  
FEO =  b0 + b1BSIZEit-1+  b2BCOMit-1 +  b3DIRFORit-1 + b4DIRMULit-1  + 
b5DIRWOMit-1  + b6DIRPROFit-1 + b7DIRWESTit-1 + MODEL 1+ αi + λt + μit 
       (Equation 5.2) 
 
Model 3: Ownership Structure 
FEO =  b0 + b1FCCit-1+  b2MANTOWit-1 +  b3INSTOWit-1 + MODEL 1+ αi + λt + μit 
       (Equation 5.3) 
 
Model 4: (Board attributes, ownership structure and control variables) is as follows: 
FEO =  b0 + b1BSIZEit-1+  b2BCOMit-1 +  b3DIRFORit-1 + b4DIRMULit-1  + 
b5DIRWOMit-1  + b6DIRPROFit-1 + b7DIRWESTit-1 + b8FCCit-1+ b9MANTOWit-1 +  
b10INSTOWit-1 + MODEL 1+ αi + λt + μit 
        (Equation 5.4) 
Notes: FEO=Foreign Equity Ownership, BSIZE=Board size, BCOM=Board Compliance, 
DIRFOR=Foreign Director, DIRMUL=Multiple-directorship, DIRWOM=Woman director, 
DIRWEST=Western Education director, DIRPROF=Director professional, FCC=Family-Controlled 
companies,  MANTOW=Management ownership, INSTOW=Institutional Ownership,  
FSIZE=Company’s size, FAGE=Company’s age, AUDF=Audit firm, ROE=Return on Equity, 
LIQRAT=Liquidity ratio,  DEBRAT=Debt ratio,  DIVYI=Dividend yield.    
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The above models are related to the continuous dependent variable, which is the 
percentage of FEO. In order to derive a more meaningful explanation, further analysis 
was performed by transforming the percentage of FEO to the binary variable 
according to a few specifications which have been discussed in Section 5.6.1 
Dependent Variable and Section 6.2.3 Dependent Variable: Distribution and Skewed 
Data. By transforming this dependent variable, logistic regression is the best analysis 
option to be run. The detail of logistic regression analysis is presented in the following 
section. 
 
5.7.5 Logistic Regression Model 
Based on the nature of the dependent variable which is binary, logistic regression can 
be used to measure the relationship between the dichotomous dependent variable and 
several independent variables (Long 1997; Menard 1995) using probability scores as 
the predicted values on the dependent variable. Likewise with GLS, logistic regression 
also applies the maximum likelihood estimation. An explanation of logistic regression 
begins with an explanation of the logistic function, which always takes on values 
between zero (0) and one (1). 
 
 
 
 
(Equation 5.5) 
 
Equation 5.5 above views t as a linear function of an explanatory variable. The values 
of t can vary from negative infinity (-∞ ) to positive infinity (+∞), whereas the output 
is confined to values between 0 and 1 and hence it is interpreted as a probability. 
When the f(t)= -∞, the logistic function f(t) equals 0, otherwise f(t) equals 1. 
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Figure 5.2: Logistic Function Graph 
 
A graph of the logistic function is shown in Figure 5.2 above. The shape derived from 
this logistic function explains the earlier discussion. If the t value starts at -∞, and 
moves to the right, then f(t) is close to 0 for a while, but then starts to increase 
dramatically towards 1, and finally levels off around 1 as t increases towards +∞. This 
gives the S-shaped picture. It is useful because it can take an input with any value 
from negative infinity to positive infinity.  
 
The shape of this graph represents the view that the percentage of FEO is categorised 
as mild if it does not reach 20% of the total equity. Then the value given is 0. It is 
assumed that the characteristics they preferred in these companies are different from 
the companies that they have an intention to become seriously involved with (FEO 
more than 20%). From this analysis, the results are expected to shed some light on the 
difference between the firms with high FEO and those with low FEO. Thus, the 
equation for the logistic regression model is as given below: 
 
Model 5: (Board attributes, ownership structure and control variables) is as follows: 
FEO dummy (1,0)  =  b0 + b1BSIZEit-1+  b2BCOMit-1 +  b3DIRFORit-1 + 
b4DIRMULit-1  + b5DIRWOMit-1  + b6DIRPROFit-1 + b7DIRWESTit-1 + b8FCCit-1+  
b9MANTOWit-1 +  b10INSTOWit-1 + MODEL 1+ αi + λt + μit   
   (Equation 5.6) 
Notes: FEO=Foreign Equity Ownership, BSIZE=Board size, BCOM=Board Compliance, 
DIRFOR=Foreign Director, DIRMUL=Multiple-directorships, DIRWOM=Woman director, 
DIRWEST=Western Education director, DIRPROF=Director professional, FCC=Family-Controlled 
companies, MANTOW=Management ownership, INSTOW=Institutional Ownership,  
FSIZE=Company’s size, FAGE=Company’s age, AUDF=Audit firm, ROE=Return on Equity, 
LIQRAT=Liquidity ratio,  DEBRAT=Debt ratio,  DIVYI=Dividend yield.    
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Logistic regression has advantages compared to OLS because it does not require the 
linear assumption between the dependent variable and the independent variables, the 
data distribution does not need to be normally distributed, as well as there being no 
concern with heteroscedasticity. In brief, the characteristics of the data are less 
emphasised, thus making this analysis easier to perform. The goodness-of-fit
34
 for the 
logistic regression model is evaluated using the log-likelihood and the Wald Chi-
Square. 
 
The type of data in this study is panel data. Therefore, a panel data model must be 
specified. For the logistic regression, it can fit random-effect, conditional fixed-effect 
and population-averaged logit models. The selection of which panel data model to be 
applied for the model must be based on the characteristics of the explanatory 
variables. The differences between the panel data models are discussed in Section 
5.7.6.1 and 5.7.6.2.  
 
5.7.6 Panel Data Model 
For panel data analysis, a natural way to explain the relationship between dependent 
and independent variables is through two techniques: fixed-effects (FE) estimation 
and random-effects (RE) estimation. Applying panel data as pooled cross sections is 
not appropriate because the data is analysed with the strong assumption of its 
independence, which is not true because the firm’s composition is correlated over 
time. Simply applying OLS to it, is an act that ignores the fact that it is panel data. 
Ignoring this important fact often misleads due to the existence of unobserved 
heterogeneity (Baum 2006). Panel data analysis provides ways to deal with 
unobserved heterogeneity. FE and RE are discussed in the next sections.  
 
                                                 
34 It is necessary to ascertain how effective the constructed model can be used to 
predict the relationship between dependent and independent variables. This is 
referred as goodness-of-fit. 
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5.7.6.1 Fixed-effects Model 
A fixed-effects (FE) model would be used if the objective of the study is to analyse 
the impact of variables that vary over time. It would explore the relationship between 
the predictor and outcome variables within an entity. Each entity has its own 
characteristics which may or may not influence the predictor variables. Thus, when 
using FE, the assumption that something within the entity may impact or bias the 
predictors should be applied. This individual bias must be controlled. FE will remove 
the effect of the time-invariant characteristics from the predictor variables and the net 
effect can then be assessed. 
 
Another important assumption of FE is that time-invariant characteristics are unique 
to the entity and should not be correlated with the characteristics of another entity. 
Therefore, the entity’s error term and the constant should not be correlated with the 
others. This model relaxes the assumption that the regression parameters are constant 
over time and space (Baum 2006) when it allows each cross-sectional unit to have its 
own intercept while the slope of the coefficient remains constant across companies. If 
the error terms are correlated then the FE model is not suitable since inferences may 
not be correlated. The equation for the FE model is: 
Yit= β1Xit+ β2Xit + … + βnXit + αi + μit  
That is, i denotes the firms and t denotes time. Therefore, Yit is the dependent variable 
of pooling N cross-sectional observations and T time series observations, and Xit are 
the independent variables of pooling N cross-sectional observations and T time series 
observations. Β1 is the coefficient for the independent variable, αi (i=1…n) is the 
unknown intercept for each entity (n entity- specific intercept), and μi is the error term.   
 
5.7.6.2 Random-effects Model 
Unlike the fixed-effects model, the random-effects (RE) model assumes that the 
variations across entities are random and uncorrelated with the predictors included in 
the model (Greene 2008). RE should be used when there is reason to believe that 
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differences across entities have some influence on the dependent variable. The 
equation for the RE model is: 
Yit= β1Xit+ β1Xit + β2Xit + … + βnXit + α+ μit + +εit 
Comparing the two models, the difference in the RE equation is that time invariant 
variables can be included, while in the FE equation these variables are absorbed by the 
intercept. The individual heterogeneity is captured in the composite-error term (a 
combination of the individual-level effect and the disturbance time) (Baum 2006). 
 
In order to decide between the models, the characteristics of the data have to be 
scrutinised. The Hausman test can be run as an option to find the best model to suit 
the panel data in this study (see Section 7.3.3 Hausman Test for further elaboration). 
However, only after the real tests have been run, can the result be discussed 
comprehensively.  
 
5.7.7 Robustness Analysis 
5.7.7.1 The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
Other than those discussed above, there are various statistical methods available to 
analyse the data-set of interest. These analyses are needed to estimate the parameter of 
the data. However, in obtaining this estimation, most of these analyses require 
additional restrictions, restricted proportions, in order to make additional assumptions 
which are not unjustified by the economic theory. The risk that might occur is the 
validity issue of the result, which may be undermined.  
 
Most economic data is dynamic by nature. Considering this, it is important that the 
statistical method chosen fits well with the exact information that has been gathered. 
Most of the time restrictions implied by the economic theory take the form of the 
population moment condition. Thus, the GMM is applied in this condition. GMM is a 
statistical method that combines observed economic data with the information in the 
population moment condition to produce an estimate of the unknown parameters. The 
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method was developed by Lars Peter Hanson in 1982 and is known to be consistent, 
asymptotically normal, and efficient in the class of all estimators. 
 
In the dynamic model, the lagged dependent variable is included as a regressor. The 
standard form of the dynamic model is as follows: 
Yit= ƛ.Yit-1+ αi + εit 
In the panel data model where T is small, both fixed and random effects estimators of 
ƛ are biased of order 1/T. In order to eliminate the bias, the value of T--> ∞. In panel 
data, the T value is considered as small, and serious bias may be encountered if it is 
less than 10. However, Nickell (1981) suggests that the T value is still considered as 
small if it is less than 20. In the current study, the T value is 12 and it is under the 
considerable range of a small value. Therefore, GMM is used in an attempt to 
eliminate the bias.  
 
This method requires that a certain number of moment conditions get specified for the 
model. These moment conditions are a function of the model parameters and the data, 
such that their expectation is zero (0) at the true values of the parameters. The GMM 
method then minimises a certain norm of the sample averages of the moment 
conditions. These moment conditions state that the regressors should be uncorrelated 
with the errors. GMM models tend to be robust with respect to heteroscedasticity and 
non-normality. Besides this, GMM is a suitable analysis technique for a dataset with 
endogeneity (see Section 5.7.7.2 Endogeneity for further explanation). 
 
To run GMM, a suitable estimator should be selected. There are a few estimators to be 
considered: Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991), Ahn and Schmidt 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) estimators. Considering the weakness and the 
strengths of each of the instruments, the Arellano and Bon (1991) estimator is finally 
chosen for this study. The Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator, for example, does 
not deal with the residual autocorrelation problem, and in practice it drops a lot of 
observations. The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, one of the popular estimators, 
has proved to be more efficient than the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator. It uses 
lagged values of yit as instruments. Using this estimator, the observations for each 
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individual are stacked together and equations are formed. However, one of its 
weaknesses is its limitation in using a different set of instruments for different time 
points. Besides this, many instruments are used as an additional instrument is added 
every time for the new forward period. On the other hand, the Anh and Schmidt 
(1995) estimator proposes additional moment conditions, (T-2). Nonetheless, amongst 
these, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is still considered helpful for the 
current study.  
 
In order to run the GMM analysis, a few practical guidelines have to be followed: i) 
choose a reasonable maximum number of lags to be used as instruments, ii) the choice 
must be made based on theory, the extant literature and computer capacity, and iii) it 
is advisable to report results from more than one estimator, especially if persistence is 
high. Further, there are two important relative tests to be performed in GMM 
estimation: i) the Hansen-Sargan J-test (Sargan 1958; Hansen 1982) for over-
identifying restrictions - this tests the validity of the moment conditions and ii) the 
Residual autocorrelation test, in order to ensure that the second order correlation is 
zero.  
 
In theory, it is relatively complicated. However, practically, STATA helps to ease the 
use of GMM. 
 
5.7.7.2 Endogeneity 
Corporate governance studies are likely to be plagued with endogeneity issue (Bhagat 
and Jefferis 2002). To put it theoretically, corporate governance practices in a 
company might be influenced by the level of FEO, rather than the other way round. 
For example, the higher level of foreign ownership in a company empowers them to 
give pressure to management to appoint more outside director(s) on board, appoint 
foreign director(s), hire more directors with preferred background such as directors 
with professional qualification(s) and directors with Western educational background  
to sit on the board in order to safeguard their interests in a company. However, in this 
study, the relationships were hypothesised to emerge from the inverse direction. The 
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presence of foreign director(s) on the board and other corporate governance variables 
are argued to influence the level of FEO in a company and not otherwise. 
 
To put it statistically, concerns regarding endogeneity might emerge because of 
omitted unobservable variable firm characteristics. Omitted variables that affect both 
the selection of corporate governance variables and the level of firm FEO could lead 
to spurious correlations between the two variables. It is plausible, for example that 
some firms are more progressive than others (Adams and Ferreira 2009), so they have 
better governance as well as high FEO level. In the context of this study, the examined 
relationships might potentially suffer from reverse causality.  
 
To explore this potential endogeneity issue, the previous literature has been examined. 
Therefore, this study follows recent literature, and replaces the value of independent 
variables in each given observation by the value of independent variables in the 
previous year of the sample (denoted by the t-1 in the model). The idea is that the 
independent variables (especially corporate governance variables) in previous years 
could not have been caused by FEO in subsequent years; thus the possibility of the 
endogeneity problem is not likely to be significant. This technique should mitigate the 
concern that FEO level leads to change in corporate governance practice. If a 
significant relationship is found, the direction of causality is more likely to run from 
the independent variables to the percentage of foreign ownership in a company rather 
than vice versa. This kind of method of dealing with the endogeneity issue has been 
practised in a number of research studies, such as Jiraporn et al. (2009), Cheng (2008),  
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Peng and Jiang (2010). In addition, for the purposes 
of this study, GMM analysis has also been utilised to deal with the potential 
endogeneity issue in the model. 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the procedures involved in collecting data, as well as the 
research design and research methods pursued for the empirical analyses. It started by 
discussing the philosophical approach to the study, which is positivism. This spirit of 
positivism has been applied both in the data collection method and in the statistical 
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analysis. However, the whole of the processes involved in obtaining the required data 
and conducting the necessary analyses are not necessarily easy. 
 
The biggest challenge in this part of the study is the consumption of time in the data 
collection process. Corporate governance data for Malaysian companies is not 
available in any database, making it difficult to gather. Thus, it was collected one by 
one, by reading line by line in the related sections of the companies’ annual reports. In 
addition, data was also collected from a number of sources, such as Datastream, 
Thompson One Banker, companies’ websites, other related web sites, etc. The initial 
plan for conducting interviews was discarded and the rationale for this has been 
explained. Even though it is obvious that time is the main obstacle at this stage, 
eventually, the final sample was derived. Meticulous steps have been taken to ensure 
the representativeness of the sample, and it has not been compromised in any way. 
 
In the data analysis process, a few models were constructed, referring to the category 
of the variables, and the last model constituted all the variables. The main analysis is 
still determining between OLS or GLS, depending on the data characteristics which 
will be determined after conducting a few analyses, as discussed in this chapter. For 
the robustness tests, a few other analyses, logistic regression and GMM were planned 
to be utilised to strengthen the results. These analyses were run using statistical 
software: SPSS and STATA. The next two chapters - Chapter 6: Results and 
Descriptive Analyses and Chapter 7: Multivariate Results and Analyses - are devoted 
only to a discussion of the results yielded by these analyses. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RESULTS AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter dealt with data and specified the research design employed in 
this study. This section aims to explore the main features of the data collected by 
describing its characteristics quantitatively. The method of explaining it is twofold: 
univariate and bivariate. Section 6.2, Descriptive Statistics, starts with the outlier 
results and continues with univariate and bivariate analysis for dependent, 
independent and control variables. Univariate analysis is the simplest form of 
quantitative analysis, describing the single variable in terms of the applicable unit of 
analysis: frequency distribution, central tendency and statistical dispersion. Bivariate 
analysis, on the other hand, describes the relationship between pairs of variables (in 
this chapter, two tests were run; Chi-Square and Mann-Whitney). Bivariate analysis 
(correlation test) is continued in Chapter 7 before running multivariate tests. The final 
part of this chapter, Section 6.3, provides a summary and conclusion.  
 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
In order to explain the variation of the dependent variable (FEO), there are 10 
independent variables and eight control variables analysed (see Table 5.5 for 
independent variables and Table 5.6 for control variables). Six of the independent 
variables and seven of the control variables are continuous variables, while the 
remaining are categorical variables. Continuous variables are briefly defined as those 
variables where the data is of an infinite type, where the value can change 
continuously (for example, height, weight, distance, etc.). Categorical data, in 
contrast, is data which falls into groups or categories (for example, 1 for woman, 0 for 
man). This chapter starts with the checking of outliers. 
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6.2.1 Outliers 
Before further analyses were run, the existence of potential outliers was identified in 
the distribution using SPSS software. The detailed elaboration of outliers can be 
referenced from Section 5.7.3.1 Outliers. Several graphs such as the histogram, box 
plot, and stem and leaf plot were utilised to find the observations which can be 
classified as outliers. From the histograms, the tails of the distribution were examined 
to check for any data points falling away as extremes. Then the box plots were 
inspected to see whether SPSS identifies any outliers. The outliers were displayed as 
little circles with an ID number attached. The highest and lowest extreme values for 
the related variables were also generated in the extreme value table with the ID 
number. This helps to identify the case that has the outlying values.  
 
After the outliers and their ID numbers were identified, every case was referred back 
to check whether these outliers arose due to a tendency in measurement error or 
because of the characteristics of the sample itself which has a heavy tailed 
distribution. By confirming that there was no variability in measurement, the outliers 
were not discarded from the total observations. As a precautionary step, the statistical 
analyses that are robust to outliers were used. However, for the latter case of data 
distribution where the statistical tools with a normal distribution were assumed, more 
suggested actions would be taken (see Section 6.2.4.2 on winsorising).  
 
6.2.2 Descriptive Data 
Entering the dataset of 1836 observations from 153 companies for the time period of 
12 years into the STATA, was recognised by the system as strongly balanced data. 
This refers to the fact that all the companies have complete data for all the years under 
observation. From the observation, throughout the system there was no sign of 
missing data. Thus, there is no concern over the issue of missing data for this study as 
it was well treated during the data collection process (see Section 5.7.2.2 Missing 
Value Analysis).  
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In this study, independent variables were divided into three categories: (i) board 
characteristics (ii) directors’ attributes and (iii) ownership structure. The static panel 
was adopted, where the same companies were selected over a 12 year period.  
 
This section starts by exploring data characteristics and distributions by obtaining 
frequency distributions such as the mean, median, standard deviation, range and 
variance for each variable.  
 
6.2.3 Dependent Variable: Distribution and Skewed Data 
The dependent variable, Foreign Equity Ownership (FEO) in percentage is scrutinised 
in two ways in this section: distribution and the skewed data.  
Table 6.1: Data Distribution for the Dependent Variable (FEO) 
 
 
Table 6.1 presents the distribution of data for the dependent variable, FEO. It reports 
the overall mean, variation in the overall mean, as well as the variation between and 
within the firms over the period. All firms in the sample have foreign ownership in 
their companies, and the range of FEO in Malaysian companies varies from 0.01% to 
87% with a mean value of 10.25% and a median value of 5.37%. The overall average 
distance to the mean is between +/- 13.18%, which is shown by the standard deviation 
(SD) from the table. It shows the variation over the period and across the sample size. 
 
The high skewness and kurtosis values portrayed in the table suggest that the 
dependent variable is not normally distributed. This is also supported by the result of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests with p-value less than 0.05. The results 
indicate that the null hypothesis was rejected and the normal distribution assumption 
has been violated. In order to overcome this issue, the percentage of FEO was first 
Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis Sig.
Overall 10.25 5.37 13.18 0.01 87.00 2.63 11.34
Between 12.11 0.47 66.94
Within 5.30 -27.03 83.52
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.0000
Shapiro-Wilk  test 0.0000
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transformed to the natural logarithm. However, because the percentage of FEO 
comprises many values that are close to zero (e.g. 0.3, 0.17, etc.), the natural 
logarithm of these values produces negative values. Theoretically, this would be 
incorrect because the ownership in companies cannot be negative. Therefore, the 
approach of applying the natural logarithm to the FEO is unsuited to the present study 
and was, therefore, not used. 
 
Previous studies (Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001; Kim et al. 2010) which are close to 
the current study were reviewed. However, they did not treat the issue of normality.  
Therefore, during the analysis process, prudent steps would be applied in order to test 
the data. Suitable analyses that do not require the assumption of normality would be 
given priority. Nevertheless, the results that are produced from the tests with the 
normality assumption would be acknowledged for the high skewness and kurtosis 
which may flaw the estimator for the model. Nevertheless, according to the central 
limit theorem, if sample size n>30 this should be not a problem and parametric tests 
can still be used (Field 2012). 
 
To enrich the findings, a further step was taken. Examining only the percentage of 
foreign equity ownership is inadequate because the results will only show the 
variables that that varies in relation to the vicissitudes of FEO percentage. Thus, in 
order to make it more meaningful and represent the characteristics of foreign investors 
in Malaysia, FEO in data percentage was changed to a dummy variable where 0 
implies FEO less than 20% and 1 represents FEO 20% and above. 20% is used as a 
benchmark to differentiate high and low FEO. This is because 20% ownership in 
Malaysia implies significant influences
35
 for the investor, being the power to 
participate in the financial and operating policy decisions in the companies.  
                                                 
35Referring to FRS 128(5) “If an entity holds, directly or indirectly (e.g. through 
subsidiaries), 20 per cent or more of the voting power of the investee, it is 
presumed that the entity has significant influence, unless it can be clearly 
demonstrated that this is not the case. Conversely, if the entity holds, directly or 
indirectly (e.g. through subsidiaries), less than 20 per cent of the voting power of 
the investee, it is presumed that the entity does not have significant influence, 
unless such influence can be clearly demonstrated. A substantial or majority 
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In Malaysia, when one company acquires 20% to 50% of shares in another company it 
is referred as its associate
36
 company. In this case, 20% is applied to the individual, a 
group or foreign company which invests in Malaysian companies. This value is also 
approximately in agreement with Sarkar and Sarkar (2000), where they use 25% 
ownership in a company as a cut-off point for the shareholders to have a significant 
influence on the company’s value.    
 
By differentiating the significance as 20% of FEO and below, the study would be able 
to identify the significance variable that is related to the high and low proportion of 
foreign investment. With this binary classification, it is possible to apply logistic 
regression. 
 
6.2.4 Continuous Independent and Control Variables 
6.2.4.1 Distribution and Skewed Data 
The data distribution for the continuous variables is presented in Table 6.2. The results 
from the normality tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk) show that all the 
independent continuous data is not normally distributed. However, there are certain 
variables that are within the normality threshold from the reading of skewness and 
kurtosis (skewness +/-1.96 and kurtosis +/-3.29) as suggested by Field (2005). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
ownership by another investor does not necessarily preclude an entity from 
having significant influence.” 
36   An associate is an “entity over which the investor has significant influence.” (FRS 
128). 
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Table 6.2: Data Distribution for the Continuous Independent and Control 
Variables 
 
Notes: BSIZE=Board size, BOUT=Outside Director, DIRFOR=Foreign Director, DIRMUL= Multiple-
directorships, DIRWOM=Woman director, DIRWEST=Western Education director, 
DIRPROF=Director with professional qualification, MANTOW=Management ownership, 
FAMTOW=Family total ownership, INSTOW=Institutional Ownership, FAGE=Firm’s age, 
FSIZE=Firm’s size, ROE=Return on Equity, LIQRAT=Liquidity ratio, DEBRAT=Debt ratio, 
FSALE=Foreign Sale, DIVYI=Dividend yield.   
 
From Table 6.2 above, the means of independent variables - board size (BSIZE), 
outside director (BOUT), Western education director (DIRWEST), managerial 
ownership (MANTOW) - are positively skewed, with only slight differences 
compared with the medians. This can be proved by the reading of their skewness and 
kurtosis values which are still under the mentioned threshold values, even though the 
normality tests performed did not verify them as normally distributed. 
 
In general, the average number of directors on the board for Malaysian companies is 
7, with the maximum number being 13, and the average percentage of outside 
directors on the board is 41.84%. This is higher than that suggested in the Malaysian 
Code (2000): 33.33% or more than 1/3 from the total number of directors. The 
percentage of directors with a Western educational background is almost half of the 
board in aligning with the average number of foreign directors which is 4.37. 
Variable Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
(Sig)
Shapiro-
Wilk Test 
(Sig)
Independent Variables:
BSIZE 7.43 7.00 1.71 3.00 13.00 0.346 3.035 0.000 0.000
BOUT 41.84 40.00 12.07 14.29 80.00 0.715 3.473 0.000 0.000
DIRFOR 4.37 0.00 11.59 0.00 80.00 3.485 16.411 0.000 0.000
DIRMUL 9.32 6.00 9.26 0.00 55.00 1.846 7.696 0.000 0.000
DIRWOM 7.09 0.00 9.89 0.00 40.00 1.174 3.486 0.000 0.000
DIRWEST 46.99 44.44 23.16 0.00 100.00 0.153 2.675 0.000 0.004
DIRPROF 20.06 16.67 13.15 0.00 62.50 0.785 3.565 0.000 0.000
MANTOW 29.89 30.63 21.14 0.00 90.66 0.058 1.996 0.000 0.000
FAMTOW 26.26 28.46 22.10 0.00 89.63 0.116 1.685 0.000 0.000
INSTOW 9.87 4.74 13.71 0.00 71.33 2.256 8.832 0.000 0.000
FSIZE 19.63 19.56 1.31 16.22 24.13 0.421 3.505 0.000 0.000
FAGE 30.46 29.00 16.05 5.00 89.00 1.149 5.176 0.000 0.000
DEBRAT 0.45 0.42 0.31 0.01 2.16 1.836 9.591 0.000 0.000
ROE 0.03 0.05 0.38 -2.46 2.21 -1.141 23.621 0.000 0.000
LIQRAT 2.91 1.59 4.22 0.10 33.38 4.124 24.016 0.000 0.000
FSALE 11.89 0.00 21.69 0.00 97.60 2.147 7.152 0.000 0.000
DIVYI 2.02 1.07 2.54 0.00 13.07 1.544 5.640 0.000 0.000
Control Variables:
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Managerial ownership and family ownership (direct and indirect) is close to 30% of 
the Malaysian companies. Institutional ownership (direct) is only recorded averagely 
at 9.87%. However, the maximum value is apparently high, which registers at 
71.33%.  
 
The means that directors with a professional qualification (DIRPROF), multiple-
directorships (DIRMUL), foreign directorship (DIRFOR) and institutional ownership 
(INSTOW) are higher than their medians with a wide distribution (refer to their SD in 
the table). The distribution of the number of multiple-directorships held is given as: 
7.4% of the directors in the sample hold no other directorship, 7.5% hold at least one 
additional directorship and 48% hold more than 6 outside directorships at a time. The 
highest number of DIRMUL is recorded at 55 seats, which is far too large. 
 
The continuous control variables can be found from the second part of the table. On 
average, the companies’ firm size ranges between 16.22 to 24.13, with a mean of 
19.63 after the total assets of the companies were recomputed as the natural log. The 
average of firms’ age is 30.46 years, commensurate with the conditions imposed to be 
eligible as the sample element (see Section 5.4.2.2 (i) The Listing Year). The mean for 
the debt ratio is registered at 0.45, while ROE and liquidity ratio are 0.03 and 2.91 
respectively. These are the indications that the overall companies in the sample are 
financially strong and stable. In other words, these companies’ total assets are almost 
double their total liabilities with higher liquidity assets to pay for the debt.  
 
Foreign sales (FSALE) is used as a proxy for the company to be known globally, and 
dividend yield (DIVYI) is a ratio that shows how much a company pays out in 
dividend each year relative to its share price. Their means are 11.89% and 2.02% 
respectively, which are considered as good. Generally, well-established companies 
tend to have a higher value of dividend yields, compared to the young and growth-
oriented companies, while most of the small growing companies rarely document this 
value as they do not pay out dividends
37
.  
                                                 
37http://www.investorwords.com/1523/dividend_yield.html 
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6.2.4.2 Winsorising 
In order to deal with the normality and outlier issue, the technique of winsorisation 
was utilised. Winsorising is a method of censoring data where extreme values are 
replaced by certain percentiles. In this case, the 99% winsorisation applied where all 
the data below the 1st percentile was set to the 1st percentile, and the data above the 
99th percentile was set to the 99th percentile. Instead of pulling them out of the 
sample, this technique limits the extreme values in the statistical data to reduce the 
effect of outliers and simultaneously treat the distribution of many statistics that are 
heavily influenced by outliers. This command can be executed in STATA. 
 
6.2.4.3 Mann-Whitney Test for the Continuous Variables 
Table 6.3: Mann-Whitney Test for the Independent and Control Variables 
 
Notes: FEO=Foreign Equity Ownership, FCC=Family-Controlled Companies, NFCC=Non family-
controlled companies, BSIZE=Board size, BOUT=Outside Director, DIRFOR=Foreign Director, 
DIRMUL=Multiple-directorships, DIRWOM=Woman director, DIRWEST=Western Education 
director, DIRPROF=Director with professional qualification, MANTOW=Management ownership, 
FAMTOW=Family total ownership, INSTOW=Institutional Ownership, FAGE=Firm’s age, 
FSIZE=Firm’s size, AUDF=Audit firm, ROE=Return on Equity, LIQRAT=Liquidity ratio, 
DEBRAT=Debt ratio,  DIVYI=Dividend yield, FSALE=Foreign sales. 
FEO = 1 
n=251 
(13.67%)
FEO = 0 
n=1585 
(86.33%)
Overall 
Mean
FCC 
n=1062 
(57.84%)
NFCC    n= 
774 
(42.16%)
Independent Variables
BSIZE 7.87 7.36 0.00 7.43 7.54 7.29 0.002
DIRFOR 14.38 2.79 0.00 4.37 4.25 4.54 0.089
DIRWEST 53.84 45.92 0.00 46.99 44.17 50.87 0.000
DIRWOM 5.01 7.42 0.00 7.09 8.23 5.54 0.000
BOUT 42.72 41.71 0.16 41.84 40.10 44.25 0.000
DIRMUL 13.13 8.72 0.00 9.32 8.40 10.60 0.000
DIRPROF 22.74 19.64 0.00 20.06 18.71 21.92 0.000
FAMTOW 24.80 26.49 0.67 26.26 41.78 4.95 0.000
MANTOW 28.05 30.18 0.53 29.89 41.30 14.23 0.000
INSTOW 10.11 9.83 0.00 9.87 7.49 13.14 0.000
Control Variables
DEBRAT 0.42 0.46 0.00 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.915
DIVYI 2.27 1.98 0.03 2.02 2.21 1.76 0.000
ROE 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.157
FAGE 36.00 29.00 0.00 30.46 30.82 29.95 0.155
LIQRAT 3.46 2.83 0.00 2.91 2.84 3.02 0.429
FSIZE 20.45 19.50 0.00 19.63 19.63 19.62 0.993
FSALE 17.27 11.04 0.00 11.89 10.55 13.74 0.416
Variables
Mean Mann-
Whitney 
(Sig. 2-
tailed test)  
Mean Mann-
Whitney 
(Sig. 2-
tailed test)  
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The Mann-Whitney test was run to ascertain the relationship between continuous 
variables. This comparison was made between two independent groups in two 
categories: high FEO vs low FEO, and family-controlled companies (FCC) vs non 
family-controlled companies (NFCC). This test is a non-parametric method that 
makes no distributional assumption, since the earlier distribution test showed that 
almost all the variables are not normally distributed. From Table 6.3, the results reveal 
significant differences in 13 of the 17 variables when comparing variables for 
companies with high FEO and low FEO. While comparisons made for FCC and 
NFCC show 10 variables to be significantly different. The above table presents the 
means for both groups in order to make comparisons. Overall means (in italic text) are 
included for extra precaution.  
 
High FEO companies constitute 13.67% of the total 1836 observations. Under this 
group, for independent variables, other than outside director proportion (BOUT), 
family ownership (FAMOW) and managerial ownership (MANTOW), the remaining 
variables have rejected the null hypothesis that the median score is the same for high 
FEO and low FEO groups. The sig value (p-value) <0.05 rejects H0 which provides 
evidence of HA being true. For the companies with high FEO, the average number of 
directors on the board is greater than 7 and the Western educational background 
director is more than half (mean = 53.84%) of the board size. Companies with low 
FEO show lower values of means for these two variables (7.36 for board size and 
45.92% for directors with Western educational background).  The difference for both 
the means is small but statistically significant. Interestingly, the means for the number 
of female directorships is contradictory; high FEO companies show a lower mean 
value (mean = 5.0) compared to companies with low FEO (mean = 7.42). 
 
The mean values for multiple-directorships (DIRMUL) and director with professional 
qualification (DIRPROF) are 13.13% and 22.74%, respectively,  providing additional 
proof that companies with high FEO always have higher percentage values compared 
to low FEO companies (means = 8.72% and 19.64%, respectively). The Code (2000) 
requires that boards must have at least one qualified director with an accounting 
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background. This indicates that the level of compliance among Malaysian companies 
with the Code (2000) is satisfactory in terms of directors’ professional qualification.  
From the table too, it is interesting to note that the proportion of foreign directors 
(DIRFOR) on the board is 5 times higher for high FEO companies than for companies 
with low FEO.  
 
In terms of ownership structure, family and managerial ownership show no evidence 
of significant difference between the two groups, with the overall means being 25% 
and 29% respectively. However, in regards to institutional ownership, there is a   
significant difference in the means of the two groups based on this test. For control 
variables, all the variables are statistically proven to be different, except ROE which 
shows a sig-value (p=0.05) which is at the borderline.    
 
The second comparison was made between FCC and NFCC. Family-controlled 
company constitutes 57.84% of 1836 total observations. It provides evidence that all 
the independent variables except foreign director (DIRFOR) are significantly different 
between the two groups. It is also interesting to note that the results for this second 
group (FCC vs NFC) are totally different to the results from the first group (high FEO 
vs low FEO). All explanatory variables are in an inverse pattern to the first group, 
except for BSIZE. There are also large differences in the means of FAMTOW and 
MANTOW (41.78% and 41.30% vs 4.95% and 14.23%, respectively) for the two 
categories (FCC and NFCC). However, these values were predicted, as the 
comparison is made between family-controlled company and non-family-controlled 
company. 
 
In summary, from the values of means presented in Table 6.3, it appears that family-
controlled companies favour more female directors, but are lower in the number of 
foreign directors, Western educational directors, independent directors, multiple-
directorships and professional directors on board compared with NFCC. The average 
of women directorship in FCC is 8, whereas the average in NFCC is approximately 6. 
Only 44% of the directors have a Western educational background in FCC, while 
there are more than 50% Western educational directors in NFCC. The remainder of 
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the means comparisons can be found in Table 6.3. For control variables, all the 
variables - with exception given to the dividend yield (DIVYI) - are found to be 
statistically insignificant compared with the opposite group for the differences of their 
means.  There is only 1.76% of dividend yield in NFCC, while there is 2.21% of it in 
FCC, which is small but statistically significant. The details in terms of means and 
significant values are shown in the table.  
 
The discussion continues by examining the categorical variables and providing some 
linkage with the other categorical variables. 
 
6.2.5 Categorical Independent and Control Variables 
Table 6.4: Frequency and Percentage of Categorical Variables 
 
Notes: FEO=Foreign Equity Ownership, FCC=Family-controlled company, NFCC= Non-Family-
Controlled Company  
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The above table presents the frequency and percentages for the categorical variables 
in this study. The key variable in this study, foreign equity ownership (FEO), has 
shown that less than 20% (13.67%) of the Malaysian companies have foreign 
accumulated equities in their companies of more than 20%. More than 80% of the 
total number of investments in the companies only managed to attract a slim 
investment from foreign investors, which is less than 20%. The reason for using 20% 
as the benchmark to divide the groups is explained in Section 6.2.3 Dependent 
Variable: Distribution and Skewed Data.  
 
The second variable in the above table shows that the size of sample for family-
controlled company is 57.84% (1062) out of the total of 1836 observations. This 
finding is consistent with the previous studies, which also found that this type of 
company represented almost 60% of the total PLCs in their studied capital markets 
(Claessens et al. 2000; Soederberg 2003; World Bank 1999). From the observation for 
the period of 12 years, out of the 153 companies, 48.36% (74 companies) are pure 
family-controlled companies. These companies are considered as pure family-
controlled companies which fulfilled the stated conditions for 12 years in a row. In 
contrast, there are 34.64% (53 companies) categorised as non-family-controlled 
companies which failed to comply with the conditions for 12 years in a row as family-
controlled companies. Meanwhile, the other 26 remaining companies in the sample 
are mixed which fulfilled the conditions in certain years and violated the conditions in 
the other years. For the clarifications of conditions imposed please see Section 5.6.2 
Independent Variables on how to be classified as an FCC. 
 
In general, more than half (59.04%) of the PLCs in Malaysia prefer to hire an 
established audit firm to audit their accounts as proven in this finding. According to 
Hossain et al. (1994) and Barako (2004), big audit firms can enhance a firm’s 
reporting quality and simultaneously reflect the image of the company. The 
percentages shown also represent the general practice both by family-controlled and 
non-family-controlled companies where almost 60% of the companies from each 
group tend to choose a recognised audit firm to audit their companies’ accounts.  
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Overall, 1,566 out of the total observations (which represents 85.29%) comply with 
the suggestion made in the Code (2000) to have at least 1/3 proportion of outside 
directors from the board size. Board size was divided into two groups, large and small. 
The mean for this variable is 7. Thus, a board size of 7 and above is considered big 
and below 7 is considered small. From the table it is shown that only 31.81% of the 
total observations have less than 7 members on the board of directors. More than half 
of them (68.19%) prefer to have more than 7 members on the board of directors. A 
large board size is claimed to be effective in overseeing duties relative to small boards 
and are capable of monitoring the actions of top management (Zahra and Pearce 
1989).  
 
Multiple-directorships refer to the number of other directorships one director can have 
at the time he/she holds the current directorship under study. After checking the 
pattern of the sample, 7 is set as the benchmark for high and low multiple-
directorship. The percentage shows that there is not much difference between these 
two groups. However, low directorship is slightly higher than high directorship with 
only a 3.26% difference. The last categorical variable is women on the board 
(DIRWOM).  From the observation, 60.68% of the samples have no women directors 
on the board.   
Table 6.5: Frequency and Percentage of Companies with Foreign Equity 
Ownership (FEO) by Industry 
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In the early stage of sample selection, the principle of proportionate stratified random 
sampling and sector/stratum was followed. The sectors are industrial products, 
property, consumer products, construction, technology, trading/service plantation and 
others. For proportionate stratified random sampling according to the sector, please 
see Table 5.2 in Section 5.4.2.6 (ii) Stratified Random Sampling.  
 
Table 6.5 provides a summary of foreign ownership companies in each industry. 
These proportions are not based on the amount of ownership, but the volume of 
companies with the foreign ownership for each industry. The largest category by far is 
industrial which accounts for about 30.07% of the total sample size. This finding is in 
agreement with Kim et al. (2010), who find that foreign investors outweigh 
manufacturing companies in the Korean market. The second, third and fourth largest 
industries are trading/services, property and consumer products, at about 21.57%, 
15.03% and 12.42% respectively. It appears here that foreign investors are not keen 
on construction companies in Malaysia at only 7.84%. This type of industry is 
generally shunned by foreign investors (Kim et al. 2010) and one of the reasons could 
be that the construction industry is typically a local business and, as a consequence, 
foreign investors know little about the firms in this industry (Dahlquist and 
Robertsson 2001). It is also clear from the statistic given that technology is not the 
preferred industry for foreign investors to be involved in, with only a 1.96% 
proportion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6  233 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
Table 6.6: Frequency and Percentage of Family and Non-Family Controlled 
Companies (FCC/NFCC) by Industry 
 
 
Table 6.6 above shows the proportion of the sectors according to the category of 
family (FCC) and non-family controlled companies (NFCCs) in relation to the 
industry as defined by the Bursa Malaysia. The difference is very obvious in the 
technology sector where none of the companies from the FCCs group are involved in 
this industry. Most of the FCCs engage in industrial products, property, consumer 
products and construction where the percentages show similar patterns with more or 
less 60%-65%, and NFCCs are more or less 35%-40%.  
 
All the above frequency and percentage information for each variable only depicts the 
figure derived from the sample observations. No proper association can be claimed 
from these figures. Table 6.6 tries to define the relationship between industry and 
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FCCs or NFCCs, but to verify this claim; a valid test should be conducted. For the 
categorical variables, whether nominal or ordinal, a chi-squared (χ2) test of association 
is worthy of application. This test is a hypothesis test of whether there is an 
association between the attributes. Giving the facts about percentage and frequency 
between two variables is not sufficient to infer whether the association exists. Thus, a 
chi-squared (χ2) is helpful in proving the claim. 
 
6.2.5.1 Pearson Chi-squared Test for the Categorical Independent and Control 
Variables 
Table 6.7: Pearson Chi-squared Test for the Categorical Independent and 
Control Variables 
 
Notes: FEO=Foreign Equity Ownership, FCC=Family-Controlled Companies, NFCC=Non-family-
controlled companies, AUDF=Audit firm, INDTY=Industry type, BCOM=Outside director 
compliance. 
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Table 6.7 above presents the results for the categorical variables, chi-squared (χ2) test 
in this study. There are five categorical variables examined to prove their association 
with two main categorical variables: foreign equity ownership (FEO) and family-
controlled companies (FCC).   The first categorical variable - audit firm (AUDF) - has 
proven to have an association (p-value < 0.05) with FEO but not with the FCC. This 
indicates that there is an association between firms with high FEO or low FEO in 
choosing an audit firm for their companies, where 69% of high FEO companies 
choose to hire a big audit firm to audit their accounts compared to only 31% which do 
not. There is not much difference for low FEO companies where 58% of them hired 
big audit firms compared to 42% which did not.  
 
The HA which claims the existence of an association between two categorical 
variables is accepted for the industry type variables (INDTY) between FCC. This test 
was not applied to check the association with FEO since the sample was selected 
based on the principle of the proportionate stratified random sampling according to 
the sector (see Table 5.2 in Section 5.4.2.6.2 Stratified Random Sampling).  
 
The explanation for the revealed association is that there are types of industries that 
have been preferred by family-controlled companies. The technology sector is the 
least attractive sector, where not a single family-controlled company engages in this 
sector (0%). The earlier discussion has witnessed the preferred sectors of family-
controlled companies - industrial products, property, consumer products and 
construction - where the percentages show similar patterns with more or less 60%-
65%, and non-family controlled are more or less 35%-40%.   
 
Outside director compliance is one of the variables which is proved to have an 
association with the FCC but not with FEO, but at the same time FCC itself has an 
association with FEO. More than 80% of FCC complies with the Code (2000) to have 
at least 1/3 or 33.33% of outside directors from the total number of board directors 
and a similar pattern is shown by the NFCC.  
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FCC can be associated with the FEO as shown by the p-value < 0.05 from the chi-
squared (χ2) test. Companies with high FEO are associated with FCC less than low 
FEO companies are associated with FCC (51% vs 59%). The difference, however, is 
not statistically significant, but the association has been proved by the chi-squared 
(χ2) test. 
6.3 Summary 
This chapter has described the data characteristics quantitatively. They have been 
explained by referring to the analyses conducted: univariate and bivariate. Suitable 
analyses and techniques (Mann-Whitney test, Chi-squared test, winsorising etc.) have 
been run and applied in order for the data to be deciphered before further tests for 
each model have been applied.  Bivariate analysis however is continued in the next 
chapter -Chapter 7:  before multivariate analysis is run.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
MULTIVARIATE: RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 6, two types of data analysis methods were utilised,  univariate and 
bivariate. The aim of this current chapter is to continue analysing the data by 
extensively exploring multivariate analyses to explain the association between 
variables. However, before the main tests were run, a few related tests were performed 
in order to determine the best type of regression analyses to be applied to the models. 
Section 7.2 starts with multicollinearity tests, followed by the model specification in 
Section 7.3.   Section 7.4 presents the results of diagnostic tests and Section 7.5 
continues with the multivariate tests, beginning with generalised least square (GLS) 
regression estimation, followed by logistic regression and finally general method of 
moments (GMM) analysis. The final part, Section 7.6 Summary, concludes this 
chapter.  
 
7.2 Multicollinearity Tests  
In regression models, when two explanatory variables are highly correlated with each 
other, it is likely that the usefulness of the analysis may be impaired because there is a 
probability that they may be measuring similar things. Even though the model’s 
predictive power as a whole is unaffected, however, the coefficient estimates of the 
multiple regressions may change dramatically in response to the small change in the 
model. Thus, in order to detect the presence of multicollinearity, two tests were run in 
this study. The following Table 7.1 presents Spearman’s38 rank (upper right) and 
                                                 
38 Spearman’s coefficient is usually presented for non-parametric data (Field 2005). 
Based on the results from the normality tests performed prior to this 
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Pearson Product-moment
39
 (lower left) correlation coefficients between the 
dependent, independent and control variables. 
 
The values from the table can assist in ascertaining the strength of the relationships 
and determining the direction between the variables. The table also shows that the 
results of these tests are consistent with only slight differences. Most of the variables 
are not significant and neither are they highly-correlated. As expected, the exceptions 
are given to only a few which were predicted earlier.  
 
The correlation of the key dependent variables, are recorded at 0.569 in Spearman’s 
rho test and 0.761 in Pearson Correlation test. This is related to the correlation 
between the percentage of foreign ownership (FEO) and foreign ownership in 
dichotomous form (FEO 1/0). This highly correlated relationship was expected as they 
are related by construction, where the latter variable was derived from the former 
variable. However, it is not considered as an issue for concern since they are tested in 
two different models. The results from both tests (Spearman’s rho test and Pearson 
Correlation test) are in mutual agreement for this case and for the rest of the 
correlation relationships tested in this study. Therefore, afterwards, the discussions of 
correlation will only refer to the values in Spearman’s rho correlation test table as the 
distributions of almost all variables are not normal (see explanation in footnote 
number 38). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
multicollinearity test, most of the data is not normally distributed. Thus, 
Spearman’s rho was used to ascertain the correlation between variables which are 
not normally distributed. Spearman's coefficient, like any correlation calculation, 
is appropriate for both continuous and discrete variables, including ordinal 
variables. The results from Pearson Product-moment test was attached to cross 
check the results. 
39 Pearson Correlation is not suitable to be performed on the categorical variables 
because, according to Field (2005: 125), the correlation requires data which are 
measured at an interval or ratio level for the result to be meaningful.  
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The highest correlation, -0.771, is documented between liquidity ratio (LIQRAT) and 
debt ratio (DEBRAT), whilst the second highest correlation value, 0.635, is recorded 
between managerial ownership (MANTOW) and family-controlled company 
(FCC).The latter correlation value apparently confirms the earlier prediction that most 
of the family members sitting on the board are designated as executive director(s) and 
at the same time they acquire a certain number of company shares. The remaining 
correlation values in the table are too small to be reported. Overall, the correlation 
values of all variables are within the suggested threshold values as suggested by 
Gujarati and Porter (2009: 338) and Hair et al. (2006: 191). The pairwise correlation 
coefficient between two regressors, which is less than 0.8, is free from the 
multicollinearity issue. Moreover, utilising panel data analysis methods helps to 
overcome the multicollinearity issue as well.  
 
As shown in Table 7.1, the tests suggest that FEO has a significant positive 
relationship at p<0.01 with independent variables, namely BSIZE, BOUT, DIRFOR, 
DIRMUL, DIRPROF, DIRWEST and INSTOW. FEO also has a positive and 
significant relationship at p<0.01 with control variables, namely FSIZE, FAGE, 
AUDF, ROE, LIQRAT, FSALE and DIVYI. FEO dummy reveals the same results 
with the exception of BSIZE, BOUT and ROE. On the other hand, significant 
negative relationships at p<0.01 are documented between FEO and FCC, MANTOW, 
FAMTOW and DEBRAT but FEO dummy only records the negative correlation at 
p<0.01 with DEBRAT.  
 
In addition, to ascertain the structure of the regression models, a formal detection-
tolerance or the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was used to measure the 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. The results of VIF are shown in 
Table 7.2 (see Section 7.4.1 on VIF test). This test was run before performing 
regression analysis for each model. 
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Table 7.1: Spearman and Pearson Correlation 
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7.3 Model specifications 
Four main regression models (Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4) were 
constructed and an additional model (Model 5) was constructed by switching 
dependent variable FEO to dummy type. Model 1 was constructed without including 
corporate governance variables. The aim of this model is to gain a view of how the 
control variables in this study impact the dependent variable, FEO. Model 2 was 
developed by incorporating the board of director variables into Model 1. This second 
model focuses on the understanding of how the board of directors’ characteristics 
influence FEO. Model 3 captures the effect of ownership structure variables, i.e. 
family-controlled company (FCC), managerial ownership (MANTOW) and 
institutional ownership (INSTOW) on FEO. Control variables are also included in 
Model 3. Lastly, Model 4 combines all the variables from Model 1, Model 2 and 
Model 3 in the full model. For the model specification, please refer to Section 5.7.4.1 
Research Model and Measurement. Since panel data is used for the models, the related 
diagnostic tests are performed. Multivariate tests are then performed by referring to 
the results from diagnostic tests. 
 
7.4 Panel Data Related Tests 
In order to perform multivariate tests for panel data, a few diagnostic tests were run in 
order to examine whether the underlying statistical assumptions have been violated. 
The series of diagnostic tests required are discussed in Section 5.7.3 Multivariate 
Analysis. Therefore, under the current section, only the results of these tests, namely, 
detection-tolerance (VIF), heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and Hausman tests are 
presented. The results will suggest whether the underlying assumptions of ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression have been followed or violated. Then, based on this 
information, necessary decisions are taken in order to determine the best analyses to 
be applied in running the models. Table 7.2 VIF test depicts the first test under the 
diagnostic tests, followed accordingly by the other related tests. The discussion of the 
results for each test is given accordingly after the result table.  
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7.4.1 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test 
Table 7.2: VIF Test 
 
Note: FCC=Family-controlled company, BSIZE=Board size, BCOM=Outside Director Compliance, 
DIRFOR=Foreign Director, DIRMUL=Multiple-directorship, DIRWOM=Woman director, 
DIRPROF=Director with professional qualification, DIRWEST=Western Education director, 
MANTOW=Management ownership, INSTOW=Institutional Ownership,  FSIZE=Firm’s size, 
FAGE=Firm’s age, DEBRAT=Debt ratio, AUDF= Audit Firm, ROE=Return on Equity, 
LIQRAT=Liquidity ratio, DIVYI=Dividend yield, FSALE=Foreign Sale.   
 
The VIF test was run to quantify the severity of multicollinearity in the constructive 
regression models. Each value represents an index that becomes an indicator of how 
much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is increased due to the 
collinearity problem (please refer to Section 5.7.2.3 Multicollinearity Test for more 
explanation of VIF). Table 7.2 shows that the VIF values in the models range from 
1.02 to 1.87, far below the threshold value of 10, indicating that there are no 
multicollinearity problems in the model (Gujarati and Porter 2009; Hair et al. 2006; 
Ho 2006; Neter, Wasserman and Kutner 1990;).  
 
From the Spearman’s rank multicollinearity test in Table 7.1, concern was given to the 
high correlation values between i) FCC and MANTOW and ii) LIQRAT and 
DEBRAT with the values of 0.635 and -0.771 respectively. By referring to the VIF 
test, the tolerance level between LIQRAT and DEBRAT in the models are above 0.6, 
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with the highest VIF at 1.50, while the tolerance level for FCC and MANTOW are 
above 0.5 and the highest VIF is 1.87. According to Menard (1995:66), “a tolerance 
score of 0.2 or below is a sign for concern”. O’brien (2007) also suggests that a 
tolerance less than 0.2 or 0.1, and/or a VIF of 5 or 10 and above, indicates a 
multicollinearity problem. Since all the tolerance scores are above 0.5 for all the 
variables in the model and the VIFs are below 2.00, it can be concluded that 
multicollinearity is not likely to be an issue for the constructed regression models 
which allow for the standard interpretation of the regression coefficient.   
 
7.4.2 Autocorrelation Test 
Table 7.3: Wooldridge Test 
 
Note: H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
FEO=Foreign Equity Ownership 
 
Based on the data observation, firms with higher foreign equity ownership in one year 
are likely to repeat the same pattern in following years. If so, the firms’ residuals may 
be correlated across years or the presence of serial-correlation is suspected (see 5.7.3.3 
Autocorrelation for details). Thus, based on the previous discussion, the Wooldridge 
test was run to examine whether the issue of autocorrelation should be given any 
concern in the structured models. If autocorrelation or serial correlation is detected, 
the error term needs to be transformed, in order to be serially independent and not 
related across time. In this case, Baltagi (2008) and Wooldridge (2002) suggest the 
use of other estimators to produce more efficient estimates. Table 7.3 shows an 
indication of the autocorrelation problem with the models. The results from all the 
models show that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is strongly rejected at 
p˂0.000. The consequences of this test will be discussed in the following part - 
Section 7.4 Multivariate Analyses. 
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7.4.3 Hausman Test 
Table 7.4: Hausman Test 
 
Note: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
The Hausman specification test is a generally accepted way of choosing between 
fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) (Greene 2008). The function of this test is 
to evaluate a more efficient model (RE) against a less efficient but consistent one 
(FE). The comparison is made in order to ensure that the more efficient model also 
gives consistent results (Davidson and MacKinnon 1995; Stock and Watson 2007). 
The null hypothesis in this test is that the coefficients estimated by the efficient RE 
estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent FE estimator. It is safe 
to use a random effect if the result produces the insignificant p-value (Prob>chi2 
larger than 0.05). Alternatively, FE should be chosen if the result shows otherwise.  
 
The RE model may provide the better p-value as the estimator is more efficient. 
However, it may not be the most efficient model to run. On the other hand, the FE 
model has always presented consistent results. Therefore, in this case, the Hausman 
test was run to justify which test provides better results.  Statistically, the initial 
hypothesis that the individual-level effects are adequately captured by an RE model is 
resoundingly accepted when the p-value, Prob>chi2 is larger than 0.05 for all the 
models (except for the second model). Thus, based on this statistical result, RE was 
chosen as it is the better model to run the panel data analyses.   
 
 
CHAPTER 7  245 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
7.4.4 Testing for Heteroscedasticity 
Table 7.5: Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg Test 
 
Note: H0: Constant variance (homoscedasticity) 
FEO=Foreign Equity Ownership 
 
A detailed discussion on heteroscedasticity was made in Section 5.7.3.2. The Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test is one of several suggested methods to test the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. Table 7.5 shows the results from this test, which conclude that the 
null hypotheses were rejected when the p-values were significant (p<0.05) for all the 
models. This rejection suggested the presence of heteroscedasticity in the models 
which explains that the variances are not constant. In order to remedy this problem, 
the robust command in STATA software can be used as one of the options to solve the 
heteroscedasticity problem. Next, multivariate analyses are run based on the results of 
the current diagnostic tests.  
 
7.5 Multivariate Analysis 
The statistical, mathematical and economic tools most suitable for the type of analysis 
must be carefully selected (Lind et al. 2005). In order to determine the appropriate 
analyses to run the models, the results of the diagnostic tests presented in Section 7.3 
Panel Data Related Tests, were scrutinised. From the analyses, the Wooldridge test, 
the Hausman test and the Breusch-Pagan test, the presence of serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity in the models are proven. These problems are accompanied by the 
abnormal data distribution issue, making GLS the proper estimation method to be 
applied (for further discussion on GLS and OLS, please refer to Section 5.7.4 Model 
Estimation: OLS vs GLS).  
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In this case, OLS is not reliable as the results will not be efficient and this leads to 
misleading inferences (Drukker 2003). GLS, on the other hand, effectively 
standardises the observations with the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation (Greene 2003; Baltagi 2008) and is also suitable for use with the dataset 
which is not in normal distribution. Coinciding with the result of Hausman test, the 
use of GLS regression is consistent with the characteristics of variables in the 
regression model, as well as the selected technique to analyse panel data, which is 
random effects. The random effects technique is classified under GLS regression 
method. This panel data technique is compatible to investigate time-invariant 
variables in this model. In addition, after performing statistical test to check for 
variables distribution, one of the notable characteristics found was the variance 
‘between’ variables is higher than the variance ‘within’ variables. Therefore, it is 
argued that the difference across entities have some influence on the dependent 
variable. This has strengthened the reason for choosing random effects technique as 
the most robust technique to be applied and it is fall under GLS regression method. 
Thus,  the results of GLS regression are robust and reliable to be applied in order to 
infer the population. 
 
It is claimed that GLS is the OLS on the transformed variables that satisfy the 
standard least square assumptions (Greene 2003). Thus, GLS is used to correct for 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation problems and to suit the pattern of dataset 
distribution in the models.  
 
7.5.1 GLS Estimation Regression Models 
The tests conducted in the previous Section 7.4 Panel Data Related Tests provide 
evidence that GLS regression is the most suitable method to be applied to the models. 
The rationale for using GLS regression is explained in the previous Section 7.5 
Multivariate Analysis, and further comparisons and explanations of OLS versus GLS 
regression models can be found in Section 5.7.4.  
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Hereafter, the discussion focuses on the analyses run for each constructed model. The 
analyses for all models are based on 1836 observations allocated into 153 groups, for 
a span of a 12 year period, between 2000 and 2011. The goodness-of-fit for the 
models are evaluated using the log-likelihood and the Wald Chi-Square.   
 
Table 7.6: Regression Results for GLS Estimation Models 
 
Notes:***, ** and * denote that the correlations are statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, 
respectively (2-tailed). BSIZE=Board size, BCOM=Outside Director Compliance, DIRFOR=Foreign 
Director, DIRMUL=Multiple-directorship, DIRWOM=Woman directorship, DIRPROF=Director with 
professional qualification, DIRWEST=Western Educational director, FCC=Family-controlled 
company, MANTOW=Managerial ownership, INSTOW=Institutional Ownership,  FSIZE=Firm’s size, 
FAGE=Firm’s age, DEBRAT=Debt ratio, AUDF= Audit Firm, ROE=Return on Equity, 
LIQRAT=Liquidity ratio, DIVYI=Dividend yield, FSALE=Foreign Sale. 
 
 
Table 7.6 shows the GLS regression results for all the models. In each model, the 
coefficient, z-statistic and its standard error (in parentheses/ *** form) are reported. 
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The discussion starts with the first model, Model 1, which incorporates 8 control 
variables. This model is significant (at p-value less than 0.01) with Wald Chi-square 
of 370.52 and log likelihood -7170.569. These values indicate that the model as a 
whole fits significantly better than an empty model (i.e. a model with no predictor). 
The equation for Model 1 is presented in Equation 7.1: 
 
FEO =  b0 + b1FSIZEit-1+  b2FAGEit-1 +  b3DEBRATit-1 + b4AUDFit-1  + b5ROEit-1  + 
b6LIQRATit-1 + b7DIVYIit-1 + b8FSALEit-1 + αi + λt + μit 
Equation 7.1 
 
Model 1 consists only of control variables. This model measures the relationship 
between control variables and FEO without the interference of any other variables. 
These variables are consistently used in previous literature and their results are highly 
predicted. It is expected that FSIZE, FAGE, AUDF, ROE, LIQRAT and FSALE will 
have a positive relationship with FEO, on the other hand, DEBRAT and DIVYI are 
expected to have a negative relationship. The following models include other 
exogenous variables with further discussions. 
 
Secondly, Model 2 is structured to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and FEO. Corporate governance mechanisms in this model 
are divided into two groups, namely i) board characteristics, ii) directors’ attributes 
and (see Figure 1.2: Conceptual Framework for the details). Control variables from 
Model 1 are incorporated in this model. GLS regression results show that Model 2, 
which incorporates 15 variables (7 independent variables and 8 control variables) is 
significant (at p-value<0.01) with Wald Chi-square of 866.20 and log likelihood -
6984.537. These values indicate that the model as a whole fits significantly better than 
an empty model (i.e. a model with no predictor) and better than the previous Model 1. 
The following equation for Model 2 is presented below: 
 
FEO =  b0 + b1BSIZEit-1+  b2BCOMit-1 +  b3DIRFORit-1 + b4DIRMULit-1  + 
b5DIRWOMit-1  + b6DIRPROFit-1 + b7DIRWESTit-1 + MODEL 1+ αi + λt + μit 
(Equation 7.2) 
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The third model, Model 3, is built by inserting ownership variables (FCC, MANTOW 
and INSTOW), one of the corporate governance mechanism strands, to show their 
relationship with FEO. These variables are merged with control variables from Model 
1. Model 3 GLS Regression Results which consist altogether of 11 variables is 
significant (at p-value<0.01) with Wald Chi-square of 386.91 and log likelihood -
7163.778. These values indicate that the model as a whole fits significantly better than 
an empty model (i.e. a model with no predictor), albeit less efficiently than the 
previous Model 2. The following equation for Model 3 is applied: 
 
FEO =  b0 + b1FCCit-1+  b2MANTOWit-1 +  b3INSTOWit-1 + MODEL 1+ αi + λt + μit 
(Equation 7.3) 
 
Lastly, the final model, Model 4, combines all the variables from Model 1 to Model 3 
into one comprehensive model. 10 corporate governance variables are now examined 
by combining eight control variables from Model 1 to study their relationships with 
FEO.  In terms of the goodness-of-fit for Model 4, the regression results show the 
model is significant (at p-value<0.01) with Wald Chi-square of 877.01 and log 
likelihood -6980.873. These values indicate that the model as a whole fits 
significantly better than an empty model (i.e. a model with no predictor), and 
simultaneously surpasses the previous three models. Thus, this model is considered as 
the final model. The following equation for Model 4 is applied: 
 
FEO =  b0 + b1BSIZEit-1+  b2BCOMit-1 +  b3DIRFORit-1 + b4DIRMULit-1  + 
b5DIRWOMit-1  + b6DIRPROFit-1 + b7DIRWESTit-1 + b8FCCit-1+  b9MANTOWit-1 +  
b10INSTOWit-1 + MODEL 1+ αi + λt + μit 
 (Equation 7.4) 
 
7.5.1.1 GLS Estimation Regression Results 
The preceding section has discussed the models and the goodness-of-fit by evaluating 
the log-likelihood and the Wald Chi-Square. This section, therefore, is devoted to 
discussing the interpretation of the regression results, variable coefficients, z-statistics 
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and significant levels (measured by p-value) for each hypothesis. These values are 
presented in Table 7.6, in accordance with their respective models. However, the 
focus of this discussion is on the values of the regression results from the final model, 
Model 4, unless otherwise indicated as there are insignificant differences between the 
results for these models. A year dummy is included in all models to reflect the time 
fixed effect. Significant levels (p<0.10, p<0.0 and p<0.01) are denoted by *, ** and 
*** respectively. The discussion begins with the regression results of the control 
variables and is followed accordingly by the hypotheses. 
 
GLS regression results for FEO also reveal the control variables’ predictive 
properties. Firm size (FSIZE) is found to be significantly and positively related to 
FEO, as suggested by Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), such that foreigners show a 
preference for a large firm. The finding illustrates that the larger the firm, the higher 
the level of FEO in the company. This argument is based on the perspective that the 
larger firms are more likely to attract more foreigners to invest in the company as they 
feel more secure with the back-up of resources that belong to the firm. It is also 
consistent with the finding by Kim et al. (2010) that during the unstable and volatile 
period, foreign investors outweigh the large firm because the probability of firm 
survival increases with firm size (Evans 1987). FSIZE consistently portrays a positive 
and significant relationship with FEO at p-value<0.01, regardless of any models.
 
 
As for the firm age (FAGE), it is not surprising to see that the result is consistent with 
the FSIZE, which is positively significant with FEO. The probability of survival 
increases with size more rapidly for older firms, and the probability of survival 
increases with age more rapidly for larger firms (Evans 1987). However, the 
significant positive relationship (p-value<0.01) between FAGE and FEO is only 
consistent in Model 1 and Model 3. FAGE indicates insignificant results in Model 2 
and Model 4 after the directors’ elements were incorporated into the models. 
 
Debt ratio (DEBRAT), on the other hand, is found to be negatively significant with 
the FEO in all models. Meanwhile, the selection of audit firm (AUDF) by firms shows 
a significant (p<0.01) and positive relationship with the FEO regardless of any 
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models. This is likewise for liquidity ratio (LIQRAT) and foreign sale (FSALE). 
However, LIQRAT repeats the relationship pattern shown by FAGE, whereby the 
significant results are only portrayed in Model 1 and Model 3, whilst FSALE is found 
to be insignificant only in Model 2. On the other hand, return on equity (ROE) and 
dividend yield (DIVYI) are found to be non-significant with the FEO level in almost 
all models.  
 
Turning to the independent variables, the first hypothesis, (H1), tests the association 
between board size (BSIZE) and the level of FEO. Based on the arguments given in  
the hypotheses development section, invoking the multi-theoretical perspective, the 
higher the number of directors on the board, the higher the level of FEO in the 
company. As shown in Table 7.6, the coefficient for BSIZE is 0.043, in the expected 
direction with z-statistics of 0.26. However, the BSIZE is not statistically significant 
(p-value>0.1) in determining FEO level in the two models involved. The results 
indicate that the board size does not affect FEO level in the firm. Therefore H1 is not 
supported. 
 
The second association (H2) is tested between board outside director compliance 
(BCOM) and FEO level. A positive relationship is expected between BCOM and 
FEO, where companies that comply with the minimum number required for outside 
directors are expected to have higher FEO. As reported in Table 7.6, the coefficient 
between BCOM and FEO is -0.041 with p-value more than 0.10, which is not 
statistically significant. Thus, H2 is also rejected. This implies that BCOM does not 
have a significant influence on the level of FEO in the company.  
 
A similar association is hypothesised between foreign director (DIRFOR) and FEO 
through H3. As explained in the hypotheses development chapter (see Section 4.4.2.1 
Foreign Directorship), H3 proposed that the higher the number of foreign directors on 
the board, the more likely it is that the level of FEO in the firm is also high. This 
expectation is based on the notion that foreign investors prefer to invest in a company 
with a high proportion of foreign directors on board whom they believe can bring their 
global expertise, experience and share their cultural dimension, in order to enhance 
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the company’s performance. Table 7.6 shows that the coefficient between DIRFOR 
and FEO is 0.462 in a positive direction with z-statistic of 19.14. The coefficient value 
postulates that, for every one-unit increase in percentage of foreign director, it is 
expected that foreign ownership in the company will increase by 0.46 percent, holding 
all other independent variables constant. The p-value indicates that this association is 
statistically significant at p<0.01. Therefore, H3 is strongly supported. This finding 
implies that the numbers of foreign directors on the board is important to foreign 
investors in making investment decisions. 
 
The next relationship to be examined is between multiple directorships (DIRMUL) 
and FEO. Multiple-directorships is likely to indicate ‘directors’ busyness’ which may 
lead to the corporate governance problem in the company. Therefore, it is 
hypothesised (H4) that DIRMUL will have a negative relationship with FEO. As 
reported in Table 7.6, the result shows that the direction of the relationship is negative 
and significant (p<0.01) between them. The coefficient for this variable is -1.659. This 
means that for a one-unit increase in DIRMUL (in other words, the number of 
directorships going from 6 to 7 and above), the FEO level is expected to decrease by -
1.65 percent. This result also implies that DIRMUL is a matter of concern for foreign 
investors in making their investment decision. Thus, H4 is supported. 
 
Further, the association between women directorship (DIRWOM) and FEO is 
examined through H5. As argued in Chapter 4, it is proposed that DIRWOM will bring 
a positive effect on the level of FEO in company. Table 7.6 shows that the coefficient 
between these variables is -0.674 with z-statistic of -1.23. The result, however, denies 
the hypothesised prediction as p-value has shown the insignificant value.   Therefore, 
H5 is rejected.  
 
Hypothesis six (H6) tests the association between professional director (DIRPROF) 
and FEO. It is argued that a higher number of professional directors will attract more 
foreign investors to invest in the company. The regression results confirm a positive 
and significant association between DIRPROF and FEO at p-value<0.01. The 
coefficient value 0.074, suggests that an increase of one percent in DIRPROF, 
CHAPTER 7  253 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
subsequently increases the FEO level by 0.074 percent, holding other variables 
constant. This finding implies that the higher the number of professional directors on 
the board, the higher the FEO level in the company. Thus, H6 is strongly supported.  
 
The next hypothesis, (H7), examines the association between a Western educational 
background director (DIRWEST) and FEO. Based on the arguments made in Chapter 
4, it is postulated that the higher the number of directors with a Western educational 
background the more favourable it is for foreign investors when making decisions to 
invest in a company. The regression results show the positive coefficient level at 
0.044 and z-statistic of 3.60 at p-value<0.01. This indicates the 0.044 percent increase 
in FEO level if the percentage of DIRWEST increases by one percent, holding other 
variables constant. The significant level shown, supports H7. 
 
The association between a family-controlled company (FCC) and FEO is examined in 
hypothesis eight (H8). The lengthy arguments in Chapter 4 shed some light on the 
expectation that foreign investors will react negatively towards FCC. Consistent with 
the prediction, the regression results in Table 7.6 support this view. The coefficient 
value is -1.64. This suggests that the decrease of FEO level when FCC changes by one 
unit (when NFCC becomes FCC), holding other variables constant. However, the 
significant level is marginal at p-value<0.10. Nonetheless, H8 is supported.  
 
Next, hypothesis (H9) tests the relationship between managerial ownership 
(MANTOW) and FEO. H9 proposes a negative relationship between MANTOW and 
FEO. The regression result is in the predicted direction (0.015) with z-statistics of 
0.92. However, the p-value shows an insignificant impact of MANTOW and FEO. 
The result implies that MANTOW does not influence FEO level in the company. 
Thus, H9 is not supported.  
 
The final hypothesis for GLS regression posits an association between institutional 
ownership (INSTOW) and FEO. It is hypothesised that the higher the institutional 
ownership in the company, the lower the FEO level in the company. Table 7.6 shows 
that INSTOW and FEO have a negative relationship with a correlation coefficient of -
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0.044. This value represents the decrease in FEO level with a one percent increase in 
INSTOW. The p-value is significant at the 5% level. This result implies that higher 
institutional ownership hinders foreign investors from investing in the company. 
Therefore, the final hypothesis, H10, is supported.  
 
Generally, the results shown in all the models are consistent. The results of the final 
model are consistent with those shown in the previous models. Succinctly, board 
attributes - DIRFOR, DIRPROF and DIRWEST variables - are positively significant 
(at p<0.01) with the FEO, while DIRMUL is negatively significant (at p<0.01). The 
other three (3) - BSIZE, BCOM and DIRWOM - show no significant relationship with 
FEO. This output mirrors the results from Model 2. For the ownership variables, FCC 
and INSTOW are found to be negatively significant at p<0.10 and p<0.05 
respectively. INSTOW was previously found not significant in Model 3, but with the 
inclusion of board attributes variables, the model has improved and its significant 
level has changed. 
 
Control variables - FSIZE, AUDF - are positively significant (p<0.01) and FSALE is 
found to be marginally significant (p<0.10). The other significant control variable is 
DEBRAT in a negative direction at p-value<0.01, as predicted earlier. The results for 
control variables in this final model are nearly consistent with the output in Model 2 
and 3.  
 
Further, this study also seeks to explain the difference between firms with a high level 
of FEO and firms with a low level FEO in terms of corporate governance practice. 
Thus, additional analysis, logistic regression analysis, is conducted. The results are 
displayed below in Section 7.5.2 Logit Estimation Regression Models. 
 
7.5.2 Logit Estimation Regression Models 
For this additional analysis, the same model - Model 4 - is utilised and the same 
independent variables are involved. However, the type of dependent variable is 
changed, from a continuous variable to a dummy variable. For this type of variable, 
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logistic regression is applied. Further explanation of this dummy variable can be 
found in Section 6.2.3: Dependent Variable: Distribution and Skewed Data. The 
equation for Model 5, (adjusted from Model 4) is applied below, and the results of the 
analysis are presented in the following Table 7.7: 
 
FEO dummy =  b0 + b1BSIZEit-1+  b2BCOMit-1 +  b3DIRFORit-1 + b4DIRMULit-1  
+ b5DIRWOMit-1  + b6DIRPROFit-1 + b7DIRWESTit-1 + b8FCCit-1+  b9MANTOWit-1 +  
b10INSTOWit-1 + MODEL 1+ αi + λt + μit 
 (Equation 7.5) 
 
Table 7.7: Regression Results for Logit Estimation Models. 
 
Notes:***, ** and * denote that the correlations are statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10, respectively (2-tailed). BSIZE=Board size, BCOM=Outside Director Compliance, 
DIRFOR=Foreign Director, DIRMUL=Multiple-directorship, DIRWOM=Woman director, 
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DIRPROF=Director with professional qualification, DIRWEST=Western Education director, 
FCC=Family-controlled company, MANTOW=Management ownership, INSTOW=Institutional 
Ownership,  FSIZE=Firm’s size, FAGE=Firm’s age, DEBRAT=Debt ratio, AUDF= Audit Firm, 
ROE=Return on Equity, LIQRAT=Liquidity ratio, DIVYI=Dividend yield, FSALE=Foreign Sale.  
 
Consistent with the previous four models, the analysis for Model 5 is based on 1836 
observations allocated in 153 groups for a span of a 12 year period, between 2000 and 
2011. The goodness-of-fit for the models is evaluated using the log-likelihood and the 
Wald Chi-Square. The log likelihood of the final model is -255.725, which indicates 
that it fits significantly better than an empty model (with log likelihood of -732.465). 
This model is statistically significant given the p-value is less than 0.000 (Prob>chi2 = 
0.0000).  The likelihood ratio chi-square test, Wald chi2 (29) = 82.80, represents the 
difference between the starting and ending log likelihood and it indicates the degrees 
of freedom for this model, which is 29. Significant effects for p-value<0.10, <0.05 and 
<0.01 are denoted by *,** and ***. A year dummy effect is included to eliminate 
certain aspects of cross-year heterogeneity.  
 
Utilising logistic regression analysis, it is presumed that there is an association 
between good corporate governance practice and high FEO firms. It is argued that the 
high level FEO firms favour the good corporate governance practice in the company. 
Table 7.7 shows the results, which indicate the positive and significant relationship 
between high FEO firms and BSIZE, DIRFOR (at p-value<0.01) and BCOM (at 
p<0.1), while a negative relationship is documented between high FEO firms with 
DIRWEST (at p<0.05) and FCC (at p<0.1). This result implies that when the level of 
foreign ownership in one company reaches 20% or beyond, the corporate governance 
variables that have predictive properties are board size, number of foreign directors on 
board, outside director compliance, directors with Western educational background 
and family-controlled company. Given the number of corporate governance variables 
associated with this dummy variable, this presupposition is supported, thus 
strengthening the results from GLS regression. Further discussion of the similarities 
and contradictory results between GLS estimation and logistic regression can be found 
in Chapter 8, Section 8.3 Summary of the Analyses. 
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7.5.3 Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) Estimator 
After running two main analyses, GLS and logistic regression, GMM analysis is 
further applied. The detailed explanation of GMM can be found in Section 5.7.7.1.  
 
GMM can be considered as a robustness check. Besides, as explained in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.7.7.2. Endogeneity, GMM analysis is also a suitable analysis for a dataset 
with an endogeneity case. In the context of this study, there is a potential for 
endogeneity problems to exist. The results from the two previous analyses may not be 
accurate, due to the endogeneity issue. Therefore, GMM analysis is utilised to correct 
the potential problem caused by endogeneity. However, it is interesting to note that 
endogeneity in this study is unlikely to pose a serious problem, since in the earlier 
formation of  the models it was taken into account by using a lagged dependent 
variable to tackle this issue (see Section 5.7.7.2 Endogeneity). 
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Table 7.8: GMM Estimation Model. 
 
Notes:***, ** and * denote that the correlations are statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10, respectively (2-tailed). BSIZE=Board size, BCOM=Outside Director Compliance, 
DIRFOR=Foreign Director, DIRMUL=Multiple-directorship, DIRWOM=Woman director, 
DIRPROF=Director with professional qualification, DIRWEST=Western Education director, 
FCC=Family-controlled company, MANTOW=Management ownership, INSTOW=Institutional 
Ownership,  FSIZE=Firm’s size, FAGE=Firm’s age, DEBRAT=Debt ratio, AUDF= Audit Firm, 
ROE=Return on Equity, LIQRAT=Liquidity ratio, DIVYI=Dividend yield, FSALE=Foreign Sale.  
 
For this GMM analysis, the Arellano-Bond estimator is used. It uses lagged values of 
yit as instruments. Using this estimator, observations for each individual are stacked 
together and equations are formed. The number of instruments used in this analysis is 
82. The number of observations was reduced to 1377 from the original number of 
observations, which was 1836. The GMM model for this analysis is statistically 
significant, at p<0.01, whilst Wald chi2 (29) = 3512.54. As generally practiced, 
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significant effects for p-value< 0.10, <0.05 and <0.01 are denoted by *, ** and ***. 
The year dummy effect is also included to eliminate certain aspects of cross-year 
heterogeneity. 
 
The GMM analysis is run with two lags of dependent variable included as regressors. 
All are assumed to be exogenous. The equation 7.6 below is derived from previous 
Model 4, but it is improved to the dynamic version.  
 
FEOit =  ƛ1.FEOi,t-1 + ƛ1.FEOi,t-2 + b1BSIZEit-1+  b2BCOMit-1 +  b3DIRFORit-1 + 
b4DIRMULit-1  + b5DIRWOMit-1  + b6DIRPROFit-1 + b7DIRWESTit-1 + b8FCCit-1+  
b9MANTOWit-1 +  b10INSTOWit-1 + MODEL 1+ αi + λt + μit 
(Equation 7.6) 
 
There are two specification tests required following system GMM estimation 
(Arellano and Bond 1991) as previously mentioned in Section 5.7.7.1 The General 
Method of Moments (GMM). The first test is the Sargan test and the second test is the 
Arellano-Bond test. The null hypothesis for the Sargan test is that over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. The results in Table 7.9 Sargan Test show that the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. This indicates that the moment restrictions are valid for this 
analysis. 
 
Table 7.9: Sargan Test 
 
Note: H0: Over-identifying restrictions are valid 
 
The second test, the Arellano-Bond Test, is applied to test whether a second order 
autocorrelation is zero (0). Table 7.10: Arellano-Bond test shows that the null 
hypothesis is accepted. The null hypothesis for this test posits that there is no second 
autocorrelation in the residuals.  
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Table 7.10: Arellano-Bond Test 
 
Note: H0: No autocorrelation 
 
Based on the results of these two specification tests, this GMM estimation model is 
accepted. The results from the GMM estimation analysis are discussed in the 
following paragraph. However, it is important to note here that the standard errors 
might be biased since the robust estimator of Windmeijer was not operationalised for 
these analyses (Windmeijer 2005).  
 
The results displayed in Table 7.8 show the positive and significant association 
between DIRFOR (p-value<0.01) and DIRWOM (p-value<0.1) and FEO. However, 
the inverse and significant relationship is found for BCOM, DIRWEST and INSTOW 
at p-value<0.01.  The findings for DIRFOR (H3) and INSTOW (H10) are consistent 
with those shown in the GLS regression analysis.  However, a few variables which 
were previously significant in GLS estimation are found to be otherwise in GMM 
analysis, and they are DIRMUL, DIRPROF and FCC. Apart from this, BCOM (H2) is 
found to be significant, even though it was not significant in the GLS estimation. 
Interestingly, the direction also changes for DIRWEST (H7). The consistency and 
inconsistency of the results in GMM analysis and GLS analysis are discussed in 
Chapter 8. However, it is interesting to note that from all the types of tests conducted, 
DIRFOR reveals its strong predictive properties to explain FEO.  
 
7.5.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
To further attest the robustness of results from the main analysis, a number of checks 
were carried out to determine the sensitivity of the results. The models are re-
estimated by dropping and adding back each of the control variables to the models. 
All results replicate, which indicates that no serious flaw is attached to the models 
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pertaining to their control variables, thus corroborating the performed analyses. 
Therefore, the results are not presented here as there are no new results to be reported. 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the findings from a few analyses: GLS estimation 
regression, logistic regression and the GMM estimator. Five models were constructed 
and analysed. In this chapter, the discussion starts with correlation analyses and is 
followed by diagnostic tests for panel data. Next, multivariate analysis results from 
three types of regressions analyses - GLS estimation regression, logistic regression 
and GMM estimation analysis - are provided. However, GLS regression is the main 
analysis for this study. The other two analyses (logistic regression and the GMM 
estimator) can be considered as robustness tests to complement the main analysis. 
Altogether, there are 10 hypotheses (H1 – H10) being tested. They are structured in a 
few models, which can be determined from Table 7.6: Regression Results for GLS 
Estimation Models. A summary of these results under three types of analyses is shown 
in Table 7.11 below, which emphasises the prominent theory for each hypothesis. 
Only explanatory variables are shown in this table. 
Table 7.11: Summary of Results for All Analyses 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote that the correlations are statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10, respectively (2-tailed). ). “/”= Outcome as per expectation, “X”= Outcome is not as per 
expectation, IT=Institutional theory, AT=Agency theory, BSIZE=Board size, BCOM=Outside 
Director Compliance, DIRFOR=Foreign Director, DIRMUL=Multiple-directorship, 
DIRWOM=Woman director, DIRPROF=Director with professional qualification, 
DIRWEST=Western Education director, FCC=Family-controlled company, 
MANTOW=Management ownership, INSTOW=Institutional Ownership. 
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Overall, the results from all regression analyses are technically consistent with each 
other, however with slight differences. There are a plethora of reasons for the 
difference between what was predicted and what has been found. It is worth noting 
that foreign directorship (DIRFOR) persistently shows its significant value with a 
positive direction, regardless of any models or any regression analyses. This result is 
robust even after controlling for the time-fixed effect, firm-specific characteristics and 
endogeneity. A detailed discussion in regards to this table can be found in Chapter 8, 
Section 8.3 Summary of the Study. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 specified the research objectives – to examine whether the level of foreign 
equity ownership (FEO) is determined by a firm’s corporate governance structure. 
The background to corporate governance is presented in Chapter 2. Here, the 
discussion of corporate governance is linked to FEO as a basis for the subsequent 
chapters. The thesis proceeds to use a multi-theoretical approach (as discussed in 
Chapter 3) as a framework for the development of the hypotheses provided in Chapter 
4. Chapter 5 illustrates the process of data collection and the procedure for using the 
statistical method to test the hypotheses. Preliminary findings in the form of 
descriptive statistics are presented in Chapter 6 and the multivariate results are 
summarised in Chapter 7. In this chapter, the empirical results from the statistical tests 
are discussed and summarised in the light of the theoretical and practical implications, 
limitations and avenues for future research.  
 
This concluding chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 reviews the key findings. 
Section 8.3 provides a summary of the analyses performed, Section 8.4 considers the 
possible incremental knowledge contributed to the academic debate, the use of the 
theoretical approach that can enhance the understanding of foreign investors’ 
behaviour, the impact that it might have on policymakers, the new measurement that 
may benefit the methodological view and lastly, the actual corporate governance 
practice which can be used in firms to appease foreign investors. Section 8.5 discusses 
the limitations of the research, and at the same time, proposing an avenue for future 
research. Finally, Section 8.6 concludes the study. 
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8.2 Discussion of Key Findings 
More specifically, this study has focussed on answering the following research 
questions:  i) Do the characteristics of the board of directors influence the level of 
FEO? ii) Do directors’ attributes influence the level of FEO? and iii) Do ownership 
structures influence the level of FEO? These three questions (sub-research questions) 
may be taken as constituents of one big, one namely: Does corporate governance 
influence the level of FEO in Malaysian companies?  
 
In the following sub-sections, the above questions are discussed accordingly, in terms 
of existing knowledge, along with the results of this study, in an attempt to enhance 
our understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and foreign 
investment decisions. Starting from the next sub-section, the discussion will be based 
on the results from the main analysis. In other words, we refer to generalised least 
square (GLS) regression results in our discussion of findings and their implications 
(see Table 7.6: Regression Results for GLS Estimation Models).  
 
8.2.1 Board Characteristics Determinants for Foreign Investors’ 
Investment Decisions 
In this study, there are two corporate governance variables used as proxies to answer 
the first research question. The first variable is board size (BSIZE) and the second one 
is outside director compliance (BCOM). These independent variables, suggested by 
corporate governance mechanisms and the multi-theoretical approach, proved to be 
insignificant in predicting the probability of attracting foreign investment. The 
justifications for these findings will be discussed in the following sub-sections. 
 
8.2.1.1 Board Size 
The results for BSIZE were insignificant in both Model 2 and Model 4. The results 
appear to defy the findings of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) which provide evidence of a 
significant relationship between board size and company performance. Even though a 
significant association cannot be statistically proved, the result is consistent with the 
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earlier supposition, namely that there is a positive direction between board size and 
foreign equity level in Malaysia. Nevertheless, this finding leads to the conclusion that 
foreign investors do not have a  significant interest in board size when making their 
investment decisions. Even though the Code (2000) emphasises that board size should 
be carefully examined, it fails to provide the ideal number of directors who should sit 
on the board.  
 
In Malaysia, foreign investors disregard board size in making their investment 
decisions. It is argued that the size of the board does not have a significant bearing on 
a company’s monitoring or controlling, or on shareholder value.  Drawing on  the 
Anglo-American governance system, no ideal number for the board size has been 
dictated. Thus, foreign investors may place less weight on the size of the board to 
determine their investment, as they have in mind that this has no particular impact on 
the firms.  
 
By referring to a previous table in Chapter 6 (Table 6.2: Data Distribution for the 
Continuous Independent and Control Variables), the average number for the board 
size for Malaysian firms is 7.43, the median is 7 and the standard deviation is only 
1.71. Even the previous survey conducted by Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers in 1999 found that, on average, the board size in 
Malaysian companies consisted of 8 directors and the composition of each board was 
generally constituted of independent non-executive directors, equalling about one 
third of the board (Thillainathan 2001). These figures provide the essential 
explanation that in Malaysian firms, the size of the board of directors is almost 
uniform. Therefore, the issue of whether the size is large or small is not relevant to the 
debate.  
 
Drawing on resource dependence theory (RDT) and agency theory, the advocates of a 
larger board argue in terms of the diversity advantage, critical resources (Haniffa and 
Hudaib 2006), reducing the uncertainties in the corporate environment (Dalton et. al 
1999; Pfeffer 1987), and access to external linkages (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). On 
the other hand, those who disfavour the larger board make counter arguments such as 
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communication problems, poor decision making (John and Senbet 1998), and 
monitoring problems etc.  
 
In the context of this study, neither  agency nor  resource dependence theories explain 
the reason why foreign investors give no particular preference to board size when 
making investment decisions. Drawing on the institutional theory explanation, foreign 
investors are aware of the fact that ‘one-size-fits-all’ is misleading and the ideal 
number for the board size depends on the circumstances of the individual firm. 
Therefore, no robust cut-off for the board size is sought by foreign investors. 
Moreover, as claimed beforehand, there is no particular code in developed markets 
like the US, UK and New Zealand, marking any specific size for the board of 
directors.  Each individual company is free to decide the ideal number for its board 
size in accordance to the companies’ specific characteristics, provided that board 
effectiveness is not compromised.  
 
8.2.1.2 Outside Director Compliance-Independence of the Outside Director 
The earlier presupposition drawing on a multi-theoretical approach (MTA), and 
mainly from institutional theory, views the presence of outside directors on the board 
as one of the main determinants which attracts foreign investors. On the contrary, the 
result of this study refutes the idea that the proportion of outside directors could affect 
foreign investors’ investment decisions. In fact, it is also suggested that the 
composition of outside directors on the board does not influence foreign investors to 
make an investment in the company.  
 
This puzzling finding has to be explained carefully, especially in Malaysia’s capital 
markets. It is argued that the definition of ‘independent’ for directors in Malaysia can 
invite scepticism. Even though it is clear from the Code (2000: 25) that the term 
‘independent’ refers to two crucial aspects, i) independence from management and ii) 
independence from significant shareholders, unfortunately, the compliance with the 
Code (2000) is doubtful. The concern is - Are independent directors in Malaysia really 
‘independent’?  Abdullah and Nasir (2004: 23) assert that it is difficult to justify 
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whether independent directors in Malaysian PLCs are truly independent as 
“Malaysian companies are very closely held and mostly are family controlled”. There 
is evidence of the ineffectiveness of independent directors in discharging their duties 
in Malaysian companies, such as the study by Leng and Mansor (2005) in which it 
was found that independent directors in Malaysian PLCs have no influence on a 
company’s profitability. Nevertheless, the evidence from  empirical studies on the 
effectiveness of independent directors in Malaysian companies whilst carrying out 
their duties is limited, and not clearly deciphered (Abdullah and Nasir 2004). 
 
Despite many arguments that propose the benefits of a high proportion of outside 
directors on the board, derived from many perspectives (see Section 4.4.1.2 Outside 
Director Compliance), foreign investors find independent directors in Malaysia to be 
less relevant to their investment decision making. One of the explanations is that the 
‘independent’ status can be disputed. During the data collection process, while 
studying the directors’ backgrounds, it was discovered that amongst the current 
independent directors was a former employee, or people that used to be appointed as 
executive directors, or had held the position of independent director for too long,  
thus, the clause of ‘independence from management’ was not fulfilled. Many cases 
were found to be similar
40
, and it is believed that the same issue arises in family 
companies, where independent directors may have a blood relationship with the 
family members who control the firm. In this case, an argument from the principal-
principal concept is applied. The foreign investors' fears of  being manipulated by 
controlling shareholders could not be quelled  despite  the presence of outside 
directors on corporate board. A suggestion in relation to this issue can be found in 
8.4.4 Practical Contribution. 
 
                                                 
40 At this point in time, this presumption has no empirical support, as a 
statistical number cannot be provided. In future work, it might be beneficial to come 
up with the specific percentage of the sample to attest this claim.  
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The second argument is based on the descriptive data from Table 6.4: Frequency and 
percentage of categorical variables. It has been  shown that out of the total 
observations, 85.29% of them comply with the suggestion made in the Code (2000) to 
have at least a 1/3 proportion of outside directors on the board. The great compliance 
shown by companies may provide an overview to foreign investors that generally, 
Malaysian companies have no problem in abiding by this rule. Study by Shamsul 
Nahar (1999) provides evidence for this claim in finding that Malaysian PLCs are 
dominated in numbers by outside directors. Thus, foreign investors give no preference 
to the variable, as the adherence to the presence of independent directors’ on the board 
is followed equally by the majority of firms.  
 
Nonetheless, this study does not lessen the importance of the independent directors’ 
role in monitoring companies as it is seen  as one example of good governance 
practice  (Cho and Kim 2007; Payne et al. 2009). This has long been applied in the 
Anglo-American governance system, and the adoption of this practice is evidence of 
corporate governance reformation (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2009).  
 
8.2.2 Directors’ Attributes as Determinants for Foreign Investors 
Investment Decisions 
The discussion of this section is centred on answering the second research question.   
In this context, there are five corporate governance variables that are utilised to 
predict the foreign investors’ behaviour in making investment decisions. These are 
foreign directorships (DIRFOR), multiple-directorships (DIRMUL), women 
directorships (DIRWOM), professional directors (DIRPROF) and Western 
educational background for directors (DIRWEST). All variables were significant 
except for DIRWOM. Discussions of these significant results are given in the sub-
sections below.      
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8.2.2.1 Foreign Directorship 
As expected, the results support the hypothesis that foreign directorship is positively 
associated with foreign equity investment. The findings in this study are consistent 
with Kim et al. (2010). The fact that firms with foreign directorships (DIRFOR) are 
more likely to attract foreign investors, could possibly suggest that societal pressure 
plays an important role in the investment decision process. These societal pressures 
that coercively push firms to adopt shareholder value principles, in this case, the 
representation of foreign directors on the board, are certainly a cornerstone of Anglo-
American style corporate governance. The appointment of foreign directors to the 
board is perceived by foreign investors as a sign of improved governance, which then 
becomes the impetus for them to invest in the firm (Kim et al. 2010).  
 
In addition, the appointment of foreign directors to the board is also mutually agreed 
by agency theory as one of the efficient corporate governance mechanisms that can 
curb monitoring costs. Foreign investors may believe that the existence of foreign 
directors (generally from the developed capital market) on the board secures their 
interests in the firms as they share similar values and perspectives, which is to 
maximise shareholder wealth, and reduce agency conflict. Besides this, foreign 
directors may assist in improving the board’s advisory role through their first-hand 
experience from their home countries.  It could also be argued that from the 
perspective of RDT, foreign directors are a crucial asset to the company in bringing in 
prospective resources such as global experiences, foreign networks (Masulis et al. 
2012), managerial expertise (Kim et al. 2010), or technical skills that cannot be 
offered by the domestic directors. Access to these crucial resources is facilitated by 
the presence of foreign directors.  
 
Even though there is an argument that the benefit of having foreign directors on the 
board can be better explained by RDT, it is well documented that in institutional 
theory parlance, in order to obtain legitimacy, firms need to adhere to societal 
expectations, which results in facilitating access to resources (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). Another possible explanation pertains to mimetic isomorphism. This is one 
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case that leads to the diffusion of the appointment of foreign directors onto boards - 
through mimicking best practices. In summary, all the underlying theories seem 
consistent in explaining the outcome of the analyses.  However, in practical terms, 
institutional theory surpasses the other theories in its justification concerning the 
presence of foreign directors on the board in relation to the level of foreign equity 
ownership in the companies. 
 
In addition, based on the observations from the study sample, Malaysian firms with 
foreign directors on the board registered only 18% of the total observations. This 
figure is relatively small, but the presence of foreign directors on the board is highly 
sought after by foreign investors in Malaysia. This has been proven by the significant 
regression results shown, regardless of any models or statistical analyses used (see 
Table 7.11: Summary of Results for All Analyses). Indeed, this result is robust even 
after controlling for the time-fixed effects, firm-specific characteristics and 
endogeneity. 
 
8.2.2.2 Multiple-Directorships 
The literature on directors with multiple board seats shows two different directions. In 
brief, scholars who advocate directors with multiple-directorships put forward their 
arguments that directors with multiple-directorships are gaining precious executive 
experiences, learning more managerial styles (Carpenter and Westphal 2001), 
establishing corporate networks (Loderer and Peyer 2002), signalling positive 
recognition of their expertise, and building their reputation as a monitoring expert, etc.  
(Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). 
 
The results, however, provide evidence that, in Malaysia, foreign investors perceive 
directors with multiple directorships negatively, as their stretching schedules may 
impact their fiduciary duty, which can jeopardise the firm’s value. In matters of time 
and energy limitations (Fich and Shivdasani 2006), directors who sit on multiple 
boards may be unable to perform their duties effectively (Ferris et al. 2003), they are 
associated with absence from board meetings (Jiraporn et al. 2009; Masulis et al. 
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2012), and they have a limited capability to serve on internal board committees 
(Jiraporn et al. 2009). All in all, this ‘busyness’ problem may lead to corporate 
governance problems in the company (Fich and Shivdasani 2006), which indirectly 
affects the firm’s value (Jiraporn et al. 2009; Vafeas 1999).  
 
Therefore, consistent with the finding, from the lens of agency theory, outside 
directors’ ‘busyness’ may reduce the management monitoring activity and lessen their 
participation in small board committees, hence resulting in the incremental cost of 
agency problems. Consequently, this deteriorates the firm’s value (Core et al. 1999; 
Ferris et al. 2003). Moreover, the monitoring role in an emerging market like 
Malaysia is one of the supreme concerns of foreign investors, compared to the 
developed market, as the directors’ monitoring role may be superseded by the steady 
existence of efficient regulations to protect investors’ investments (Booth et al. 2002), 
for example the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, as previously discussed.  
 
In Malaysia, even though there is no maximum number of directorships prescribed in 
the Code, it is recommended that the appointment of a new director to the board must 
go through a screening and assessment process held by a nomination committee. One 
of the objectives of this assessment is to consider the level of commitment that they 
can offer to benefit the company. Nonetheless, aware of the potentially hazardous 
effect of over-committed directors, the government of Malaysia has used its superior 
power to pressurise PLCs in Malaysia to restrict the number of directorships at any 
one time for each director on their board, through the Listing Requirements of the 
Bursa Malaysia. The motive behind this restriction is to ensure that the directors can 
discharge their responsibilities efficiently.  
 
Drawing on the institutional theory perspective, in order to search for legitimacy and 
to be recognised by society, the PLCs in Malaysia have to follow the prescribed 
requirements. The pressure placed upon the PLCs by the government of Malaysia is 
an effort to maximise shareholder value in the form of coercive isomorphism, 
adopting the governance structures of the Anglo-American system (DiMaggio and 
Powel 1983). Foreign investors are argued to be selective in this context, in their 
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attempt to avoid investing in companies where the directors have too many outside 
commitments, as this can dilute their quality time in the company. Foreign investors 
are more confident in placing their investment in PLCs that abide by this rule, 
whereby the directors are expected to give a reasonable commitment to increasing 
shareholder value, simultaneously mitigating the agency problem. Hence, as indicated 
by the findings in this study, multiple-directorships imply a negative signal to foreign 
investors as equally perceived by investors in developed markets.  However, in this 
context, institutional theory plays a major role in explaining the relationship between 
multiple-directorship variables and the level of FEO in Malaysian companies.  
 
8.2.2.3 Female Directorships 
The earlier presupposition, drawing on a multi-theoretical approach, views the 
presence of women directorships on the board as one of the crucial factors that could 
attract foreign investors. However, the results depict a different picture and disprove 
the idea that the female director(s) could affect foreign investors’ investment 
decisions. Despite many empirical results which present a positive association 
between women directorships and firm value, which indirectly translates as good 
governance practice and is preferred by foreign investors in Malaysia, in the light of 
this study, no significant relationship is recognised.  
 
According to the Grant Thornton International Business Report (IBR), Malaysia has 
the highest number of women in the workforce compared with other Asian countries, 
yet has the lowest proportion of senior roles occupied by women, at only 26%.   The 
data also shows that Malaysia is ranked third globally to have women on the board of 
companies in the role of chairperson, chief executive officer, chief financial officer, 
executive and non-executive director. This corporate environment does not seem to be 
very promising for nurturing the involvement of women directors on Malaysian 
boards, or is still in its infancy phase. This is one of the explanations why the 
relationship between women directorship and foreign equity is found not to be 
significant, and is a negative relationship. 
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It is believed, at this stage that  the institutional environment in Malaysia cannot be 
compared with other developed economies, even though it is moving forwards to 
achieve that level. At this point, it may be seen that foreign investors’ decisions do not 
hinge upon the presence of women directors on the board as they are still sceptical 
about the roles played by women directors in Malaysia.  Thus, the presence of women 
directors on the Malaysian board makes no difference to foreign investors as they 
view them as only ‘tokenism’ (Wellalage and Locke 2013) (see 4.4.2.3 Female 
Directorships where the concept of tokenism is discussed). 
 
Relatively speaking, in developed countries, for example in the year 2005, Fortune 
500 boards documented that 15% of the total boards had three women directors or 
more and 36% of the boards had at least one woman on the board (Konrad et al. 
2008). These figures show a huge different with what is happening in Malaysia. The 
table below depicts the percentage for the scenario of PLCs in Malaysia. 
Table 8.1: Women Directorship on Malaysian Boards 
 
 
From 1836 observations, 26% of the companies have only one female director, 
12.15% do not exceed two female directors and 0.82% of the observations have more 
than two females on the board or exactly three. From the sample observation, no 
company is found to provide more than three women directorships. The majority of 
companies in Malaysia (more than 50%), have no female directors serving on their 
boards, while 39% of the companies have at least one female director, but only 13% 
have more than one. This slim percentage of female representation on the board, 
which has apparently occurred in Malaysia, can be regarded as evidence of ‘tokenism’ 
(Branson 2007). 
 
As argued in Chapter 4, the existence of gender diversity on the board can increase the 
level of board independence.  This can be achieved when people with different gender 
have different views about any issue arising in the company, which from the 
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perspective of agency theory will reduce the principal-agent monitoring cost. 
However, the effectiveness of monitoring also depends on the proportion of gender 
representation on the board. A small proportion may only provide a marginal effect 
and not be significant in influencing board decisions. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
suggest that, despite the insights derived from the theory pertaining to board diversity, 
it is not particularly useful for explaining board-specific phenomena.   
 
For example, the study by Konrad et al. (2008) implies that even though women 
directors can make a positive contribution, the ‘number’ is pivotal in order to make a 
difference. ‘Three’ women on the board is considered an ‘ideal’ number for women to 
speak more freely and to assure that their points are not taken lightly. The reality in 
Malaysia is quite different, however, with only 0.82% (see Table 8.1) out of the total 
observations following this implicit ‘rule’. Thus, making their presence felt is not 
significantly appreciated by the foreign investors in making investment decisions 
concerning Malaysian companies.  Indeed, from the view of the observed data, foreign 
investors consider female directorships on Malaysian boards as a negative influence 
on the board, as the appointments are not made purely based on the director’s 
expertise.  
 
The above claim is underpinned by the fact that most of the women on the board come 
from family-controlled companies. During the data collection process, from the 
general observation
41
, it is common to see the presence of women directors on family-
controlled company boards. After further investigation, most of them are found to 
have a family relationship with the other directors. From the total group of companies 
(n=722) with women on the board, 67% are family-controlled companies (n=485). 
Therefore, it is strongly believed that no stringent conditions have been imposed to 
make them appoint a minority (woman director) onto the board, in terms of the 
expertise or qualifications needed for corporate directorship. The motive is more 
                                                 
41Observations were made during the execution of the data collection process. 
However, no empirical records are made to prove this claim. Future study is 
sought to examine this issue.  
CHAPTER 8  275 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
about expanding the family business empire by controlling the board of directors.  
This is contrary to the suggestion made by Konrad et al. (2008), which is that the 
selection of women directors should be based on the required skills needed on the 
board for obtaining future benefits (Hillman et al. 2007), and they should not be 
brought in as a token. 
 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the argument made by Carter et al. (2003) that  
either significant negative or non-significant estimates of this relationship do not mean 
that women are poor in their directorship. In Malaysia, it may be plausible to assume 
that a firm using women as “tokenism” means that the culture of the firm is not 
conducive to their success as directors. Therefore, with this in mind, the explanation 
of the negative but insignificant relationship has been answered. The results are also 
consistent with the empirical studies by Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy (2009) and 
Shukeri et al. (2012), who  found that gender effects have no significant relationship 
with regard to Malaysian companies’ financial performance. Thus, it is concluded that 
in Malaysia, given the rational of country and corporate culture (Kang et al. 2010; 
Shukeri et al. 2012), foreign investors are not interested in considering women 
directorships in making their investment decisions in a company. In this context, 
institutional theory is argued to be the most applicable theory in explaining this 
situation.  
 
8.2.2.4 Financial Expertise of Directors 
The hypothesis drawn from the multi-theoretical approach was that directors with 
financial expertise are positively associated with the level of foreign investment in a 
firm. This implies that a higher proportion of professional directors with financial 
expertise on the board will attract more foreign investors to make investments.  This 
hypothesis is supported by the significant association revealed in the main statistical 
analysis. 
 
The ability of professional directors to read, comprehend, analyse and translate 
financial statements is likely to influence the investment decisions of foreign 
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investors. This underscores the fact that the wave of accounting scandals around the 
world is not taken lightly by foreign investors. Thus, directors with the right 
qualifications (Code 2007) are desired, consistent with the escalation of high-profile 
cases of accounting scandals (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). Foreign investors 
prefer directors with financial acumen to assist in the overseeing function, therefore, 
protecting shareholders’ interests (Burak Gurner et al. 2008).  It can be argued from 
the perspective of agency theory that the appointment of directors with financial 
expertise onto the board leads to a decrease in the monitoring cost. Besides, directors 
with a professional qualification are likely to cling to the same values, which are 
centred on maximising shareholder value, thus mitigating agency problems. 
 
As argued, directors with financial expertise are able to understand the financial 
information presented in companies’ reports (Burak Gurner et al. 2008). Thus, in turn, 
the reports produced by the company are more likely to be at a higher quality level 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008).  Invoking an RDT, amongst the benefits of having 
financial expertise on the board are: fewer earning statements (Agrawal and Chandha 
2005), positive stock reaction (Defond et al. 2005), and the skills and expertise 
possessed by these directors can assist management in making important decisions for 
the company, which can increase a firm’s value (Hillman et al. 2000). 
 
In Malaysia, where investor protection mechanisms are still in process, directors with 
accounting and financial acumen are highly sought after by foreign investors in order 
to protect their investment. Indeed, the use of standard accounting practice such as the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS), and the application of US GAAP is 
oriented based on shareholder value (Tuschke and Sanders 2003). IAS has been 
adapted in Malaysia, with the name Financial Reporting Standard (FRS), and PLCs in 
Malaysia must comply with the accounting standard in preparing their financial 
reports. In institutional theory terms, this can be viewed as coercive isomorphism.  
 
Recalling the previous discussion on directors with financial expertise in Chapter 4, 
invoking an institutional theory, in summary, there are three levels of the isomorphism 
process that have been adopted, which are in close proximity to the Anglo-American 
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mechanisms, and they are coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism (see Section 
4.4.2.4 (i) Directors with Financial Expertise).  Mimetic refers to the imitation of 
mechanisms, codes and practices from the Anglo-American markets. Coercive refers 
to the fact that these were later enforced on the PLCs (by the government of Malaysia) 
through the revised Code 2007. Normative refers to the idea that this led to the 
diffusion of values and practices by the professional directors (this stems from 
professionalism) across the firms which derived from the growth and elaboration of 
their professional network.  
 
Therefore, in this study, the financial expertise of directors is viewed as a strong 
determinant for foreign investors in deciding their investment allocation. The 
similarity, familiarity and the values held by professional directors are favoured by 
foreign investors. Foreign investors discern that the effort to mimic the best practices 
of corporate governance from Anglo-American capitalism is an attempt to obtain 
legitimacy in order to gain access to more resources for the company to survive and 
remain competitive. Thus, it can be concluded that institutional theory leads the other 
two theories in explaining the relationship between two variables.  
 
8.2.2.5 Directors with a Western Educational Background 
An extension to the above arguments, explaining the role of professional directors in 
attracting foreign investments, is relevant here, where firms with a higher proportion 
of directors with a Western educational background are more likely to draw the 
attention of foreign investors. The result supports the hypothesis whereby the 
relationship between directors’ Western educational background is positively and 
significantly associated with the level of foreign equity ownership.  
 
The values embedded by the directors on the board, received during their formal 
education in Western institutions, are highly favoured by foreign investors when 
making investment decisions. It is argued that foreign investors place a high reliance 
on directors to make company decisions in the best interests of shareholders. 
Directors’ educational background is claimed to assist management in strategy 
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evaluation (Ruigrok et al. 2006). Thus, with the same values and perspectives 
emanating from the same educational system, foreign investors infer that these 
directors will act towards maximising shareholder value.  
 
It is suggested that organisations are shaped by the normative pressures that pervade 
them (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987). In this 
scenario, the source of normative pressure is derived from the directors’ educational 
background, which may result in changes in the organisational structure occurring in 
an isomorphic way according to institutionally prescribed expectation (Slack and 
Hinings 1994). In the case of PLCs in Malaysia, foreign investors seem to express a 
strong preference for companies with a presence of directors with a Western 
educational background on the board. It is argued that these directors may preserve 
foreign investors’ interests in the company as they share similar values, which is to 
maximise shareholder wealth. 
 
Drawing on  the perspective of agency theory, foreign investors may view the 
existence of directors with a Western educational background on the board as a 
positive signal of improved governance. The exposure, values and educational 
background received by these directors share similarities between the directors and the 
foreign investors. Therefore, foreign investors feel they can depend upon the expected 
integrity that these directors uphold when making important company decisions or 
while performing their duties in the company, which results in decreasing monitoring 
costs. 
 
From the view of RDT, the existence of directors with a different educational 
background may promote heterogeneity, which is claimed to have a positive impact 
on a firm’s performance (Douma et al. 2006). They can advise on global experiences 
(Masulis et al. 2012), breaking the traditional board deadlock by provoking the board 
meeting with different thought paradigms to solve any issues raised in the company. 
These directors seem to advocate a new management practice, which is centred on the 
Anglo-American governance practice. Instead, consistent with the institutional theory 
perspective, this is referred to as normative isomorphism. Again, for this variable, 
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institutional theory has offered better justifications to explain the explicit outcome 
from the hypothesised relationship.  
 
8.2.3 Ownership Structures as Determinants for Foreign Investors’ 
Investment Decisions 
The following discussion is aimed at answering the third research question.  In this 
regard, three ownership variables were tested to understand their relationships with 
the foreign equity level in a company. These variables are family-controlled 
companies (FCC), managerial ownership (MANTOW) and institutional ownership 
(INSTOW). Of these three variables, two – FCC and INSTOW were found to be 
significant. These significant results will be discussed in detail in the next sub-
sections.  
 
8.2.3.1 Family-Controlled Company (FCC) 
One of the tenets of shareholder value is diffuse ownership. There are many studies 
which demonstrate the significance of diffuse ownership in achieving the ultimate 
objective of shareholder value maximisation (LaPorta et al. 2000). Kim et al. (2010) 
find that foreign investors outweigh firms with low ownership concentration, 
indicating that they disfavoured family companies during the unstable and volatile 
period. The results documented in this study seem to reinforce the claim, which is also 
consistent with the findings by Tsamenyi et al. (2007).  
 
Even though many studies offer evidence that family companies are better in terms of 
performance (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Daily and Dollinger 1992; Margaritis and 
Psillaki 2010; Maury 2006: Villalonga and Amit 2006), this notion seems true with 
certain limitations. In particular provinces, the differences in institutional environment 
hinder the generalisation from being applied uniformly. As asserted by Peng and Jiang 
(2010), the impact of family control on a firm’s value hinges upon the level of 
investor protection enshrined in the legal and regulatory institutions of a particular 
country. For a country like Malaysia, the controlling power and higher concentration 
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of large shareholders, especially by family members, are prevalent, whereas the 
investor protection is weak (Peng and Jeng 2010). The structure of ownership 
elements in this country shows resistance to institutional pressures – inconsistent with 
the development of the modern corporations of the US and the UK which started with 
concentrated family ownership (Chandler 1990) but then, over time their ownership 
became dispersed (Berle and Means 1932). These resisting elements, either stay static, 
do not change rapidly, or do not change as much as the others (Slack and Hinings 
1994). Therefore, foreign investors perceive a family business through a different lens 
when making investments in two different countries.  
 
It is argued that the main explanation for this is the existence of the country’s 
institutional regulations concerning investor protection (La Porta et al. 2008; Peng and 
Jiang 2010; Young et al. 2008). Consequently, prospective minority shareholders such 
as foreign investors may be less passionate about making investments, as they are 
sceptical of the ineffective investor protection and the expropriation by controlling 
shareholders. These situations encourage concentrated ownership, for example family 
ownership becomes more visible and prevalent in these countries (La Porta et al. 
2000; Young et al. 2008).  
 
Likewise, by invoking a branch of agency theory, based on principal-principal conflict 
it is asserted that the greater the control of family companies, the greater the 
opportunities to expropriate minority interests, which results in reducing a firm’s 
value. Even though there are two sides to agency theory to be grasped, based on the 
results, it is likely to associate FCC with high agency cost organisations, even though 
RDT advocates otherwise.  
 
Hence, based on the theoretical arguments, from the institutional theory perspective, 
foreign investors, when making investments in countries with weak institutional and 
governance regulation, such as Malaysia, discern FCC in a negative manner. In 
addition, agency theory  associates FCC with high agency cost, but resource 
dependence theory is weak in explaining the negative relationship between foreign 
investors and FCC. Thus, for this variable, agency theory plays a  prominent role in 
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explaining the reaction of foreign investors towards the family-controlled companies 
when making decisions on investment in the Malaysian equity market.   
 
8.2.3.2 Managerial Ownership 
The earlier conjecture tried to suggest that there is a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership (MANTOW) and foreign equity ownership (FEO). However, 
the results reveal that managerial ownership does not influence foreign investors’ in 
their investment decision process. The study failed to demonstrate any relationship 
between managerial ownership and foreign equity ownership, regardless of any of the 
models utilised or any of the analyses conducted.  
 
The fact that the firms with high managerial ownership appear to prevent foreign 
shareholders from making their investment was refuted by the recent finding. The 
managerial ownership factor has been given no preference by foreign investors when 
investment decisions have to be made. It is argued that the results are highly 
connected to the institutional settings and corporate governance system in the 
particular countries. Therefore,  the impact of managerial ownership in the developed 
markets cannot simply be generalised to other counterparts. In Malaysia, where the 
common type of ownership is concentrated ownership, owner-managers are prevalent 
among PLCs (Liew 2007; Mat Nor and Sulong 2007), especially in family companies 
(Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Thus, the top management are usually selected from their 
family members (Peng 2006).  
 
Therefore, it can be postulated that foreign investors are not sensitive to managerial 
ownership in Malaysia as it may be argued that foreign investors will scrutinise the 
factors that emanate from the form of managerial ownership, rather than the 
managerial ownership itself, (e.g. family-controlled companies) when making their 
investment decisions. The factors that influence the form of managerial ownership 
will dictate whether the firms will benefit from or be harmed by the possession of 
ownership by the managers. Thus, the practicality of relying on managerial ownership 
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to decide on investment seems to be less relevant (see the arguments from the 
perspective of theoretical approach discussed in Chapter 4).  
 
This finding can be explained by the uniqueness of corporate ownership in Malaysia 
as depicted in Chapters 2 and 4. From the data observed, out of the total observations 
(N=1836), 67% (1237) of them are firms with the total managerial ownership (direct 
or indirect) of 20% or above. Interestingly, out of 1237 firms with substantial 
managerial ownership (above or equal to 20%), 80% (985) of them are family-
controlled companies. This figure (985) represents 92% of total FCC.  The figures 
demonstrate that the ownership in Malaysia is concentrated and it is asserted that the 
ownership structure in Malaysia is resistant to institutional pressures. Hence,  it 
remains in its initial structure or if changes happen they are at a slower pace (Slack 
and Hinings 1994).  
 
Therefore, foreign investors heed the warnings from the series of financial turmoil, 
accounting scandals and the weakness in corporate governance systems, to examine 
the basic form of company ownership, which later may exercise its influence on the 
managerial ownership of the firm.  The arguments made from agency theory:  
principal-principal conflicts, offer sturdy justifications as to where foreign investors 
should place extra precaution when making investment decision in capital market with  
concentrated ownership like Malaysia as the possibilities for being manipulated by 
controlling shareholders are higher. The controlling shareholders can exercise their 
control by the appointment of their proxies in the companies or precisely choose their 
selected manager(s) to run the company. Thus, the managerial ownership should be 
scrutinised beyond the ownership itself, to consider  the real structure of company’s 
ownership. In the continuation, institutional theory provides a sensible explanation 
that foreign investors give priority to understanding the company’s basic ownership 
form, whether dispersed or concentrated (etc. family-ownership), as the institutional 
background in Malaysia is not strong enough to protect shareholder interests. In 
addition, managerial ownership can easily be manipulated by controlling shareholders.  
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An important point here is that despite the voluminous literature, which yields mixed 
results on managerial ownership, this study provides an interesting argument from the 
multi-theoretical perspective. Corporate governance in Malaysia, which is claimed to 
be moving towards Anglo-American methods, is found to be left far short of 
convergence to the system when comparing their ownership structure. Obviously, 
there are difficulties in transferring Anglo-American institutions to certain countries 
that are resistant to the changes as they have different cultures, traditions and 
practices. Therefore, foreign investors place less emphasis on managerial ownership 
in their investment decision making in Malaysia, and place extra precaution on the 
determinants that may influence managerial ownership, rather than the managerial 
ownership itself. Thus, the arguments made from the perspective of the multi-
theoretical approach, especially agency theory, are relevant to explain the outcome 
explicit for the hypothesis of managerial ownership with the level of FEO.  
 
8.2.3.3 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional shareholding was found to be significant and negatively related to FEO in 
both models, as shown in Table 7.6: Regression Results for GLS Estimation Models. 
This indicates that foreign investors act differently to institutional investors. This 
opposes the argument made by Dahlquist and Robertson (2003) that institutional and 
foreign shareholders can be depicted in similar ways, which is evidenced by Smith 
(1996) and Strickland (1996), to provide a positive impact on a firm’s value. The 
result, however, is in agreement with the finding by Kim et al. (2010) which 
documents the opposite reactions of the two groups toward similar variables, for 
instance ‘foreign directors’ and ‘foreign listing’ are two variables that are favoured by 
foreign investors but negative signs are shown by institutional investors. The study 
also mirrors the findings by Karpoff (1996), Wahal (1996), and Faccio and Lasfer 
(2000), who questioned the monitoring ability of institutional investors. On the other 
hand, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) found a significant and positive relationship 
between FEO and institutional investors in the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. However, 
it can be explained that these companies are found to be strong in corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
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Nevertheless, the result of this study can be explained by the arguments proposed by 
Suto (2003). He suggests that the major proportion of institutional shareholders in 
Malaysia consists of Malay shareholders. Malay shareholders are claimed to be 
passive shareholders, since most of the time they just follow what is stated in the 
government’s policy. Instead, the government is actually the real player that charts the 
direction for institutional shareholders in Malaysia. Therefore, it is argued that as long 
as the Malay people are given preferential treatment in government policy pertaining 
to the equity in leading institutions in this country, more silent shareholders are 
produced. Therefore, the free-rider problem is not resolved and can become more 
severe. Further, Malay shareholders are claimed as not being capable of disciplining 
the management in the firm in which they invest (Suto 2003). Thus, the agency 
problem is not mitigated.  
 
However these claims are disputed by Mahathir Mohamad
42
 (2013), the prominent 
leader and the former prime minister of Malaysia. In his argument, the make-up of the 
Malaysian government, whereby the majority of the officers and employers are 
dominated by Malays, has proven that they can rule the country efficiently. Malaysia 
has thrived in many respects and its economy has flourish rapidly, if compared with 
the countries that achieved their independence within close proximity. In fact, the 
currency crisis that hit Asian countries in 1997/1998 was able to be managed 
efficiently by the Malay-dominated administration. Therefore, the people in Malaysia, 
regardless of their race, equally enjoy the country’s prosperity (read more in 
http://chedet.cc/?p=1103). 
 
Nevertheless, in the context of Malaysia with its different institutional background, 
foreign investors take more precautions. In the developed capital market, institutional 
                                                 
42 Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad is an active Malaysian politician. He was the 
fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia. He held the post from 1981 to 2003, equal to 22 
years in administration; making him Malaysia’s longest serving Prime Minister. His 
political career spanned almost half a century and, indeed, he is a very influential 
political figure in Malaysia and is respected worldwide. 
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investors have the capacity to ensure that their voices are heard (Seki 2005), and that 
they play an active role. Indeed, they can use the mechanisms of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’. 
However, as previously claimed, in Malaysia, shareholder activism is still in its 
infancy phase and promoting shareholder value is an undertaking in progress. 
Therefore, foreign investors do not substantially rely on institutional ownership to 
gauge the effectiveness of the corporate governance system practiced in a company. 
Based on the previous arguments, theoretical justifications (mainly institutional 
theory) and the documented results, institutional ownership is even discerned by 
foreign investors to be a negative determinant when deciding whether to invest in a 
firm. Therefore, it should be avoided.  
 
8.3 Summary of the Analyses 
Restated: Table 7.11: Summary of Results for All Analyses 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote that the correlations are statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10, respectively (2-tailed). ). “/”= Outcome as per expectation, “X”= Outcome is not as per 
expectation, IT=Institutional theory, AT=Agency theory, BSIZE=Board size, BCOM=Outside 
Director Compliance, DIRFOR=Foreign Director, DIRMUL=Multiple-directorship, 
DIRWOM=Woman director, DIRPROF=Director with professional qualification, 
DIRWEST=Western Education director, FCC=Family-controlled company, 
MANTOW=Management ownership, INSTOW=Institutional Ownership. 
 
Table 7.11 is restated. This section is put forward to reiterate the results of three 
different analyses (GLS regression, logit regression and GMM) in order to elucidate 
the differences that come into view with more caution. In summary, the results from 
the three analyses are technically consistent with each other, albeit with slight 
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differences. First, it is remarkably interesting to find the potent relationship between 
foreign directorship (DIRFOR) and the level of foreign equity ownership in the firm. 
The results from the three analyses for DIRFOR are persistently significant in a 
positive direction, regardless of any models or any types of regression analyses. The 
result is robust even after controlling for time-fixed effects, firm specific 
characteristics and endogeneity.  
 
From the Table 7.11, too,   the explanatory variables have been classified in terms of 
the most applicable theory to   successfully explain, or which is close to perfect in 
explaining the hypothesised relationships. To shed some light on this, institutional 
theory seems to dominate the discussion of outcome analyses and surmount the other 
two theories in giving realistic justifications as to the emerging  correlation between 
the two variables. However, agency theory that was applied beyond the principal-
agent relationship in this study, or more specifically the principal-principal conflict, 
also played an important role in offering a profound understanding of a particular 
issue in the Asian corporate environment, especially the Malaysian capital market (for 
example; concentrated ownership, minority shareholder expropriation, controlling 
shareholders, etc.). Nevertheless, despite not being the main theory, the importance of 
RDT’s role cannot be disputed as it helps to strengthen the justifications given to 
explain the outcome of the analyses.  
 
The results of the main analysis, GLS regression, are presented and discussed in detail 
throughout the chapter. Thus, in this section, the results of the additional analyses 
(logit regressions and GMM) are featured to find possible explanations that might be 
important to be deciphered. For Logit regression, (see Table 7.7: Regression Results 
for Logit Estimation Models) the positive and significant relationship between high 
FEO firms and BSIZE, DIRFOR and BCOM were documented, while a negative 
relationship was found between high FEO firms and DIRWEST and FCC. This result 
implies that when the equity acquired by foreign investors is at 20% or higher, the 
corporate governance variables that have predictive properties are board size, the 
number of foreign directors on the board, outside director compliance, directors with a 
Western educational background and family-controlled companies. Given the number 
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of corporate governance variables associated with this dummy variable, it 
corroborates the generalisation derived from the main analysis, GLS regression that 
corporate governance attributes do influence foreign investors’ decision making with 
regard to Malaysian companies.   
 
However, there are some changes in the determinants of foreign investment in terms 
of significant values and direction, whereby the variables that were previously 
insignificant (BSIZE and BCOM) were found significant. On the other hand, the 
variables that were previously significant (DIRMUL, DIRPROF and INSTOW) were 
found to be insignificant. Besides, there is a variable that previously showed a positive 
direction (DIRWEST) which conversely showed a different direction (negative). The 
other two variables (DIRFOR and FCC) remain in a similar pattern with the GLS 
regression results. These changes can be simply explained as resulting from the 
changes in the foreign equity proportion, which leads to the power to exert a 
significant influence on the company’s direction.  
 
Therefore, as the proportion of a firm’s foreign equity increases, corresponding to the 
foreign investors’ influence in the firm, the board size and the board composition 
become important. Previously, these variables were not favoured in making 
investment decisions in Malaysian firms (the discussion was provided in Section 
8.2.1.1 Board Size and 8.2.1.2 Outside Director Compliance). However,  with the 
accumulated equity possessed and the escalation of power, the preference has now 
diverged. The change in foreign investors’ preference is argued to emerge from the 
increase of power to influence management and to dictate the company’s direction. 
The significant influence gained by foreign investors enables them to at least 
intervene in deciding the size of the board (BSIZE) and to select the outside directors 
(BCOM). 
 
It is important to note here that the results from the second additional analysis, logistic 
regression was run to understand the differences between two groups of companies, 
those  with high and low FEO – thus, it cannot  be used to replace the main results 
from GLS regression as they measure different things. As previously explained, 
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logistic regression was applied to provide an additional explanation, but not to 
transcend the main GLS regression results which were principally applied to answer 
research objectives of this study. The results from logistic regression are considered as 
a complement to better understand foreign equity ownership in Malaysian companies. 
 
Next, the results from the GMM estimation model further reinforced foreign 
directorship (DIRFOR) as the powerful explanatory variable to attract foreign 
investors when making investments in Malaysian PLCs. Likewise, institutional 
ownership (INSTOW) reiterated a similar result as well. However, apart from these 
two variables, the GMM estimation model showed a lack of consistency with the GLS 
regression results, and this can be explained from four angles.  
 
First, based on the justifications and empirical results, GLS regression analysis was 
chosen as the main econometric technique that is suitable to analyse the data 
efficiently. Thus, an additional test is run to strengthen the results further, and any 
deviation from the main results may not impair the result (see Section 7.4 Panel Data 
Related Tests and its subsections and Section 7.5 Multivariate Analysis). Second, the 
use of the GMM estimation model was aimed at dealing with the potential 
endogeneity issue in the model. However,  this issue has been well defined (see 
Section 5.7.7.2 Endogeneity) by following a few of the researchers’ practices such as 
Jiraporn et al. (2009), Cheng (2008),  Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Peng and Jiang 
(2010). Next, even though Blundell and Bond (1998) claim the superiority of the 
GMM estimator over other estimators, there is a validity issue with the results when 
the number of observations is small (Soto 2007).  
 
Finally, in this study, GMM used only ‘lag of time’ as an instrument which considered 
as the basic instrument. More appropriate instruments are needed to yield more 
competent results, in order to infer the population. However, it will take a significant 
amount of time to identify the instrument, and collecting the data consequently 
prolongs the entire research process. Nevertheless, in future study, the appropriate 
instrument(s) will be identified and scrutinised to construct a more efficient model, 
and yield more reliable results. Therefore, the results produced by the current GMM 
CHAPTER 8  289 
 
 
 
 
Zaimah Abdullah  2015 
estimation model are used to support the results derived from the main analysis, GLS 
regression, but not to transcend the main results.   
 
8.4 Research Contribution 
This section discusses the contributions of this study to the body of knowledge – in 
terms of its theoretical and methodological implications – for regulators and 
policymakers. An analysis is made based on the relevance of the study to the literature 
and theoretical development in the corporate governance purview, alongside the 
methodological standpoint. Its implications are also put forward in terms of the future 
practical actions to be taken by the related parties in setting up a new policy, 
designing new rules and strengthening the existing regulations in terms of corporate 
governance practices for Malaysian companies in order to attract foreign investors. 
Overall, the contribution of the study is discussed in terms of its literature, theoretical, 
methodological and practical contributions. 
 
8.4.1 Literature Contribution 
Overall, this study contributes to the extant literature in four notable ways. First, this 
study applies  and extends our understanding of corporate governance mechanisms in 
the context of foreign investment in Malaysian firms. This is important, given the 
nature of corporate ownership peculiar to Malaysia, while taking into account the 
institutional framework and the historical background of the Malaysian corporate 
governance structure in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. 
Although there is a growing literature on corporate governance issues on Malaysia, 
however, there is an absence of research examining the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and FEO. Indeed, previous research has focused on the 
effects of corporate governance on firm performance, without consideration for other 
dependent variables (Ponnu 2008). The findings of empirical studies carried out in the 
US, the UK, Sweden, Japan, Korea, and other countries regarding corporate 
governance and FEO were found to be slightly mixed. Thus, by conducting this study, 
it contributes to the extant literature and provides more evidence on the corporate 
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governance system in relation to foreign investment based in the Malaysian setting, 
with a great possibility of applying the findings to other Asian countries that have 
culture and institutions closer to Malaysia. 
 
Correspondingly, the setting of this study is focused on the institutional background 
which is designated in Malaysia, at the peak of corporate governance reform in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis 1997-1998. Drawing upon institutional theory 
as the main insight, the analyses of governance variables in Malaysian firms are 
viewed from the reworking of corporate governance due to the harsh changes in the 
macro institutional environment (Chizema and Kim 2010) – or specifically the Asian 
currency crisis 1997/1998. This study reinforces and extends the extant literature on 
the relationship of corporate governance and foreign ownership in Malaysia by 
considering its macro environment, social, socio-cultural, beliefs, values, judicial 
systems, etc.  These elements are embedded in every organisation and should be 
heavily reviewed (Peng 2002). Therefore, the behaviour of foreign investors in 
making investment decisions in particular countries, such as Malaysia, can be 
comprehended.  
 
Furthermore, the use of PLCs in Malaysia as a sample may provide useful information 
in making comparative studies with corporate governance and FEO in other countries, 
either from the same region, or a different continent. To date, there is a lack of studies 
concerning corporate governance and FEO in Malaysia, as well as in many emerging 
economies. The findings of this study may shed some light on investors’ investment 
behaviour in relation to corporate governance in Malaysia. In particular, the factors 
that are key to foreign investors’ preferences should first be analysed profoundly 
before further assumptions in terms of its resemblance or dissimilarity across 
countries are proposed.  
 
Finally, this study leads to the contemporaneous debate pertinent to the reformation of 
Malaysian corporate governance in line with the Anglo-American system. There are 
disconcerting views regarding the convergence, either the reformation process is 
persistently applied, staggered, or there is a resistance element in the institutional 
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environment of Malaysia that hinders the convergence process. To my knowledge, 
this kind of study has yet to be done in a Malaysian institutional setting. Thus, 
discussion on this issue is very limited and indeterminate. Nevertheless, this study has 
not provided evidence as to whether convergence is taking place or otherwise. 
However, efforts have been made to demonstrate any possible influences which might 
impact the adoption of particular governance innovations – one of the signals that 
represent the undertaking of the convergence process towards the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system.   
 
Nonetheless, this observation contributes to identifying and measuring the 
contribution of different institutional variables to a particular governance innovation. 
 
8.4.2 Theoretical Contribution 
In terms of theoretical contribution, this study regards institutional theory as one of 
the main theories to provide explanations concerning foreign investors’ behaviour 
toward corporate governance practices when making investments in Malaysian firms. 
It is contended that the prevalent theories applied in corporate governance studies, 
such as agency theory and resource dependence theory, have argued for the positive 
and negative sides of certain variables to be connected with foreign ownership. 
However, this study took a step forward when, at the same time, it explored the 
Malaysian institutional context in order to provide arguments for the hypothesised 
relationships. Thus, this study advances an understanding of institutional theory by 
applying the lens in an environment distinguished by unique corporate ownership 
structure following a period marked by changes in the external environment as a result 
of the Asian financial crisis 1997/1998.  The institutional-based views may assist in 
explaining several of the findings that seem to contradict each other. Drawing on  the 
institutional theory perspective, the differences emerged due to the divergence of the 
institutional frameworks in each country, not due to the corporate governance 
variables that are ‘favourable’ or ‘unfavourable’ to foreign investors, as these foreign 
investors do not perceive these variables uniformly across countries. They hinge upon 
the institutional background in the respective countries (Peng 2002). 
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Secondly, this study underscores the salience of the institutional context to the study 
of corporate governance reformation. Peng (2002) asserts that no firms are immune  to 
the institutional framework of the environment in which they operate, thus, the issue 
of institutions is important. More specifically, it contends the institutional force and 
dynamic changes of corporate governance that have been experienced by the 
Malaysian business environment in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis 
1997/1998. There are sturdy signs that in Malaysia, corporate governance is gradually 
converging towards the Anglo-American model (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). This 
converging process has been undertaken in order to strengthen the system (Ho and 
Wong 2001) and regain investors’ confidence to ensure the inflow of fund to the 
country. Thus, the universal application of agency theory in this kind of corporate 
governance study is questioned for its applicability (Aguilera and Jackson 2003).  
 
Next, this study puts forward some arguments as to  the insufficiency of theoretical 
arguments to support the hypothesised relationship based on only a unitary 
perspective. Agency theory and resource dependence theory are the common theories 
applied in corporate governance studies. However, the insights from these two 
theories are of little value to the firms in emerging economies with different 
institutional backgrounds (Fama and Jensen 1983), in contrast with developed 
economies.  Therefore, institutional theory is affixed to better explain the institutional 
changes of corporate governance in Malaysia, especially after the Asian financial 
crisis 1997/1998. In referring to the Table 7.11, it may be seen that the theory which 
works best for this study is institutional theory. Institutional theory seems to dominate 
the discussion of outcome analyses and surmount the other two theories in giving 
realistic justifications for the outcome of hypotheses tested. 
 
However, Table 7.11 also indicates the importance of agency theory as a theoretical 
lens in explaining the outcome of analyses conducted. In this regard, it is argued that 
this study offers an additional perspective of agency theory which rarely applied in the 
extant literature for Asian capital market, especially Malaysia. There are some 
exceptions, such as the study of China’s capital market by Peng (2002), Peng (2004), 
Peng and Jiang (2010), etc., where the arguments were made beyond the basic 
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principal-agent conflict, to place greater emphasis on  principal-principal’s goal 
incongruence (revisit Section 3.3.3 Principal-Principal Conflicts for details). Thus far, 
the studies that examine the capital market in Malaysia merely focus on applying the 
basic model of agency theory in explaining the variables by ignoring the 
characteristics of Malaysian firm that generally associated with concentrated 
ownership, controlling shareholders, family-companies and minority shareholders 
expropriation. Therefore, this study provides an additional perspective for 
understanding the relationship between the examined variables in the Malaysian 
capital market which are considered to coincide and be relevant to the Malaysian 
setting.  
 
Finally, this study may be seen to coincide with the current trend for corporate 
governance study that embraces a multi-theoretical approach to assist in explaining 
the predicted relationship. Recently, the use of a multi-theoretical approach has 
received heightened interest in terms of the  issue of corporate governance (e.g. 
Douma et al. 2006; Lynall et al. 2003; Ruigrok et al. 2006). To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no study that uses this approach for the study of corporate 
governance in Malaysia. The combination of three theories assists in articulating the 
influences of variables through a more holistic perspective, which affects the 
investment decisions made by foreign investors in emerging markets. In essence, the 
effects of each variable are further accentuated by the incremental value infused from 
the multi-theoretical approach.  
 
8.4.3 Methodological Contribution 
Empirically, cross-sectional data has been used extensively in corporate governance 
studies to find the answer to predicted relationships. This research aims to look at the 
same problem but seeks a better and more robust data analysis to give a finer-grained 
view of the final results. For this reason, the study obtained data from the same firms 
over multiple years (the term longitudinal study is often used). In this case, the data 
was collected from the year 2000 to 2011, 12 years in a row. The panel data is 
particularly useful in answering questions about the dynamics of change and in 
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predicting long-term or cumulative effects that are normally difficult to analyse in a 
case study or cross-sectional study. Therefore, it is argued that this study provides 
more reliable results. Moreover, by using panel data, many analyses can be utilised 
(for example, fixed-effects estimation and random-effects estimation – see Section 
5.7.6 Panel data model). The use of panel data can benefit the final results by 
increasing their reliability. 
 
In terms of measurement, this study has given meticulous effort to ensure that the 
definitions of each of the variables included in this study reflect the Malaysian picture, 
with the rules and regulations applied. However, previous literature was constantly 
reviewed to ensure the reliability of the defined measurement. Therefore, concomitant 
with the credibility postulated during the data collection process, the final results of 
this study are argued to represent Malaysia’s corporate governance in its entirety.  
 
In addition, besides the main analysis, which is GLS regression (see Section 7.5.1 
GLS Estimation Regression Models), a few other analyses were performed to verify 
the results and to add robustness to the main findings. The second analysis, Logit 
regression (see Section 7.5.2 Logit Estimation Regression Models) was performed by 
transforming the main dependent variable to a binary variable, and the third analysis - 
GMM (see Section 7.5.3 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Estimator) - was 
then run by adding a lag of the dependent variable into the model to transform it into a 
dynamic model and also to tackle the endogeneity issue in the model. The additional 
analyses designed in this study are appropriate to add credibility to the results and 
they also act as a robustness check for the main analysis. It is argued that the 
combination of several analyses provides an edge to this study as it will help to 
establish the findings, could contribute to enrich the field of study, and leads to results 
that are hard to be disputed and repudiated. 
 
Finally, from the methodological standpoint, the inclusion of a few new variables (e.g. 
the presence of foreign directors on the board, Western educational directors, female 
directorship), which were claimed to be variables that obviously represent the 
convergence elements in line with Anglo-American corporate governance, may 
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trigger a new platform for discussion in the corporate governance purview in 
Malaysia.  The previous board of directors’ literature of corporate governance in 
Malaysia revolves around board independence, board size, audit committee, etc. Thus, 
this study offers a new paradigm which allows corporate governance issues to be 
highlighted.  
 
8.4.4 Practical Contribution 
Apart from its theoretical contribution, the findings of this study may also be 
significant to many stakeholders, such as policymakers, regulators, companies, and 
also investors, in a number of ways. At the company level, this study helps companies 
to identify the corporate governance variables that foreign investors favour. Thus, it 
should be possible for company managers to initiate appropriate actions to attract 
more foreign investors to invest in their firms.  
 
In referring to the outcome of analyses presented in Table 7.11,  the lessons learned 
from this study are, inter alia:  i) the appointment of directors to the board should be 
made based on their qualifications and skills, not merely to safeguard the interests of 
the family; ii) directors with financial expertise should be sought as an important 
mechanism to protect the interests of investors, as their financial acumen may help 
them to understand the risks and the company’s financial stability; iii) foreign 
investors favour directors with a Western educational background, professional 
directors and foreign directors on corporate board, as these directors are claimed to 
share the same norms, principles and values. Thus, the decisions made by these 
directors are consistent with the aim to maximise the wealth of shareholders, and iv) 
directors with too many board seats on other firms are perceived negatively by foreign 
directors as their ‘busyness’ may harm the firm’s value by making them lose their 
quality time in undertaking their fiduciary duties. Therefore, companies may benefit 
from the recent insights discovered in this study. The necessary actions should then be 
taken if the companies are interested in pulling more investments from foreign 
investors.  
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The findings from this study may have a wider impact on the regulator bodies in 
Malaysia, such as the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG), the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG), the Securities Commission (SC), 
and other interested parties, in setting up a new policy, designing new rules and 
strengthening the existent regulations in terms of corporate governance for Malaysian 
companies in order to attract more foreign investors  (See Section 2.4.3 Corporate 
Governance Regulatory Bodies in Malaysia, for the roles played by each institution). 
The understanding of how to increase the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices at the firm level is not commensurate with the absence of an effective 
institutional monitoring system at the country level. Beyond the firm level, 
policymakers should strive to recuperate the poor image of the corporate governance 
institution embedded in the foreign investors’ perception of emerging markets. The 
low confidence level of investors towards Malaysian capital market can be seen from 
Table 7.11, in which  the negative relationships are documented for family-controlled 
companies (FCC) and institutional ownership with the level of foreign equity 
ownership in the companies.  
 
In order to regain investor confidence, the weak institutions of corporate governance 
should be eliminated. MSWG for example, should think of better ways to ensure that 
minority shareholders’ interests can be protected from the expropriation of controlling 
shareholders and ensure this group of investors unruffled when making investments in 
Malaysian firms. The current operational systems of MSWG do not square well with 
the objective to protect the interests of minority shareholders, when in fact they are 
still sceptical about making investments in this country.  
 
The Government of Malaysia may also benefit from this study in deciding the 
appropriate governance mechanisms for adoption in this country, as portfolio 
investment from foreigners plays a significant part in economic growth. Policy 
options can be considered at the national level to encourage more foreign investors to 
make investments in Malaysia. A lengthy discussion was advanced in Chapter 2 
concerning the state of Malaysia’s business economy before the Asian financial crisis 
1997/1998. Briefly, Malaysia was a fast growing country, however, the potential 
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growth rate of the Malaysian economy moved to a lower plateau in the aftermath of 
the financial turmoil. The significant fall in foreign portfolio equity (see Table 2.2: 
Five East Asian Economies: External Financing, 1994 – 98 (billion dollars) had 
terrible consequences for the Malaysian economy.  
 
Therefore, this study enlightens the government concerning the behaviour of foreign 
investors, and how this group of investors discerns the corporate governance issue 
when making investment decisions. Since this study focuses on corporate governance, 
there are many elements of the system that can be scrutinised in order to make 
improvements to attract more foreign investors. The main concern is on the 
institutional background, whereby the claim that the Malaysian corporate governance 
system has undertaken major convergence towards the Anglo-American model is not 
entirely true. There are certain parts of the corporate governance elements that show 
resistance to the changes, for example, the form of corporate ownership.  
 
The prevalent ownership forms in the Malaysian corporate environment are family 
ownership and domestic institutional ownership. The results show that foreign 
investors perceive family ownership and institutional ownership as negative signs for 
the corporate governance attributes (see Table 7.11 Summary of Results for All 
Analyses). Therefore, realising the pessimistic influence emerging from these kinds of 
ownership, the Malaysian government should come up with staggered solutions to 
overcome these negative reactions of foreign investors. A special code of corporate 
governance may have pertinence to be applied to family-controlled companies in 
order to signal to foreign investors that their concerns are being heard. Besides, this 
study also provides wider implications for governance reform.  In essence, the results 
in this study should be utilised to comprehend foreign investors’ perceptions. 
Therefore, a possible solution could be proposed by the responsible parties. 
Afterwards, the following discussion is referring to the results presented in Table 7.11 
as well.  
 
First, in this study, it is found that foreign directorship (DIRFOR) has a significant 
influence in attracting foreign investors to invest in a firm. Therefore, the presence of 
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foreign directors on the board should be considered as an integral part of the Code of 
Corporate Governance.  This will encourage more firms to adopt this practice. A 
second example is women directorship (DIRWOM) – even though, worldwide, the 
trend of appointing female directors is escalating due to the intense pressure of many 
parties, in Malaysia, foreign investors give no preference to this practice. The reason 
behind this should be carefully investigated and action should be taken by responsible 
institution(s) to rectify the image of female directors in Malaysian PLCs, hence 
foreign investors may give some weight to female directors in their investment 
decision process. If the presence of female directors is appreciated by foreign 
investors, this mechanism can be a crucial factor in attracting  foreign investors when 
making their investment, as in the other counterparts of the world, foreign investors 
place so much emphasis on the presence of female directors on the board.  Therefore, 
each of the corporate governance variables examined in this study should be 
scrutinised, plausible answers should be offered, and realistic actions should be taken 
to attract more foreign investors to invest in Malaysian companies. 
 
On the other hand, managerial ownership (MANTOW) is disregarded by foreign 
investors as a determinant for investing in a firm. This is argued to stem from the 
institutional background and prevalent ownership structure in Malaysia. Managerial 
ownership is influenced by the controlling power in the firms. Thus, foreign investors 
pay no attention to managers’ equity but to the controlling power of the firms, as this 
power will steer the firm’s direction. The commitment and value creation of 
managers’ ownership may be counted only after the shareholder-value orientation is 
translated clearly. Hence, again the institutional background and ownership pattern in 
Malaysia should be given more attention by higher authority powers, e.g. SC, MICG, 
etc., either to sculpt the appropriate guideline in the form of Codes or to promote a 
healthy equity distribution within the company. In this regard, institutional theory has 
played a major role in explaining the institutional setting in Malaysian corporate 
governance, as can be seen by the categorisation made for the most theory applied in 
explaining the relationships between corporate governance variables and FEO (see 
Table 7.11).  
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In addition, the definition of independent or more generally outside directors (BCOM) 
should be clearly explained and effectively applied to increase the confidence level of 
foreign investors. In this study, the findings show that foreign investors place no 
preference on this variable in making their investment decisions. It is argued that the 
‘independence’ term applied to directors can be questioned. Therefore, there is no 
point for foreign investors in emphasising this factor as an important determinant to 
make investment decisions.  One of the suggestions which can be offered is to 
establish an independent body to monitor the appointment of independent directors to 
the board of directors. This body should be free from any influence and should be 
established at the higher level, not at the company level. Should the company require 
any independent director(s), the selection of the director(s) should be authorised by 
this body. This would ensure that the director(s) appointed are ‘really independent’ 
and this may persuade foreign investors to rely on independent directors as guardians 
of their interests.    
 
In fact, for the remainder of the corporate governance variables in this study, the 
appropriate parties, such as the government of Malaysia, MICG, SC, MSWG etc., 
should take collaborating action to further enhance the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance mechanisms in Malaysian firms. Concern should be given to the adoption 
of the national corporate governance codes from the developed markets. The 
compliance with the prescribed codes should be carefully defined either to be 
mandatory or voluntary, based on a spirit of “comply or explain”. 
 
Finally, this study strives to assist local investors by providing them with a better 
picture of how foreign investors make their investment decisions. It is asserted by 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) that the degree of sophistication matters when 
studying foreign investors in the Finnish market. They contend that domestic 
investors, presumably less sophisticated, take the opposite position to that of the more 
sophisticated foreign investors. In this case, it is expected that the domestic investors 
can learn something from this study, such as how to react to and analyse corporate 
governance and firms’ characteristics to make wise, profitable, and secure 
investments.  
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8.5 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Notwithstanding the relevance of this study and its timeliness, there are limitations 
encountered during the process that are worthy of discussion. These suggest a number 
of avenues to be considered for further research as given below.  
 
Firstly, there is the issue of a ‘single source’ used to collect foreign equity ownership 
data. There are a few explanations for using this “one source” for data. In Malaysia, as 
a developing country, in order to be compared with developed countries like the UK 
and US, it is hard to find  available data. An exception can be given to data that need 
to be  publicly disclosed. However, a company’s foreign equity ownership is a part of 
a company’s private data, and no disclosure needs to be made. To the best of my 
knowledge, after extensive searching, the data of foreign equity ownership for each 
Malaysian public listed companies from the year 2000 to the year 2012 (12 
consecutive years) could only be obtained from Bursa Malaysia.  
 
However, there are several other sources as well such as the Thompson One Banker, 
Readers Digest Magazine and company annual reports. However, each of these 
sources has its own limitation.  The limitations are explained as follow: 
(i)  Thompson One Banker database – this database only provides current year data 
for foreign equity ownership.  However, the  data was required for 12 
consecutive years, so this was too far away from  expectations. 
(ii)  Investors Digest Magazine – this magazine provides data only for a few years 
and there are large gaps in the latest data over  recent years. 
(iii)  Company’s annual report - there is a section which presents equity ownership 
for the highest 30 shareholders. The data of foreign ownership may be obtained 
from this section. However, there is a limitation, insofar as  the disclosure is 
only made for the highest 30 shareholders. The remaining foreign ownership 
may be overlooked, and they may hold  a smaller number of shares, meaning 
that they are  not included in the disclosure list, but the accumulation of shares 
held by foreign shareholders may be higher, and significant. 
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“One source” of data that can only provide this extensive foreign ownership data is 
Bursa Malaysia.  Bursa Malaysia is the only legal party who can access this data from 
the disclosure made by the shareholders in their Central Depository System (CDS) 
accounts. Bursa Malaysia is the Malaysian Stock Exchange, and approved under 
Section 15 of the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007. The data provided by this 
entity is reliable, widely recognised and used extensively by many scholars to 
examine Malaysian capital market such as Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Amran and 
Ahmad (2010), etc. The data relating to  foreign ownership provided by the Investors 
Digest magazine are also sourced from Bursa Malaysia. Therefore, it is argued that 
there is no issue of data reliability in regards to the  “one source” used for foreign 
ownership data. However, for the purposes of future studies, extensive effort will be 
made  to discover the potential reliable source to enhance the level of data reliability.  
 
Secondly, the study does not make a distinction in regards to the source of foreign 
investment. It would be more interesting if the countries of origin of the foreign 
investors can be traced, as the behaviour of investors could differ by country. 
However, this is a practical limitation, as advice was sought from the Bursa Malaysia 
in order to access this information – from their feedback it was understood that this 
information is not made available to the public and is not provided to Bursa Malaysia 
as well. All PLCs are requested to provide the proportion of foreign ownership out of 
the total ownership, but not the investors’ countries of origin. However, the countries 
of origin of the investors may be  accessed from The Thompson One Banker database, 
but this is only available for the current year. Given this limitation, an alternative 
means of gaining access to the countries of origin of the foreign investors could be 
determined for future research. There is a possibility that the results would differ if the 
foreign investors’ countries of origin are identified. Their background may influence 
their investment pattern. However, given that the largest group of foreign investors in 
Malaysia is from the US, the discussion is generalised based on this fact.  
 
A third limitation is that this study does not make the important distinction between 
the two prominent categories of foreign equity holders, namely foreign financial 
institutions and foreign industrial corporations. Therefore, a coarse-grained picture of 
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‘foreign investors’ may have been presented. Even though both refer to foreign 
shareholders in local firms, these two classes of investors differ in their motivations 
and preferences. The study by Douma et al. (2006) shows the necessity of 
disentangling foreign ownership into foreign corporate shareholding and foreign 
institutional shareholding, since they are vastly different in their governance and 
investment objectives. Thus, it is suggested, for future study that  these categories of 
foreign investors be analysed separately, to obtain a better picture of investors’ 
behaviour. In terms of investment choices, foreign corporations are prone to invest in 
local companies which are related to their core business. Their experiences and skills 
will be utilised to achieve the maximum results from their investment, considering 
that they are enabled to set a particular benchmark for it (ibid., p. 642). For instance, 
Honda, one of the foreign transportation corporations, is potentially making an 
investment in a transport company rather than in a food related company. Apart from 
this interesting finding, unfortunately, in this current study, it is difficult to obtain this 
data, as explained previously in Section 5.6.1 Dependent Variable (FEO).  
 
Fourthly, another limitation of the study concerns the generalisability of the results to 
smaller companies. The sample is drawn from the public listed companies in 
Malaysia. Although, the sample was observed for a 12 year consecutive period, they 
represent only large Malaysian companies.  However, it is well postulated that public 
companies are chosen for a variety of reasons over non-listed companies, or smaller 
companies (see Section 5.4.1 Population). The difficulties associated with obtaining 
the relevant information from small firms and the uniformity issue means that small 
firms can automatically be considered peripheral. In addition, foreign investors 
generally invest in well established firms, as they are in an adverse position in terms 
of obtaining company information in relation to local investors (see Section 2.5.4 
Information Asymmetries). Nevertheless, in order to comprehend the whole picture of 
foreign investors’ behaviour in the Malaysian market in relation to the companies’ 
corporate governance practices, it would seem interesting if an extension of the 
research considered data from small and medium firms. In essence, there are no 
apparent reasons why the results would differ for smaller companies. However, 
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further study on the segregation of large and small companies may give substance to 
this claim. 
 
Fifth, even though the use of the methodology and the data collection mechanism 
selected in this study were argued  to be the most suitable and efficient choices to 
understand foreign investors’ behaviour concerning changes in corporate governance, 
more could be done to achieve triangulation. For example, if the right ‘key person’ 
can be identified (see Section 5.3.1 Secondary Data), in a future study, the interview 
method of data collection could be used to complement the data collected from the 
annual reports and database.  
 
Additionally, it is acknowledged that this study used foreign investors as the key 
dependent variable. However, corporate governance mechanisms (independent 
variables) can also be utilised to understand the behaviour of other groups of 
investors, not just foreign investors. The study conducted by Kim et al. (2010) 
concerning the Korean stock market, for example subsumed the category of investors 
into four groups – foreign investors, institutional investors, retail investors and 
government investors. The similarities and the differences between the groups of 
investors are identified. Therefore, the investment pattern of foreign investors can be 
distinguished in relation to the groups of domestic investors. Different strategies can 
be used by the responsible parties to attract different investor groups. In the future, an 
extension of this study may aim to discriminate the groups of investors to arrive at 
firmer conclusions regarding foreign investors’ behaviour towards corporate 
governance practice in firms.  
 
Another limitation concerns the period of the study. This study applies a longitudinal 
approach, which spans 12 consecutive years from 2000 to 2011. The study was to 
examine the effect of the pinnacle of the Asian financial crisis 1997/1998 on the 
corporate governance system in Malaysia. Therefore, the period covered only the 
years after the financial turmoil. It might be more meaningful to discriminate  between 
the periods; however, data availability is unfortunately very limited (see Section 
5.4.2.1 Sample Period). In the future, there is a possibility that the data can be 
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manipulated and the effect of corporate governance on foreign investors’ behaviour 
can be examined comprehensively. The specified period, for example before, during 
and after the Asian financial crisis 1997/1998, if possible, can be separated and the 
comparison between each period of foreign investors’ behaviour towards corporate 
governance practice can be made, similar to the work carried out by Kim et al. (2010) 
in the setting of the Korean stock market.  
 
Next, another limitation of this study is the cause-and-effect relationship between 
foreign investors’ behaviour and corporate governance practice. Even though in this 
study there is empirical evidence that certain relationships are significant, in the real 
and complex world of business such relationships cannot simply be explained by 
corporate governance variables. Care should be taken in making decisions as there are 
other potential determinants that could influence foreign investors’ decision making, 
for example the political stability of the countries. Certainly, special vigilance should 
be taken by any related parties when making decisions based on the results put 
forward in this study. Future studies could use more variables in order to improve the 
quality of the study.  
 
Besides this, a single country study does not offer much contribution in terms of 
generalisation to other countries in relation to the institutional environment pressure, 
corporate governance changes and foreign investors’ behaviour. Even though the 
characteristics of the countries - Asian countries for example - are touted to be similar, 
nevertheless, empirical evidence is required to prove the claim. Therefore, by 
employing the same variables and the same multi-theoretical lenses, future work could 
consider a multi-country approach. This kind of research is capable of providing a 
better understanding of institutional changes across countries by controlling the 
country specific variables - such as the culture’s values, the political background and 
the economic environment.  
 
From the methodological standpoint, there are two matters that should be given great 
emphasis in a future study. The key dependent variable, foreign equity ownership, 
should reflect the firm’s market capitalisation. A 1% ownership in a large firm is not 
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equivalent to a 1% ownership in small firms. The same percentage value carries a 
different value of dollar investment. The second methodological limitation is the 
absence of interactional terms in the analyses. It is argued that interactional terms can 
be included in the analyses by defining a specific variable that can influence certain 
variables in the model. Therefore, in a future study, appropriate actions can be taken 
to ameliorate both of these methodological limitations.  
 
Finally, the focus on the institutional contexts of Malaysia may be flawed by the 
specific attention given to the legal and regulatory institutions. In a wider context, it is 
important to note that institutions are not restricted to the legal and regulatory 
institutions, since ‘formal and informal aspects’ - such as companies’ policies, 
cultural and societal norms (Aguilera and Jackson 2003) - are also included. 
Therefore, in future work,   it will be useful to explore other parts of the institutional 
aspects to enrich the findings.  
 
8.6 Conclusion of the Study 
The main aim of this study is to enhance the understanding of the foreign equity 
ownership in Malaysian firms and its association with corporate governance 
mechanisms, in a unique institutional background, i.e. Malaysia. In summary, it can 
be concluded that foreign investors allocate disproportionately more shares to firms 
that appoint more foreign directors, more directors with a Western educational 
background, and more professional directors, but disfavour firms with high multiple 
directorships on the board. In addition, the role of ownership structure is decisive 
upon foreign investors’ behaviour, since it is found that foreign investors avoid 
investing in family-controlled companies and companies with high domestic 
institutional ownership.  
 
The findings and the discussion offered (see Section 8.2.1 Board Characteristics 
Determinants for Foreign Investors’ Investment Decisions) lead to the suggestion that 
the first research question – i) Does the board of director’s characteristics influence 
the level of FEO? –is likely to have an indeterminate answer where hypotheses 1 and 
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2 (H1 and H2) being rejected. The second research question - ii) Do directors’ 
attributes influence the level of FEO? – however, seems to have a positive answer 
with the  majority of the hypotheses (4 out of the 5 hypotheses - H3, H4, H6 and H7) 
being empirically supported (see Section 8.2.2 Directors’ Attributes Determinants for 
Foreign Investors’ Investment Decisions for a discussion of the findings).   Lastly the 
third research question – iii) Do ownership structures influence the level of FEO? – is 
also positively answered with two out of three hypotheses (H8 and H10) being 
empirically supported.  These three questions lead to answering the main research 
question which is - Does corporate governance influence the level of FEO in 
Malaysian companies? Therefore, from the overall results of this study, it can be 
concluded that there is evidence that corporate governance attributes do influence 
foreign investors’ decision making in Malaysian companies. However, with five of the 
ten hypotheses being supported at a high level of significance, and one with  moderate 
significance, the conclusion that corporate governance practices in Malaysian 
companies affect the level of foreign investors’ ownership cannot be strongly 
justified. Thus, the related parties that might use this study for any practical reason(s) 
should take reasonable precautions. 
 
Nevertheless, this study had certain limitations (see Section 8.5 Limitations and 
Future Research Directions). These limitations are to be further refined and can 
provide a platform for future research advancement. Notwithstanding its limitations, 
this study has made significant contributions in terms of its theoretical, practical, and 
empirical implications (see Section 8.4 Research Contribution). An additional 
perspective is also offered for comprehending the relationship of corporate 
governance and FEO level in Malaysia, by exploring the corporate governance 
institutional background through an institutional theory lens, the corporate ownership 
structure in Malaysia through agency theory with principal-principal based conflicts,  
as well as using insights from resource dependence theory.  In summary, the findings 
of this study improve our understanding of the association between firms’ corporate 
governance mechanisms and foreign equity ownership. 
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The selected sections of annual report from where the data was collected are attached 
in the appendixes.  
 
Sources: A & M Realty annual report 
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